Mi casa no es su Casa Azul: Fifth Circuit revives tequila infringement claim

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated a judgment of no trademark infringement, finding that the district court erred in evaluating four likelihood-of-confusion factors, including by considering third-party use of a term absent from the senior user’s mark and discounting evidence of actual consumer confusion. Casa Tradición S.A. de C.V. v. Casa Azul Spirits, L.L.C., Case No. 24-20255 (5th Cir. Nov. 4, 2026) (Elrod, Guidry, JJ.) (Engelhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Casa TradiciĂłn (Clase Azul) has sold luxury tequila under the CLASE AZUL mark in the United States since 2003. Its tequila is packaged in distinctive hand-painted ceramic decanters and sold at premium prices. Casa Azul Spirits (Casa Azul) owns registrations for the CASA AZUL mark covering wine and, since 2019, alcoholic beverages other than beer. Casa Azul launched canned tequila sodas in 2022 and organic, additive-free bottled tequila in 2023. Clase Azul sued for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act and Texas law. Following a bench trial, the district court found no likelihood of confusion. Clase Azul appealed.

The Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings under the eight likelihood-of-confusion factors (known in the Fifth Circuit as the “digits of confusion”) and identified errors in four of them.

Strength of the mark

The Fifth Circuit found that the district court clearly erred in finding that CLASE AZUL was descriptive rather than suggestive. Although “azul” (Spanish for “blue”) could refer to the blue Weber agave plant used to make tequila, consumers must exercise imagination to make that connection. The Court also noted that “blue class,” the English translation of CLASE AZUL, does not appear in dictionaries, competitors do not need the phrase to describe tequila, and no other tequila brand uses it.

The Fifth Circuit also rejected the district court’s finding that CLASE AZUL lacked marketplace recognition, citing more than 20 years of use, annual sales exceeding $200 million, and extensive media coverage.

Addressing third-party use, the Fifth Circuit found that the district court applied the wrong legal standard by considering third-party marks containing “casa” and “azul,” rather than focusing on “clase” and “azul,” the terms in the senior user’s mark. The Court explained that third-party use of a term absent from the senior mark cannot diminish that mark’s strength. The Court rejected Clase Azul’s argument that only marks combining “clase” and “azul” were relevant, however, because third-party use of a shared component could also bear on the mark’s strength. The Court remanded for further findings on relevant third-party use, explaining that the absence of sales or survey evidence affects the weight of such evidence, not its relevance.

Similarity of the marks and products

The Fifth Circuit found no clear error in the district court’s determination that the marks, although similar in sound, differed in appearance and meaning.

The Fifth Circuit reached a different conclusion regarding the similarity of the products. It concluded that the district court erred by focusing on differences in price and marketing, including Casa Azul’s organic, additive-free positioning, rather [...]

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Seedy departure leads to trade secret liability, but fee award is trimmed

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict finding willful and malicious trade secret misappropriation and declined to review the denial of summary judgment after trial because it involved factual rather than purely legal issues. The Court vacated an attorneys’ fees award, however, because the district court failed to consider the plaintiff’s overall degree of success. Wilbur-Ellis Company, LLC v. Cody Downing, Case No. 25-2865 (8th Cir. Nov. 9, 2026) (Loken, Benton, Erickson, JJ.)

Cody Downing worked as a sales representative for Wilbur-Ellis before resigning to join a competitor. Before his departure, Downing copied hundreds of files containing Wilbur-Ellis’ confidential customer purchasing information, sales forecasts, budgets, strategies, orders, inventory, and pricing information. Wilbur-Ellis sued Downing for trade secret misappropriation, breach of the duty of loyalty, and tortious interference with business relations. Downing moved for summary judgment on all claims and, at trial, moved for judgment as a matter of law on the issues of damages and causation. The district court denied his summary judgment motion on the misappropriation claims and deferred ruling on his motion for judgment as a matter of law.

A jury found that Downing willfully and maliciously misappropriated Wilbur-Ellis’ trade secrets and awarded about $200,000 in damages. The district court subsequently awarded almost $450,000 in attorneys’ fees. Downing renewed his motion for judgment as a matter of law, which the lower court denied. Downing appealed the denial of his summary judgment motion on the misappropriation claims, the denial of his renewed motion, and the award of attorneys’ fees.

Post-trial review of summary judgment motion

The Eighth Circuit explained that denial of summary judgment is generally not reviewable after trial unless the motion presents a purely legal issue. The district court had found genuine disputes of material fact as to each of the four elements of Wilbur-Ellis’ misappropriation claims. Downing argued that the fixed factual record rendered the district court’s ruling purely legal. The Court disagreed, explaining that Downing’s sufficiency of the evidence arguments would require it to review the pretrial record, assess the evidence and permissible inferences, and determine whether a reasonable jury could find for Wilbur-Ellis. Because that inquiry did not present a “purely legal issue,” the Court declined to review the denial of summary judgment.

