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Hanging Patentability on Written Description Cannot Be Truss-ted

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a Patent Trial & Appeal Board finding that the claims of a patent for a truss hanger were invalid for lack of written description because they claimed an undisclosed range despite the predictable nature of the technology. Columbia Insurance Company v. Simpson Strong-Tie Company Inc., Case Nos. 21-2145; -2157 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 31, 2023) (Prost, Hughes, JJ.) (Moore, C.J., dissenting) (non-precedential).

Truss hangers secure support beams to wall frames in buildings. These hangers normally accommodate layers of fire-resistant sheathing by cutting out the sheathing that overlaps with the hanger, but this can reduce fire resistance. Columbia owns a patent claiming a truss hanger that extends through the sheathing and does not decrease fire resistance. The extension for the sheathing, illustrated below, must be “sized large enough to permit two layers of ⅝ inch thick sheathing to be received between the rear edge plane and the back flange plane, but too small to permit three layers of ⅝ inch thick sheathing to be received.”

Simpson petitioned for a post-grant review of the patent at the Board. That proceeding resulted in a mixed decision. The Board found in favor of Simpson that certain original claims and certain substitute claims of the patent were unpatentable for lack of written description and that certain claims were obvious over the prior art. However, it found in favor of Columbia with regard to one claim. Both parties appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s findings regarding written description. The claimed extension portion covered a range of extension sizes between the upper limit (three layers of five-eighths-inch-thick sheathing) and lower limit (two layers of five-eighths-inch-thick sheathing). The Court affirmed the Board’s finding that nothing in the specification covered the claimed upper limit. Columbia argued that a skilled artisan would read the claims to cover exactly two layers of five-eighths-inch-thick sheathing, but the Court found that this claim construction argument was forfeited because it was raised for the first time on appeal and, even if it weren’t, it was incorrect because it was akin to rewriting the claims.

The Federal Circuit also affirmed the Board’s finding that certain claims were obvious, concluding that the Board’s determination was supported by substantial evidence. The Court rejected Columbia’s argument that the Board’s claim construction violated the Administrative Procedure Act because the construction adopted by the Board was similar enough to Simpson’s proposed construction and not raised sua sponte.

Finally, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s finding that the claim on which Simpson appealed was not indefinite because the term “large enough to permit the drywall to be received” informs a skilled artisan with reasonable certainty that the scope of this claim includes any extension portion sized larger than the smallest commonly known sheathing size. The Court also found that the claim was not obvious because the Board correctly interpreted the claim language [...]

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PTO Proposes Patent Fee Increases

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) announced proposed patent fee increases. Patent fees would increase by about 5% across the board because of inflation.

Certain fees would be increased by substantially more than the 5% inflationary increase to reduce subsidization from other fee sources. For example, the overall design patent fees would increase by 48%, based on a 27% increase in filing, search and examination fees and a 76% issue fee increase. The PTO also proposes a 100% increase in the excess claim fee for each claim over 20, and a 25% increase in the fee for each independent claim over three. Because the costs of reviewing patent term extensions is complex, the PTO proposes fee increases of 196% to 468%. The PTO also proposes a fee of $500 for filing an After Final Consideration Pilot (AFCP) 2.0 request, and new fees for filing an information disclosure statement (IDS) that causes the number of applicant-provided citations to exceed 50, 100 or 200 citations, respectively.

To offset the loss of future maintenance fee payments, the PTO proposes fees of $1,500 for continuing applications filed more than three years from the earliest benefit date and $3,000 for continuing applications filed more than seven years from the earliest benefit date.

Other proposed fee increases are intended to expedite the patent examination process. For example, the PTO proposes a 25% increase in the fee for a second request for continued examination (RCE) and an 80% increase for a third or subsequent RCE. The fee for a terminal disclaimer filed after the first action on the merits and before a final rejection would increase by 194%. After a final rejection or notice of allowance, the fee would increase by 371%. On or after a notice of appeal, the increase would be 547%, and the proposed increase for filing a terminal disclaimer in an issued patent would be 724%.

The PTO further proposes increasing Patent Trial & Appeal Board America Invents Act (AIA) trial fees by 25%. The PTO also proposes new fees for inter partes review (IPR) and post grant review (PGR) petitions that exceed the word count limits. For example, the PTO proposes a 50% higher fee for petitions that exceed the word count limit by up to 50%, and a 100% higher fee for those that exceed the limit by up to 100%.

