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On the Road Again: Alternative Designs May Impact Trade Dress Functionality Analysis

by Kavya Rallabhandi | May 25, 2023 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded a summary judgment ruling, finding that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the plaintiff’s alleged trade dress was functional and therefore excluded from trade dress protection. DayCab Co., Inc. v. Prairie Tech., LLC, Case No. 22-5625 (6th Cir. May 11, 2023) (Moore, Clay, Stranch, JJ.)

DayCab manufactures conversion panels for tractor-trailer cabs. DayCab asserted Lanham Act and Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claims again Prairie Technology for trade dress infringement of its DayCab conversion kit. Prairie denied infringement and counterclaimed for declaratory judgment that DayCab’s trade dress was functional.

DayCab asserted that its product’s slant-back design, depth, rounded edges and gray color were protectable trade dress, explaining that it had carefully selected the angles, curves, tapers, lines, profile and appearance of the DayCab conversion kit. DayCab further argued that the 144-degree angle of the “slant-back” design, the dimensions of the depth and radius of the design, and the color were aesthetic and not functional. In support of its argument, DayCab presented competitor conversion kits to illustrate that there are many different appearances and ways to style conversion kits. DayCab attested that the only requirement for manufacturability is that the top of the fiberglass mold used for manufacturing the conversion kits must be slightly larger at the top than at the bottom. In response, Prairie presented expert testimony that the parties’ respective kits were not identical and that the panel’s depth, top body radius, lower body angle, flange/body radius and color were functional.

The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Prairie argued that DayCab could not prove that its trade dress was nonfunctional, had secondary meaning or that there was likelihood of confusion. The district court granted Prairie’s motion, finding that DayCab’s asserted trade dress was functional and therefore not protectable. The district court did not address secondary meaning or likelihood of confusion. DayCab appealed.

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment ruling, finding that the district court did not determine open questions about whether DayCab’s conversion kits’ slant-back design was functional. The Sixth Circuit further remanded because the district court did not consider whether Prairie’s kits infringed DayCab’s design. Regarding functionality of the conversion kit, the Court determined that existence of alternative designs and testimony from DayCab’s founder claiming that the design choices were aesthetic raised issues in the district court’s functionality ruling. The Court also noted that the existence of alternative designs was relevant to the functionality determination because they supported DayCab’s contentions that it designed the panel with aesthetic intent and that its resulting features were ornamental rather than functional.

The Sixth Circuit found that it was for the jury to determine secondary meaning and whether Prairie intentionally copied DayCab’s design. The Court also found that likelihood of confusion needed to be determined by a jury because of conflicting evidence: DayCab presented evidence that consumers inquired about ordering Prairie’s kits from DayCab because the products were similarly named and indistinguishable on [...]

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Elevate the $: Geographic Isolation Helps Defeat Trademark Infringement Claim

by Kathleen Lynch | May 25, 2023 | Trademarks

In a case between similarly named banks, the US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit confirmed expert disclosure requirements, conducted a de novo likelihood of confusion analysis and ultimately upheld a finding of no trademark infringement. Elevate Federal Credit Union v. Elevations Credit Union, Case No. 22-4029 (10th Cir. May 10, 2023) (Bacharach, Moritz, Rossman, JJ.)

Elevate is a federal credit union with almost 13,000 total members, operating exclusively in three rural Utah counties. Elevations is a Colorado state-chartered credit union with more than 150,000 members. The parties’ respective logos are shown below:

Elevate filed a suit seeking declaratory judgment of noninfringement, and Elevations counterclaimed for trademark infringement. After excluding testimony from Elevations’s expert, the district court found no infringement and granted summary judgment in favor of Elevate. Elevations appealed.

Elevations raised two issues on appeal:

Did the district court abuse its discretion in excluding Elevations’s expert’s testimony?
Did the district court err in granting summary judgment to Elevate on likelihood of confusion?

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court on the first issue. Elevations’s expert conducted a survey that involved showing marks from internet searches to consumers and asking whether they thought any came from the same company. While this survey type is legitimate, the expert did not keep records of his searches, write down his search terms, identify his search engines, or justify why he conducted multiple internet searches but showed consumers only results from Bing and the Apple App store. The Tenth Circuit found that the district court could have reasonably considered this information “facts or data” considered by the expert that needed to be—but was not—disclosed. Because the expert failed to meet his disclosure obligations and because this failure was not excused by justification or harmlessness, the lower court did not abuse its discretion.

