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Lanham Act Liability May Apply to Copyrighted Material

by | Jun 8, 2023 | ,

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that liability under the Copyright Act and liability under the Lanham Act are not mutually exclusive and that liability under the Copyright Act does not negate trade dress damages under the Lanham Act. Jason Scott Collection, Inc. v. Trendily Furniture, LLC, Case No. 21-16978 (9th Cir. May 30, 2023) (Wardlaw, Bumatay, Schreier (sitting by designation), JJ.)

Jason Scott Collection (JSC) and Trendily Furniture are high-end furniture manufacturers that sell their products in the Texas market. In 2016, Trendily intentionally copied three unique furniture designs by JSC and sold them to Texas retailers. Both collections featured heavy carved wood pieces with detailed embellishments and metal elements. The record showed that Trendily’s collection had been based on photographs of the preexisting JSC collection. The Trendily pieces were so similar that even JSC had initially mistaken the furniture as its own when confronted by a retailer. After JSC filed suit, the district court granted summary judgment to JSC on its copyright claim. Following a bench trial, the district court held Trendily liable on the trade dress claim. On that claim, the district court awarded almost $133,000 in prospective lost annual profits over a period of three years, which amounted to about six times the almost $20,000 in retrospective gross profits awarded on JSC’s copyright claim. Trendily appealed.

To obtain a judgment for trade dress infringement, a plaintiff must prove that the claimed trade dress is nonfunctional, the claimed trade dress serves a source-identifying role because it is either inherently distinctive or has acquired a secondary meaning and the defendant’s product creates a likelihood of confusion. Trendily argued that JSC had not adequately established a secondary meaning (for trade dress the parties stipulated was not inherently distinctive) or likelihood of confusion. The Ninth Circuit, however, found that the district court found adequate evidence of secondary meaning through copying and through confusion by retailers and consumers in the high-end furniture market. The Ninth Circuit also found that the district court had correctly found likelihood of confusion, putting special emphasis on Trendily’s intentional and precise copying of the JSC pieces leading to retailer confusion.

Turning to the damages award, Trendily argued that because copying is a commercially acceptable and necessary act in terms of competition, Trendily should only be held liable under the Copyright Act, rather than for trade dress infringement under the Lanham Act. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that liability under the Copyright Act and liability under the Lanham Act are not mutually exclusive and that liability under the Copyright Act did not negate the judgment against Trendily for trade dress damages under the Lanham Act. The Court then affirmed the trade dress damages award, finding that the prospective damages incurred when one of JSC’s business relationships fell apart because of Trendily’s copied furniture were reasonably foreseeable and had been “satisfactorily demonstrated.” The Court emphasized that the law only required “crude measures of damages in cases of intentional infringement.”

Finally, the Ninth Circuit affirmed [...]

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All’s Well That Edwell: Two Markets Can Be Substantially Different if Defined Narrowly Enough

by | Jun 8, 2023 |

Despite evidence of actual confusion and seemingly similar services, the US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld a district court’s noninfringement finding concerning two nearly identical education-related marks because the parties targeted different goods and marketing channels. M Welles & Assocs., Inc. v. Edwell, Inc., Case No. 22-1248 (10th Cir. May 31, 2023) (Ebel, Bacharach, JJ.) (Tymkovich, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Tymkovich criticized the lower court for characterizing the scope of the parties’ services too narrowly and observed that “[a]ny court can find some differences between businesses and markets at a particular level of generality.”

M Welles & Associates provides classes, seminars and certification workshops in the project management space under the brand name EDWEL (derived from “education done well”). The classes are designed for professionals in a variety of industries, including information technology, healthcare, education and the military. Welles primarily advertises its services via social media, Google and email, and further owns a variety of domain names incorporating both EDWEL and EDWELL. The defendant, Edwell, is a nonprofit organization that provides mental health coaching services to schoolteachers using the domain name Edwell.org and the brand name EDWELL (derived from “to be an educator and to be well”). Edwell operates by partnering with schools to provide its services and currently has partnerships with 10 K-12 public schools. Edwell does not target institutions of higher learning and does not offer services to corporations.

