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Blunt Rejection of Attorney Fees in Stipulated Dismissal

by | May 18, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the rejection of attorney fees, finding that neither inequitable conduct nor a conflict of interest rendered the case exceptional given the limited factual record following a stipulated dismissal in a patent case. United Cannabis Corp. v. Pure Hemp Collective Inc., Case No. 22-1363 (Fed. Cir. May 8, 2023) (Lourie, Cunningham, Stark, JJ.).

United Cannabis Corporation (UCANN) sued Pure Hemp for patent infringement. After the litigation was stayed pending bankruptcy proceedings, the parties stipulated to the dismissal. Pure Hemp then sought attorney fees based on alleged inequitable conduct by UCANN during prosecution of the asserted patent due to nondisclosure of a prior art reference used in the patent’s specification and based on a purported conflict of interest by UCANN’s litigation counsel. The district court denied Pure Hemp’s request, finding that the case was not exceptional. Pure Hemp appealed.

Pure Hemp argued that the district court erred by (1) failing to find Pure Hemp to be the prevailing party in the litigation, (2) not concluding that the undisputed facts established inequitable conduct and (3) not recognizing that UCANN’s attorneys had a conflict of interest.

The Federal Circuit found that although the district court erred in not finding Pure Hemp to be the prevailing party, this was a harmless error. The Court explained that by fending off UCANN’s lawsuit with a stipulation dismissing UCANN’s claims with prejudice, Pure Hemp is a prevailing party under § 285. However, the Court concluded that this error was harmless because the district court ultimately concluded that this case was unexceptional.

The Federal Circuit found Pure Hemp’s arguments on inequitable conduct without merit. The Court explained that it had no findings to review because Pure Hemp voluntarily dismissed its inequitable conduct counterclaim and did not seek any post-dismissal inequitable conduct proceedings. Although Pure Hemp argued that it could prevail based on the undisputed facts in the record, the Court disagreed. It explained that even the limited record demonstrated at least a genuine dispute as to both the materiality and intent prongs of inequitable conduct and, therefore, the district court properly determined that Pure Hemp did not demonstrate that this case was exceptional.

The Federal Circuit also rejected Pure Hemp’s argument that copying and pasting portions from the prior art in the patent’s specification (but not disclosing the same prior art references) was inequitable conduct. The Court explained that unlike the nonbinding cases Pure Hemp relied on, the district court here did not find that the copied prior art was material, and the record gave no reason to disbelieve the explanation provided by UCANN’s prosecution counsel. The Court was also unpersuaded by Pure Hemp’s arguments to support inequitable conduct, explaining that the Court was not free to make its own findings on intent to deceive and materiality and, further, the district court was not required to provide its reasoning for its decision in attorney fee cases.

As to Pure Hemp’s argument that the case was exceptional because UCANN’s attorneys [...]

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Pending Appeal Does Not Divest Board of Statutory Authority to Institute IPRs

by | May 18, 2023 | ,

In a case involving sua sponte review, the Director of the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) vacated an inter partes review (IPR) decision denying institution, found that the Patent Trial & Appeal Board had statutory authority to institute IPR review of a claim that had been previously found invalid by a district court under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (but under appeal), and remanded the proceeding for the Board to consider whether discretionary denial was appropriate. Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC v. Brunswick Corp., IPR2022-01366, -01367, -01368, -01369, -01424 (PTO May 2, 2023) (Vidal, Dir.).

Brunswick owns several patents related to marine vessels. Volvo filed IPR petitions challenging the patents, which the Board ultimately denied. Prior to the Board’s decision, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia determined that claim 1 in each of the challenged patents was directed to patent-ineligible subject matter and thus was invalid under § 101. In denying institution, the Board concluded that it lacked authority to institute the IPRs because the challenged claims were no longer in effect and the America Invents Act (AIA) only permits a petitioner to challenge a claim, noting that “when given its plain and ordinary meaning, § 311(b) provides that only claims that are in effect may be annulled.” Although Brunswick appealed the district court’s decision, the Board determined that the challenged claims were finally adjudicated. Thus, the Board lacked authority to institute the requested IPR. The Board also determined that the multi-factor Fintiv analysis for discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 214(a) was inapplicable here in view of the district court’s invalidity finding.

The Director reviewed the Board’s decision sua sponte and vacated the Board’s institution decision with instructions to analyze Fintiv factors 1 through 5 in view of the parallel district court proceeding.

