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And All That Jazz: Trademark Used for One Service Doesn’t Permit Tacking for Others

by Kyle Sorenson, PhD | Apr 13, 2023 | Trademarks

Reversing the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board’s decision to dismiss an opposition, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed the requirements for a trademark owner to employ “tacking” based on the use of a mark for one service in the context of a trademark application listing multiple services. Bertini v. Apple Inc., Case No. 21-2301 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 4, 2023) (Moore, C.J.; Taranto, Chen, JJ.)

Charles Bertini is a professional jazz musician who filed a notice of opposition to Apple’s application to register the mark APPLE MUSIC. Because the parties did not dispute that there was a likelihood of confusion between the two marks, the only disputed issue was which party’s mark was entitled to an earlier priority date. Bertini’s mark, APPLE JAZZ, had a priority date of June 13, 1985, for use in live music festivals and concerts. Apple’s mark, APPLE MUSIC, which was the subject of the opposition, had a priority date of June 8, 2015. In its application, Apple sought to register its mark for 15 broad service categories, including the production and distribution of sound recordings and the arranging, organizing, conducting and presenting of live musical performances.

Because Bertini’s mark had the earlier priority date, Apple attempted to use tacking to claim an earlier priority date to an APPLE mark used by Apple Corps. for gramophone records featuring music since August 1968. Apple purchased this mark from the Beatles’ Apple Corps. in 2007. Tacking allows a trademark owner to give a newly modified mark the priority date of its old mark, but only if both marks “create the same, continuing commercial impression so that consumers consider both as the same mark.” The Board found that Apple was entitled to tack back to use the 1968 date of use of the APPLE MUSIC mark and thus had priority over Bertini. The Board accordingly dismissed Bertini’s opposition. Bertini appealed.

The Federal Circuit first addressed the tacking standard in the context of trademark registration. The Court explained that in order to obtain an earlier priority date through tacking, an applicant must show that the old mark was associated with all of the goods and/or services listed in its application as of the proposed earlier priority date. The Court found that Apple failed to meet this burden. As of 1968, the APPLE mark was not associated with the service of “arranging, organizing, conducting, and presenting live musical performances.” Because this service was listed in Apple’s trademark application, the APPLE MUSIC mark application was not entitled to claim priority back to the priority date of the Apple Corps. APPLE mark. The Court noted that Bertini only needed to show priority of use of APPLE JAZZ for any service listed in Apple’s application to succeed in his opposition. Because the Court rejected Apple’s attempt to tack back to the 1968 priority date for all of Apple’s listed services where Apple could only show priority for one service listed in its application, Bertini met this burden. The Court also concluded [...]

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PTO to Host Listening Session on Role of AI in Innovation

by Amol Parikh | Apr 13, 2023 | Patents

As previously reported, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) published a Request for Comments Regarding Artificial Intelligence and Inventorship, seeking input from stakeholders on inventorship issues that may arise as artificial intelligence (AI) and emerging technologies play a greater role in the innovation process. In the wake of the request, the PTO published a Notice announcing that it is hosting a listening session to address the “current state of AI technologies and inventorship issues,” including whether AI should qualify as an inventor and whether the PTO should expand its current guidance.

The listening session will be held at the PTO’s headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia, on April 25, 2023, from 10:30 am to 2:45 pm EDT. Anyone seeking to speak at the listening session must register by 5:00 pm EDT on April 20, 2023. Anyone seeking to attend, either virtually or in person, but not speak at the event must register by April 24, 2023.

Registration information is available here.

Nitpicking Allowed When Determining Statutory Damages

by Sarah Bro | Apr 13, 2023 | Copyrights

On the second round of a copyright dispute, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded (again) to the district court to apply the “independent economic value test” handed down by the Court in the first iteration of the dispute to determine what constitutes as “one work” for purposes of calculating statutory damages where a jury finds infringement on multiple works registered in a single copyright application. Amy Lee Sullivan, dba Design King v. Flora Inc., Case No. 15-cv-298 (7th Cir. Mar. 31, 2023) (Flaum, Scudder, Eve, JJ.)