A public hearing is scheduled for May 18, 2023. Those wishing to present oral testimony at the hearing must submit a written request by May 11, 2023. Written comments on the proposed fees will be accepted until May 25, 2023.

The PTO anticipates that the fee changes will be implemented around January 2025.

More details, including a complete list of the proposed fee increases, can be found on the PTO website.




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Strike 1: Priority. Strike 2 :Likelihood of Confusion. Strike 3: You’re Out under Section 2(d).

The Trademark Trial & Appeal Board affirmed the rejection of three trademark applications, finding that the applied-for marks would cause confusion with a record-setting major league baseball player. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Chisena, Opp. Nos. 91240180; 91242556; 91243244 (TTAB Apr. 12, 2023) (Cataldo, Heasley, Larkin, ATJ.) (precedential).

Michael P. Chisena sought registration of the standard character marks ALL RISE and HERE COMES THE JUDGE, along with the following design mark for use in commerce on “clothing, namely, t-shirts, shirts, shorts, pants, sweatshirts, sweatpants, jackets, jerseys, athletic uniforms, and caps.”

New York Yankees outfielder Aaron Judge and the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) filed Notices of Opposition challenging Chisena’s registration for likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), among other things.

At the outset, the Board addressed the issue of whether Judge and MLBPA were entitled to a statutory cause of action challenging the registration of Chisena’s marks. The Board found standing, concluding that both Judge and MLBPA had “legitimate interest[s] in the outcome of this opposition” because granting Chisena’s registration “would provide a prima facie right to exclusive use of [the] marks on [the] identified apparel, in competition with the apparel marketed by Opposers’ licensees.” The Board reasoned that this stake in the outcome of the opposition created a sufficiently high level of potential harm to Judge and MLBPA to support standing.

Turning to the merits of the Section 2(d) claim, the Board explained that Judge and MLBPA must “prove both priority of use of their pleaded marks and a likelihood of confusion between those marks and those Applicant ha[d] applied to register.”

First, the Board addressed priority of use of ALL RISE and HERE COMES THE JUDGE, as well as judicial designs, such as a gavel, courthouse image or the scales of justice, as trademarks on t-shirts, baseball caps and other athletic apparel. Judge and MLBPA established that Judge had been an MLBPA member since 2016 and that since then, “numerous licensees have obtained approval to produce and market products bearing his personal indicia.”

Chisena responded with multiple arguments in favor of priority but the Board found none to be persuasive. The Board reasoned as follows:

  • “[T]he relevant purchasing public [would] clearly perceive[] ‘JUDGE’ in the context of ‘HERE COMES THE JUDGE’ as a play on words, embracing both its judicial and surname meanings.”
  • “[B]aseball fans and commentators began using ‘ALL RISE’ as a play on Aaron Judge’s last name early in his career,” and whether it is a nickname or not, there is “a protectable property right in any term the public has come to associate with . . . goods or services.”
  • The slogans and symbols function as trademarks because “consumers who encounter [them] on t-shirts and other athletic apparel would recognize, associate, and perceive them as pointing to a single source: Aaron Judge.”
  • “[T]he judicial phrases and symbols . . . serve to perform the [...]

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Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Validity Upheld Based on Expert Separation Testimony

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court decision finding that two patents covering enantiomerically pure compositions of the psoriasis drug Otezla® (apremilast) were valid and one patent covering a dosage titration schedule was invalid as obvious. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. Case No. 22-1147 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 2023) (Lourie, Cunningham, Stark, JJ.)

Amgen markets apremilast, a phosphodiesterase-4 inhibitor that is used for treating psoriasis and related conditions, under the brand name Otezla®. Amgen has three patents covering Otezla®. Two of the patents are directed to orally administered pharmaceutical compositions of enantiomerically pure apremilast (composition patents), and one of the patents covers a dosage titration schedule for enantiomerically pure apremilast that ranges from a starting dose of 10 mg to a dose of 60 mg by the sixth day (dosage patent). Sandoz submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) seeking approval from the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to market a generic version of apremilast. Amgen filed suit against Sandoz for infringement of its three patents covering Otezla®.

