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“Goods in Trade” in the Age of the Internet

The Trademark Trial & Appeal Board recently redefined what it takes in the age of the internet to meet the “goods in trade” requirement for registrability by holding that the Lens.com three-factor test is the universal legal standard for that inquiry. In re The New York Times Company, Serial Nos. 90106071, 90112154, 90112577, 90115155, 90115491, 90115337 (TTAB Mar. 30, 2023) (Lykos, J.) (precedential).

The New York Times applied to trademark six column names: “The New Old Age,” “A Good Appetite,” “Hungry City,” “Work Friend,” “Off the Shelf” and “Like a Boss.” The Examining Attorney issued a final refusal, explaining that the specimens did not demonstrate that the marks were used on separate goods in trade. The Times appealed. The question before the Board was whether the printed columns were independent “goods in trade.”

The Board reversed the refusal and held that The Times could register the marks. While past decisions had found that non-syndicated print newspaper columns failed to rise to the level of “goods in trade,” the Board reasoned that those decisions were based on the fact that such columns were only available to consumers as part of an overall purchase of a particular print publication—but in the age of the internet, that is no longer the case. The Board reasoned that determining whether a non-syndicated column is a good in trade should not depend on the format in which it is offered.

The Board held that going forward, the appropriate test to apply to non-syndicated print columns or sections in printed publications or recorded media is the three-part test found in the 2012 Federal Circuit Lens.com decision. The Federal Circuit test outlines the following factors to consider when evaluating whether an applicant’s goods are “goods in trade”:

  • Are the goods for which registration is sought a conduit or necessary tool useful only in connection with the applicant’s primary goods or services?
  • Are the goods for which registration is sought so inextricably tied to and associated with the primary goods or services as to have no viable existence apart from them?
  • Are the goods for which registration is sought neither sold separately nor do they have any independent value apart from the primary goods or services?

Applying the Lens.com factors to the print columns, the Board concluded that the columns were “goods in trade” even though they were not syndicated.

As to the first factor, the Board found that the columns were not just a conduit or necessary tool to get to The New York Times newspaper in print. The Board reasoned that the columns were not like an instructional manual or brochure telling the reader how to navigate The New York Times print edition.

Regarding the second factor, the Board found probative that a Google search of the proposed trademarks yielded the columns for which registration was sought. The Board found that this demonstrated that each individual print column was not so “inextricably tied to and associated with The New York Times print edition of the [...]

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Press Pause: De Novo Review Not Always Required for Obviousness

A divided panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s finding that certain challenged claims were nonobvious after applying the substantial evidence test to resolve a dispute regarding the scope and content of the prior art that the Board had resolved as a purely factual question. Roku, Inc. v. Universal Elec’s, Inc., Case No. 2022-1058 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 31, 2023) (Reyna, Stoll, JJ.) (Newman, J., dissenting). In her dissent, Judge Newman stated that even though the issue on appeal related to an underlying factual finding, the ultimate issue of obviousness remains a question of law that requires de novo review.

Universal Electronics owns a patent directed to a universal control engine (within a universal remote) that allows for communication between a “controlling device” (i.e., remote) and an “intended target appliance” (e.g., TV, DVD player). The universal control engine uses different communication methods “according to the optimal method of communication for each target appliance and command,” such as Consumer Electronic Control (CEC) commands or infrared (IR) commands.

The Federal Circuit majority first noted that the disposition of the appeal rested on a single, narrow factual issue: whether the prior art’s list of command codes that are formatted to be transmitted via different communication methods is the same as the list of different communication methods recited in the challenged claims.

The panel majority began by recognizing two relevant standards of review to be used when resolving an obviousness inquiry. First, the Federal Circuit noted that it reviews “underlying factual findings” for “substantial evidence.” Substantial evidence review considers whether a “reasonable fact finder could have arrived at the [Board’s] decision.” The Court specified that the underlying findings of fact relevant to an obviousness inquiry include the Graham factors, which comprise “the scope and content of the prior art,” among others. Next, the Court acknowledged that “[t]he ultimate question of obviousness is a legal question that it reviews de novo.”

The panel majority noted that both Roku and Universal persuasively argued their positions related to the scope and content of the prior art, that “the factual dispute . . . was highly contested and closely decided,” and that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding. On that basis, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s holding that Roku failed to show that the challenged claims were obvious. The Court declined to perform de novo review of the ultimate question of obviousness, reasoning that because Roku only raised factual questions on appeal (i.e., whether the prior art taught a particular claim element), the Court only needed to consider whether the Board’s determination on that issue was supported by substantial evidence.