The Director first addressed the Board’s § 311(b) analysis. The Director concluded that in finding the district court’s invalidity determination to be a final adjudication, the Board appeared to have borrowed from collateral estoppel principles. The Director found, however, that these principles do not apply to § 311(b) nor was there any assertion that Volvo was collaterally estopped from pursuing IPRs. The Director also determined that the challenged claims were not fully adjudicated since the district court’s decision was subject to further judicial review. Thus, the Director found that the Board had statutory authority to institute the IPRs.

Next, the Director addressed the Board’s Fintiv analysis, finding that the Board improperly interpreted Fintiv as limited to its exercise of discretion in the context of ongoing parallel district court litigation where final judgment has not yet been entered. The Director explained that the Fintiv analysis applied where, as here, the claims remain subject to further review on appeal. The Director instructed the Board to evaluate the Fintiv factors on remand and instructed that if the Board determines that these factors favor discretion to deny institution, the Board should then consider whether the case on the merits is compelling (consistent with the
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What’s Shakin’ Bacon? Not Inventorship—Contribution to Invention Can’t Be “Insignificant”

by | May 11, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court decision and found that an asserted inventor not named in the application was not a joint inventor because in the context of the entire invention his contribution was too insignificant to constitute joint inventorship. HIP, Inc. v. Hormel Foods Corp., Case No. 22-1696 (Fed. Cir. May 2, 2023) (Lourie, Clevenger, Taranto, JJ.)

Hormel owns a patent directed to precooking bacon and meat pieces. The patent claims a two-step method that involves a preheating step using a microwave oven, infrared oven or hot air, and then a higher-temperature cooking step. Prior to filing its patent application, Hormel and HIP entered into a joint agreement to develop an oven for the two-step cooking process. Hormel evaluated an HIP oven and learned, among other things, that preheating the bacon via a microwave oven prevented condensation from washing away the salt and flavor. HIP’s David Howard suggested an infrared oven (already known in the art) as a possibility for use in the preheating step. Hormel subsequently filed a patent application that did not name Howard as a joint inventor. HIP sued Hormel alleging that Howard was a joint inventor. The district court found that Howard was a joint inventor based solely on his alleged contribution of infrared preheating. Hormel appealed.

The inventors listed on an issued patent are presumed to be the only true inventors. Thus, a party must prove a claim to correct inventorship by clear and convincing evidence. A joint inventor must do the following:

  • Contribute in a significant manner to the conception or reduction to practice of the invention
  • Make a contribution to the claimed invention that is not insignificant in quality when that contribution is measured against the dimension of the full invention
  • Do more than explain well-known concepts or the current state of the art.

The Federal Circuit found that Howard’s alleged contribution of using an infrared oven for preheating the bacon was insignificant in quality when measured against the full invention, which it found to be clearly focused on preheating with a microwave oven. Preheating with an infrared oven was briefly mentioned in passing as an alternative to a microwave oven in the patent’s specification and in a single dependent claim. In contrast to using an infrared oven, the patent claims, specification and figures all prominently featured using a microwave oven for the preheating step. All the independent claims required or allowed using a microwave oven for the preheating step. The specification also repeatedly referred to preheating with a microwave oven, including in the background of the invention and the summary of the invention sections. Further, the examples and corresponding figures included procedures using a microwave oven to preheat, but no mention of using an infrared oven to preheat. Accordingly, the Court found that Howard’s infrared oven suggestion was insignificant in light of the full invention.

The Federal Circuit did not address the other requirements for joint inventorship, reasoning that since all three [...]

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Hanging Patentability on Written Description Cannot Be Truss-ted

by | May 4, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a Patent Trial & Appeal Board finding that the claims of a patent for a truss hanger were invalid for lack of written description because they claimed an undisclosed range despite the predictable nature of the technology. Columbia Insurance Company v. Simpson Strong-Tie Company Inc., Case Nos. 21-2145; -2157 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 31, 2023) (Prost, Hughes, JJ.) (Moore, C.J., dissenting) (non-precedential).