Sandoz asserted that the composition patents were invalid based on prior art that had an example (Example 12) that described a 50%:50% racemic mixture of apremilast but did not disclose the purified apremilast (+) enantiomer recited in the claims. The prior art did state that apremilast could be isolated from this racemic mixture using chiral chromatography, a well-known technique. The district court rejected Sandoz’s argument, finding that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that a skilled artisan would have had reason to believe that the desirable properties of Example 12 derived in whole or in part from the apremilast enantiomer (i.e., the (+) enantiomer). The district court also concluded that Sandoz had not demonstrated that a skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in resolving Example 12 into its individual enantiomeric components. Furthermore, the district court looked to objective indicia of non-obviousness, finding that apremilast unexpectedly provided substantial improvement over previously known phosphodiesterase inhibitors in terms of both efficacy and tolerability, and a nexus existed between the unexpected potency and the asserted claims.

Sandoz also argued that the dosage patent was invalid based on prior art that taught various dosage schedules and amounts for apremilast. The district court found that it would have been within the ability of a skilled artisan to titrate apremilast for a patient presenting with psoriasis and that doing so would have been a routine aspect of treating psoriasis with a drug (such as apremilast) that was known in the art to require dose titration to ameliorate side effects. The district court therefore found that the dosage patent was invalid. Sandoz appealed with respect to the composition patents, and Amgen appealed with respect to the dosage patent.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision with respect to the composition patents, finding that Sandoz had not proven that a skilled artisan would have had sufficient motivation to purify apremilast’s (+) enantiomer from the racemic mixture disclosed in Example [...]

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Reaching New Lights: Inherent Upper Limit Enables Open-Ended Range

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed an International Trade Commission decision finding a § 337 violation. The Court concluded that the Commission correctly found that an open-ended claim was enabled since there was an inherent upper limit and correctly construed the term “a” to mean “one or more” in finding infringement. FS.com Inc. v. International Trade Commission, Case No. 22-1228 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 2023) (Moore, Prost, Hughes, JJ.)

Corning Optical Communications owns several patents directed to fiber optic technology. Corning alleged that FS violated § 337 by importing high-density fiber optic equipment that infringed the patents. In assessing infringement, the Commission construed the claim term “a front opening” to mean “an opening located in the front side of a fiber optic module (e.g., the opening depicted in Figure 13 of the [asserted] patent as having dimensions H1 and W1”) and further concluded that the term encompassed one or more openings. The Commission found that FS’s products met this requirement and therefore infringed. FS argued that certain claims were invalid because they were not enabled. The claims at issue recited “a fiber optic connection density of at least ninety-eight (98) fiber optic connections per U space” or “a fiber optic connection of at least one hundred forty-four (144) fiber optic connections per U space.” FS argued that these open-ended density ranges were not enabled because the specification only enabled up to 144 fiber optic connections per U space. The Commission rejected FS’s invalidity argument. FS appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s enablement determination. The Court explained that open-ended claims are not inherently improper and may be enabled “if there is an inherent, albeit not precisely known, upper limit and the specification enables one of skill in the art to approach that limit.” The Court found that there was an inherent upper limit of about 144 connections per U space since skilled artisans would have understood that densities substantially above 144 connections per U space were technologically infeasible. The Court further found that the specification disclosed that the maximum density achievable was 144 connections per U space and expert testimony confirmed that, despite market pressure, no commercial product has achieved a density greater than 144 connections. Considering this evidence, the Court concluded that the Commission properly found that the open-ended claims had an inherent upper limit of about 144 connections per U space and the claimed open-ended range was therefore enabled.

The Federal Circuit also affirmed the Commission’s infringement determination. The Court explained that the terms “a” or “an” in a patent claim generally mean “one or more,” unless the patentee evinces a clear intent to limit “a” or “an” to “one.” FS argued that the recitation of “front openings” in an unasserted claim showed a clear intent to limit “a front opening” in the asserted claim to a single opening. The Court rejected that argument, finding that limiting an unasserted claim to multiple openings did not show an intent to limit the asserted claim to [...]

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No Spark Here: TTAB Refuses to Register Similar Mark for Real Estate Services

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board’s refusal to register a mark due to the “close similarity” between the applied-for mark and a previously registered mark. In Re: Charger Ventures LLC, Case No. 22-1094 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 13, 2023) (Prost, Reyna, Stark, JJ.)

