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Results for "Patent application"
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Transfer Motions Must Take Top Priority

by | Nov 19, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit granted an accused infringer’s mandamus petition to transfer a case from the Western District of Texas to the Northern District of California, concluding that the district court “barreled ahead” on the merits before addressing the transfer motion and clearly abused its discretion in denying transfer. In re. Apple, Inc., Case No. 20-135 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2020) (Prost, C.J.) (Moore, J., dissenting). In re. Apple, Inc

In September 2019, Uniloc sued Apple in the Western District of Texas alleging that several Apple products infringed one of Uniloc’s patents. In November 2019, Apple moved to transfer the case to the Northern District of California on the basis that it would be clearly more convenient to litigate the case in that district. In January 2020, Apple moved to stay all activity in the case unrelated to its transfer motion pending a decision on that motion. The district court denied the stay motion without explanation. In May 2020, the district court held a hearing on Apple’s transfer motion during which the court stated that it would deny the motion and issue a written order as soon as possible. After the hearing, but before issuing a written order, the court held a Markman hearing, issued its claim construction order, held a discovery hearing and issued a corresponding discovery order. In response to these advances in the case, in June 2020 Apple filed a petition for writ of mandamus requesting that the Federal Circuit transfer the case to the Northern District of California. One week after Apple filed its petition, the district court issued its written order denying transfer.

The Federal Circuit granted Apple’s mandamus petition and directed the district court to transfer the case to the Northern District of California. The Federal Circuit explained that the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit assesses transfer requests using private and public interest factors. The private interest factors are: “(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” The public interest factors are: “(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws [or in] the application of foreign law.” The parties agreed that the third and fourth public interest factors were neutral, but disputed whether the remaining factors weighed for or against transfer.

The Federal Circuit found numerous errors in the district court’s analysis. As to the first private factor (access to sources of proof), the Court found that the district court erred in determining that the location of witnesses weighed in favor of transfer. The Court explained that the “access to proof” factor [...]

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Analogous Art Includes Reference a Skilled Artisan Would Reasonably Consult

by | Nov 19, 2020 |

Addressing the standard for determining whether a prior art reference constitutes analogous art for purposes of an obviousness analysis, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded a Patent Trial and Appeal Board decision that a reference was not analogous. The Court explained that the Board did not consider the purpose and problems to which the prior art and challenged patent relate. Donner Tech., LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC, Case No. 20-1104 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2020) (Prost, C.J.)

Pro Stage owns a patent directed to an improved guitar effects pedalboard. Guitar effects pedals are electronic devices that affect the amplified sound of a guitar. The pedals are controlled by foot operation switches in order to leave the user’s hands free to play the instrument. When multiple pedals are used, they must be interconnected by cables, which are typically daisy-chained between each separate pedal. Once interconnected, the pedals are placed on a wooden pedalboard and covered with foam so that the cables are not exposed. This leads to difficulty when swapping or adding new pedals because the foam must be removed from the board and the cables repositioned. Pro Stage’s patent attempts to remedy this issue by elevating one side of the pedalboard from the stage floor and providing a mounting surface and cable connection openings such that cables can pass beneath the mounting surface, as demonstrated by the patent figures shown below.

Donner petitioned for inter partes review of the patent, challenging various claims as obvious under 35 USC §103. Donner asserted three grounds of invalidity, all relying at least in part on the teachings of the Mullen patent. Mullen relates to an improved structure for supporting one or more electrical relays and for providing wiring-channel space for receiving wires connected to the relays in order to connect the relays to various control circuits. As part of its petition, Donner claimed that certain embodiments of Mullen (below), disclose a structure that is analogous to the structure claimed in the challenged patent.

The Board rejected that Donner’s obviousness challenges, finding that Donner did “not put forth any argument or evidence to explain what would have compelled a pedalboard inventor in 1999 or 2000 to consider potential solutions arising from early 1970s-era relay technologies,” notwithstanding arguments, expert and other testimony, and other evidence submitted by Donner to the contrary. Donner appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed, explaining the relevant tests to analyze whether a prior art reference is analogous. The two separate tests are (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is [...]

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PTO Exam Guide: Post Booking.com, Generic.com Terms Still Face Uphill Battle for Registration

by | Nov 12, 2020 |

Addressing the Supreme Court of the United States’ ruling in USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) recently issued guidance on the examining procedures for “generic.com terms.” (Examination Guide No. 3-20, Generic.com Terms after USPTO v. Booking.com, October 2020.)