In her dissent, Judge Newman disagreed with the majority decision to abstain from a de novo review of obviousness notwithstanding the majority’s conclusion that the underlying findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. Judge Newman argued that both forms of review are appropriate—and required—in cases such as this. In her de novo review, Judge Newman concluded [...]

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Disclaiming Claim Scope: Could the Patentee Have Anticipated This?

In the most recent decision in the Apple/VirnetX saga, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a remand ruling from the Patent Trial & Appeal Board finding the challenged claims of VirnetX’s patents unpatentable. VirnetX Inc. v. Mangrove Partners Master Fund, Ltd., Case No. 2020-2271 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 30, 2023) (Moore, C.J.; Hughes, Stark, JJ.) (nonprecedential).

VirnetX owns two patents relating to a “secure mechanism for communicating over the internet.” The patents relate to a system in which a DNS module “intercepts . . . and determines whether [a] request is for a secure site.” The system creates a VPN if the proxy determines that the request is for a secure site. If the proxy determines that the request is not for a secure site, it forwards the request to a conventional DNS.

Mangrove, Apple and Black Swamp (collectively, Mangrove) petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) challenging various claims of the patents. The Board found that all the challenged claims were unpatentable as anticipated by Kiuchi or obvious in view of Kiuchi and other references. VirnetX appealed to the Federal Circuit (Mangrove Appeal). In that appeal, the Federal Circuit determined that, contrary to the Board’s finding, when VirnetX distinguished Aventail during reexamination of one of the patents, VirnetX disclaimed “a system in which a client computer communicates with an intermediate server via a singular, point-to-point connection.” As a consequence of the prosecution disclaimer, the Court found that the claims “require[s] direct communication between the client and target computers.” The Court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded the case for the Board to determine further factual questions regarding Kiuchi because “substantial evidence does not support the Board’s finding that the C-HTTP name server of Kiuchi performs the functions of the claimed DNS proxy module.”

Following the Mangrove Appeal, the Board again found that Kiuchi—the only prior art reference at issue in the present appeal—discloses a “secure network” for the transfer of patient information in a hospital setting and teaches a “direct-communication VPN between the client and target.” As a result, the Board concluded that Kiuchi anticipates all the challenged claims. VirnetX again appealed.

The Federal Circuit first addressed the Board’s conclusion that “Kiuchi teaches a direct-communication VPN and is therefore within the scope of the claims of VirnetX’s … patent, and not an indirect-communication VPN, which would have brought Kiuchi within the scope of VirnetX’s disclaimer.” The Court agreed with the Board that “Kiuchi discloses direct communication that satisfies the claimed VPN.” Specifically, “Kiuchi’s user agent does not communicate with the client-side proxy using a singular, point-to-point connection because the user agent addresses the desired endpoint, and the VPN provides the required message routing for the user agent to receive a response from the desired endpoint.” Moreover, the Court reasoned that Kiuchi’s proxy servers forward data packets and that Kiuchi teaches “the ability to address data to a particular computer,” consistent with the scope of the claims.

Next, the Federal Circuit addressed the Board’s [...]

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No Smoking Gun Here: Soliciting Input Sufficient to Satisfy Commission’s Statutory Obligation

Addressing a decision by the US International Trade Commission finding a violation of Section 337, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed with the Commission on a slew of issues, including its determination that soliciting comments from a sister agency regarding the products at issue was sufficient consultation to satisfy the Commission’s statutory obligation to consult. Philip Morris Products S.A. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Case No. 22-1227 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 31, 2023) (Prost, Reyna, Stoll, JJ.)

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company filed a complaint at the Commission asserting a Section 337 violation by Philip Morris based on alleged infringement of three patents directed to tobacco heating products. During the course of the investigation, the administrative law judge (ALJ) granted summary determination in favor of R.J. Reynolds on the economic prong of the domestic industry requirement as to two of the asserted patents. The ALJ issued his initial determination finding that Philip Morris had violated Section 337 with respect to two of the asserted patents. On review, the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision with minor modifications and issued a limited exclusion order and a cease-and-desist order. Philip Morris appealed.