Charger Ventures applied to register SPARK LIVING, identifying its services as rental property management and real estate leasing and listing. Based on an existing mark, SPARK, which identified other real estate services such as rental brokerage, commercial property leasing and management, the Examining Attorney ultimately refused to register Charger’s mark, despite Charger twice amending its application and disclaiming the word LIVING. Charger appealed to the Board, which used the 13 DuPont factors to analyze likelihood of confusion. The Board focused on five of the DuPont factors:

  1. Similarity of the marks: SPARK LIVING fully incorporates SPARK, and LIVING is both descriptive and disclaimed, making it “subordinate to SPARK.”
  2. Similarity of the nature of goods/services: While not identical, commercial and residential real estate services may “emanate from a single source under a single mark.”
  3. Similarity of trade channels: There exists “some overlap” between commercial and residential real estate trade channels.
  4. Class of purchasers: Although real estate purchasers exercise a high level of care, “even . . . sophisticated purchasers are not immune from source confusion.”
  5. Strength of the mark: Although SPARK is somewhat commercially weak, “even weak marks are entitled to protection.”

The Board did not announce the weight it afforded to each factor but found that Charger failed to overcome the high similarity between its mark and SPARK. The Board therefore affirmed the Examining Attorney and refused to register SPARK LIVING. Charger appealed to the Federal Circuit.

As to factor 1, Charger argued that the Board erred in finding similarity of the marks. The Federal Circuit disagreed, noting that Charger disclaimed LIVING from its mark. The Court explained that disclaimer has no legal effect on likelihood of confusion because consumers do not know which words have been disclaimed. The Court found that the Board properly considered the full mark and that the marks were clearly similar.

As to factors 2 and 3, Charger argued that the previous SPARK registration could not be newly extended to include residential real estate services. The Federal Circuit rejected Charger’s argument, finding that many marks bridge the commercial and residential gap and that a registration’s listed services do not limit the trade channels in which the mark actually operates.

Regarding factor 4, Charger argued that SPARK and SPARK LIVING appealed to different classes of purchasers. The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that Charger had failed to show that residential property owners were distinct from commercial owners.

Charger asserted that the Board improperly analyzed factor 5, since a mark’s weakness is “paramount” to likelihood of confusion. However, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board that Charger failed to overcome the registered mark’s presumption of validity, despite other “spark” marks in the field. The Court [...]

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Same Old Story: Copyright Discovery Rule Still Applies

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s infringement determination, finding that the copyright owner’s claims were timely since they were brought within three years of discovering the infringement. Martinelli v. Hearst Newspapers LLC, Case No. 22-20333 (5th Cir. Apr. 13, 2023) (Barksdale, Southwick, Higginson, JJ.)

In 2015, Sotheby’s International Realty commissioned Antonio Martinelli to photograph an Irish estate owned by the Guinness family. Martinelli took seven photographs of the property, and the property was subsequently listed for sale. On March 7, 2017, Hearst Newspapers used those commissioned photographs in news articles discussing the sale in various Hearst publications. Over the next few years, Martinelli learned about Hearst’s use of the photographs. For instance, on November 17, 2018, Martinelli learned about the use of the photographs in the Houston Chronicle, and between September 2019 and May 2020, Martinelli learned about further use of the photographs in the San Francisco Chronicle, the Times Union, the Greenwich Time, the Middletown Press and the Elle Décor website. Based on these uses, Martinelli sued for copyright infringement on October 18, 2021—more than three years after the initial publication but less than three years after Martinelli discovered the publication.

Hearst stipulated both to infringement and that Martinelli could not have discovered the use of the copyrighted photographs at an earlier time. Instead, Hearst argued that Martinelli was too slow in bringing his infringement action since, under 17 U.S.C. § 507(b), the action must be brought within three years of the infringement, regardless of a plaintiff’s knowledge or diligence. The district court disagreed, holding that § 507(b) follows the discovery rule, which means the limitations period only begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury. Hearst appealed.

Hearst argued that the district court’s decision ran afoul of the Supreme Court’s 2019 decisions in Petrella v. MGM and Rotkiske v. Klemm. According to Hearst, under Petrella and Rotkiske, the discovery rule cannot apply to § 507(b) and the limitations period starts “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” The Fifth Circuit disagreed.

