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‘Show Me The Money’ Isn’t Enough: Disproportionate $1.7M Attorneys’ Fees Rejected

by | Jun 22, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded a $1.7 million award of attorneys’ fees, finding the amount unreasonable compared to the benefit the plaintiffs received. Lowery v. Rhapsody International, Inc., Case No. 22-15162 (9th Cir. June 7, 2023) (Smith, Collins, Lee, JJ.)

Streaming music providers such as Apple Music, Spotify and Napster (formally Rhapsody International) have fundamentally changed the way we enjoy music. Gone are the days of the mixtape. But to bring these services, providers must license the copyrighted music and pay royalties to the owners. At the time this case was filed, the two main licensing paths available to streaming music providers required either direct negotiations with the owners or compulsory licensing by serving a notice of intent to each owner. These paths were unworkable and antiquated given the millions of songs that the providers were playing.

David Lowery and others sued Rhapsody in 2016 on behalf of a putative class of copyright owners. They claimed Rhapsody had infringed their copyrights by reproducing and distributing their musical compositions through its platform without a license. The parties eventually reached a settlement. Rhapsody agreed to pay a maximum of $20 million to the class members, but because an earlier argument effectively decimated the putative class, the actual payout to the class was just over $50,000.

Despite the low amount paid to the class, the plaintiffs’ counsel requested $6 million in attorneys’ fees. The request was based on a “lodestar” calculation, where the number of hours reasonably spent on the case is multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, then adjusted up or down as called for by the peculiarities of the case. The plaintiffs’ counsel estimated its fees to be around $2.1 million, with a proposed 2.87 multiplier due to the “exceptional” results in a “complex” case.

The magistrate judge disagreed and recommended reducing the lodestar to $1.7 million because one-fifth of the hours spent were either unreasonable or improperly blocked billed. The judge also recommended further reducing the lodestar value with a negative multiplier in light of the limited benefit actually paid out. The district court took issue with the magistrate judge’s cross-checking of the lodestar value against the amount paid. The court noted that there was “no bright-line rule” to cross-check a lodestar value either against the claimed amount ($50,000 in this case) or the possible recovery ($20 million). However, the district court agreed with the magistrate judge’s lodestar calculation and awarded $1.7 million in attorneys’ fees. Rhapsody appealed.

The Ninth Circuit rejected the award, concluding that the $1.7 million award was unreasonable given the small benefit to the class members. The Court explained that the actual benefit to the class must be considered when assessing the value of a class action settlement. Here, the Court pointed out that the district court should have cross-checked any lodestar calculations to ensure that there was a reasonably proportional benefit to the class members. The district court also should have disregarded the $20 million settlement cap when [...]

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A Single Picture Database Is Worth a Thousand Statutory Damages Awards

by | Jun 22, 2023 |

In the latest appeal of a copyright infringement dispute, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s finding that the copyright owner’s photographs were not part of a single compilation for purposes of awarding statutory damages. VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., Case Nos. 22-35147; -35200 (9th Cir. June 7, 2023) (McKeown, Fletcher, Gould, JJ.)

VHT is a professional real estate photography studio that real estate brokerages and listing services hire to photograph properties. VHT retouches the photographs, saves them in its photo database and licenses them to its clients for marketing purposes. In 2015, VHT sued Zillow for copyright infringement based on Zillow’s display of VHT photographs on its real estate listing website and on its Digs home design website. The district court found that Zillow was not liable for displaying VHT photographs on its real estate listing website or for displaying untagged, unsearchable VHT photographs on its Digs home design website. However, the district court found that Zillow’s display of tagged, searchable VHT photographs on Digs constituted infringement and that the searchability functionality was not fair use.

The parties cross-appealed, and the Ninth Circuit considered the issue of infringement in a 2019 decision (Zillow I). In this prior appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed that Zillow’s display of VHT photographs on its real estate listing website was not copyright infringement, while Zillow’s display of searchable VHT photographs on its Digs home design website constituted infringement and was not fair use. The Ninth Circuit also reversed the jury’s finding that Zillow had willfully infringed 2,700 searchable VHT photographs displayed on Digs and remanded for consideration of whether the searchable photographs were a compilation for purposes of awarding statutory damages. On remand, the district court found that the photographs were not a compilation and awarded statutory damages of $200 for each innocently infringed photograph and $800 for each remaining photograph.