In 2013, graphic design artist Amy Sullivan sued herbal supplemental company Flora for copyright infringement after Flora used Sullivan’s illustrations in a manner exceeding the scope of the parties’ license agreement. The district court instructed the jury that Sullivan could receive separate statutory awards for 33 acts of infringement on 33 individual illustrations, which were the subject of two separate US copyright registrations, as compilations. The jury issued a statutory damages award of $3.6 million. Flora appealed.

In its decision on the first appeal, the Seventh Circuit adopted the independent economic value test to address the standard for determining whether multiple related works of authorship are each entitled to a separate statutory damages award, or if the related works constitute one compilation warranting only a single statutory damages award. Because the record in Sullivan’s case was insufficient to make that determination and assess proper damages, the Seventh Circuit remanded to the district court to determine whether Sullivan’s illustrations had standalone “distinct and discernable value to the copyright holder.”

On remand, the district court found that Flora waived several arguments challenging the independent economic value of certain of Sullivan’s illustrations, and therefore entered the same jury verdict. Flora appealed again.

After a lengthy analysis on the scope of remand, the Seventh Circuit found that the district court violated its mandate on remand because it did not put the independent economic value assessment to a jury, and instead decided the factual issue on the same record the appeals court had previously found insufficient. The Court then moved to its summary judgment analysis and reiterated the independent economic value test for considering whether Sullivan’s 33 illustrations constituted 33 individual works or instead were parts of two compilations. The Court articulated several relevant factors that went into its totality of the circumstances analysis, including whether the copyright holder marketed or distributed the works independently or as a compendium, whether the works were produced together or separately, how the works were registered for copyright protection and, ultimately, whether the market assigned value to the works.

The Seventh Circuit concluded that Flora raised facts and arguments relating to the independent economic value test that were within the scope of remand and not waived. Flora was not prohibited from arguing several primary positions. First, Flora noted that it provided Sullivan with only two invoices for both “illustration collections,” and Sullivan registered the illustrations in two compilation copyrights, [...]

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Console Yourself: Patent Owner Bears IPR Estoppel Burden

by James M. Oehler | Apr 13, 2023 | Patents

Addressing for the first time the standard and burden of proof for the “reasonably could have raised” requirement for inter partes review (IPR) estoppel to apply, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that a patent owner bears the burden of proving that an IPR petitioner is estopped from using invalidity grounds that a skilled searcher conducting a diligent search reasonably could have been expected to discover. Ironburg Inventions Ltd. v. Valve Corp., Case Nos. 21-2296; -2297; 22-1070 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 3, 2023) (Lourie, Stark, JJ.) (Clevenger, J., dissenting).

Ironburg sued Valve for infringing Ironburg’s video game controller patent. Valve responded by filing an IPR petition in 2016. The Patent Trial & Appeal Board partially instituted on three grounds but declined to institute on two other grounds (the Non-Instituted Grounds), as was permitted prior to the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu. Valve did not seek remand pursuant to SAS, which would have allowed the Board to consider the Non-Instituted Grounds. In the district court litigation, Valve alleged invalidity based on the Non-Instituted Grounds and grounds Valve learned of from a third party’s IPR filed after Valve filed its IPR (the Non-Petitioned Grounds). Ironburg filed a motion asserting that Valve was estopped, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2), from asserting both the Non-Instituted Grounds and the Non-Petitioned Grounds. The district court granted Ironburg’s motion in full, removing all of Valve’s invalidity defenses. After trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that Valve willfully infringed the patent. Valve appealed.

35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) precludes an IPR petitioner from asserting invalidity during a district court proceeding based on “any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that [IPR].” The Federal Circuit first addressed the legal standard needed to meet the “reasonably could have raised” requirement for IPR estoppel. The Court found that the “skilled searcher” standard used by several district courts is appropriate, as opposed to a higher “scorched earth” search standard. The “skilled searcher” standard is consistent with the § 315(e)(2) statutory requirement of discovering prior art references that “reasonably could have been raised.”