Truss hangers secure support beams to wall frames in buildings. These hangers normally accommodate layers of fire-resistant sheathing by cutting out the sheathing that overlaps with the hanger, but this can reduce fire resistance. Columbia owns a patent claiming a truss hanger that extends through the sheathing and does not decrease fire resistance. The extension for the sheathing, illustrated below, must be “sized large enough to permit two layers of ⅝ inch thick sheathing to be received between the rear edge plane and the back flange plane, but too small to permit three layers of ⅝ inch thick sheathing to be received.”

Simpson petitioned for a post-grant review of the patent at the Board. That proceeding resulted in a mixed decision. The Board found in favor of Simpson that certain original claims and certain substitute claims of the patent were unpatentable for lack of written description and that certain claims were obvious over the prior art. However, it found in favor of Columbia with regard to one claim. Both parties appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s findings regarding written description. The claimed extension portion covered a range of extension sizes between the upper limit (three layers of five-eighths-inch-thick sheathing) and lower limit (two layers of five-eighths-inch-thick sheathing). The Court affirmed the Board’s finding that nothing in the specification covered the claimed upper limit. Columbia argued that a skilled artisan would read the claims to cover exactly two layers of five-eighths-inch-thick sheathing, but the Court found that this claim construction argument was forfeited because it was raised for the first time on appeal and, even if it weren’t, it was incorrect because it was akin to rewriting the claims.

The Federal Circuit also affirmed the Board’s finding that certain claims were obvious, concluding that the Board’s determination was supported by substantial evidence. The Court rejected Columbia’s argument that the Board’s claim construction violated the Administrative Procedure Act because the construction adopted by the Board was similar enough to Simpson’s proposed construction and not raised sua sponte.

Finally, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s finding that the claim on which Simpson appealed was not indefinite because the term “large enough to permit the drywall to be received” informs a skilled artisan with reasonable certainty that the scope of this claim includes any extension portion sized larger than the smallest commonly known sheathing size. The Court also found that the claim was not obvious because the Board correctly interpreted the claim language [...]

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PTO Proposes Patent Fee Increases

by | May 4, 2023 |

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) announced proposed patent fee increases. Patent fees would increase by about 5% across the board because of inflation.

Certain fees would be increased by substantially more than the 5% inflationary increase to reduce subsidization from other fee sources. For example, the overall design patent fees would increase by 48%, based on a 27% increase in filing, search and examination fees and a 76% issue fee increase. The PTO also proposes a 100% increase in the excess claim fee for each claim over 20, and a 25% increase in the fee for each independent claim over three. Because the costs of reviewing patent term extensions is complex, the PTO proposes fee increases of 196% to 468%. The PTO also proposes a fee of $500 for filing an After Final Consideration Pilot (AFCP) 2.0 request, and new fees for filing an information disclosure statement (IDS) that causes the number of applicant-provided citations to exceed 50, 100 or 200 citations, respectively.

To offset the loss of future maintenance fee payments, the PTO proposes fees of $1,500 for continuing applications filed more than three years from the earliest benefit date and $3,000 for continuing applications filed more than seven years from the earliest benefit date.

Other proposed fee increases are intended to expedite the patent examination process. For example, the PTO proposes a 25% increase in the fee for a second request for continued examination (RCE) and an 80% increase for a third or subsequent RCE. The fee for a terminal disclaimer filed after the first action on the merits and before a final rejection would increase by 194%. After a final rejection or notice of allowance, the fee would increase by 371%. On or after a notice of appeal, the increase would be 547%, and the proposed increase for filing a terminal disclaimer in an issued patent would be 724%.

The PTO further proposes increasing Patent Trial & Appeal Board America Invents Act (AIA) trial fees by 25%. The PTO also proposes new fees for inter partes review (IPR) and post grant review (PGR) petitions that exceed the word count limits. For example, the PTO proposes a 50% higher fee for petitions that exceed the word count limit by up to 50%, and a 100% higher fee for those that exceed the limit by up to 100%.

A public hearing is scheduled for May 18, 2023. Those wishing to present oral testimony at the hearing must submit a written request by May 11, 2023. Written comments on the proposed fees will be accepted until May 25, 2023.

The PTO anticipates that the fee changes will be implemented around January 2025.

More details, including a complete list of the proposed fee increases, can be found on the PTO website.



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Strike 1: Priority. Strike 2 :Likelihood of Confusion. Strike 3: You’re Out under Section 2(d).

by | Apr 27, 2023 |

The Trademark Trial & Appeal Board affirmed the rejection of three trademark applications, finding that the applied-for marks would cause confusion with a record-setting major league baseball player. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Chisena, Opp. Nos. 91240180; 91242556; 91243244 (TTAB Apr. 12, 2023) (Cataldo, Heasley, Larkin, ATJ.) (precedential).

