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Invoking Generic Need for Claim Construction Won’t Avoid § 101 Dismissal

by | Jul 27, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a patent infringement suit on § 101 grounds, rejecting the patentee’s argument that claim construction or discovery was required before assessing patent eligibility. Trinity Info Media, LLC v. Covalent, Inc., Case No. 22-1308 (Fed. Cir. July 14, 2023) (Stoll, Bryson, Cunningham, JJ.)

Trinity Info Media sued Covalent for infringement of patents related to poll-based networking systems that connect users in real time based on answers to polling questions. Covalent moved to dismiss, arguing that the patent claims were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because they were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. In resolving the motion, the district court found that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of “matching users who gave corresponding answers to a question” and did not contain an inventive concept. The district court further found that the purported invention did not improve computer functionality but simply used “generic computer components as tools to perform the functions faster than a human would.” Accordingly, it found the asserted claims invalid under § 101 and granted the motion to dismiss. Trinity appealed.

Trinity argued that the district court erred by granting the motion without first allowing fact discovery and conducting claim construction. The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that in order to overcome a motion to dismiss on § 101 grounds, “the patentee must propose a specific claim construction or identify specific facts that need development and explain why those circumstances must be resolved before the scope of the claims can be understood for § 101 purposes.” Trinity had identified claim terms to the district court, but never proffered any proposed constructions or explained how construction would affect the § 101 analysis. Because Trinity did not identify specific facts to be discovered or propose any particular claim construction that would alter the § 101 analysis, Trinity’s generic arguments were insufficient to avoid the motion to dismiss.

The Federal Circuit went on to analyze whether the asserted claims were invalid under the two-step framework established by Mayo and Alice. Under this framework, Step 1 evaluates whether the asserted claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, such as an abstract idea. Step 2 searches for an “inventive concept” by considering the claims to determine whether any elements “transform the nature of the claim” from ineligible subject matter into a patent-eligible application.

At Step 1, the Federal Circuit concluded that the claims were directed to the patent-ineligible abstract idea of “matching based on questioning.” The Court noted that a “telltale sign of abstraction is when the claimed functions are mental processes that can be performed in the human mind or using a pencil and paper” (citing Personal-Web), finding that the “human mind could review people’s answers to questions and identify matches based on those answers.” Further, the trivial variations appearing in some claims (e.g., using a handheld device, reviewing matches by swiping and matching based on gender) did not change the focus of the asserted claims. The Court explained that for software inventions, Step 1 [...]

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Reissue Boat Won’t Float: “Original Patent” Rule Sinks New Floating Grill Claims

by | Jul 20, 2023 |

Addressing the same invention requirement for reissue patents, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision to reject an overly broad reissue application. In re Float‘N’Grill LLC, Case No. 22-1438 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2023) (Prost, Linn, Cunningham, JJ.)

Float‘N’Grill (FNG) owned a patent directed to a floating device that supports a grill so that users can grill food while in water. The patent’s specification lays out a single embodiment, illustrated in Figure 1 below, which includes a float (20) that has two supports (46, 48), each of which “includes a plurality of magnets” (60) so that the grill can be removably attached to the float:

FNG filed a reissue application that claimed new ways to “more generically” removably attach a grill to the float. In rejecting the reissue claims, the Examiner found that three of the new requested claims required zero magnets, three claims required one magnet, and one claim did not specifically require magnets but referred to a magnet in the preamble. This was in contrast to the issued patent’s only embodiment, which required multiple magnets. The Examiner, therefore, rejected the reissue claims for failure to meet the “original patent” requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 251. The Board affirmed. FNG appealed.

The question on appeal was whether FNG’s newly requested claims complied with § 251. The Federal Circuit explained that the only path to expanding the coverage of an issued patent is through a reissue application, which is subject to § 251’s limitations. Pertinent here, § 251 requires reissue claims to be directed to the same invention disclosed in the original patent. Citing Supreme Court and Federal Circuit decisions, the Court described the “original patent” requirement as a question of whether the issued patent’s disclosed invention “on its face, explicitly and unequivocally describe[s] the invention as recited in the reissue claims.”