The Federal Circuit next addressed which party has the burden to prove what prior art references a skilled searcher reasonably would, or would not, have been expected to discover. The district court placed the burden on Valve, the party challenging the patent’s validity, and determined that Valve did not show how difficult it was to find the Non-Petitioned Grounds that Valve did not initially uncover. The Court noted that the third party that did find the Non-Petitioned Grounds may have used a “scorched earth” search, which would make its discovery of the Non-Petitioned Grounds irrelevant to estoppel. The Court concluded that the patent owner has the burden of proving what a skilled searcher reasonably would have found because the patent holder is looking to benefit from estoppel. The Court explained that this conclusion is consistent with the practice of placing the burden on the party asserting [...]

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Preliminary Injunction, Meet Irreparable Harm

by Alexander Piala, PhD | Apr 13, 2023 | Trade Secrets

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a case where an ex-employer sought preliminary injunctive relief based on an alleged breach of non-disclosure and non-compete agreements and alleged misappropriation of confidential business information, ruled that the Texas presumption of irreparable harm for breach of non-compete clauses does not always apply and that a finding of irreparable harm requires particularized findings regarding the alleged harm. Direct Biologics L.L.C. v. McQueen, Case No. 22-50442 (5th Cir. April 3, 2023) (Davis, Dennis, JJ., Higginson, C.J.).

Adam McQueen previously was executive vice president of Direct Biologics (DB). As a member of DB’s management, McQueen had access to DB’s confidential trade secret information regarding the production and production specifications of DB’s novel medical technologies. To protect that information, McQueen signed both non-compete and non-disclosure agreements with DB, preventing him from providing “services . . . similar to that which [he] provided to [DB],” and from disclosing or using DB’s confidential information.

McQueen resigned from his position and joined Vivex, DB’s direct competitor. Almost immediately DB sued McQueen and Vivex, alleging breach of the non-compete, breach of the non-disclosure agreement and trade secret misappropriation. Shortly thereafter, DB moved for a preliminary injunction to compel McQueen to comply with the non-compete covenant and prevent him from using DB’s confidential and trade secret information. Vivex countered by arguing that McQueen’s new role as vice president of product strategy was a “non-competitive role,” and that McQueen was sequestered from all products that would compete with DB. The district court denied the preliminary injunction motion, agreeing with Vivex that DB failed to provide any evidence that DB had been harmed. DB appealed.

DB argued that the district court erred in two ways—first, by failing to apply Texas’s presumption of irreparable harm based on McQueen’s breach of a non-compete agreement, and second, by failing to correctly apply the irreparable harm analysis by looking only at past actions.

The Fifth Circuit began by reviewing Texas’s presumption of irreparable harm. Under Texas law, the breach of a non-compete agreement can result in a presumption of irreparable harm. But, as the Court explained, the presumption does not always apply. Texas courts can decline to apply the presumption when there is no independent proof of harm. Here, not only did DB fail to produce any evidence that McQueen disclosed or used DB’s confidential information, but there also was evidence showing that he had not. Based on this record, the Court held that it was not an abuse of discretion to decline to apply the presumption.

The Fifth Circuit then analyzed the district court’s irreparable harm analysis. The Court explained that the irreparable harm analysis requires that the trial court make particularized findings regarding whether the harm was likely to occur over the pendency of the litigation, and if so, whether the harm would be difficult to quantify monetarily. While the district court here made findings directed to whether McQueen had caused harm, it did not make any findings regarding what might happen during the litigation. The [...]

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It’s All in the Grammar: “A” Still Means “One or More,” but Single Component Must Perform All Claimed Functions

by Amol Parikh | Apr 13, 2023 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a jury’s noninfringement verdict, finding that the district court correctly interpreted the article “a” and antecedent “said” in the asserted claims to require that a single microprocessor be capable of performing every one of the recited microprocessor functions. Salazar v. AT&T Mobility LLC et al., Case No. 21-2320; -2376 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 5, 2023) (Stoll, Schall, Stark, JJ.)