The district court also considered the impact of the Copyright Act’s preregistration requirement and Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street (Supreme Court, 2019) on VHT’s ability to sue. In accordance with Ninth Circuit precedent holding that registration is made when the Copyright Office receives a completed registration application, VHT had sued Zillow for copyright infringement after applying for copyright registration. However, the works were not registered until after the suit was filed. Just 11 days before Zillow I was decided, in Fourth Estate, the Supreme Court held that registration is made when the Copyright Office has registered a copyright after examination—not when the application is filed. Zillow argued that VHT’s claims should be dismissed because VHT did not satisfy the preregistration requirement. The district court excused the exhaustion requirement because dismissal would result in a massive waste of resources. The parties again cross-appealed.

Preregistration and Fourth Estate

Addressing the preregistration issue, the Ninth Circuit agreed that dismissal was not required. The decision to excuse compliance with a non-jurisdictional exhaustion requirement is based on whether the claim is wholly collateral to the substantive [...]

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It’s a Hard Rock Life: Guitar-Shaped Hotel Warrants Trademark, but Hilton Doesn’t

by | Jun 22, 2023 |

In a twin set of precedential opinions, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board laid the foundation for determining whether building designs can be trademark protected as service marks. In re Palacio Del Rio, Inc., Ser. Nos. 88412764; 88437801 (TTAB May 25, 2023) (Shaw, Goodman, Hudis, ATJs); In re Seminole Tribe of Florida, Ser. No. 87890892 (TTAB May 25, 2023) (Taylor, Greenbaum, Johnson, ATJs).

The subjects of the opinions were the designs of the Hilton Palacio del Rio in San Antonio, Texas, and the Seminole Hard Rock Hotel & Casino in Hollywood, Florida. The Board concluded that the former was nondistinctive trade dress, whereas the latter constituted protectable trade dress. For reference, the two designs at issue appear below:

In the Hilton case, Hilton sought separate registrations for the three-dimensional design of the “River” and “Street” sides of its hotel building due to their “unique and readily recognizable design,” consisting of a pattern of alternating protruding and receding rectangular shapes created by the assembly of the hotel’s modular guest rooms. Similarly, Seminole Tribe argued that its guitar-shaped building was akin to product packaging that can be protected under trade dress.

In both cases, the Board anchored its analysis in Supreme Court precedent in Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana (1992) and Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros. (2000), but with a different result in each case. As an initial matter, in both the Hilton and Seminole cases, the Board confirmed that a building structure, if inherently distinctive and not mere product design, could constitute protected trade dress. The Board analogized a hotel’s design to product packaging, which dispensed with the need to show secondary meaning.

Where the outcomes diverged, however, was the distinctiveness of the buildings that the two entities sought to protect. In the Hilton case, the Board determined that the record did not demonstrate that the Palacio del Rio’s building design was sufficient to differentiate it from competitor hotels. Although Hilton submitted customer declarations claiming that the Rio’s design was unique, the Board did not credit such evidence on the grounds that the customers did not have personal knowledge about what was commonplace in the hotel industry and that the declarations were substantively scant.

In the Seminole case, the Board found that the record reflected that no other hotel had the Hard Rock’s unique guitar design. Analogizing to In re Frankish Enterprises (TTAB 2015), in which a monster truck was found distinguishable from all other monster truck designs of record, the Board concluded that the guitar design was inherently distinctive.

Practice Note: Now that hotels have cracked the door open for building design trademarks, it remains to be seen whether other types of unique buildings will follow suit. As the two cases collectively demonstrate, developing a supportive record—i.e., one founded by compelling evidence of uniqueness—is likely necessary to secure a trade dress for building design.

Rick [...]

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First Rule of the PTAB? Play by the Rules

by | Jun 22, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed two Patent Trial & Appeal Board decisions holding the challenged claims unpatentable as obvious, even though the Board declined to consider evidence of antedating and found that the claims lacked written description support. Parus Holdings, Inc. v. Google LLC, Case Nos. 22-1269; -1270 (Fed. Cir. June 12, 2023) (Lourie, Bryson, Reyna, JJ.)