Michael P. Chisena sought registration of the standard character marks ALL RISE and HERE COMES THE JUDGE, along with the following design mark for use in commerce on “clothing, namely, t-shirts, shirts, shorts, pants, sweatshirts, sweatpants, jackets, jerseys, athletic uniforms, and caps.”

New York Yankees outfielder Aaron Judge and the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) filed Notices of Opposition challenging Chisena’s registration for likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), among other things.

At the outset, the Board addressed the issue of whether Judge and MLBPA were entitled to a statutory cause of action challenging the registration of Chisena’s marks. The Board found standing, concluding that both Judge and MLBPA had “legitimate interest[s] in the outcome of this opposition” because granting Chisena’s registration “would provide a prima facie right to exclusive use of [the] marks on [the] identified apparel, in competition with the apparel marketed by Opposers’ licensees.” The Board reasoned that this stake in the outcome of the opposition created a sufficiently high level of potential harm to Judge and MLBPA to support standing.

Turning to the merits of the Section 2(d) claim, the Board explained that Judge and MLBPA must “prove both priority of use of their pleaded marks and a likelihood of confusion between those marks and those Applicant ha[d] applied to register.”

First, the Board addressed priority of use of ALL RISE and HERE COMES THE JUDGE, as well as judicial designs, such as a gavel, courthouse image or the scales of justice, as trademarks on t-shirts, baseball caps and other athletic apparel. Judge and MLBPA established that Judge had been an MLBPA member since 2016 and that since then, “numerous licensees have obtained approval to produce and market products bearing his personal indicia.”

Chisena responded with multiple arguments in favor of priority but the Board found none to be persuasive. The Board reasoned as follows:

  • “[T]he relevant purchasing public [would] clearly perceive[] ‘JUDGE’ in the context of ‘HERE COMES THE JUDGE’ as a play on words, embracing both its judicial and surname meanings.”
  • “[B]aseball fans and commentators began using ‘ALL RISE’ as a play on Aaron Judge’s last name early in his career,” and whether it is a nickname or not, there is “a protectable property right in any term the public has come to associate with . . . goods or services.”
  • The slogans and symbols function as trademarks because “consumers who encounter [them] on t-shirts and other athletic apparel would recognize, associate, and perceive them as pointing to a single source: Aaron Judge.”
  • “[T]he judicial phrases and symbols . . . serve to perform the [...]

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Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Validity Upheld Based on Expert Separation Testimony

by | Apr 27, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court decision finding that two patents covering enantiomerically pure compositions of the psoriasis drug Otezla® (apremilast) were valid and one patent covering a dosage titration schedule was invalid as obvious. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. Case No. 22-1147 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 2023) (Lourie, Cunningham, Stark, JJ.)

Amgen markets apremilast, a phosphodiesterase-4 inhibitor that is used for treating psoriasis and related conditions, under the brand name Otezla®. Amgen has three patents covering Otezla®. Two of the patents are directed to orally administered pharmaceutical compositions of enantiomerically pure apremilast (composition patents), and one of the patents covers a dosage titration schedule for enantiomerically pure apremilast that ranges from a starting dose of 10 mg to a dose of 60 mg by the sixth day (dosage patent). Sandoz submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) seeking approval from the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to market a generic version of apremilast. Amgen filed suit against Sandoz for infringement of its three patents covering Otezla®.

Sandoz asserted that the composition patents were invalid based on prior art that had an example (Example 12) that described a 50%:50% racemic mixture of apremilast but did not disclose the purified apremilast (+) enantiomer recited in the claims. The prior art did state that apremilast could be isolated from this racemic mixture using chiral chromatography, a well-known technique. The district court rejected Sandoz’s argument, finding that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that a skilled artisan would have had reason to believe that the desirable properties of Example 12 derived in whole or in part from the apremilast enantiomer (i.e., the (+) enantiomer). The district court also concluded that Sandoz had not demonstrated that a skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in resolving Example 12 into its individual enantiomeric components. Furthermore, the district court looked to objective indicia of non-obviousness, finding that apremilast unexpectedly provided substantial improvement over previously known phosphodiesterase inhibitors in terms of both efficacy and tolerability, and a nexus existed between the unexpected potency and the asserted claims.