Joe Salazar owns a patent directed to technology for wireless and wired communication, including command, control and sensing systems for two-way communications. In 2016, Salazar sued HTC, alleging that HTC infringed the patent by selling certain phones that allegedly embodied the asserted claims. A jury returned a verdict finding that HTC did not infringe. In 2019, Salazar sued AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile and Verizon (collectively, the Telecom Providers) asserting the same patent against the same HTC products. HTC intervened, arguing that the accused products did not infringe. The district court severed HTC and stayed that portion of the case.

At claim construction, the parties disputed limitations that required “a microprocessor for generating, . . . said microprocessor creating . . . , a plurality of parameter sets retrieved by said microprocessor . . . , [and] said microprocessor generating.” The essence of the dispute was “whether the claims require one microprocessor that is capable of performing the recited ‘generating,’ ‘creating,’ ‘retrieving,’ and ‘generating’ functions.” The district court answered the question in the affirmative and construed the term to mean “one or more microprocessors, at least one of which is configured to perform the generating, creating, retrieving, and generating functions.” The district court further reasoned that “at least one microprocessor must satisfy all the functional (and relational) limitations recited for ‘said microprocessor.’” At trial, the jury found that the accused products did not infringe and that the patent was not invalid. Salazar appealed, and the Telecom Providers cross-appealed.

Salazar argued that the district court erred in construing “a” microprocessor and “said” microprocessor and that the court should have interpreted the claim terms to require one or more microprocessors, any one of which may be capable of performing the “generating,” “creating” and “retrieving” functions recited in the claims. Put another way, in Salazar’s view, the correct claim construction would encompass one microprocessor capable of performing one claimed function and another microprocessor capable of performing a different claimed function, even if no single microprocessor could perform all of the recited functions.

The Federal Circuit rejected Salazar’s argument. Generally, the indefinite article “a” means “one or more” in open-ended claims containing the transitional phrase “comprising.” An exception to the general rule arises where the language of the claims themselves, the specification or the prosecution history necessitates a departure from the rule. The Court found that while the claim term “a microprocessor” does not require that there be only one microprocessor, the subsequent limitations referring to “said microprocessor” require that at least one microprocessor be capable of performing each of the claimed functions. The Court further explained that [...]

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“Goods in Trade” in the Age of the Internet

by Lillian Spetrino | Apr 6, 2023 | Trademarks

The Trademark Trial & Appeal Board recently redefined what it takes in the age of the internet to meet the “goods in trade” requirement for registrability by holding that the Lens.com three-factor test is the universal legal standard for that inquiry. In re The New York Times Company, Serial Nos. 90106071, 90112154, 90112577, 90115155, 90115491, 90115337 (TTAB Mar. 30, 2023) (Lykos, J.) (precedential).

The New York Times applied to trademark six column names: “The New Old Age,” “A Good Appetite,” “Hungry City,” “Work Friend,” “Off the Shelf” and “Like a Boss.” The Examining Attorney issued a final refusal, explaining that the specimens did not demonstrate that the marks were used on separate goods in trade. The Times appealed. The question before the Board was whether the printed columns were independent “goods in trade.”

The Board reversed the refusal and held that The Times could register the marks. While past decisions had found that non-syndicated print newspaper columns failed to rise to the level of “goods in trade,” the Board reasoned that those decisions were based on the fact that such columns were only available to consumers as part of an overall purchase of a particular print publication—but in the age of the internet, that is no longer the case. The Board reasoned that determining whether a non-syndicated column is a good in trade should not depend on the format in which it is offered.

The Board held that going forward, the appropriate test to apply to non-syndicated print columns or sections in printed publications or recorded media is the three-part test found in the 2012 Federal Circuit Lens.com decision. The Federal Circuit test outlines the following factors to consider when evaluating whether an applicant’s goods are “goods in trade”:

Are the goods for which registration is sought a conduit or necessary tool useful only in connection with the applicant’s primary goods or services?
Are the goods for which registration is sought so inextricably tied to and associated with the primary goods or services as to have no viable existence apart from them?
Are the goods for which registration is sought neither sold separately nor do they have any independent value apart from the primary goods or services?

Applying the Lens.com factors to the print columns, the Board concluded that the columns were “goods in trade” even though they were not syndicated.