Parus Holdings owns two patents related to an interactive voice system to request information from a voice web browser. Google (among others) petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of the patents.

During the IPR proceedings, the Board found that a publication (Kovatch) was prior art to the challenged patents. In reaching that decision, the Board declined to consider Parus’s arguments and evidence of an earlier conception and reduction to practice because they were only presented via incorporation by reference in violation of 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3). The Board ruled that Parus failed to meet its burden of production on antedating.

The Board also found that the publication of the application to which Parus’s challenged patents claimed priority (Kurganov-262) was prior art because the common specification failed to provide written description support for the challenged claims. Parus appealed the Board’s decision, raising two main arguments.

First, Parus contended that the Board erred when it declined to consider Parus’s arguments and evidence on antedating. Parus argued that § 42.6(a)(3)’s prohibition on incorporation by reference did not warrant the Board’s decision because Parus, as patent owner, need not have submitted a response at all. Parus also argued that the Federal Circuit’s 2017 decision in Aqua Products mandates that the Board consider all record evidence, regardless of the manner of presentation. The Federal Circuit rejected Parus’s arguments in turn.

Regarding Parus’s violation of the incorporation by reference rule, the Federal Circuit explained that Parus had assumed an affirmative burden of production when it chose to submit a response to antedate Kovatch. Along with that burden came other responsibilities, such as complying with the US Patent & Trademark Office’s (PTO) rules and regulations, including § 42.6(a)(3). The Court further explained that this burden of production could not be met without some combination of citing evidence with specificity and explaining the significance of the cited material. Parus did neither.

The Federal Circuit also rejected Parus’s argument that the Board is required by law to review all evidence in the record. The Court clarified that, while its Aqua Products holding requires the Board to decide all issues properly before it, nothing in Aqua Products requires the Board to review evidence or issues not introduced or introduced in violation of the Board’s rules. As the Court noted, “[t]he burden of production cannot be met simply by throwing mountains of evidence at the Board without explanation or identification of the relevant portions of that evidence. One cannot reasonably expect the Board to sift through hundreds of documents, thousands of pages, to find the relevant facts.”

Parus also argued that the Board exceeded its statutory authority under 35 U.S.C. [...]

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Under High Pressure: New Mechanism of Action Can’t Save Drug Administration Claims

by | Jun 22, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board ruling that method claims reciting a mechanism of action triggered by the co-administration of two known antihypertensive agents were obvious over the cited prior art. In re Couvaras, Case No. 22-1489 (Fed. Cir. June 14, 2023) (Lourie, Dyk, Stoll, JJ.)

This case arose out of applicant John Couvaras’s prosecution of patent claims reciting a method of increasing prostacyclin release in the systemic blood vessels to improve vasodilation in a human with essential hypertension by co-administering two therapeutic agents. During prosecution, Couvaras conceded that the two claimed therapeutic agents had been known as essential hypertension treatments for many decades. The examiner agreed, citing 10 references as confirmation. The examiner further found that the physiological results of co-administering the two therapeutic agents were not patentable because they naturally flowed from the claimed administration of the known antihypertensive agents.

Couvaras appealed to the Board, arguing that the increased prostacyclin release was unexpected and that objective indicia overcame any existing prima facie case of obviousness. The Board disagreed, ruling that the increased prostacyclin release was inherent in the obvious administration of the two known antihypertensive agents and that no evidence existed to support a finding of any objective indicia. Couvaras appealed.

Couvaras raised three arguments on appeal:

  1. The Board erred in affirming that a skilled artisan would have had motivation to combine the art.
  2. The claimed mechanism of action was unexpected, and the Board erred in discounting its patentable weight by deeming it inherent in the claimed method.
  3. The Board erred in weighing objective indicia of non-obviousness.

With respect to motivation to combine, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board that the art supplied sufficient motivation to combine because the claimed therapeutic agents were known for decades to treat hypertension, finding the Board’s conclusion supported by substantial evidence. The Court found that Couvaras had forfeited a related argument for no reasonable expectation of success by failing to first raise that challenge to the Board.