Philip Morris raised numerous issues on appeal. It claimed, for the first time, that the Commission erred in failing to consult with the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA), the US Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) agency exclusively tasked with regulating the tobacco products at issue. The Federal Circuit agreed with the Commission that Philip Morris forfeited this issue because, notwithstanding several rounds of briefing on the public interest factor, it never raised the issue before the ALJ nor the Commission until a motion filed after entry of the remedial orders. The Court also rejected Philips Morris’ consultation argument on the merits, finding that the Commission’s request for comments sent to the FDA was sufficient to meet the statutorily required “consult with[] and seek advice and information from” HHS, even though the FDA failed to respond.

Philip Morris next argued that the Commission abused its discretion by not concluding that the public interest in reduced-risk tobacco products at issue should have barred relief. But the Federal Circuit held that the Commission’s public interest finding had a sufficient basis in the record in the form of expert testimony, scientific articles and FDA documents regarding the products at issue to support its findings regarding the availability of alternative non-tobacco therapies and that the tobacco products were still potentially harmful.

Philip Morris also argued that the Commission erred by finding a domestic industry based on R.J. Reynolds’s competing products that had not yet received FDA approval. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that those competing products were being sold at the time of the complaint and that the recently approved law imposing FDA regulation on those products was still in its grace period.

Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Philip Morris’s various patent-related arguments, finding that the Commission’s determinations were based on substantial evidence.




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UK High Court Issues Landmark Global FRAND Rate Decision

The UK High Court of Justice issued its long-anticipated decision establishing a global Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) royalty rate for a patent portfolio essential to 3G, 4G and 5G cellular technologies. InterDigital Tech. Corp. et al. v. Lenovo Group Limited, Case No. HP-2019-000032, [2023] EWHC 529 (Pat) (Mar. 16, 2023) (Mellor, J.)

InterDigital owns a portfolio of standard essential patents (SEPs) that have been declared essential to the European Telecommunications Standard Institute’s (ETSI) 3G, 4G and 5G cellular technology standards. InterDigital sought to license the SEPs to Lenovo, which implements these cellular standards in its mobile phones, tablets and PCs. After the parties could not agree on the terms under which Lenovo should take a license, InterDigital filed a lawsuit. The High Court held several technical trials in which it found that Lenovo infringed certain of the patents.

Based on the result of the technical trials, the High Court determined that InterDigital had established the right to a FRAND determination of its portfolio. The parties presented two issues regarding FRAND. The first issue was whether the InterDigital license offer was FRAND, and if not, what terms would be FRAND for a license to Lenovo of the InterDigital patent portfolio. The second issue was whether InterDigital was entitled to an injunction based on the parties’ negotiation conduct, including whether InterDigital acted as a willing licensor and whether Lenovo acted as a willing licensee.

The High Court concluded that Lenovo should pay InterDigital a FRAND rate of $0.175 per cellular unit for a worldwide license to InterDigital’s portfolio. The $0.175 rate yields a lump sum payment of $138.7 million for sales from 2007 to the end of 2023. The Court’s FRAND rate determination was closer to Lenovo’s offered rate of $0.16/unit than to InterDigital’s demand of $0.498/unit.

In determining the appropriate FRAND rate, the High Court analyzed whether InterDigital’s proposed rate was comparable to the rate in InterDigital’s other license agreements for SEPs. InterDigital argued that its license offer to Lenovo was consistent with “program rates” under which it had already licensed its SEPs to other companies. The Court, however, rejected InterDigital’s program rates as comparable because the other licenses included volume discounts ranging from 60% to 80% of InterDigital’s program rate. InterDigital argued that Lenovo was not entitled to the same type of steep volume discount and, therefore, those licenses with discounts applied were not comparable licenses for Lenovo. The Court disagreed, finding that the volume discounts applied to those licenses “do not have any economic or other justification” and that their primary purpose was to “shore up InterDigital’s chosen program rates.” The Court further observed that the primary effect of the volume discount in the other licenses was to discriminate against smaller licensees, which is exactly what FRAND is supposed to avoid.

InterDigital tried to bolster its argument that its program rate was FRAND by applying a top-down cross-check. The top-down approach starts with the cumulative value of all royalties that should be paid on FRAND [...]

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PTO Reduces Small and Micro-Entity Fees

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issued a final rule reducing certain patent fees for small and micro-entities on March 22, 2023. The Federal Register notice can be found here. Small entity filing fee discounts are increased to 60% (from 50%) and micro-entity filing fee discounts are increased to 80% (from 75%). The fee reductions apply to PTO fees for filing, searching, examining, issuing, appealing and maintaining patent applications and patents.

The fee reductions were mandated by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (the Act), which included the Unleashing American Innovators Act of 2022. The Act was signed into law by President Biden on December 29, 2022. The new PTO fee schedule can be found here.