Booking.com had been engaged in a prolonged battle to secure registration for its BOOKING.COM trademark in connection with hotel reservation services. Earlier this year, the Supreme Court addressed the issue in Booking.com, rejecting the PTO’s proposed per se rule that a generic term combined with a generic top-level domain (a “generic.com term”) is necessarily generic and therefore ineligible for trademark protection. As the Supreme Court concluded, “[W]hether any given ‘generic.com’ term is generic . . . depends on whether consumers in fact perceive that term as the name of a class or, instead, as a term capable of distinguishing among members of the class.”

In light of this holding, the PTO issued Exam Guide 3-20, which outlines new guidance for examining generic.com terms. The PTO emphasized that the registrability of generic.com terms should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, but that these terms would often face an uphill battle for registration: “[G]iven the nature of these terms, the available evidence will likely support a conclusion that they are, at least, highly descriptive, and thus consumers would be less likely to believe that they indicate source in any party. Thus, for generic.com terms, applicants will generally have a greater evidentiary burden to establish that the proposed mark has acquired distinctiveness.”

The procedure for refusing registration of a generic.com term remains largely unchanged. Typically, an examining attorney cannot issue an initial refusal for genericness; the office action should instead refuse registration for mere descriptiveness under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1). Depending on the examining attorney’s assessment of whether the relevant generic.com term is even capable of serving as a source identifier, the office action may include language suggesting (or advising against) a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) or amendment to the supplemental register.

Applicants seeking registration for a generic.com term on the principal register under Section 2(f) should be prepared to present substantial evidence that consumers recognize the mark as a source identifier, including, for example:

  • Consumer surveys
  • Consumer declarations
  • Evidence as to the duration, extent and nature of the mark’s use
  • Advertising expenditures.

The PTO warned that evidence of five years’ use or reliance on a prior registration alone is likely insufficient. Additionally, surveys should be accompanied by a report outlining “the procedural aspects of the survey and statistical accuracy of the results, . . . [i]nformation regarding how the survey was conducted, the questionnaire itself, the universe of consumers surveyed, the number of participants surveyed, and the geographic scope of the survey.” If the examining attorney believes the generic.com term is capable of functioning as a trademark but the proffered evidence is insufficient to establish acquired distinctiveness, the examining attorney may allow the applicant to amend the registration to the supplemental register.

A [...]

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Federal Circuit Will Not Second-Guess IPR Institution Denials

by | Nov 11, 2020 | ,

In a series of non-precedential orders, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reiterated that it lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals on whether the Patent Trial and Appeal Board properly decided to deny inter partes review (IPR) petitions based on parallel district court litigation. Cisco Systems Inc. v. Ramot at Tel Aviv University, Case Nos. 20-2047, -2049 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 30, 2020); Google LLC v. Uniloc 2017 LLC, Case No. 20-2040 (Oct. 30, 2020); In re: Cisco Systems Inc., Case No. 2020-148 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 30, 2020); Apple Inc. v. Maxell, Ltd., Case No. 20-2132, -2211, -2212, -2213, 21-1033 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 30, 2020).

The 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) created various mechanisms for challenging the validity of issued patents in post-grant proceedings before the US Patent and Trademark Office PTO) by adding transitional covered business method and post-grant review proceedings to existing ex parte re-examination, and expanding and renaming inter partes re-examination to inter partes review (IPR).

Under 35 USC §§ 311, 312, a petition for IPR must identify all real parties in interest, identify and support the prior art grounds for challenges to the claims, and provide “such other information as the Director may require by regulation.” Under 35 USC § 314 and 37 CFR 42.4(a), the Board institutes a trial on behalf of the PTO Director, and a “determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.” In deciding whether to institute the trial, the Board considers, at a minimum, whether a petitioner has satisfied the relevant statutory institution standard. Even when a petitioner has satisfied the institution standard, the Director has statutory discretion under 35 USC 314(a) and 324(a) to deny a petition.

In 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee that “the agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion,” and that there is “no mandate to institute review.” The Supreme Court also found that the Director is given broad discretion under 35 USC 315(d) and 325(d) to determine the manner in which “multiple proceedings” before the PTO involving the same patent may proceed, “including providing for stay, transfer, consolidation, or termination of any such matter or proceeding.” Subsequent PTO policies and precedential Board decisions set forth factors affecting the case-specific analysis of whether to institute an AIA proceeding, and particularly a follow-on or serial petition, or discretionary denial due to the timing of parallel district court proceedings.

In Cisco v. Ramot, the Board denied Cisco’s petitions to institute IPRs against two patents that Ramot had asserted against it in a district court case. The decisions denying Cisco’s petitions cited the Board’s discretion under 35 USC § 314(a) not to institute review and relied on the factors determining whether efficiency, fairness and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution in view of an earlier trial date in the parallel proceeding. Specifically, the Board [...]