Welles first learned of Edwell’s services when it received a call from a potential customer asking about classes at Denver North High School—classes that were in fact offered by Edwell, not Welles. Welles sent a cease-and-desist notice to Edwell, which rebranded to “Educator Wellness Project” for a short time before reverting back to EDWELL. Welles then sued Edwell for trademark infringement, and the district court found that there was no likelihood of confusion. Welles appealed.

Welles raised three arguments on appeal:

  1. The magistrate judge used the wrong legal standard in assessing likelihood of confusion.
  2. The Tenth Circuit should adopt a presumption of confusion.
  3. The magistrate judge clearly erred in the analysis of Edwell’s intent, the similarity of the parties’ services and marketing, the degree of purchaser care and actual confusion.

Welles also moved to supplement the appellate record with new evidence of actual confusion that occurred after the trial.

Supplementation

The Tenth Circuit first addressed Welles’s motion, finding that there was no legitimate basis for supplementing the record. Fed. R. of Civ. P. 10(e) permits a court to modify the appellate record “only to the extent necessary to ‘truly disclose what occurred in the district court.’” Because the new evidence of actual confusion was not before the district court, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Rule 10(e) would not permit it to be added to the record. The Court further reasoned that the rare exception to Rule 10, which permits the court to supplement the record to correct misrepresentations, demonstrate mootness, or raise an issue for the first time on appeal, did not [...]

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Electra Powers Second Circuit’s False Endorsement Analysis

by | Jun 8, 2023 |

Following on the heels of its 2021 decision in Electra v. 59 Murray, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the summary judgment denial of a Lanham Act claim related to false endorsement premised upon the unauthorized use of photographs in connection with promotional materials. Souza et. al. v. Exotic Island Enterprs., Inc., Case No. 21-2149 (2d Cir. May 19, 2023) (Lynch, Nardini, Menashi, JJ.) The Second Circuit also affirmed the district court’s summary judgment denial of Lanham Act false advertising and New York state right of publicity claims.

The operator of a gentlemen’s club used photographs of current and former professional models in social media posts promoting the club. The photographs were obtained without the models’ permission through a third-party vendor. The models sued the club operator asserting false endorsement, false advertising and right of publicity violations. The parties filed dueling summary judgment motions in February 2021. During the pendency of those motions, the Second Circuit decided Electra, a case involving overlapping plaintiffs suing on several of the same causes of action based on highly similar fact patterns. The district court subsequently granted the club operator’s motion for summary judgment and denied the models’ motion. The models appealed.

The Second Circuit relied heavily on its Electra decision to affirm the district court’s denial of the models’ false endorsement claim. To prevail on a false endorsement claim under Section 43 of the Lanham Act, the models were required to prove that there was a likelihood of confusion between their goods or services and those of the club operator. Likelihood of consumer confusion is evaluated using the eight Polaroid factors:

  1. Strength of the trademark
  2. Similarity of the marks
  3. Proximity of the products and their competitiveness with one another
  4. Evidence that the senior user may bridge the gap by developing a product for sale in the market of the alleged infringer’s product
  5. Evidence of actual consumer confusion
  6. Evidence that the imitative mark was adopted in bad faith
  7. Respective quality of the products
  8. Sophistication of consumers in the relevant market.

First, the models argued that the district court oversimplified the “strength of the mark” analysis (factor 1) to focus only on the recognizability of the mark. The Second Circuit disagreed, explaining that not only was Electra’s focus on recognizability binding precedent but also, that factor was required to be evaluated in the context of the mark’s strength in the false endorsement context (i.e., as a function of the extent to which the endorser’s identity could be linked with the product being sold). In other words, without an adequate showing that the models were recognized in the social media posts promoting the club, there could be no case of endorsement, let alone false endorsement.