The Federal Circuit also rejected Couvaras’s argument that the claimed mechanism of action was unexpected and therefore entitled to patentable weight. Couvaras argued that the Board downgraded the patentable weight of limitations drawn to the antihypertensive agents’ mechanism of action by deeming them to be merely inherent. According to Couvaras, even if the recited mechanism of action was inherent in the claimed administration of the two agents, that mechanism was unexpected because the increased prostacyclin release was unexpected and could not be dismissed as having no patentable weight due to inherency.

The Federal Circuit disagreed, explaining that Couvaras was attempting to claim a mechanism of action that naturally flows from the co-administration of two known antihypertensive agents and that “[n]ewly discovered results of known processes directed to the same purpose are not patentable because such results are inherent.” The Court allowed that while mechanisms of action may not always meet the most rigid standards for inherency, “[r]eciting the mechanism for known compounds [...]

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False Advertising: Verifiably False Versus Subjective Opinion

by | Jun 22, 2023 |

In a case originally based on a false advertising claim under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the district court’s dismissal of the claim. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the defendant’s description of a competitor’s software product was plausibly alleged as an element of false advertising. Enigma Software Group USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc., Case No. 21-16466 (9th Cir. June 2, 2023) (Clifton, Bumatay, Baker, JJ.) (Baker, J., concurring) (Bumatay, J., dissenting).

Enigma is a security software company whose products detect and remove malicious software such as viruses, spyware, adware and ransomware. Malwarebytes is a direct competitor of Enigma and sells products aimed at detecting and removing malware and other potentially threatening programs on users’ computers. Enigma originally brought this action in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, but the case was moved to the Northern District of California on a motion to transfer filed by Malwarebytes. The California court ruled that Enigma’s claims were barred by § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, a ruling that the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that § 230 did not apply to “blocking and filtering decisions that [we]re driven by anticompetitive animus.” The Ninth Circuit remanded the case.

On remand, Enigma asserted four causes of action:

  1. False advertising in violation of the Lanham Act
  2. Violation of New York General Business Law (NYGBL) § 349, which prohibits deceptive and unlawful business practices
  3. Tortious interference with contractual relations
  4. Tortious interference with business relations.

On Malwarebytes’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the district court found that (for the Lanham Act claim) Enigma’s allegation that Malwarebytes’s designations were “just [nonactionable] subjective opinions” rather than “verifiably false.” On appeal, Enigma argued that designations of its products as malicious, threats and potentially unwanted programs were factually false and misrepresented the very purpose of the software.

To state a claim for false advertising under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, Enigma had to plausibly allege the following:

  • Malwarebytes made a false statement of fact in a commercial advertisement.
  • The statement deceived or had the tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its audience.
  • The deception was material, in that it was likely to influence the purchasing decision.
  • The false statement entered interstate commerce.
  • Enigma was or was likely to be injured as a result.

To show falsity, Enigma had to allege that the statement was literally false, either on its face or by necessary implication, or that the statement was literally true but likely to mislead or confuse consumers.

The Ninth Circuit found that, taken as true at the motions stage, Enigma’s allegations were sufficient to state a Lanham Act claim because Malwarebytes’s designations employed terminology that was substantively meaningful and verifiable in the cybersecurity context. While terms such as “malicious” and “threatening” are adjectives subject to numerous interpretations, the Court found that in the context of software competitors, a [...]

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Inventorship Hosed Clean: Contribution, Corroboration and Collaboration Prove Joint Invention

by | Jun 22, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a decision to correct inventorship, finding that the alleged joint inventor’s contribution to a claimed invention was significant and adequately corroborated by evidence. Blue Gentian, LLC v. Tristar Products, Inc., Case Nos. 21-2316; -2317 (Fed. Cir. June 9, 2023) (Prost, Chen, Stark, JJ.)

Blue Gentian owns utility and design patents directed to an expandable hose. Prior to filing the first patent application, Michael Berardi (the sole inventor of the asserted patents and Blue Gentian’s principal) met with non-party Gary Ragner to discuss investing in Ragner’s expandable hose. Berardi had no experience designing hoses at the time of the meeting. Berardi testified that he came up with the idea of his hose after watching a demonstration video of Ragner’s hose but before the meeting. At the meeting, Ragner disclosed a prototype and documents relating to his hose and discussed the inner components of the hose. Berardi built his first prototype a day after the meeting and filed his first patent application three months later. Blue Gentian subsequently filed suit against Tristar for infringement of its expandable hose patents. Tristar counterclaimed to correct inventorship of the patents, alleging that Ragner should have been named a co-inventor.