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Venue in Hatch-Waxman Cases Limited to District Where ANDA Is Submitted

by | Nov 11, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that in cases brought under the Hatch-Waxman Act, for purposes of determining venue, infringement occurs only in districts where actions related to the submission of an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) occur, and not in all locations where future distribution of the generic products specified in the ANDA is contemplated. Valeant Pharmaceuticals North American LLC v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., Case No. 19-2402 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 5, 2020) (O’Malley, J.).

Valeant holds a new drug application for the brand name drug Jublia®, which is used to treat toenail fungal infections. In 2018, Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. (MPI) executed an ANDA seeking approval to market a generic version of Jublia®. MPI sent the ANDA from its West Virginia corporate office to the US Food and Drug Administration, located in White Oak, Maryland. The ANDA included a Paragraph IV certification that the Orange-Book-listed patents for Jublia® were invalid, unenforceable or would not be infringed by the ANDA product. After the ANDA was filed, Valeant filed suit in the District of New Jersey against MPI, Mylan Inc. and Mylan Laboratories Ltd. (MLL) pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Act, alleging infringement of the Orange-Book-listed patents. Valeant also filed an essentially identical lawsuit in the Northern District of West Virginia against the same three defendants. MPI is a West Virginia corporation with a principal place of business in Morgantown, West Virginia. Mylan Inc. is a Pennsylvania corporation with a principal place of business in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania. MLL is an Indian corporation with a principal place of business in Hyderabad, India.

The Mylan entities moved to dismiss the New Jersey litigation, arguing that venue was improper under 28 USC § 1400(b) because none of the Mylan defendants reside or have a regular and established place of business in New Jersey, and the only alleged act of infringement (submission of the ANDA) did not occur in New Jersey. In response, Valeant argued that it was unduly narrow to limit “act of infringement” to the act of submitting the ANDA, and that the court should consider the Mylan entities’ planned future acts, which included acts of infringement in New Jersey. The district court granted the Mylan entities’ motion based on improper venue, finding that the ANDA was submitted from West Virginia and thus venue was proper there. Valeant appealed.

The two issues presented on appeal were the proper venue in Hatch-Waxman cases after TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods, and the proper venue for patent cases brought against foreign entities. Starting with the first issue, the Federal Circuit explained that determining whether venue is proper under § 1400(b) in a district other than the state in which a defendant is incorporated requires determining where the defendant committed acts of infringement. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, it is an act of infringement to submit an ANDA for a drug claimed in a patent if the purpose of the submission is to obtain approval to engage in commercial activities related to the drug before [...]

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No Stay, But Please Fix

by | Nov 4, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied a motion to stay issuance of a mandate while a petition for certiorari regarding patentability under § 101 was pending before the Supreme Court of the United States, finding no irreparable harm if it did not do so. American Axle & Manufacturing, Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, Case No. 18-1763 D.I. 139 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 23, 2020) (Dyk, J.) (Moore, J., concurring). In her concurrence, Judge Moore encouraged the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in order to clarify the scope of § 101.

This decision was the fourth opinion issued by the Federal Circuit in this case. In the Court’s first opinion, a divided panel affirmed that method claims for a mechanical invention were invalid under 35 USC § 101. American Axle & Manufacturing I. The patent owner, American Axle, filed a petition for rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc. American Axle & Manufacturing II. Several amicus briefs were filed, including one by former Federal Circuit Chief Judge Paul R. Michel. In view of these petitions and amicus briefs, the original panel modified and re-issued its opinion to affirm that certain claims were invalid and to reverse its holding that one claim was invalid. Subsequently, the full Federal Circuit denied the petition for a rehearing en banc, polling 6–6 and demonstrating the Court’s division on the application and scope of § 101.

American Axle filed a petition for certiorari at the Supreme Court and sought a stay from the Federal Circuit of the issuance of the mandate. The Federal Circuit denied a stay, citing Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which “provides that a motion for stay of the mandate ‘must show that the petition would present a substantial question and that there is good cause for a stay.’” Fed. R. App. P. 41(d)(1). The Court explained that a three-prong test determines whether a stay in a patent case is appropriate under this rule. The applicant must show (1) a reasonable probability that four justices will grant certiorari, (2) a fair prospect that the Supreme Court will reverse judgment, and (3) a likelihood that irreparable harm will result if the stay is denied.

Relying exclusively on irreparable harm, the Federal Circuit denied a stay. With respect to the invalid patent claims, the Court explained that a stay was not warranted because no further action was required by the district court. The Court dismissed American Axle’s argument that it would have to recall its mandate if reversed by the Supreme Court, explaining that this occurrence is common for every case that is reversed. With respect to the valid patent claim, the Court explained that the burden of litigation and litigation expenses is insufficient to show irreparable harm. Thus, the Court dismissed American Axle’s motion to stay the mandate.