Second, the models challenged the district court’s exclusion of their expert testimony on certain Polaroid factors. The district court excluded surveys conducted by the models’ expert as unreliable because they suffered from various methodological flaws and, therefore, did not provide a reliable [...]

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PTO Seeks Comments on Strategies to Address Counterfeiting and Piracy

by | Jun 8, 2023 |

On May 25, 2023, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) requested comments on strategies to address counterfeiting and piracy. The PTO requested information on current anti-counterfeiting and anti-piracy strategies that have proven effective, as well as ideas for future strategies.

The PTO requested comments on the 14 points listed below. Respondents may address any, all or none of these points. The PTO will receive any input relevant to future strategies in the fight to prevent counterfeited and pirated goods from entering the stream of commerce and reaching the hands of consumers.

1. Current anti-counterfeiting and anti-piracy strategies, and any trends in how often such practices guide plans for addressing these issues in the future.

2. The types of harms observed from sales of counterfeited and pirated goods.

3. How to educate consumers about the harms and dangers that may result from the use and sale of counterfeited or pirated products.

4. Current anti-counterfeiting and anti-piracy strategies that have proven successful, and those that have not. Information relating to targets of anti-counterfeiting and anti-piracy efforts, such as ecommerce platforms, physical markets and social media.

5. Anticipated challenges in the fight to prevent counterfeited and pirated goods from entering the stream of commerce and reaching the hands of consumers, and how to address those challenges.

6. Observed patterns and trends in counterfeiting and piracy during the COVID-19 pandemic. An indication of whether the commenter anticipates that such patterns and trends will continue post-pandemic.

7. Patterns and trends observed in counterfeiting and piracy due to shifts in the economy. An indication of whether the commenter anticipates that such patterns and trends will continue and if so, an explanation regarding the expected impact on current and future strategic plans to combat counterfeiting and piracy.

8. The commenter’s thoughts on whether any strategic plans to combat counterfeiting and piracy might include collaboration with private or public parties. If a strategic plan is not collaborative, why not? If collaborative, a discussion of the anti-counterfeiting and anti-piracy strategies employed in the collaboration.

9. New collaborative efforts contemplated to combat counterfeiting and piracy and factors that will affect implementation decisions. Discussion of how future collaborations might be composed.

10. Effective technologies to prevent counterfeited and pirated goods from entering the stream of commerce and reaching the hands of consumers, such as counterfeit product identification devices or advanced algorithms to secure supply chains and provide the identity of counterfeit goods online. A discussion of how anticipated strategies will improve an overall anti-counterfeiting and anti-piracy strategy.

11. How online enforcement activities intersect with trademark and copyright laws or procedures. Do online enforcement strategies include employing existing trademark laws to combat online counterfeiting? Do online enforcement strategies use existing copyright laws to combat online piracy? If so, describe these activities and suggestions for maximizing these practices.

12. Description of any fraudulent documentation or materials observed in the furtherance of online counterfeiting and piracy activity. For example, comment on whether, after reporting an infringement to a platform, a counter-notification was attached [...]

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No Lost Value Damages Despite Trade Secret Misappropriation

by | Jun 8, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated a damages award, finding that although there was liability for appropriating trade secrets, the trade secret proprietor was only entitled to compensatory damages under federal trade secret law, not avoided cost damages based on alleged estimated research and development or loss of value. Syntel Sterling Best Shores Mauritius, Ltd., et al. v. The TriZetto Grp., Inc., et al., Case No. 21-1370 (2d Cir. May 25, 2023) (Wesley, Raggi, Lohier, JJ.)