The Fifth Circuit began by explaining that unless unequivocally overruled by a Supreme Court decision, an en banc court or a change in law, it was bound by its 2014 decision in Graper v. Mid-Continent Casualty, which held that the limitations period starts running “once the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury upon which the claim is based.” Since neither party asserted that there had been an en banc decision or a change in the law, the only question was whether Petrella or Rotkiske overruled Granger.

Since the Supreme Court explicitly refused to address whether the discovery rule applied to § 507(b) in Petrella, the Fifth Circuit refused to read Petrella as overruling Graper. Turning to Rotkiske, the Fifth Circuit noted the Supreme Court’s statement that “[i]f there are two plausible constructions of a statute of limitations, we generally adopt the construction that starts the time limit running when the [...]

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PTO Requests Comments on Revisions to AIA Trial Proceedings

On April 21, 2023, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) announced that it is seeking public input on proposed modifications to the rules of practice for inter partes reviews (IPRs) and post grant reviews (PGRs) before the Patent Trial & Appeal Board to better align the practices with the PTO’s mission to promote and protect innovation and investment in the same and to provide a less expensive alternative to district court litigation to resolve certain patentability issues while also protecting against patentee harassment.

The PTO is considering promulgating rules that the Director—and, by delegation, the Board—will use to do the following:

  • Exercise the Director’s discretion to institute IPRs and PGRs
  • Provide a procedure for separate briefing on discretionary denial that will allow parties to address relevant issues for discretionary denial without encroaching on the page limit to address the merits of a case
  • Give petitioners the ability to pay additional fees for a higher word-count limit
  • Clarify that all settlement agreements, including pre-institution settlement agreements, are required to be filed with the Board.

To create clear, predictable rules where possible, as opposed to balancing tests that decrease certainty, the PTO is considering changes that would provide for discretionary denials of petitions in the following categories, subject to certain conditions and circumstances as discussed further in the Official Notice:

  • Petitions filed by certain for-profit entities
  • Petitions challenging under-resourced patent owner patents where the patentee has brought or is attempting to bring products to market
  • Petitions challenging patent claims previously subject to a final adjudication upholding the patent claims against patentability challenges in district court or in post-grant proceedings before the PTO
  • Serial petitions
  • Petitions raising previously addressed prior art or arguments
  • Parallel petitions
  • Petitions challenging patents subject to ongoing parallel litigation in district court.

The PTO also seeks comments on proposed threshold definitions that apply to one or more of these categories of petitions subject to discretionary denials. Those definitions set forth the criteria used to determine the following:

  • What constitutes a “substantial relationship” between entities sufficient to trigger or avoid discretionary denial
  • When claim sets are deemed to have “substantial overlap” with challenged claims
  • What constitutes “compelling merits” sufficient to trigger an exception to discretionary denial.

For example, one proposal with respect to the “substantial relationship” is a requirement that a patent owner and petitioner disclose anyone with an ownership interest in the patent owner or petitioner, any government funding related to the patent, any third-party litigation funding support, and any stake any party has in the outcome of the America Invents Act (AIA) proceeding or any parallel proceedings on the challenged claims.

Additional changes being considered by the PTO include the following:

  • Absent exceptional circumstances, requiring petitioners to file a stipulation that neither they nor their privy or real parties in interest have filed prior post-grant proceedings (PGRs, IPRs, covered business methods or ex parte reexaminations) on the challenged claims
  • If petitioners’ post-grant proceeding is instituted, requiring that [...]

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If Prior Art Discloses Ingredients and How to Mix Them, the “Cake” Is Anticipated

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed that challenged claims were invalid as anticipated based on principles of inherency where the disclosed prior art formulations and processes necessarily met a disputed claim limitation. Arbutus Biopharma Corp. v. ModernaTx, Inc., Case No. 20-1183 (Fed. Cir. April 11, 2023) (Reyna, Schall, Chen, JJ.)