Attorneys’ fees

The Eighth Circuit vacated the award of attorneys’ fees, finding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider Wilbur-Ellis’ overall degree of success. Relying on the 1983 US Supreme Court decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart, the Eighth Circuit explained that although fees attributable to unsuccessful claims generally should be excluded, segregation may be impracticable when successful and unsuccessful claims arise from a common core of facts or related legal theories. The Eighth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision not to segregate fees because Wilbur-Ellis’ claims were factually related. However, that determination did not relieve the district court of its separate obligation to evaluate whether the overall results obtained justified the fees awarded.

The Eighth Circuit [...]

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Flattery will get you nowhere: Copying and industry praise defeat obviousness challenge

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s decisions finding that Google failed to establish obviousness of certain challenged claims. The Court found that secondary considerations of nonobviousness, including evidence of copying and industry praise, outweighed Google’s evidence of obviousness. Google LLC v. DDC Technology, LLC, Case Nos. 25-1315; -1316; -1330 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 5, 2026) (Reyna, Hughes, Stark, JJ.)

DDC owns three patents directed to virtual reality viewers for use with smartphones. Google petitioned the Board for inter partes review (IPR) of those patents, asserting that the challenged claims were obvious over a combination of two prior art references. Although the Board found that the combined references taught every limitation of certain claims and that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine those references with a reasonable expectation of success, the Board nevertheless concluded that evidence of copying and industry praise outweighed Google’s evidence of obviousness. Google appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s determination of nonobviousness and clarified the role of secondary considerations in the obviousness inquiry. As for the copying factor, the Federal Circuit explained that copying requires replication of a specific product, as opposed to merely showing that competing products fall within the same patent claims. Copying may be established through internal documents, direct evidence of replication, or evidence of access to and substantial similarity to the patented product. The Court rejected Google’s argument that the Board had improperly compared the products to the challenged claims rather than each other, noting that the Board directly compared Google’s viewer with DDC’s viewer and inventor Patrick Buckley’s prototype and found substantial similarity.

Next, Google attacked DDC’s industry praise evidence consisting of emails from Google engineers responding to videos of Buckley’s prototype with comments such as “[t]hat button is genius.” Google contended that these statements were biased compliments arising from a prospective business relationship rather than genuine industry praise. The Federal Circuit disagreed, explaining that the engineers were commenting on a third party’s prototype, and that the Board had accounted for the engineers’ potential lack of impartiality by discounting one response as mere politeness and recognizing that the business relationship reduced the probative value of the other two responses.

Google further argued that its “strong” prima facie case of obviousness outweighed DDC’s “marginal” evidence of secondary considerations. The Federal Circuit disagreed, citing two major reasons. First, the Federal Circuit clarified that the four-factor framework established by the US Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere requires analysis of all four factors governing obviousness, including secondary considerations of nonobviousness. This analysis must be conducted regardless of the strength of the prior art showing, although weak objective evidence may not overcome a substantially stronger showing of obviousness.

Second, the Federal Circuit distinguished the burden-shifting imposed during patent prosecution from IPR proceedings. During prosecution, an examiner’s prima facie showing of unpatentability shifts the burden of coming forward with evidence to the applicant. The Federal Circuit explained that this burden-shifting framework does not [...]

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It’s OK to keep some things close to your vest at trade secret pleading stage

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a dismissal of a Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) claim at the pleading stage, finding that a plaintiff need not disclose every detail of its trade secret to state a claim. The Court also found that misappropriation does not require exact copying but includes use of proprietary information to accelerate development of a competing product. SS&C Tech. Holdings, Inc. v. Arcesium LLC, Case No. 25-2049 (2d Cir. Nov. 3, 2026) (Sack, Livingston, Carney, JJ.)

SS&C owns Geneva, a portfolio accounting software platform used by financial institutions. In 2015, SS&C’s predecessor entered into an agreement authorizing Arcesium to sublicense Geneva and provide related services to customers. The agreement restricted Arcesium’s use of Geneva’s proprietary information and prohibited its use to develop competing products. While operating under the agreement, Arcesium developed its own competing portfolio accounting platform, Trinity, and a separate interface, Nautilus, that allegedly enabled continued access to Geneva after the license expired. SS&C alleged that Arcesium used Geneva’s proprietary data models, integration layer, and software functionality to develop these products. SS&C also pointed to internal communications discussing Geneva’s functionality, the accelerated development of Trinity, and Arcesium’s representations to customers that Trinity could replicate Geneva’s capabilities.