The Tenth Circuit also affirmed the summary judgment of no likelihood of confusion. The Court conducted a de novo review and analyzed the six factors below. The Court concluded that the following five factors weighed against the likelihood of confusion:

Level of care exercised by purchasers. When customers look to open bank accounts or borrow money, they exercise a great level of care. This is especially true here because credit unions have statutory membership restrictions, meaning consumers need to confirm they qualify for membership before applying.
Strength of senior mark. While Elevations’s marks are “suggestive” and therefore “fall[] midway in the range of conceptual strength,” many other businesses in Colorado use the root term “elevat,” which weakens Elevations’s mark. Elevations’s marks also are weak where Elevate operates in Utah due to lack of advertising.
Degree of similarity. While the marks have some similarities in appearance and sound, they differ in fonts, alignment, background colors, graphics and number of syllables. The Court also stated that the “significance of the similarities fades away” in light [...]

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First Circuit: Claim Preclusion Shouldn’t Apply to Bar Claims Under VARA

by Hannah Cohen | May 25, 2023 | Copyrights

Addressing for the first time whether federal res judicata law recognizes the alternative determinations doctrine, the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit determined that a plaintiff’s claims under the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) were not precluded by a previous action in which she brought a federal copyright claim against the defendant. Foss v. Eastern States Exposition, Case No. 22-1313 (1st Cir. May 10, 2023) (Barron, Howard, Montecalvo, JJ.)

Cynthia Foss previously brought a federal copyright action against Eastern States Exposition that was dismissed. The previous action did not involve any claim under VARA. Eastern argued that claim preclusion should apply to bar the claim, and the district court agreed. Foss appealed.

To establish federal claim preclusion, a party must establish that there is a final judgment on the merits in an earlier suit, sufficient similarity between the causes of action asserted in the earlier and later suits, and sufficient identicality between the parties in the two suits. Foss did not dispute that the first and third requirements were satisfied, and thus the First Circuit’s decision turned on whether the second requirement was met.

Foss argued that the “alternative determinations” doctrine should apply. This doctrine strips a dismissal of claim preclusive effect if the dismissal rests on multiple grounds, not all of which would on their own render the dismissal claim preclusive. Whether the doctrine should apply was a matter of first impression in the First Circuit. Foss argued that the previous dismissal was in part based on “her failure to allege that she had satisfied the registration-related precondition to copyright infringement suits under § 411(a),” which was not a merits-based dismissal and therefore had no preclusive effect. Eastern argued that even if the First Circuit adopted the alternative determinations doctrine, the Court should limit the doctrine because the district court “rigorously considered” the merits-based rationale for dismissal in the previous action.

The First Circuit adopted the alternative determinations doctrine and rejected Eastern’s contention that the doctrine should not apply in the instant case because Eastern did not provide support for the contention that the district court in the previous action “rigorously considered” the merits-based grounds for dismissal of Foss’s federal copyright claims. The Court then remanded the case for further consideration, noting that Eastern might argue that the alternative disputes doctrine should be limited in this instance because of Foss’s failure to allege satisfaction of the precondition to suit, which might be prejudicial to Eastern.

Analogous Art Must Be Compared to Challenged Patent

by Alexandra Cavazos, PhD | May 25, 2023 | America Invents Act, Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board obviousness decision, finding that a prior art reference relating to automotive engine parts was not analogous art to the challenged patent, which related to injection devices used for drug delivery. Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GMBH v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., Case No. 21-1981 (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2023) (Reyna, Mayer, Cunningham, JJ.)

Sanofi-Aventis owns a patent directed to a drug delivery device that can be configured to allow for the setting of different dose sizes. The main independent claim of the patent recites a spring washer element with “at least two fixing elements configured to axially and rotationally fix the spring washer relative to the housing.”