A court may order a correction of inventorship when it determines that an inventor has been erroneously omitted from a patent. The inventors listed on an issued patent, however, are presumed to be the only true inventors. Thus, a party must prove incorrect inventorship by clear and convincing evidence. An alleged joint inventor’s testimony standing alone is insufficient to establish inventorship by clear and convincing evidence; the testimony must be corroborated by evidence. A joint inventor must contribute significantly to the invention’s conception or reduction to practice, and the contribution must involve some collaboration with the other inventor.

The district court, after an evidentiary hearing, entered judgment on the inventorship counterclaim in Tristar’s favor and ordered correction of the patents under 35 U.S.C. § 256. Blue Gentian appealed.

The Federal Circuit found that Ragner conveyed three key elements of the hose to Berardi at the meeting and that these elements were a significant contribution to the conception of at least one claim of each asserted patent. The Court noted that these were the very elements Blue Gentian used to distinguish the invention from the prior art, establishing the element’s significance. The Court also found that Ragner’s testimony about conveying the three elements to Berardi at the meeting was adequately corroborated by both physical and circumstantial evidence. The evidence showed the similarity between Ragner’s disclosed prototype and Berardi’s first prototype, and documentary evidence showed Ragner’s familiarity with the three elements before the meeting. Finally, the Court found sufficient collaboration between Berardi and Ragner based on the information exchanged at the meeting, including Ragner’s prototype, confidential documents and verbal explanations about alternative hose designs.

The Federal Circuit dismissed Blue Gentian’s argument that claim construction was needed before analyzing Ragner’s contribution because Blue Gentian did not identify a dispute [...]

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The Best Option Is Obviously Not the Only Option

by | Jun 22, 2023 |

Following a jury verdict finding infringement of two patents and awarding $2.2 billion, the Patent Trial & Appeal Board issued a final written decision finding all claims in one of the asserted patents invalid. The Board explained that an asserted prior art combination only needs to be a suitable option, not the best option. Patent Quality Assurance, LLC v. VLSI Tech. LLC, Case No. IPR2021-01229 (June 13, 2023) (Giannetti, McNamara, Melvin, APJs).

In March 2021, a jury found that Intel infringed two patents owned by VLSI. On July 7, 2021, Patent Quality Assurance filed an inter partes review petition against all claims of one of the patents Intel was found to infringe. The Board instituted review. After institution, Intel filed an identical petition and motion for joinder, both of which were granted.

The challenged patent is directed to a method of determining the minimum operating voltage for integrated-circuit memory, storing the value of that voltage in nonvolatile memory, and using the value to determine when an alternative power-supply voltage may be switched to the memory to ensure that the minimum operating voltage is met. Intel challenged the claims of the patent based primarily on a combination of three prior art references.

VLSI raised numerous arguments for why the combination of prior art references did not teach the claimed invention. VLSI argued that a skilled artisan would not have had reason to regulate the power supply voltage of one reference with the voltage regulator of another. VLSI asserted that there would have been no need to use the switching mechanism if voltage regulation was available from the outset. The Board disagreed and quoted the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s 2022 decision in Intel v. Qualcomm, which stated that “a petitioner is required to show only that there is something in the prior art as a whole to suggest the desirability of making the combination, not whether there is something in the prior art as a whole to suggest that the combination is the most desirable combination available.”

The Board reiterated this theme in response to another of VLSI’s arguments. VLSI contended that a person of skill in the art would not have combined the prior art disclosure of a system for determining minimum operating voltages and storing them in nonvolatile memory with a reference that uses SRAM, a type of volatile memory commonly used as an alternative to nonvolatile memory. The Board again noted that “there is no requirement that an asserted combination is the best option, only that it be a suitable option.”

Given the jury’s verdict and damages award in the district court case, VLSI also argued that the jury’s verdict showed commercial success and was objective indicia of nonobviousness. As part of its analysis, the Board reiterated that the nexus between the alleged commercial success and the asserted patent claims must be both embodied by the commercial product and coextensive with them. The Board went on to find that “the record before [the Board] does [...]