This case involved trade secrets concerning healthcare insurance software called Facets® that was developed by TriZetto and alleged misappropriation by a TriZetto subcontractor, Syntel Sterling. In 2010, TriZetto and Syntel entered a Master Service Agreement (MSA) under which Syntel agreed to support TriZetto’s Facets customers. In exchange, TriZetto granted Syntel access to its trade secrets related to Facets. In 2012, the parties amended the MSA to allow Syntel to compete directly with TriZetto for consulting services. A dispute arose in 2014 when Syntel’s competitor Cognizant acquired TriZetto. Syntel terminated the amended MSA and requested payment of rebates owed. TriZetto refused, raising concerns about Syntel’s continued use of confidential trade secrets post-termination.

Syntel filed suit for breach of contract in the Southern District of New York, and TriZetto counterclaimed. During trial, TriZetto proceeded on trade secret misappropriation counterclaims related to the Facets software under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) and New York law. Syntel argued that the amended MSA authorized Syntel to compete for Facets services business while using TriZetto’s trade secrets.

During discovery, the district court issued a preclusion order that sanctioned Syntel for discovery misconduct, finding that “Syntel was actively creating a repository of [TriZetto’s] trade secrets on its own . . . to be used in future work.” Citing the preclusion order, the district court instructed the jury that Syntel had misappropriated two of 104 asserted trade secrets.

With respect to damages, TriZetto presented expert testimony that established that Syntel avoided spending about $285 million in research and development costs because of the misappropriation covering the period between 2004 and 2014, an amount that covered only a portion of TriZetto’s overall $500 million research and development costs. Syntel’s expert did not counter that amount. Instead, Syntel argued that these avoided costs did not apply here for several reasons: because the alleged misappropriation did not destroy the value of Facets since Syntel could have used Facets for free by entering a third-party access agreement with TriZetto because TriZetto continued to make millions using its Facets software, and because Syntel was not a software company but a competing service provider. The jury instructions included Syntel’s avoided development costs as one form of unjust enrichment that applied to the federal claims but not the state claims.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of TriZetto on all counts. The jury awarded TriZetto $285 million in avoided development costs under the DTSA as compensatory damages and double that amount in punitive damages. Following trial, Syntel renewed its motion for judgment as [...]

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Common Sense: Nonparties Not Precluded by Ex Parte Reexamination Termination

by | Jun 8, 2023 |

In a precedential decision, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) Trademark Trial & Appeal Board denied a motion for judgment based on either claim or issue preclusion, and in the alternative for a show cause order, in a challenger’s petition. Common Sense Press Inc. d/b/a Pocket Jacks Comics v. Ethan Van Sciver and Antonio J. Malpica, Cancellation No. 92075375, 2023 BL 171365 (TTAB May 19, 2023) (Wellington, Pologeorgis, English, ATJs).

Common Sense Press filed a petition to cancel the registration for the mark “Comics Gate” for comics. In its petition, Common Sense asserted claims of nonuse, abandonment and fraud. The Respondents denied the allegations in the petition and also raised unclean hands by petitioner as a defense.

Common Sense also requested reexamination of the “Comics Gate” mark, which the PTO Director instituted on May 9, 2022. The cancellation proceeding was suspended pending the outcome of the reexamination. The Respondents were instructed to submit evidence to establish use of their mark for comics as of the August 13, 2020, deadline for filing a statement of use, as required under Section 1(d) of the Lanham Act.

The Respondents’ Section 1(d) statement showed that the “Comics Gate” mark was used in connection with comics sales in interest commerce and that such comics were provided via interest trade channels during the relevant period. In view of the Respondents’ evidence, the PTO Director determined that use had been demonstrated for comics and terminated the reexamination.

With the Notice of Termination in hand, the Respondents requested that the Board enter judgment in their favor in the cancelation proceeding as to nonuse and abandonment based on issue preclusion or, in the alternative, issue a show cause order to Common Sense as to why judgment should not be entered against them.