Mylan initiated an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding against the patent, arguing that the challenged claims were obvious based on a combination of three prior art references: Burren, Venezia and de Gennes. Burren described a drug injection device that used a coiled spring, while Venezia described a hypodermic syringe with a spring washer having a tongue that fit into a collar to prevent the washer from rotating relative to the collar. The third prior art reference, de Gennes, disclosed a large spring-washer-like device used in automobile engines to maintain the alignment between the engine and the transmission. Sanofi argued that de Gennes was non-analogous art because it was not in the same field of endeavor as the injection devices described in the patent and was not reasonably pertinent to a problem faced by the inventor of the challenged patent.

The Board adopted Mylan’s definition of the problem to be solved, which was “axially fixing two components relative towards each other.” Under this broad definition, the Board found that de Gennes was reasonably pertinent to the challenged patent and that claims were obvious in view of Burren in combination with Venezia and de Gennes. Sanofi appealed.

Sanofi argued that the Board erred in determining that de Gennes was analogous art. The Federal Circuit explained that in evaluating whether a reference is analogous, a patent challenger must compare the reference to the challenged patent. Applying this test, the Court found that substantial evidence did not support the conclusion that de Gennes was analogous to the challenged patent. Although Mylan had mapped de Gennes to certain elements of the challenged claims, there was no evidence that de Gennes—an automobile-related patent—was analogous to the challenged patent—a drug delivery device. The Court also found that statements that de Gennes and the challenged patent were “both interested in solving the same issue . . . [of] accommodating various cartridge lengths” were insufficient to show that de Gennes was analogous to the challenged patent.

PTO Proposes Trademark Fee Increases

by Amol Parikh | May 25, 2023 | Trademarks

On May 8, 2023, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) announced proposed trademark fee increases. The proposed fee increases are the result of lower revenue than previously forecasted and higher-than-expected inflation. Aggregate PTO operating costs are projected to exceed aggregate fee revenue beginning this fiscal year.

To encourage efficient application filing behaviors, enhance the quality of incoming applications and improve processing efficiencies, the PTO proposed a new single basic application filing fee with additional premium application surcharge fees based on the following actions an applicant can take (or avoid) when filing:

Submitting incomplete applications (other than applications denied a filing date for failure to satisfy the requirements under 37 CFR § 2.21)
Providing custom descriptions of goods and services in the free-form field instead of using the preapproved drop-down fields containing acceptable identifications of goods and services from the Trademark Next Generation ID Manual
Providing excessively long identifications of goods or services when using the free-form field.

The PTO proposes a 12% fee increase per class for applications (paper submission) and a 40% fee increase per class for a basic application (formerly TEAS Plus). Proposed fee increases for intent-to-use (ITU) filings include 100% per class for an amendment to allege use (AAU), 50% per class for an AAU (paper submission), 50% per class for a statement of use (SOU) and 25% per class for an SOU (paper submission). The fee for a fourth and subsequent request for a six-month extension per class for filing an SOU would increase 100% and 56% per class for an SOU (paper submission).

Proposed fee increases for renewals include 17% per class for § 9 registration renewals, 10% per class (paper submission) and 17% for renewals filed at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).

The proposed fee increase for a Letter of Protest (LOP) would be 400%, and a petition to the director would increase 60% and 43% (paper submission). Petitions to revive an application would increase 67%, and petitions to revive (paper submission) would increase 40%.

Proposed fee increases for declarations of use include 33% per class for § 8 declarations and § 71 declarations, and 23% for paper submission. Section 15 declarations of incontestability would increase 25% per class and 17% per class (paper submission).

A hybrid public hearing is scheduled for June 5, 2023. Those wishing to present oral testimonies at the hearing must submit a written request by May 26, 2023. Written comments on the proposed fees will be accepted until June 12, 2023. The PTO anticipates that the fee changes will be implemented around November 2024.

For further details, including a complete list of the proposed fee increases, see the latest trademark fee setting information on the PTO website.

Weeded Out: Mark for Drug Paraphernalia Described as “Essential Oil Dispenser” Refused Registration

by Tessa Kroll | May 18, 2023 | Trademarks

Addressing the registrability of marks for cannabis-related products, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board upheld an Examiner’s refusal to register marks for an “essential oil dispenser” based on extrinsic evidence that the dispenser was primarily used with cannabis extract. In re National Concessions Group, Inc., Ser. Nos. 87168058 and 87183434 (TTAB May 3, 2023) (Thurmon, Greenbaum, English, ATJs) (precedential).