Turning to FNG’s reissue claims, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board, finding that the new claims were not directed to the same invention as the original patent and thus failed to satisfy § 251. The Court explained that the specification of FNG’s issued patent had just one embodiment, which featured “a plurality of magnets” to removably attach a grill to the floating device. The reissue claims, however, contemplated more general attachments without magnets.

FNG argued that its claims were acceptable under § 251 because the magnets were a “non-essential embodiment” of the invention. The Federal Circuit disagreed for four reasons:

  1. An element of a patent may be deemed essential even if the patent does not explicitly state as much. Thus, the magnets were essential to FNG’s original patent, even if not labeled so.
  2. It is irrelevant that a person of skill in the art may know to replace an original patent element with “some other undisclosed mechanism” to reach the same result. Here, a new way to attach a grill to the [...]

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Hit a Nerve? Obviousness Inquiry Must Address Claims at Issue

by | Jul 20, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded a Patent Trial & Appeal Board non-obviousness decision, finding that the context of the proposed combination of prior art in the Board’s obviousness inquiry was not directed toward the context of the claim at issue. Axonics, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., Case No. 21-1451 (Fed Cir. July 10, 2023) (Lourie, Dyk, Taranto, JJ.)

Axonics filed petitions for inter partes review (IPR) challenging the validity of two patents owned by Medtronic as obvious. During the IPRs, the Board analyzed two prior art references, an article titled, “Electrical Stimulation of the Trigeminal Nerve Root for the Treatment of Chronic Facial Pain” by Ronald Young and a patent assigned to Gerber. The Medtronic patents described percutaneously positioning a lead to stimulate the sacral nerve. By contrast, Gerber described positioning an electrode in the sacral nerve region in a non-percutaneous way, and Young described positioning an electrode percutaneously to stimulate the trigeminal sensory root. The Board found that Medtronic’s patents were not obvious over Young in view of Gerber because of lack of motivation to combine the two prior art references. The Board also noted “that the proposed combination ‘would not be feasible in the trigeminal nerve region.’” Axonics appealed.

The Federal Circuit found that the Board erred in conducting the obviousness analysis. The Board’s proposed analysis centered on Young’s trigeminal sensory root context, not the Medtronic patents’ sacral nerve context. First, the Board questioned whether motivation to use the resulting combination of Young and Gerber existed in the trigeminal nerve context, but not in Medtronic patents’ sacral nerve context. Second, the Board found “that the relevant art [of the Medtronic patents] is medical leads specifically for sacral neuromodulation.”

Addressing the first error, the Federal Circuit explained that the prior art combination must be directed toward meeting the requirement of the claimed patent, not the requirement of the first prior art. The Court found that the Board did not conduct this analysis. Addressing the second error, the Court noted that “the relevant art” of the Medtronic patents was not “limited to medical leads for sacral-nerve stimulation.” The Court examined the specification of the patent as well as its claim and ruled that the scope of the Medtronic patents was broader than what the Board concluded.

The Court found that the Board’s errors were not harmless since the Board relied on these errors in rejecting Axonics’s obviousness arguments and provided no other reason for concluding Medtronic’s claims were not obvious. Therefore, the Court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further consideration.

Practice Note: In considering obviousness arguments under 35 U.S.C. § 103, keep in mind the difference between the claim at issue and the considered combination of prior art. The scope of the claim also needs to be considered based on the entirety of the patent.

Woohyeong Cho, a summer associate in the Washington, DC, office, also contributed to this case note.



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Speculative Injury from Rulemaking Petition Denial Doesn’t Confer Standing

by | Jul 20, 2023 | ,

The US District Court for the District of Columbia affirmed the dismissal of a case alleging that the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by denying the plaintiffs’ rulemaking petition. The district court found that the plaintiffs’ alleged injury was too speculative to confer Article III standing. US Inventor, Inc. v. US Patent and Trademark Office, Case No. 22-2218 (D.D.C. July 12, 2023) (Bates, J.)

Under the America Invents Act (AIA), the Patent Trial & Appeal Board may hear challenges to the validity of patents through inter partes review (IPR) and post-grant review (PGR). The decision to initiate a review is made at the discretion of the PTO on a case-by-case basis. US Inventor, Inc., and National Small Business United (collectively, NSBU) filed a rulemaking petition with the PTO, arguing that the PTO unlawfully designated cases as precedential or informative without putting those considerations through notice-and-comment rulemaking, as required by the APA. NSBU expressed the same position in a previous lawsuit filed in the Eastern District of Texas that was dismissed for lack of standing—a decision upheld by the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. NSBU subsequently filed a lawsuit in the District of Columbia. The PTO filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing.