The Board denied the Respondents’ request, reasoning that termination of a reexamination proceeding does not preclude future nonuse challenges. Nor does such a reexamination termination decision have preclusive effect on a petitioner seeking cancellation, even if the petitioner requested the terminated reexamination. Citing due process concerns, the Board explained that the termination of an ex parte reexamination proceeding in which the petitioner necessarily does not participate may not serve as a basis for preventing the petitioner from raising even identical challenges in another action. The Board further noted that while the applicable statute “contains explicit estoppel provisions that bar the filing of future expungement or reexamination proceedings as to the identical goods or services once a proceeding of the same kind has been instituted . . . neither the statute nor regulations set forth a limitation on any party’s ability to petition to cancel a registration just because it is or has been the subject of a reexamination or expungement proceeding.” Thus, the Board concluded there is no basis to issue a show-cause order to a litigant who never appeared in a prior action.

Practice Note: This case serves as a reminder of the metes and bounds of an ex parte reexamination or expungement proceeding. Although [...]

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Hairy Situation: Trademark Act Doesn’t Provide Consumer Standing

by | Jun 1, 2023 |

The US Patent & Trademark Office Trademark Trial & Appeal Board found that a consumer did not have standing to oppose an application for registration because the consumer failed to establish a commercial interest and injury that would be proximately caused by the registration of the mark. Rebecca Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc. (TTAB May 4, 2023) (Adlin, Lynch, Bunn, ATJs.)

Rebecca Curtin, a trademark law professor, has purchased various toys for her daughter. Curtin filed an opposition to United Trademark Holdings’ (UTH) application to register RAPUNZEL for use in connection with “dolls; toy figures.” Curtin alleged that RAPUNZEL fails to function as a trademark and is generic (or merely descriptive) of the identified goods and that UTH committed fraud. Curtin lamented that competition would be impeded if “private companies are allowed ‘to trademark the name of a famous fairytale character in the public domain,’” which would likely force consumers to pay higher prices for the relevant goods. Curtin also stated that allowing this registration “could chill the creation of new dolls and toys by fans of the Rapunzel fairytale, crowding out the substantial social benefit of having diverse interpreters of the fairytale’s legacy.”

More than four years ago, the Board denied UTH’s motion to dismiss, finding that Curtin had standing by relying on a case from 1999 that addressed the Trademark Act’s bar to registration for “immoral” or “scandalous” marks. Months after the Board’s initial decision, however, the Supreme Court ruled in Iancu v. Brunetti that the portion of the Trademark Act barring registration for “immoral” or “scandalous” marks was unconstitutional, and updates were issued on the “standard for determining whether a party is eligible to bring a statutory cause of action.”

A plaintiff has standing to oppose registration of a mark “when doing so is within the zone of interests protected by the statute and [opposer] has a reasonable belief in damage that would be proximately caused by registration of the mark.” Here, the Board explained that the statute at issue was the Trademark Act, which identifies its interest as regulating commerce and protecting plaintiffs with commercial interests: “[A] mere consumer that buys goods or services is not under the Trademark Act’s aegis.”

Moreover, Curtin failed to demonstrate that an injury would result from registration of the mark. The Board was unconvinced by Curtin’s explanations of the potential harm to competition and resulting higher prices for consumers, stating that the “allegations of damage are [] too remote, because the alleged damage to Opposer depends first on the alleged effect of registration on other commercial doll markets or sellers.” The Board, therefore, dismissed the opposition.



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Well Runs Dry: Summary Judgment Denial Supports Non-Exceptional Case Finding

by | Jun 1, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees, explaining that when a district court denies summary judgment and allows a plaintiff’s case to proceed, the district court effectively determines that the position of the party opposing summary judgment is not objectively baseless. OneSubsea IP UK Limited v. FMC Techs, Inc., Case No. 22-1099 (Fed. Cir. May 23, 2023) (Moore, Clevenger, Dyk, JJ.)