National Concessions sought registration of the word mark BAKKED and a stylized drop logo for an “essential oil dispenser, sold empty, for domestic use” on the Principal Register. The specimen provided by National Concessions illustrated the two marks on an oil dispensing pen identified as “THE DABARATUS.” After reviewing National Concessions’ website—where THE DABARATUS was touted as “THE ALL-IN-ONE TOOL FOR DABBING” that delivers “THE PERFECT DOSE OF CANNABIS EXTRACT”—the Examiner concluded that THE DABARATUS was unlawful drug paraphernalia under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and refused registration of the marks. National Concessions appealed on the following three grounds:

The goods are not drug paraphernalia because they are used to dispense essential oil.
The exemption in Section 863(f)(1) of the CSA applies because National Concessions was permitted to sell the goods under Colorado state law.
The exemption in Section 863(f)(2) of the CSA applies because the goods are traditionally intended for tobacco products.

After briefing, the Board suspended the appeal and remanded the applications to the Examiner to request information from National Concessions concerning the legislative histories of Sections 863(f)(1) and (2) of the CSA and the relevant provisions of Colorado state law. The Examiner then issued a Supplemental Final Office Action maintaining the refusal of both marks, and the Board continued proceedings.

The Board began its analysis by outlining the relevant provisions of the CSA, explaining that for a mark to be eligible for registration, the goods must be legal under federal law. Under Section 863(a) of the CSA, it is unlawful to sell “drug paraphernalia,” which is defined as “any equipment, product, or material of any kind which is primarily intended or designed for use in … introducing into the human body a controlled substance, possession of which is unlawful under [the CSA],” including marijuana and marijuana-based preparations. The CSA includes exemptions for any person authorized by local, state or federal law to distribute such items (Section 863(f)(1)) or any item that is traditionally intended for use with tobacco products (Section 863(f)(2)).

The Board first found that National Concessions’ “essential oil dispenser” was prohibited drug paraphernalia under the CSA, even though the product was not unlawful as described in the application. The Board noted that extrinsic evidence, such as an applicant’s marketing materials or product instructions, can be used to show a violation of the CSA even if the application does not reveal a per se violation. After considering National Concessions’ website as well as third-party websites and articles, the Board agreed with the Examiner that National Concessions’ “essential oil dispenser” was primarily intended to dispense cannabis oil for “dabbing”—a method of inhaling superheated cannabis concentrates. The [...]

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No Extra Life: Harmless Claim Construction Error Does Not Restart Invalidity Challenge

by Christian Tatum | May 18, 2023 | America Invents Act, Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision, finding that under the harmless error rule, the challenged claims were invalid as obvious even if the Board erred in claim construction. Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Interactive Entertainment LLC, Case Nos. 22-1291 (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2023) (Prost, Reyna, Cunningham, JJ.).

Bot M8 owns a patent related to a gaming machine that authenticates certain data and includes both a board and a motherboard. The independent claims require that a “game program” is stored in memory on the board and written to the motherboard only after the game program has been authenticated by a central processing unit (CPU) on the motherboard (the Write Limitation). Sony Interactive Entertainment petitioned for inter partes review (IPR). Ultimately, the Board determined that the challenged claims were unpatentable as obvious. Bot M8 appealed.

The issue presented to the Federal Circuit was what data the Write Limitation precludes from being written to the motherboard prior to authentication: (1) the entire game program, (2) any portion of the game program and/or (3) any data (including data not related to the game program). It was undisputed that the claims at minimum preclude writing the entire game program to the motherboard before authentication (option 1). Both the Board and the Court rejected Bot M8’s argument that would preclude writing any data whatsoever before authentication (option 3). The question thus resolved into whether the Write Limitation also precluded writing any portion of the game program prior to authentication (option 2). Bot M8 argued that it did.

Bot M8 focused on a statement made by the Board as indicative that the Board applied an erroneous claim construction that would allow a portion of the game program to be written prior to authentication (rejecting option 2): “[Bot M8] seeks to read into claim 1 a requirement that nothing related to, or any portion of, the gaming information be read into [the motherboard’s] RAM … prior to authenticating the game program.”