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No One Likes a Sore Winner: IPR Prevailing Party Can’t Appeal

Reaffirming precedent, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reiterated the rule that the prevailing party in an inter partes review (IPR) cannot appeal a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision. Termax Co. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., Case Nos. 23-1252; -1254 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 8, 2023) (Dyk, Reyna, Chen, JJ.)

Illinois Tool Works (ITW) asserted that Termax had infringed a patent directed to an automobile fastener. Termax challenged the asserted patent by filing a petition for IPR. The petition was granted, and ultimately the Board agreed with Termax that all the challenged claims of ITW were unpatentable. Both parties appealed.

ITW moved to voluntarily dismiss its own appeal and to dismiss Termax’s cross-appeal. Termax opposed, arguing that the Board erred in its construction of certain claim limitations that have also been incorporated into a new ITW patent.

The Federal Circuit dismissed both appeals. Citing what it called a “familiar rule,” the Court stated that the winner in a lower court or other tribunal cannot ordinarily seek relief in the appellate court. The Court was not persuaded by Termax’s argument that the Board erred in its construction of certain claim limitations, noting that Termax sought to appeal the constructions in the hopes that a Federal Circuit decision in its favor would “collaterally estop Illinois Tool Works from asserting those newly issued claims.” However, the Court refused to hear the appeal prematurely, stating that if ITW asserts the claims of its new patent against Termax in the future, Termax can address the issue at that time.

Practice Note: While an IPR can be a powerful tool for accused infringers, it is not without future risks.




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Prior Art Coherency and Cache Incoherency: “Known-Technique” Rationale for Motivation to Combine

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, addressing the issue of whether certain factual and legal conclusions relating to obviousness were supported by substantial evidence, held that the Patent Trial & Appeal Board improperly rejected evidence of “known-technique” rationale to provide a motivation to combine. Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, Case No. 22-1037 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 13, 2023) (Newman, Prost, Hughes, JJ.)

PACT owns a patent that “relates to multiprocessor systems and how processors in those systems access data.” The claimed multiprocessor system addressed cache incoherency, a problem associated with the use of multiple cache memories to store data, particularly local copies of the same data stored on multiple processors. Cache incoherency (i.e., inconsistencies among different cache processors) “may arise if one processor changes its local copy of the data and that change isn’t propagated to the other copies of that data.”

Intel petitioned for inter partes review of claims 4 and 5 of the patent, relying on two prior art references, Kabemoto and Bauman. Kabemoto and Bauman both address the problem of cache incoherency. As the Federal Circuit explained, Kabemoto maintains cache coherency “by ‘snooping’ along a shared ‘bus,’” while Bauman “us[es] a global, segmented secondary cache.”

The Board upheld the patentability of the challenged claims, concluding that “Intel failed to prove the obviousness of each limitation of [independent] claim 4,” from which claim 5 depended. Intel had contended that a person of ordinary skill in the art would combine Kabemoto and Bauman to teach all limitations in claim 4 by “replac[ing] Kabemoto’s secondary caches” with “Bauman’s segmented global [secondary cache],” which is a separate cache. PACT did not dispute that the combination of Kabemoto and Bauman taught each limitation of claim 4 but argued that Intel failed to demonstrate a motivation to combine Kabemoto and Bauman.

The Board nevertheless found that Intel failed to demonstrate that the prior art disclosed the segment-to-segment limitation and concluded that Intel failed to show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Kabemoto and Bauman. Intel appealed.

The Federal Circuit first addressed Intel’s contention “that substantial evidence d[id] not support the Board’s determination that the prior art fails to disclose the segment-by-segment limitation” of claim 4. The Court found that “Bauman’s Figure 6 teaches—if not plainly illustrates—the segment-to-segment limitation of the claims interconnect system” and reversed the Board’s contrary conclusion.

Next, the Federal Circuit addressed Intel’s contention that the Board’s determination that there was no motivation to combine Kabemoto and Bauman was not supported by substantial evidence. On this issue, the Court reasoned that under KSR, it was “enough for Intel to show that there was a known problem of cache incoherency in the art, that Bauman’s secondary cache helped address that issue, and that combining the teachings of Kabemoto and Bauman wasn’t beyond the skill of an ordinary artisan.” As the Court put it, “[n]othing more is required to show a motivation to combine under KSR.”

Explaining [...]