Judge Moore filed a concurring opinion asking the Supreme Court to grant certiorari. Moore explained that the Supreme Court often grants cases where there is a [...]

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First-to-File Rule Must Be Followed Unless Compelling Circumstances Justify Exception

by | Nov 4, 2020 |

Vacating and remanding a district court’s decision not to transfer a case, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit granted a petition for a writ of mandamus because the district court did not consider whether the first-to-file rule favored keeping the case in the second-filed court. In re: Nitro, Case No. 20-142 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 28, 2020) (Reyna, J.).

In 2018, Cameron International filed a suit against Nitro in the Southern District of Texas alleging that Nitro’s fracturing-fluid delivery systems infringed three of Cameron’s patents. In February 2020, Cameron filed a second suit against Nitro in the Western District of Texas, alleging that the same accused products infringed two of Cameron’s other related patents. Relying on the first-to-file rule, which generally dictates that the court in which an action is first filed is the appropriate court to determine whether subsequently filed cases involving substantially similar issues should proceed, Nitro moved the Western District of Texas to decline jurisdiction or transfer the action to the Southern District of Texas.

The district court rejected the application of the first-to-file rule, but not because the two cases lacked substantial overlap. Instead, the district court relied on US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit precedent stating that even where there is such overlap, the court still must determine whether there are “sufficiently ‘compelling circumstances’ to avoid the rule’s application.” The district court determined that it was appropriate to use a balance of the traditional transfer factors to make that determination, concluding that when a balance of transfer factors “does not weigh in favor of transfer[,] . . . compelling circumstances exist in order to avoid application of the first-to-file rule.” Applying this standard, the district court denied Nitro’s motion. The district court found that although two of the factors (relative ease of access to sources of proof, and local interest in having localized interests decided at home) favored transfer, the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion, co-pending suits against another defendant involving the same patents, and the district court’s ability to more quickly schedule a trial weighed against transfer. Nitro filed for mandamus.

Proceeding from the district court’s premise that transfer pursuant to the first-to-file rule would be proper absent the existence of compelling circumstances, and that a balance of the transfer factors can support such an exception, the Federal Circuit explained that consideration of Nitro’s petition turned on the correctness of the district court’s application of those factors. The Court explained that the district court had it backwards by concluding that the first-to-file rule is only applicable when the balance of factors favors the first-filed court. Instead, the proper inquiry is that unless the balance of transfer factors favors keeping the case in the second-filed court, there are no compelling circumstances to keep the case in the second-filed court.

The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not resolve the critical issue of whether a balance of the factors favored the second-filed court. The Federal Circuit explained that although [...]

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Supreme Court to Consider Whether PTAB Judges Are Unconstitutionally Appointed

by | Oct 22, 2020 |

The Supreme Court of the United States agreed to consider whether Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) judges are unconstitutionally appointed. The United States of America v. Arthrex, Inc., Case Nos. 19-1452, -1458, -1459 (Supr. Ct. October 13, 2020) (certiorari granted).

In what quickly turned into a controversial decision, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held the appointment of administrative patent judges at the PTAB unconstitutional. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.  The Federal Circuit found that PTAB judges were appointed as if they were “inferior officers” but vested by the PTAB with authority that is reserved for Senate-confirmed “principal officers.” Smith & Nephew, Arthrex and the United States of America petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the decision.

The questions presented are:

  1. Whether, for purposes of the Appointments Clause, US Const. Art. II, § 2, Cl. 2, administrative patent judges of the US Patent and Trademark Office are principal officers who must be appointed by the president with the Senate’s advice and consent, or “inferior officers” whose appointment Congress has permissibly vested in a department head.
  2. If administrative patent judges are principal officers, whether the court of appeals properly cured any Appointments Clause defect in the current statutory scheme prospectively by severing the application of 5 USC 7513(a) to those judges.


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Federal Circuit Restores Induced Infringement Verdict Against Teva

by | Oct 15, 2020 |

Addressing the issue of whether a generic pharmaceutical company can be found to induce infringement even when all patented uses have been “carved out” of the label (resulting in a so-called “skinny label”), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that circumstantial evidence of inducement was sufficient. The Court relied on evidence that defendant stated its drug was a “complete replacement” for plaintiff’s drug covered by the asserted patent. GlaxoSmithKline LLC et al. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., Case Nos. 18-1976, -2023 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 2, 2020) (Newman, J.) (Prost, C.J., dissenting). The Court reinstated a jury verdict against Teva Pharmaceuticals, ordering it to pay GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) $235 million.