The Federal Circuit rejected Bot M8’s argument, finding that even if the Board erred in construing the claim, Bot M8 failed to demonstrate that the alleged error was harmful. Specifically, the Court found that any such error was harmless because the Board never needed to apply an improper construction since it found the prior art disclosed writing only non-game program data prior to authentication, a protocol that both the Board and the Court found was not precluded by the Write Limitation. Deeming the Board’s potential claim construction error harmless, the Court affirmed the Board’s invalidity determination.

Practice Note: Parties seeking to appeal a Board decision based on an improper claim construction theory should demonstrate how the Board’s error resulted in harm.

Blunt Rejection of Attorney Fees in Stipulated Dismissal

by Lillian Spetrino | May 18, 2023 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the rejection of attorney fees, finding that neither inequitable conduct nor a conflict of interest rendered the case exceptional given the limited factual record following a stipulated dismissal in a patent case. United Cannabis Corp. v. Pure Hemp Collective Inc., Case No. 22-1363 (Fed. Cir. May 8, 2023) (Lourie, Cunningham, Stark, JJ.).

United Cannabis Corporation (UCANN) sued Pure Hemp for patent infringement. After the litigation was stayed pending bankruptcy proceedings, the parties stipulated to the dismissal. Pure Hemp then sought attorney fees based on alleged inequitable conduct by UCANN during prosecution of the asserted patent due to nondisclosure of a prior art reference used in the patent’s specification and based on a purported conflict of interest by UCANN’s litigation counsel. The district court denied Pure Hemp’s request, finding that the case was not exceptional. Pure Hemp appealed.

Pure Hemp argued that the district court erred by (1) failing to find Pure Hemp to be the prevailing party in the litigation, (2) not concluding that the undisputed facts established inequitable conduct and (3) not recognizing that UCANN’s attorneys had a conflict of interest.

The Federal Circuit found that although the district court erred in not finding Pure Hemp to be the prevailing party, this was a harmless error. The Court explained that by fending off UCANN’s lawsuit with a stipulation dismissing UCANN’s claims with prejudice, Pure Hemp is a prevailing party under § 285. However, the Court concluded that this error was harmless because the district court ultimately concluded that this case was unexceptional.

The Federal Circuit found Pure Hemp’s arguments on inequitable conduct without merit. The Court explained that it had no findings to review because Pure Hemp voluntarily dismissed its inequitable conduct counterclaim and did not seek any post-dismissal inequitable conduct proceedings. Although Pure Hemp argued that it could prevail based on the undisputed facts in the record, the Court disagreed. It explained that even the limited record demonstrated at least a genuine dispute as to both the materiality and intent prongs of inequitable conduct and, therefore, the district court properly determined that Pure Hemp did not demonstrate that this case was exceptional.

The Federal Circuit also rejected Pure Hemp’s argument that copying and pasting portions from the prior art in the patent’s specification (but not disclosing the same prior art references) was inequitable conduct. The Court explained that unlike the nonbinding cases Pure Hemp relied on, the district court here did not find that the copied prior art was material, and the record gave no reason to disbelieve the explanation provided by UCANN’s prosecution counsel. The Court was also unpersuaded by Pure Hemp’s arguments to support inequitable conduct, explaining that the Court was not free to make its own findings on intent to deceive and materiality and, further, the district court was not required to provide its reasoning for its decision in attorney fee cases.

As to Pure Hemp’s argument that the case was exceptional because UCANN’s attorneys [...]

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Pending Appeal Does Not Divest Board of Statutory Authority to Institute IPRs

by Amol Parikh | May 18, 2023 | America Invents Act, Patents

In a case involving sua sponte review, the Director of the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) vacated an inter partes review (IPR) decision denying institution, found that the Patent Trial & Appeal Board had statutory authority to institute IPR review of a claim that had been previously found invalid by a district court under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (but under appeal), and remanded the proceeding for the Board to consider whether discretionary denial was appropriate. Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC v. Brunswick Corp., IPR2022-01366, -01367, -01368, -01369, -01424 (PTO May 2, 2023) (Vidal, Dir.).