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Actual or Potential Consumers in Related Goods Context Doesn’t Require PURE Overlap

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reminded us that, in the context of related goods, the likelihood of confusion analysis does not require that actual or potential consumers of the goods be the same, but only that there be sufficient overlap. In re Oxiteno S.A. Industria e Comercio, Case No. 22-1213 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 9, 2023) (Dyk, Bryson, Prost, JJ.)

Oxiteno filed an intent-to-use trademark application for OXIPURITY, with its goods and services statement ultimately amended to include dozens of chemical products “for use in the pharmaceutical, veterinary, flavor and fragrance, and cosmetic fields.” The application was refused on likelihood of confusion grounds in view of FMC Corporation’s registered OXYPURE mark, largely because the hydrogen peroxide products covered by the OXYPURE registration moved through the same channels of trade as products recited in the Oxiteno application.

Oxiteno appealed the refusal to the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board. The Board analyzed likelihood of confusion using the DuPont factors and found the first four factors most relevant:

  • Factor 1: The similarity of OXIPURITY and OXYPURE. The Board concluded (as had the Examiner) that the two marks were “similar in sound, meaning and commercial impression,” and found that this factor strongly favored a likelihood of confusion.
  • Factor 2: The similarity of the covered goods. The Board agreed with the Examiner that the respective goods, while not the same, were sufficiently related to favor a likelihood of confusion finding.
  • Factor 3: The similarity of channels of trade. The Board reviewed the third-party websites that the Examiner considered particularly dispositive. The websites sold hydrogen peroxide goods covered by the OXYPURE mark and the chemicals Oxiteno intended to sell under the OXIPURITY mark. The Board concluded that the same sources manufactured FMC’s established products and Oxiteno’s intent-too-use products, and directly sold these products to largely overlapping industries.
  • Factor 4: “[t]he conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made.” Of the four most relevant factors in this case, this was the only factor that the Board found to favor registration. The Board concluded that the consumers of the established and intent-to-use products would be sophisticated and not act on impulse.

Despite the potential consumers’ presumed sophistication, the Board found that factors 1 through 3 “rendered confusion likely” and thus affirmed the Examiner’s refusal. Oxiteno appealed.

Oxiteno argued that likelihood of confusion could not be found when the actual or potential consumers of the respective products covered by two marks were not the same, as with the relevant products here.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board, noting statements made by a company selling Oxiteno’s products that explained why almost every business is a potential purchaser of FMC’s OXYPURE hydrogen peroxide products. The Court also noted that FMC’s brochures stated that it sold its hydrogen peroxide products under OXYPURE and other brand names to the same key industries to which Oxiteno sold its products. The Court, therefore, concluded that substantial evidence supported that at least some [...]

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Not Today, HAL: Copyright Still Requires Human Input

The US Copyright Office (USCO) issued a policy statement on March 16, 2023, clarifying its position on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in copyrighted materials. This statement came in the wake of the USCO’s recent decision to revoke partial copyright protection over AI-generated images in a graphic novel.

The USCO had previously issued copyright registration to Kris Kashtanova for a graphic novel. Upon learning that the images had been generated using Midjourney, an AI that produces images based on text prompts, the USCO revoked copyright protection over the images consisting of mixed text and images. Zarya of the Dawn, Registration No. VAu001480196 (USCO, Feb. 21, 2023) (Kasunic, Asso. Register of Copr.)

The USCO explained that the images lacked the requisite “minimum creative spark” required to make the images copyrightable. The USCO further emphasized that a human author with ultimate creative control is necessary for copyright protection and that providing an AI with word prompts is insufficient to qualify. Therefore, the copyright registration for the images in Kashtanova’s novel was revoked. However, because the work consisted of images and text and the text was all written by Kashtanova, that aspect of the work did satisfy the requirements for copyright protection and retained its registration. The USCO did allow that if Kashtanova could exhibit “substantive edits” to an AI-generated image, those edits could prove human authorship and therefore qualify the image for copyright protection.

In its March 16 policy statement, the USCO reiterated that non-humans are firmly excluded from authorship and, therefore, solely AI generated works are ineligible for copyright registration. Applicants should not list AIs as authors, but authors do have a duty to disclose the use of AI in their work and provide an explanation of their own human contribution compared to that of the AI. The USCO explained that the use of AI tools does not necessarily exclude a work from copyright registration. The salient issue in such cases would be the extent of creative control that the human author had over the work and its creative expression. As long as the human-made modifications to the AI-generated work meet the “minimum creative spark” requirement, such works could be subject to copyright protection.




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