As to the first factor, the Board found that the columns were not just a conduit or necessary tool to get to The New York Times newspaper in print. The Board reasoned that the columns were not like an instructional manual or brochure telling the reader how to navigate The New York Times print edition.

Regarding the second factor, the Board found probative that a Google search of the proposed trademarks yielded the columns for which registration was sought. The Board found that this demonstrated that each individual print column was not so “inextricably tied to and associated with The New York Times print edition of the [...]

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Press Pause: De Novo Review Not Always Required for Obviousness

by Kyle Sorenson, PhD | Apr 6, 2023 | Patents

A divided panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s finding that certain challenged claims were nonobvious after applying the substantial evidence test to resolve a dispute regarding the scope and content of the prior art that the Board had resolved as a purely factual question. Roku, Inc. v. Universal Elec’s, Inc., Case No. 2022-1058 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 31, 2023) (Reyna, Stoll, JJ.) (Newman, J., dissenting). In her dissent, Judge Newman stated that even though the issue on appeal related to an underlying factual finding, the ultimate issue of obviousness remains a question of law that requires de novo review.

Universal Electronics owns a patent directed to a universal control engine (within a universal remote) that allows for communication between a “controlling device” (i.e., remote) and an “intended target appliance” (e.g., TV, DVD player). The universal control engine uses different communication methods “according to the optimal method of communication for each target appliance and command,” such as Consumer Electronic Control (CEC) commands or infrared (IR) commands.

The Federal Circuit majority first noted that the disposition of the appeal rested on a single, narrow factual issue: whether the prior art’s list of command codes that are formatted to be transmitted via different communication methods is the same as the list of different communication methods recited in the challenged claims.

The panel majority began by recognizing two relevant standards of review to be used when resolving an obviousness inquiry. First, the Federal Circuit noted that it reviews “underlying factual findings” for “substantial evidence.” Substantial evidence review considers whether a “reasonable fact finder could have arrived at the [Board’s] decision.” The Court specified that the underlying findings of fact relevant to an obviousness inquiry include the Graham factors, which comprise “the scope and content of the prior art,” among others. Next, the Court acknowledged that “[t]he ultimate question of obviousness is a legal question that it reviews de novo.”

The panel majority noted that both Roku and Universal persuasively argued their positions related to the scope and content of the prior art, that “the factual dispute . . . was highly contested and closely decided,” and that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding. On that basis, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s holding that Roku failed to show that the challenged claims were obvious. The Court declined to perform de novo review of the ultimate question of obviousness, reasoning that because Roku only raised factual questions on appeal (i.e., whether the prior art taught a particular claim element), the Court only needed to consider whether the Board’s determination on that issue was supported by substantial evidence.

In her dissent, Judge Newman disagreed with the majority decision to abstain from a de novo review of obviousness notwithstanding the majority’s conclusion that the underlying findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. Judge Newman argued that both forms of review are appropriate—and required—in cases such as this. In her de novo review, Judge Newman concluded [...]

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Disclaiming Claim Scope: Could the Patentee Have Anticipated This?

by Jake B. Vallen | Apr 6, 2023 | Patents

In the most recent decision in the Apple/VirnetX saga, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a remand ruling from the Patent Trial & Appeal Board finding the challenged claims of VirnetX’s patents unpatentable. VirnetX Inc. v. Mangrove Partners Master Fund, Ltd., Case No. 2020-2271 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 30, 2023) (Moore, C.J.; Hughes, Stark, JJ.) (nonprecedential).

VirnetX owns two patents relating to a “secure mechanism for communicating over the internet.” The patents relate to a system in which a DNS module “intercepts . . . and determines whether [a] request is for a secure site.” The system creates a VPN if the proxy determines that the request is for a secure site. If the proxy determines that the request is not for a secure site, it forwards the request to a conventional DNS.