Brunswick owns several patents related to marine vessels. Volvo filed IPR petitions challenging the patents, which the Board ultimately denied. Prior to the Board’s decision, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia determined that claim 1 in each of the challenged patents was directed to patent-ineligible subject matter and thus was invalid under § 101. In denying institution, the Board concluded that it lacked authority to institute the IPRs because the challenged claims were no longer in effect and the America Invents Act (AIA) only permits a petitioner to challenge a claim, noting that “when given its plain and ordinary meaning, § 311(b) provides that only claims that are in effect may be annulled.” Although Brunswick appealed the district court’s decision, the Board determined that the challenged claims were finally adjudicated. Thus, the Board lacked authority to institute the requested IPR. The Board also determined that the multi-factor Fintiv analysis for discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 214(a) was inapplicable here in view of the district court’s invalidity finding.

The Director reviewed the Board’s decision sua sponte and vacated the Board’s institution decision with instructions to analyze Fintiv factors 1 through 5 in view of the parallel district court proceeding.

The Director first addressed the Board’s § 311(b) analysis. The Director concluded that in finding the district court’s invalidity determination to be a final adjudication, the Board appeared to have borrowed from collateral estoppel principles. The Director found, however, that these principles do not apply to § 311(b) nor was there any assertion that Volvo was collaterally estopped from pursuing IPRs. The Director also determined that the challenged claims were not fully adjudicated since the district court’s decision was subject to further judicial review. Thus, the Director found that the Board had statutory authority to institute the IPRs.

Next, the Director addressed the Board’s Fintiv analysis, finding that the Board improperly interpreted Fintiv as limited to its exercise of discretion in the context of ongoing parallel district court litigation where final judgment has not yet been entered. The Director explained that the Fintiv analysis applied where, as here, the claims remain subject to further review on appeal. The Director instructed the Board to evaluate the Fintiv factors on remand and instructed that if the Board determines that these factors favor discretion to deny institution, the Board should then consider whether the case on the merits is compelling (consistent with the
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What’s Shakin’ Bacon? Not Inventorship—Contribution to Invention Can’t Be “Insignificant”

by James M. Oehler | May 11, 2023 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court decision and found that an asserted inventor not named in the application was not a joint inventor because in the context of the entire invention his contribution was too insignificant to constitute joint inventorship. HIP, Inc. v. Hormel Foods Corp., Case No. 22-1696 (Fed. Cir. May 2, 2023) (Lourie, Clevenger, Taranto, JJ.)

Hormel owns a patent directed to precooking bacon and meat pieces. The patent claims a two-step method that involves a preheating step using a microwave oven, infrared oven or hot air, and then a higher-temperature cooking step. Prior to filing its patent application, Hormel and HIP entered into a joint agreement to develop an oven for the two-step cooking process. Hormel evaluated an HIP oven and learned, among other things, that preheating the bacon via a microwave oven prevented condensation from washing away the salt and flavor. HIP’s David Howard suggested an infrared oven (already known in the art) as a possibility for use in the preheating step. Hormel subsequently filed a patent application that did not name Howard as a joint inventor. HIP sued Hormel alleging that Howard was a joint inventor. The district court found that Howard was a joint inventor based solely on his alleged contribution of infrared preheating. Hormel appealed.

The inventors listed on an issued patent are presumed to be the only true inventors. Thus, a party must prove a claim to correct inventorship by clear and convincing evidence. A joint inventor must do the following:

Contribute in a significant manner to the conception or reduction to practice of the invention
Make a contribution to the claimed invention that is not insignificant in quality when that contribution is measured against the dimension of the full invention
Do more than explain well-known concepts or the current state of the art.

The Federal Circuit found that Howard’s alleged contribution of using an infrared oven for preheating the bacon was insignificant in quality when measured against the full invention, which it found to be clearly focused on preheating with a microwave oven. Preheating with an infrared oven was briefly mentioned in passing as an alternative to a microwave oven in the patent’s specification and in a single dependent claim. In contrast to using an infrared oven, the patent claims, specification and figures all prominently featured using a microwave oven for the preheating step. All the independent claims required or allowed using a microwave oven for the preheating step. The specification also repeatedly referred to preheating with a microwave oven, including in the background of the invention and the summary of the invention sections. Further, the examples and corresponding figures included procedures using a microwave oven to preheat, but no mention of using an infrared oven to preheat. Accordingly, the Court found that Howard’s infrared oven suggestion was insignificant in light of the full invention.

The Federal Circuit did not address the other requirements for joint inventorship, reasoning that since all three [...]

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