In a motion to dismiss, a court will accept facts alleged in the complaint as true but will not assume the truth of legal conclusions. The District of Columbia noted that not every denial of a rulemaking petition confers standing on the petitioner. Standing is established by claiming an injury in fact that can be traced to the defendant’s actions and is likely to be redressed by the court. Therefore, a plaintiff must show that the denial of the petition caused a concrete injury in fact. Injury in fact must be concrete, particularized and not conjectural or hypothetical. Standing can be established via associational standing or organizational standing. Here, the court found that NSBU could establish neither.

In finding no associational standing, the District of Columbia agreed with the PTO that NSBU’s theory of injury was too speculative and not concrete. NSBU proposed an “uncertain series of events” that could lead to an alleged injury, but the court rejected the claim as attenuated conjecture based on the actions of independent third parties (similar to the fact pattern in the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA.)

The District of Columbia heavily criticized the first step of NSBU’s proposed series of events, which was that a valid IPR or PGR would have to be filed on behalf of a patent held by a member of NSBU’s organizations. The court found that identifying potential members that might face IPR or PGR proceedings if a third party decided to bring a claim against them was too hypothetical and relied entirely on the actions of a third party.

The District of Columbia also disagreed with NSBU’s reliance on statistics. NSBU argued that patent cancellation is more likely [...]

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The Game of Life: Winner Gets Everything Except Attorneys’ Fees

by | Jul 13, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed with the trial court regarding the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s legal positions and found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants, as the prevailing party, attorneys’ fees. The First Circuit determined that the positions advanced by the unsuccessful plaintiffs were not objectively unreasonable. Markham Concepts, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., Case Nos. 19-1927; 21-1957; -1958 (1st Cir. June 22, 2023) (Kayatta, Lipez, Thompson, JJ.)

The underlying case involved a copyright action concerning ownership rights to The Game of Life, a board game that has been widely popular since its launch in 1960. The Game of Life became the center of a long-standing dispute between its creators, Reuben Klamer and Bill Markham. Klamer, a toy developer, conceived the initial idea for the game and enlisted Markham to design and create the game prototype. Markham believed he deserved greater recognition for his contribution and felt the royalty he received was unfairly low.

In its previous ruling on the merits, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in favor of the Hasbro defendants (including Klamer). The Hasbro defendants then sought attorneys’ fees, which the district court denied. Hasbro appealed and moved for appellate attorneys’ fees.

Although both the district court and the First Circuit examined various factors, such as Markham’s motivations and the need for compensation or deterrence, the key factor for both courts in determining whether to award legal fees hinged on the reasonableness of Markham’s litigation arguments.

The merits of the underlying case revolved around the termination right provided by the Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act), which allows authors to terminate copyright grants after a certain period and thereby disentangle themselves from agreements made before the true value of their work became apparent. This right does not apply to works made for hire. In this instance, the issue of whether The Game of Life qualified as a work made for hire was determined under the Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act), as the game was created long before the 1976 Act took effect. Under the 1909 Act, Markham had to meet the “instance and expense” test, which treats contractors as employees of the party commissioning the work, thereby presuming copyright ownership in the latter. The district court held that The Game of Life was a work for hire because it was created at Klamer’s instance and expense.

Markham’s primary argument relied on the 1989 Supreme Court decision in Reid, which interpreted “employee” for purposes of the work-for-hire test as being defined according to “the general common law of agency.” Although Markham acknowledged that Reid was directed to the 1976 Act, he contended that the logic of Reid should extend to the 1909 Act, thereby nullifying the “instance and expense” test in favor of the general common law of agency.

Four years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Reid, however, the First Circuit applied the “instance and expense” test in Forward to a work covered [...]

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Federal Circuit to Revisit Whether KSR Extends to Design Patents

by | Jul 13, 2023 |

Granting a petition for rehearing en banc, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided to revisit the effect of the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in KSR International v. Teleflex on design patents. LKQ Corporation v. GM Global Technology Operations, Case No. 21-2348 (Fed. Cir. June 30, 2023) (per curiam). The Federal Circuit withdrew its earlier panel decision addressing KSR’s application to design patents.