OneSubsea and FMC compete in the subsea oil and gas exploration and extraction industry. In March 2015, OneSubsea filed a lawsuit against FMC alleging infringement of 95 claims across 10 OneSubsea patents. After the district court issued its claim construction ruling, FMC moved for summary judgment of noninfringement. OneSubsea opposed. While the summary judgment motion was pending, the Patent Trial & Appeal Board instituted inter partes review (IPR) proceedings on a subset of the asserted patents. FMC argued that while a stay of district court proceedings would be appropriate, it was unnecessary in light of its pending summary judgment motion. In August 2016, the district court denied summary judgment and stayed the case.

The case remained stayed for three years, during which time the Board invalidated 76 claims. In 2019, the district court lifted the stay. At a pre-trial hearing in 2020 discussing whether additional discovery was needed to address summary judgment, FMC doubted the need for more discovery and pointed to the 3,200 record pages illustrating differences between the designs of the accused device and the patented devices. In response, the district court stated, “And you really think I’m going to be able to grant summary judgment on that?” After the hearing, FMC renewed its summary judgment motion, which OneSubsea opposed. In reply, FMC moved to exclude the report of OneSubsea’s expert because he applied the wrong claim construction. Ultimately, the district court granted FMC’s motion to exclude and its motion for summary judgment.

In 2021, FMC moved for attorneys’ fees based on OneSubsea’s “substantively weak infringement claims” after the claim construction order was issued and “litigation misconduct.” After briefing was complete, the district court announced that the case had been reassigned to another judge following the retirement of the original assigned judge. The new judge rejected FMC’s view that OneSubsea’s case was objectively baseless and further rejected FMC’s claims of litigation misconduct. FMC appealed.

As a threshold matter, FMC argued that the Federal Circuit should apply de novo review instead of an abuse-of-discretion standard because the new judge only briefly “lived with the case” and should be disqualified from exercising discretion in deciding FMC’s attorneys’ fees motion. The Court rejected FMC’s invitation to change the standard of review, citing the substantial body of law in which appellate courts have consistently reviewed successor judges’ decisions on discretionary issues for abuse of discretion.

Turning to the merits, the Federal Circuit found that FMC’s exceptional case argument lacked merit. The Court explained that the argument disregarded the district court’s observation that FMC’s demand for a prompt favorable noninfringement judgment based [...]

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Heart-to-Heart on Reduction to Practice: When It Comes to Testing, How Much Is Enough?

by | Jun 1, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision that the patent owner successfully demonstrated that the claimed heart catheter invention was conceived and reduced to practice prior to the effective date of the reference, by record evidence of adequate testing to demonstrate that the invention would work for its intended purpose. Medtronic, Inc. v. Teleflex Innovations S.Á.R.L., Case Nos. 21-2356; -2358; -2361; -2363; -2365 (Fed. Cir. May 24, 2023) (Moore, C.J.; Lourie, J.) (Dyk, J., dissenting).

Teleflex Innovations owns five patents directed to guide extension catheters that use a tapered inner catheter that runs over a standard coronary guidewire to reduce the likelihood that a guide catheter will dislodge from the coronary artery’s opening. All of the patents are related and share a common specification. Around the time of the challenged patents’ priority date, the applicant was working to develop two commercial variants of similar technology: the “rapid exchange” (or “RX”) version of the GuideLiner product, which Teleflex claims practices the challenged patents, and an “over-the-wire” (or “OTW”) variant, which does not practice the challenged patents.

Medtronic petitioned for inter partes review (IPR), challenging all five patents on the basis that they were predated by a patent to Itou. During the IPR proceedings, Teleflex claimed that conception and reduction to practice occurred prior to Itou’s priority date and submitted several declarations and exhibits such as lab notebooks, internal company memoranda, presentations, invoices, sales orders, photographs, engineering drawings and documents from outside patent counsel in support of its contentions. Ultimately, the Board found that Itou did not constitute prior art and therefore Medtronic had failed to demonstrate that the challenged claims were unpatentable. Medtronic appealed.