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“TRUMP TOO SMALL” Trademark Decision Heads to Supreme Court

by | Jun 15, 2023 | ,

The Supreme Court agreed to review the US Patent & Trademark Office’s (PTO) challenge to a February 2022 ruling by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In the ruling at issue, the Federal Circuit held that applying Sec. 2(c) of the Lanham Act (which bars registration of a trademark that consists of or comprises a name of a particular living individual without their written consent) may unconstitutionally restrict free speech in violation of the First Amendment in certain instances. Vidal v. Elster, Docket No. 22-704 (Supr. Ct., June 5, 2023).

In 2018, Steve Elster filed an application to register the mark TRUMP TOO SMALL for use on t-shirts, in reference to a 2016 Republican presidential primary debate exchange between then-candidate Donald Trump and Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL). The PTO examining attorney and subsequently the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board refused registration of the mark on grounds that it clearly referred to former President Trump, and that Elster did not have written consent to use former President Trump’s name, in violation of Sec. 2(c) of the Lanham Act. On Elster’s appeal, the Federal Circuit ruled that the Board’s refusal to register the trademark TRUMP TOO SMALL for use on t-shirts involved content-based discrimination that was not justified by a compelling or substantial government interest.

Following PTO Director Vidal’s January 2023 petition for a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court granted cert and will consider whether the First Amendment allows content-based but viewpoint-neutral restrictions on which trademarks may be registered—and in this case, the PTO’s restriction on marks that consist of or comprise a name identifying a particular living individual (such as former President Donald Trump) except by their written consent.

The issue on which cert was granted: Whether the refusal to register a trademark under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) violates the free speech clause of the First Amendment when the mark contains criticism of a government official or public figure.



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Quack, Waddle and Duck: Order That Grants Injunctive Relief Is an Injunction

by | Jun 15, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded a district court ruling, finding that the district court failed to properly apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) in granting injunctive relief. Wudi Industrial (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. v. Wong et al., Case Nos. 22-1495; -1662 (4th Cir. June 5, 2023) (Gregory, King, JJ.) (Rushing, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the district court simply entered a permissible order enforcing a settlement agreement between the parties.

The FRCP outlines the necessary criteria and steps for courts to grant injunctive relief. FRCP 52(a)(2) requires courts to state the findings and conclusions that support their actions. FRCP 65(d) requires courts to state the reasons why the injunction was issued, state the injunction’s terms specifically or describe the restrained/required act(s) in detail. Per the Supreme Court’s Ebay test, a party seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate the following:

  • It has suffered an irreparable injury.
  • Remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury.
  • Considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted.
  • The public interest would not be disserved by an injunction.

Wudi Industrial competes with Wai L. Wong and his business entity GT Omega Racing (collectively, GTOR) in marketing video gaming chairs and other products. GTOR challenged Wudi’s GTRACING trademark registration in a cancellation proceeding at the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board, alleging that the mark encroached on GTOR’s earlier use of GT OMEGA RACING. The Board ruled in favor of GTOR, and Wudi initiated a first appeal at the district court. The parties subsequently entered into a concurrent-use agreement that assigned to Wudi the right to use the GTRACING word mark in all global markets except within a European carve-out of 53 named countries in exchange for a $4.5 million payment to GTOR. Under the agreement, Wudi was barred from purchasing ad words from search engines and shopping sites or using any social media platforms to promote GTRACING in the European carve-out countries.

In May 2022, GTOR filed a motion for enforcement in the district court, alleging breach because some of Wudi’s marketing and promotional content in the European carve-out contained the GTRACING mark. The district court granted GTOR’s motion and issued a first order. Under threat of contempt for noncompliance, Wudi was ordered to cease impermissible conduct and take down all posts accessible in the European carve-out containing GTRACING within seven days. In June 2022, the district court issued a second order stating that the first order was a grant of specific performance, not a preliminary injunction. Wudi appealed both orders.

The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s first and second orders because of procedural errors amounting to abuses of discretion, despite the dissent’s argument that the orders merely enforced the parties’ agreement. The Court concluded that the first order constituted a preliminary injunction, later made permanent by the second order, because “if it walks like a duck, quacks like a [...]

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