This case arose from an inter partes review (IPR) filed by LKQ against GM alleging that GM’s design patent for a vehicle fender was obvious and/or anticipated. In its original opinion, the Federal Circuit applied its predecessor court’s design patent test for obviousness in In re Rosen (CCPA 1982), as well as its decision in Durling v. Spectrum Furniture (Fed. Cir. 1996), ultimately finding that GM’s design patent was not obvious or anticipated and affirming the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s decision. The Federal Circuit determined that it was unclear whether the Supreme Court had overruled Durling and Rosen with KSR, so it did not apply KSR. Judge Lourie provided an additional opinion that KSR did not overrule Rosen. Judge Stark concurred in the judgment but found that LKQ had forfeited its argument that KSR overruled Rosen.

In its order for en banc review, the Federal Circuit asked the parties to address whether KSR abrogates Rosen and Durling and whether KSR applies to design patents regardless of whether it overrules or abrogates Rosen and Durling. Specifically, the Court inquired whether KSR’s “expansive and flexible approach” means that Durling’s two requirements should be modified or eliminated. Durling’s first requirement is that “[b]efore one can begin to combine prior art designs . . . one must find a single reference, ‘a something in existence, the design characteristics of which are basically the same as the claimed design.’” Its second requirement is that secondary references “may only be used to modify the primary reference if they are ‘so related to the primary reference that the appearance of certain ornamental features in one would suggest the application of those features to the other.’”

The Federal Circuit also asked the parties to address the appropriate test for evaluating the obviousness of design patents in the event the Rosen-Durling test was to be eliminated or modified.

The Federal Circuit further requested that the parties address whether eliminating the Rosen-Durling test would cause uncertainty in a settled area of law. Finally, the Court asked whether any differences between design patents and utility patents are relevant to the design patent obviousness inquiry.

The Federal Circuit indicated that the issues of anticipation and forfeiture from the initial appeal were preserved, but that additional briefing on those issues was not required. The Court invited the United States to participate as amicus curiae.

Practice Note: With the Federal Circuit granting rehearing en banc, there is a possibility that the Court may extend the obviousness analysis of KSR to design patents.



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Coons and Tillis Introduce Two Bills Intended to Change Patent Landscape

by | Jul 13, 2023 |

In late June 2023, Senators Chris Coons (D-DE) and Thom Tillis (R-NC) introduced two bills in Congress that, if enacted, would change the patent adjudication landscape:

The PREVAIL Act is essentially a reintroduction of the previously unsuccessful STRONGER Patents Act of 2019 bill and would change fundamental aspects of how the Board operates. Under current practice, the Board judges who rules on institution and also decides the outcome of an instituted proceeding. Under the PREVAIL Act, institution decisions would be made by a separate set of judges from those that render a decision on a petition’s merits. Through proposed changes to the initiation and estoppel provisions, a patent challenger could bring its attack on patent validity in either the district court or the Board, but not both. And as part of the harmonization of district court and Board proceedings, the PREVAIL Act would adopt the “clear and convincing” standard for Board review and codify existing Board practice of applying the same claim construction standard as district courts apply.

The PREVAIL Act would also change who can bring issues to the Board by imposing standing and revised real-party-in-interest requirements. An IPR petitioner would have to establish standing equivalent to that required for a district court declaratory judgment action. Moreover, anyone who financially contributes to an IPR would be deemed a real party in interest to avoid multiple petitions backed by the same entity. To reduce the multiplicity of proceedings, the PREVAIL Act would establish a presumption against a joinder for time-barred petitions. The PREVAIL Act also includes several provisions directed to the independence and transparency of the Board’s decision-making, including establishing a code of conduct and requiring recordation of the Director’s actions that affect Board proceedings.

Turning to subject matter eligibility, the Patent Eligibility Restoration Act would overrule Supreme Court decisions importing a judicial exception to Section 101 and would codify many of the existing categories of ineligible subject matter, including mathematical formulae; substantially economic, financial, social, cultural and artistic practices (in other words, fundamental human activity); natural processes and products made independent of human activity; and mental processes. The Patent Eligibility Restoration Act specifically would authorize early resolution and limited discovery on Section 101 ineligibility.