On appeal, Medtronic did not challenge conception but argued that the Board’s findings on actual reduction to practice and reasonable diligence toward constructive reduction to practice should be reversed. To establish an actual reduction to practice, the patent owner must show that the inventors constructed an embodiment that met all the limitations of the claimed invention and determined that the invention would work for its intended purpose. Medtronic’s arguments were based on the grounds that the Board erred in three ways:

  1. Incorrectly identifying the intended purpose of the claimed invention
  2. Not requiring comparative testing to demonstrate that the invention worked for that purpose
  3. Relying solely on uncorroborated inventor testimony.

On the first issue, Medtronic argued that the Board incorrectly found an over-broad intended purpose of the claimed invention by relying too heavily on extrinsic evidence. The Federal Circuit acknowledged that while “the patents themselves are the most important” evidence, “it is appropriate to consider extrinsic evidence, particularly when it does not contradict the patents themselves.” The Court went on to conclude that the intended purpose here was broader than the narrow purpose argued by Medtronic (relating to difficult occlusions)—“[t]he very title of the patents themselves, ‘Coaxial Guide Catheter for Interventional Cardiology Procedures,’ describes the purpose of the claimed inventions, and it is undisputed that the [...]

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Neither Narrow Proposed Claim Construction nor Work Product Claim Justify Withholding Material Factual Information

by | Jun 1, 2023 |

The Patent Trial & Appeal Board of the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) canceled all challenged claims across five patents because the patent owner failed to meet its duty of candor by selectively and improperly withholding material information that was inconsistent with its patentability arguments. Spectrum Solutions, LLC v. Longhorn Vaccines & Diagnostics, LLC, IPR2021-00847; -00850; -00854; -00857; -00860 (PTAB May 3, 2023) (Braden, Yang, Derrick, Pollock, APJs) (per curiam) (Braden, APJ concurring).

The Board instituted inter partes reviews (IPRs) against five Longhorn patents based on petitions filed by Spectrum. During the proceedings, Longhorn filed motions to amend, after which the Board issued preliminary guidance suggesting that Spectrum established a reasonable likelihood that the proposed substitute claims were unpatentable. Longhorn engaged Assured Bio Labs (ABL) to conduct biological testing that would support its arguments distinguishing a prior art reference, but Longhorn made attorney work product objections in Spectrum’s ABL depositions and withheld testing data inconsistent with its arguments on the patentability of the original and proposed substitute claims. The Board subsequently allowed additional questioning on certain ABL testing, after which Spectrum filed a motion for sanctions, requesting judgment against Longhorn, a finding that the prior art reference taught the claim limitations and precluding Longhorn from contesting the finding, and an award to Spectrum of compensatory expenses, including attorneys’ fees.

The Board determined that sanctions of adverse judgment as to all challenged claims was appropriate because Longhorn failed to meet its duty of candor and good faith. The Board explained that parties have a duty of candor and good faith before the Board that requires any factual contentions to be well supported by evidence. Parties have “a duty to disclose to the [PTO] all information known . . . to be material to patentability.” (37 C.F.R. §1.56(a).) Information is material to patentability when it is “not cumulative to information already of record or being made of record in the application and . . . it refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in . . . asserting an argument of patentability.” Taking a position contrary to any known fact while shielding factual information from the Board violates the duty of candor and good faith to the PTO, even if the party may otherwise withhold the information as being immaterial to patentability or privileged.

The Board criticized Longhorn’s proposed claim constructions as too narrow and contrary to the express language in both the original and proposed substitute claims. The Board explained that although Longhorn was free to maintain arguments grounded on Longhorn’s claim constructions, that did not excuse Longhorn’s duty of candor and good faith dealing, including disclosing material information relating to the Board’s preliminary claim constructions. Longhorn could not “simply withhold information” that the PTO would find material to patentability and should instead contest the Board’s constructions at trial.

The Board also explained that Longhorn took an overly strict view of what was material to claim patentability and a lax view as to the duty of candor [...]

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