Mangrove, Apple and Black Swamp (collectively, Mangrove) petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) challenging various claims of the patents. The Board found that all the challenged claims were unpatentable as anticipated by Kiuchi or obvious in view of Kiuchi and other references. VirnetX appealed to the Federal Circuit (Mangrove Appeal). In that appeal, the Federal Circuit determined that, contrary to the Board’s finding, when VirnetX distinguished Aventail during reexamination of one of the patents, VirnetX disclaimed “a system in which a client computer communicates with an intermediate server via a singular, point-to-point connection.” As a consequence of the prosecution disclaimer, the Court found that the claims “require[s] direct communication between the client and target computers.” The Court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded the case for the Board to determine further factual questions regarding Kiuchi because “substantial evidence does not support the Board’s finding that the C-HTTP name server of Kiuchi performs the functions of the claimed DNS proxy module.”

Following the Mangrove Appeal, the Board again found that Kiuchi—the only prior art reference at issue in the present appeal—discloses a “secure network” for the transfer of patient information in a hospital setting and teaches a “direct-communication VPN between the client and target.” As a result, the Board concluded that Kiuchi anticipates all the challenged claims. VirnetX again appealed.

The Federal Circuit first addressed the Board’s conclusion that “Kiuchi teaches a direct-communication VPN and is therefore within the scope of the claims of VirnetX’s … patent, and not an indirect-communication VPN, which would have brought Kiuchi within the scope of VirnetX’s disclaimer.” The Court agreed with the Board that “Kiuchi discloses direct communication that satisfies the claimed VPN.” Specifically, “Kiuchi’s user agent does not communicate with the client-side proxy using a singular, point-to-point connection because the user agent addresses the desired endpoint, and the VPN provides the required message routing for the user agent to receive a response from the desired endpoint.” Moreover, the Court reasoned that Kiuchi’s proxy servers forward data packets and that Kiuchi teaches “the ability to address data to a particular computer,” consistent with the scope of the claims.

Next, the Federal Circuit addressed the Board’s [...]

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No Smoking Gun Here: Soliciting Input Sufficient to Satisfy Commission’s Statutory Obligation

by Alexander P. Ott | Apr 6, 2023 | Patents

Addressing a decision by the US International Trade Commission finding a violation of Section 337, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed with the Commission on a slew of issues, including its determination that soliciting comments from a sister agency regarding the products at issue was sufficient consultation to satisfy the Commission’s statutory obligation to consult. Philip Morris Products S.A. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Case No. 22-1227 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 31, 2023) (Prost, Reyna, Stoll, JJ.)

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company filed a complaint at the Commission asserting a Section 337 violation by Philip Morris based on alleged infringement of three patents directed to tobacco heating products. During the course of the investigation, the administrative law judge (ALJ) granted summary determination in favor of R.J. Reynolds on the economic prong of the domestic industry requirement as to two of the asserted patents. The ALJ issued his initial determination finding that Philip Morris had violated Section 337 with respect to two of the asserted patents. On review, the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision with minor modifications and issued a limited exclusion order and a cease-and-desist order. Philip Morris appealed.

Philip Morris raised numerous issues on appeal. It claimed, for the first time, that the Commission erred in failing to consult with the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA), the US Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) agency exclusively tasked with regulating the tobacco products at issue. The Federal Circuit agreed with the Commission that Philip Morris forfeited this issue because, notwithstanding several rounds of briefing on the public interest factor, it never raised the issue before the ALJ nor the Commission until a motion filed after entry of the remedial orders. The Court also rejected Philips Morris’ consultation argument on the merits, finding that the Commission’s request for comments sent to the FDA was sufficient to meet the statutorily required “consult with[] and seek advice and information from” HHS, even though the FDA failed to respond.

Philip Morris next argued that the Commission abused its discretion by not concluding that the public interest in reduced-risk tobacco products at issue should have barred relief. But the Federal Circuit held that the Commission’s public interest finding had a sufficient basis in the record in the form of expert testimony, scientific articles and FDA documents regarding the products at issue to support its findings regarding the availability of alternative non-tobacco therapies and that the tobacco products were still potentially harmful.

Philip Morris also argued that the Commission erred by finding a domestic industry based on R.J. Reynolds’s competing products that had not yet received FDA approval. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that those competing products were being sold at the time of the complaint and that the recently approved law imposing FDA regulation on those products was still in its grace period.

Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Philip Morris’s various patent-related arguments, finding that the Commission’s determinations were based on substantial evidence.

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