Practice Note: Although both acts have been introduced before without much success, Congress’s present focus on technology (such as artificial intelligence) may serve to propel one or both bills forward. Of course, it remains to be seen whether Congress has an appetite for modifying patent law, particularly in the lead-up to an election year.



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Amending a Range? Better Enable It

by | Jul 13, 2023 |

In a post-grant review appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained that patent claims reciting a range must enable the full scope of that range and, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Patent Trial & Appeal Board is not bound to decisions rendered in a Preliminary Guidance. Medytox, Inc. v. Galderma S.A., Case No. 22-1165 (Fed. Cir. June 27, 2023) (Dyk, Reyna, Stark, JJ.)

Medytox owns a patent directed to the use of animal-protein-free botulinum toxins with long-lasting effects. Galderma challenged the validity of Medytox’s patent in a post-grant review. In response to the challenge, Medytox filed a motion to amend the patent under the Board’s Pilot Program, which allows a petitioner to amend the patent claims and receive a preliminary decision as to whether the amendment would preserve the patent’s validity (Preliminary Guidance). Medytox proposed modifying the claims so that they only encompassed treatment methods that possessed a patient response rate of “50% or greater.” Galderma opposed the motion, arguing that claiming a 50% to 100% response rate constituted new matter, meaning the claim language improperly claimed an invention that was not described in the patent application as filed.

The Board issued a Preliminary Guidance construing the new claim language and explaining that it did not believe that Medytox’s amended claims represented new matter. According to the Board, the new limitation did not “necessarily” claim a range of 50% to 100% and instead could just be claiming 50% or greater. The Board explained that since the patent contained the concept of a greater than 50% response rate, claiming that rate was not new matter. As a consequence of the Board’s positive reception, Medytox amended all the claims to include the new language. Galderma once again opposed the motion and further argued that the amended claims were not enabled. The Board held an oral hearing and questioned the parties on the proper construction of the “50% or greater” claim language.

In its final written decision, the Board decided that the limitation was a range of 50% to 100%, contrary to its statement in the Preliminary Guidance. Because the claimed limitation was a range, the Board—citing the Supreme Court’s 2023 decision in Amgen v. Sanofi and the Federal Circuit’s 2012 decision in Magsil v. Hitachi Global Storage—explained that the entire range must be enabled. The patent, however, only described a response rate of up to 62%, so the Board found that the claimed range was not enabled. Medytox appealed.

Medytox alleged three errors. First, Medytox argued that the Board’s new construction was wrong. Second, Medytox argued that the claims were enabled. Finally, Medytox argued that the Board violated the APA by capriciously departing from its Preliminary Guidance. The Federal Circuit rejected Medytox’s arguments and affirmed the Board’s decision.

First, the Federal Circuit determined that there was no meaningful difference between the two possible constructions—claiming a response rate greater than 50% was essentially the same as claiming a response rate of [...]

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If at First You DuPont Succeed, Try a Different Factor

by | Jul 13, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit remanded a Trademark Trial & Appeal Board decision, finding that the Board incorrectly analyzed several DuPont factors, improperly disregarded the DuPont factor regarding third-party registration on similar goods, permitted the opposer to succeed without a showing of identical marks for identical goods used in the marketplace and predicated its comparative analysis on the incorrect mark. Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., Case No. 22-1578 (Fed. Cir. June 26, 2023) (Mayer, Reyna, Dyk, JJ.)

Spireon filed a trademark application for the mark FL FLEX for use in connection with “[e]lectronic devices for tracking the locations of mobile assets in the nature of trailers, cargo containers, and transportation equipment using global positioning systems and cellular communication networks.” After the Examining Attorney approved the application, Flex opposed registration on grounds of priority and likelihood of confusion with Flex’s previously registered marks: FLEX, FLEX (stylized) and FLEX PULSE.

The Board sustained Flex’s opposition based on its analysis of the DuPont factors for evaluating likelihood of confusion. There are a total of 13 factors that together form the underlying factual findings upon which the legal conclusion of likelihood of confusion is made. Not all factors are relevant in every case.