The district court dismissed SS&C’s misappropriation claims, finding that although SS&C adequately alleged the existence of trade secrets, it failed to plausibly allege that Arcesium misappropriated them. SS&C appealed.

Pleading a trade secret

Arcesium argued that SS&C failed to identify its alleged trade secrets with sufficient specificity, asserting that the complaint described only broad categories of information accessible to licensed users. The Second Circuit rejected that argument, explaining that a complaint need only identify the alleged trade secrets with sufficient detail to provide notice of the basis for the claim and permit the defendant to ascertain their boundaries. SS&C satisfied that standard by identifying Geneva’s executable software, integration layer, application programming interfaces, and data model, and explaining their functions.

The Second Circuit also rejected Arcesium’s argument that providing licensed customers with access to Geneva undermined its trade secret protection. The Court explained that disclosure to third parties does not necessarily destroy trade secret protection when the information is shared subject to confidentiality obligations. SS&C’s licensing restrictions and nondisclosure agreements sufficiently alleged reasonable measures to maintain secrecy.

Misappropriation

The Second Circuit also emphasized that misappropriation is not limited to exact copying. Citing to the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s decision in Oakwood Laboratories v. Thanoo (2021), the Second Circuit explained that “use” may include exploiting trade secrets to accelerate research and development, improve competing products, or solicit customers.

Applying that interpretation, the Second Circuit found that SS&C plausibly alleged misappropriation through Arcesium’s use of Geneva’s proprietary functionality to develop Trinity and Nautilus. The allegations included Arcesium’s replication of Geneva’s data models and integration layer, reliance on Geneva’s functionality to resolve technical problems, and development of competing software on an accelerated timeline.

The Second Circuit explained that these allegations must be considered collectively rather [...]

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Criminal counterfeiters beware: Second Circuit affirms prison sentence, restitution for counterfeit trafficking

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a 24-month prison sentence and more than $111,000 in restitution for trafficking in counterfeit luxury goods, finding that the defendant’s supervisory role and the value of the counterfeit goods supported sentencing enhancements. The Court also concluded that harm to intangible trademark rights can support restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), including expenses incurred investigating the counterfeiting. United States v. Sow, Case No. 25-2621-cr (2d Cir. Nov. 3, 2026) (Leval, Wesley, Bianco, JJ.)

Adama Sow pleaded guilty to trafficking counterfeit goods after law enforcement seized more than 80,000 items bearing counterfeit luxury trademarks from storage units she rented at a Manhattan facility. At a sentencing hearing, the district court heard testimony from two storage facility employees concerning Sow’s role in the operation and from an expert retained by the affected luxury brands concerning the value of the counterfeit goods.

The district court applied a two-level sentencing enhancement based on Sow’s supervisory role and a 20-level enhancement based on the value of the counterfeit goods, which it determined exceeded $9.5 million but did not exceed $25 million. These enhancements resulted in an advisory sentencing guidelines range of 70 to 87 months’ imprisonment. The district court nevertheless imposed a substantially reduced sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment and ordered Sow to pay $111,419.32 in restitution to the luxury brands for expenses associated with the expert’s investigation and testimony. Sow appealed.

Sow argued that 28 U.S.C. § 994(j) favored a noncustodial sentence because she was a first-time offender convicted of a nonviolent crime. The Second Circuit rejected that argument, explaining that § 994(j) directs the Sentencing Commission to recognize the general appropriateness of noncustodial sentences for certain first-time offenders but does not require courts to impose such sentences. The Second Circuit found that the district court properly considered the relevant sentencing factors, including the seriousness and duration of Sow’s counterfeiting operation, and exercised its discretion by imposing a sentence substantially below the advisory guidelines range.

The Second Circuit also affirmed both enhancements. The storage facility employees testified that Sow directed at least one assistant who regularly handled merchandise and performed tasks on her behalf. Although Sow challenged the testimony as unreliable and based partly on hearsay, the Court explained that sentencing courts may consider hearsay evidence bearing sufficient indicia of reliability. The employees’ firsthand observations and the district court’s credibility findings supported the supervisory role enhancement.

The Second Circuit likewise upheld the district court’s valuation enhancement. The district court credited expert testimony estimating the street value of the seized counterfeit goods and reduced that estimate by 10% to account for sales in locations such as Canal Street rather than traditional retail stores. The valuation was supported by evidence linking the seized goods to Sow and financial records reflecting millions of dollars flowing through her bank accounts. The Second Circuit found that the district court’s methodology provided a reasonable estimate of the counterfeit goods’ value.

Sow argued that the luxury brands had not established [...]

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