GSK brought suit against Teva in 2014 in response to Teva’s attempt to market a generic form of carvedilol, developed and marketed by GSK under the brand name Coreg®. Coreg® was US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved for three separate indications: hypertension, congestive heart failure (CHF), and left ventricular dysfunction following a myocardial infarction (post-MI LVD). After March 2007, however, no GSK Orange-Book-listed patent covered the hypertension or post-MI LVD indications. A reissue patent that issued in January 2008 remained in force for CHF.

In 2002, Teva filed an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) with the FDA. Before Teva’s carvedilol product was finally approved in September 2007, Teva amended its ANDA and proposed label to “carve out” the CHF indication according to 21 USC § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii)—often referred to as a “section viii carve-out.” Thus, Teva’s carvedilol “skinny label” was only indicated for hypertension and post-MI LVD, neither of which was, at that time, covered by any GSK patent.

After a trial, the jury found that Teva had willfully induced infringement of GSK’s patent and awarded GSK $235 million in damages. The district court then granted Teva’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding that the inducement verdict was not supported by substantial evidence. GSK, the district court reasoned, had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Teva’s alleged inducement (as opposed to other factors) had actually caused even at least one physician to prescribe generic carvedilol for CHF. GSK appealed.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit overturned the grant of judgment as a matter of law, reasoning that the “intent element” of inducement may be proven through circumstantial evidence. The Court noted that the jury had received evidence of, e.g., “Teva’s promotional materials [referring] to Teva’s carvedilol tablets as AB rated equivalents of the Coreg® tablets,” press releases identifying Teva’s product as “Generic Coreg® Tablets,” Teva’s Monthly Prescribing References, and testimony from GSK’s cardiologist witness that physicians are “completely reliant” on information provided by the generic companies. The majority concluded that this was “ample record evidence . . . to support the jury verdict of inducement.”

Chief Circuit Judge Prost authored a lengthy dissent warning of the broad implications of the majority’s ruling, including contravening the congressional design and intent of the generic approval system, and potentially stifling innovation by giving rise to [...]

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Hooked on Precedent or Something New

by | Aug 13, 2020 |

Highlighting internal disagreement regarding patent eligibility under § 101, a divided panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a series of opinions revising and reissuing a previous opinion on § 101 patent eligibility for a mechanical invention and, in an even split, denied a petition for en banc review. American Axle & Manufacturing, Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, Case No. 18-1763 D.I. 134 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2019) (Dyk, J.) (Moore, J., dissenting); id. D.I. 133 (denying en banc by a 6–6 vote).

In October 2019, a divided Federal Circuit panel in American Axle v. Neapco affirmed a district court finding that method claims for a mechanical invention were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The majority specifically found that the claimed invention was nothing more than a recitation of Hooke’s law, which undoubtedly is a law of nature. Judge Moore dissented, arguing that the majority improperly expanded the § 101 eligibility inquiry beyond its statutory gatekeeping function and distorted patent eligibility under § 101 and enablement under § 112.

Neapco filed a petition for rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc. Several amicus briefs were also filed. Notably, retired Judge Paul R. Michel, formerly the chief judge of the Federal Circuit, filed an amicus brief in support of the en banc petition because he believed the panel’s original decision “conflicts with the Supreme Court’s and [Federal Circuit’s] precedent.”

In view of the petition for rehearing, the original panel modified and reissued its opinion. The Court affirmed its original decision that two of the three independent claims were invalid under § 101 (patent claims 22 and 36); however, the Court reversed its original decision invalidating claim 1. Regarding claims 22 and 36, the majority reiterated that the claims were merely an application of Hooke’s law and that it was simply applying Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent, analogizing this case to the Supreme Court’s 1853 O’Reilly v. Morse decision where the Supreme Court determined the patentability of claims directed to a natural law of using electromagnetic force to transmit messages. When responding to the dissent, the majority reiterated that it was not departing from prior precedent, and that its “holding is limited to the situation where a patent claim on its face and as construed clearly invokes a natural law, and nothing else, to accomplish a desired result.”

Regarding claim 1, the majority reversed its original decision because the claim had an additional limitation that could cause the claim to not merely be an application of Hooke’s law. Because the district court did not address this limitation, the majority remanded the case so the district court could address this issue in the first instance.

Judge Moore maintained her dissent, arguing that the majority was announcing a new patentability test: the “Nothing More” test. She argued that the decision created a new test for instances when claims are directed to a natural law even though no natural law is specifically recited in the claims. Judge Moore further reiterated [...]

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