Sandoz also argued that the dosage patent was invalid based on prior art that taught various dosage schedules and amounts for apremilast. The district court found that it would have been within the ability of a skilled artisan to titrate apremilast for a patient presenting with psoriasis and that doing so would have been a routine aspect of treating psoriasis with a drug (such as apremilast) that was known in the art to require dose titration to ameliorate side effects. The district court therefore found that the dosage patent was invalid. Sandoz appealed with respect to the composition patents, and Amgen appealed with respect to the dosage patent.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision with respect to the composition patents, finding that Sandoz had not proven that a skilled artisan would have had sufficient motivation to purify apremilast’s (+) enantiomer from the racemic mixture disclosed in Example [...]

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Reaching New Lights: Inherent Upper Limit Enables Open-Ended Range

by | Apr 27, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed an International Trade Commission decision finding a § 337 violation. The Court concluded that the Commission correctly found that an open-ended claim was enabled since there was an inherent upper limit and correctly construed the term “a” to mean “one or more” in finding infringement. FS.com Inc. v. International Trade Commission, Case No. 22-1228 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 2023) (Moore, Prost, Hughes, JJ.)

Corning Optical Communications owns several patents directed to fiber optic technology. Corning alleged that FS violated § 337 by importing high-density fiber optic equipment that infringed the patents. In assessing infringement, the Commission construed the claim term “a front opening” to mean “an opening located in the front side of a fiber optic module (e.g., the opening depicted in Figure 13 of the [asserted] patent as having dimensions H1 and W1”) and further concluded that the term encompassed one or more openings. The Commission found that FS’s products met this requirement and therefore infringed. FS argued that certain claims were invalid because they were not enabled. The claims at issue recited “a fiber optic connection density of at least ninety-eight (98) fiber optic connections per U space” or “a fiber optic connection of at least one hundred forty-four (144) fiber optic connections per U space.” FS argued that these open-ended density ranges were not enabled because the specification only enabled up to 144 fiber optic connections per U space. The Commission rejected FS’s invalidity argument. FS appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission’s enablement determination. The Court explained that open-ended claims are not inherently improper and may be enabled “if there is an inherent, albeit not precisely known, upper limit and the specification enables one of skill in the art to approach that limit.” The Court found that there was an inherent upper limit of about 144 connections per U space since skilled artisans would have understood that densities substantially above 144 connections per U space were technologically infeasible. The Court further found that the specification disclosed that the maximum density achievable was 144 connections per U space and expert testimony confirmed that, despite market pressure, no commercial product has achieved a density greater than 144 connections. Considering this evidence, the Court concluded that the Commission properly found that the open-ended claims had an inherent upper limit of about 144 connections per U space and the claimed open-ended range was therefore enabled.

The Federal Circuit also affirmed the Commission’s infringement determination. The Court explained that the terms “a” or “an” in a patent claim generally mean “one or more,” unless the patentee evinces a clear intent to limit “a” or “an” to “one.” FS argued that the recitation of “front openings” in an unasserted claim showed a clear intent to limit “a front opening” in the asserted claim to a single opening. The Court rejected that argument, finding that limiting an unasserted claim to multiple openings did not show an intent to limit the asserted claim to [...]

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No Spark Here: TTAB Refuses to Register Similar Mark for Real Estate Services

by | Apr 27, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board’s refusal to register a mark due to the “close similarity” between the applied-for mark and a previously registered mark. In Re: Charger Ventures LLC, Case No. 22-1094 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 13, 2023) (Prost, Reyna, Stark, JJ.)

Charger Ventures applied to register SPARK LIVING, identifying its services as rental property management and real estate leasing and listing. Based on an existing mark, SPARK, which identified other real estate services such as rental brokerage, commercial property leasing and management, the Examining Attorney ultimately refused to register Charger’s mark, despite Charger twice amending its application and disclaiming the word LIVING. Charger appealed to the Board, which used the 13 DuPont factors to analyze likelihood of confusion. The Board focused on five of the DuPont factors:

  1. Similarity of the marks: SPARK LIVING fully incorporates SPARK, and LIVING is both descriptive and disclaimed, making it “subordinate to SPARK.”
  2. Similarity of the nature of goods/services: While not identical, commercial and residential real estate services may “emanate from a single source under a single mark.”
  3. Similarity of trade channels: There exists “some overlap” between commercial and residential real estate trade channels.
  4. Class of purchasers: Although real estate purchasers exercise a high level of care, “even . . . sophisticated purchasers are not immune from source confusion.”
  5. Strength of the mark: Although SPARK is somewhat commercially weak, “even weak marks are entitled to protection.”