Arbutus Biopharma owns a patent that matured from an application filed on March 9, 2015, that claims priority to a provisional application filed on June 30, 2010. The claimed invention provides stable nucleic acid-lipid particle (SNALP) formulations with a non-lamellar structure that function to increase the efficiency of nucleic acid entry into cells to promote the downregulation of gene expression. The non-lamellar morphology of a SNALP formulation was known to depend on two factors: the lipids incorporated into the SNALP formulation, and the process used to form the SNALPs. The patent disclosed five SNALP formulations of various compositions that can be used and incorporated by reference two US patent publications, which describe two methods that can be used to make SNALP formulations: the Direct Dilution Method (DDM) and the Stepwise Dilution Method (SDM). The representative independent claim recites a composition of SNALPs, wherein each particle in the plurality of SNALP particles comprises a nucleic acid and various lipid types. The claim also requires that at least 95% of the particles in the plurality of particles have a non-lamellar morphology (the Morphology Limitation).

Moderna filed a petition for inter partes review (IPR) asserting that all the claims of the Arbutus patent were anticipated by a prior art patent. The Patent Trial & Appeal Board found that although the Morphology Limitation was not expressly found in the prior art, the claims were anticipated. The Board determined that the Morphology Limitation was an inherent property (or natural result) of the prior art disclosures. On appeal, Arbutus challenged the Board’s inherent and express anticipation findings for many of the challenged claims, including for the Morphology Limitation.

A limitation is inherent if it is the natural result flowing from the prior art’s explicit disclosure. In other words, a limitation is inherent when the limitation is a property necessarily present in the invention and not actually an additional requirement imposed by the claims. In the IPR proceeding, Moderna argued that the Morphology Limitation was inherent because one skilled in the art would necessarily obtain formulations meeting this limitation by making formulations using the five formulations disclosed by the patent and using the DDM method (from the incorporated-by-reference disclosures) to prepare the formulations.

Both the challenged patent and the prior art disclosed five formulations that can be used to obtain the SNALP formulations. Evidence showed that any differences between the formulations disclosed in these patents would not impact the Morphology Limitation. The Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence supported a finding that the formulations disclosed in both the challenged patent and the prior art were the same or essentially the same.

The Federal Circuit further explained that both the challenged patent and the [...]

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Branding Function Patent Yet Another 1[01] to Bite the Dust

Addressing the patentability of claims directed to digital image branding functions, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s determination that claims across three related patents were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for lacking patent-eligible subject matter. Sanderling Mgmt. Ltd. v. Snap Inc., Case No. 21-2173 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 12, 2023) (Chen, Cunningham, Stark, JJ.)

Sanderling owns three patents, each titled “Dynamic Promotional Layout Management and Distribution Rules.”  The three patents share a common specification and are generally directed to a method using distribution rules to load digital imaging branding functions to users when certain conditions are met. The specification explains that a distribution rule is “a rule used in determining how to target a group of end users, for instance, a rule that determines that only a group of end users having certain characteristics and/or match a certain requirement.”

Sanderling asserted each of the three patents against Snap in the Northern District of Illinois. Snap moved to transfer venue to the Central District of California and to dismiss the case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim based on the allegation that the asserted patents’ claimed ineligible subject matter under § 101. After the case was transferred, the Central District of California found the claims patent ineligible and granted Snap’s motion to dismiss. Sanderling appealed.

The Federal Circuit reviewed the decision by engaging in the two-step Alice framework for subject matter eligibility. Under step one, the Court determined that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of providing information—in this case, a processing function—based on meeting a condition (e.g., matching a GPS location indication with a geographic location). The Court explained that for computer-related inventions, the relevant question is whether the claims are directed to an improvement to computer functionality or to an abstract idea. The Court found that the claims in issue were not directed to an improvement in computer functionality, but instead to the use of computers as a tool—specifically, a tool to identify when a condition is met and then to distribute information based on satisfaction of that condition.

Even if directed to an abstract idea, patent claims may still be eligible under step two of the Alice framework if there are additional features that constitute an inventive concept. The Federal Circuit, however, found that the claims failed this step also. The Court explained that if a claim’s only inventive concept is the application of an abstract idea using conventional and well-understood techniques, the claim has not been transformed into a patent-eligible application of an abstract idea. The distribution rule of the asserted claims was just that: the application of the abstract idea using common computer components. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision that the patent claims were invalid under § 101.

Practice Note: On appeal, Sanderling argued that the district court erred at step one of the Alice analyses by failing to construe certain claim terms that were allegedly crucial to the determination. [...]

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