In its consideration of the first DuPont factor (the similarity of the marks), the Board addressed the strength of Flex’s marks, including the marks’ conceptual and commercial strength. The Board weighed five marks—FLEX (in three relevant commercial contexts), LOAD FLEX VALUE FLEX—and concluded that the third-party evidence did not show that Flex’s marks were either conceptually weak or inherently distinctive. The Board then considered the similarity of the marks, analyzing Spireon’s FL FLEX against FLEX, FLEX (stylized) and FLEX PLUS (rather than the actual mark FLEX PULSE). The Board found the marks highly similar and concluded that the first DuPont factor supported a finding of likelihood of confusion. The Board also addressed three other DuPont factors that it considered relevant, but no others. Spireon appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed. The Court found that the Board erred in not considering the sixth DuPont factor, “[t]he number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.” This factor requires an evaluation of conceptual strength and commercial strength. Conceptual strength focuses on the degree to which a mark is descriptive in that it “directly and immediately convey[s] some knowledge of the characteristics of products.” Commercial strength focuses on the “marketplace recognition value of the mark.”

The Federal Circuit explained the relevance of third-party registrations and their bearing on a mark’s conceptual strength, noting that the Board erred in assigning a low probative value to 15 composite marks of record. The Court explained that composite third-party marks are relevant to resolving the question of whether the “shared segment—in this case, ‘flex’—has a commonly understood” meaning in the pertinent field and to the crowded nature of the field in which the flex root is used. As the Court explained, proof of use or non-use is material because the sixth DuPont factor only considers [...]

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Personal Jurisdiction? Selling Products via Interactive Website Will Do It

by | Jul 13, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, deciding that the sale of a product via an interactive website provides sufficient “minimum contacts” to support jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a state where the defendant causes the product to be delivered. Herbal Brands, Inc. v. Photoplaza, Inc., Case No. 21-17001 (9th Cir. July 5, 2023) (Graber, Clifton, Christen, JJ.)

Herbal Brands sells health, wellness, fitness and nutrition products directly to consumers and through authorized third-party retailers in Arizona. Photoplaza sold Herbal Brands products through two e-commerce storefronts without Herbal Brands’ permission. Herbal Brands sent three cease-and-desist letters, stating that Photoplaza’s sales harmed Herbal Brands in Arizona. Herbal Brands accused Photoplaza of trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act, false advertising under the Lanham Act and tortious interference with contracts and business relationships under Arizona law. The district court granted Photoplaza’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Herbal Brands appealed.

The Ninth Circuit noted that Photoplaza failed to submit any evidence to contradict the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint. The Court found that under its three-part test, Photoplaza had sufficient minimum contacts with Arizona to warrant personal jurisdiction:

  1. Photoplaza purposefully directed its activities at the forum.
  2. Herbal Brands’ harm arose out of Photoplaza’s contacts with Arizona.
  3. Exercise of jurisdiction over Photoplaza would be reasonable.

The second and third prongs of the Ninth Circuit’s test were easily resolved. Herbal Brands’ claimed harm rose out of and related to Photoplaza’s conduct of selling the products to Arizona residents. The Court referred to its 2004 holding in Schwarzenegger regarding a plaintiff’s burden to establish jurisdiction, whereupon the burden shifts to the defendants under the seven-factor balancing test of Freestream Aircraft (2018). The Court found that Photoplaza did not meet its burden to present a compelling case that exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable.

The bulk of the Ninth Circuit’s decision focused on the first prong (purposeful availment), which applies when “a case sounds in tort,” such as claims of trademark infringement, false advertising and tortious interference with business relationships, each of which requires an intentional tortious or “tort-like” act. Referring to the effects test from the 1984 Supreme Court decision in Calder v. Jones, the Ninth Circuit explained that Photoplaza purposefully directed its activities toward the forum if it (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that Photoplaza knew was likely to be suffered in the forum state. Related to the Calder test’s first and third prongs, Photoplaza’s product sales to Arizona residents were intentional acts, and the cease-and-desist letters informed Photoplaza that its actions caused harm in Arizona.

Regarding the “express aiming” prong, the Ninth Circuit explained that when a website itself is the only jurisdictional contact, the analysis turns on whether the site had a forum-specific focus or whether the defendant exhibited an intent to cultivate an audience in the forum. The Court explained that [...]

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