The Board did not announce the weight it afforded to each factor but found that Charger failed to overcome the high similarity between its mark and SPARK. The Board therefore affirmed the Examining Attorney and refused to register SPARK LIVING. Charger appealed to the Federal Circuit.

As to factor 1, Charger argued that the Board erred in finding similarity of the marks. The Federal Circuit disagreed, noting that Charger disclaimed LIVING from its mark. The Court explained that disclaimer has no legal effect on likelihood of confusion because consumers do not know which words have been disclaimed. The Court found that the Board properly considered the full mark and that the marks were clearly similar.

As to factors 2 and 3, Charger argued that the previous SPARK registration could not be newly extended to include residential real estate services. The Federal Circuit rejected Charger’s argument, finding that many marks bridge the commercial and residential gap and that a registration’s listed services do not limit the trade channels in which the mark actually operates.

Regarding factor 4, Charger argued that SPARK and SPARK LIVING appealed to different classes of purchasers. The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that Charger had failed to show that residential property owners were distinct from commercial owners.

Charger asserted that the Board improperly analyzed factor 5, since a mark’s weakness is “paramount” to likelihood of confusion. However, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board that Charger failed to overcome the registered mark’s presumption of validity, despite other “spark” marks in the field. The Court [...]

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Same Old Story: Copyright Discovery Rule Still Applies

by | Apr 27, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s infringement determination, finding that the copyright owner’s claims were timely since they were brought within three years of discovering the infringement. Martinelli v. Hearst Newspapers LLC, Case No. 22-20333 (5th Cir. Apr. 13, 2023) (Barksdale, Southwick, Higginson, JJ.)

In 2015, Sotheby’s International Realty commissioned Antonio Martinelli to photograph an Irish estate owned by the Guinness family. Martinelli took seven photographs of the property, and the property was subsequently listed for sale. On March 7, 2017, Hearst Newspapers used those commissioned photographs in news articles discussing the sale in various Hearst publications. Over the next few years, Martinelli learned about Hearst’s use of the photographs. For instance, on November 17, 2018, Martinelli learned about the use of the photographs in the Houston Chronicle, and between September 2019 and May 2020, Martinelli learned about further use of the photographs in the San Francisco Chronicle, the Times Union, the Greenwich Time, the Middletown Press and the Elle Décor website. Based on these uses, Martinelli sued for copyright infringement on October 18, 2021—more than three years after the initial publication but less than three years after Martinelli discovered the publication.

Hearst stipulated both to infringement and that Martinelli could not have discovered the use of the copyrighted photographs at an earlier time. Instead, Hearst argued that Martinelli was too slow in bringing his infringement action since, under 17 U.S.C. § 507(b), the action must be brought within three years of the infringement, regardless of a plaintiff’s knowledge or diligence. The district court disagreed, holding that § 507(b) follows the discovery rule, which means the limitations period only begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury. Hearst appealed.

Hearst argued that the district court’s decision ran afoul of the Supreme Court’s 2019 decisions in Petrella v. MGM and Rotkiske v. Klemm. According to Hearst, under Petrella and Rotkiske, the discovery rule cannot apply to § 507(b) and the limitations period starts “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” The Fifth Circuit disagreed.

The Fifth Circuit began by explaining that unless unequivocally overruled by a Supreme Court decision, an en banc court or a change in law, it was bound by its 2014 decision in Graper v. Mid-Continent Casualty, which held that the limitations period starts running “once the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury upon which the claim is based.” Since neither party asserted that there had been an en banc decision or a change in the law, the only question was whether Petrella or Rotkiske overruled Granger.

Since the Supreme Court explicitly refused to address whether the discovery rule applied to § 507(b) in Petrella, the Fifth Circuit refused to read Petrella as overruling Graper. Turning to Rotkiske, the Fifth Circuit noted the Supreme Court’s statement that “[i]f there are two plausible constructions of a statute of limitations, we generally adopt the construction that starts the time limit running when the [...]

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