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Copyright Office Seeks Comments on Artificial Intelligence

by Amol Parikh | Sep 21, 2023 | Copyrights

The US Copyright Office (CO) issued a notice, seeking comments on copyright law and policy issues raised by artificial intelligence (AI) systems. Artificial Intelligence and Copyright, 88 Fed. Reg. 59942 (Aug. 30, 2023).

The purpose of the notice is to collect factual information and views relevant to the copyright law and policy issues raised by recent advances in generative AI. The CO intends to use this information to advise Congress by providing analyses on the current state of the law, identifying unresolved issues and evaluating potential areas for congressional action. The CO will also use this information to inform its regulatory work and to offer resources to the public, courts and other government entities considering these issues. The questions presented in the notice are grouped into the following categories:

General high-level questions
AI training, including questions of transparency and accountability
Generative AI outputs, including questions of copyrightability, infringement and labeling or identification of such outputs
Other issues related to copyrights.

The specific questions can be found in the notice. Given the importance of using shared language when discussing AI, a glossary of terms is also provided, on which commentators can provide feedback. The CO indicated that it does not expect every party choosing to respond to the notice to address every question raised. Instead, the questions are designed to gather views from a broad range of stakeholders.

Written comments are due no later than 11:59 pm (EDT) on October 18, 2023. Written reply comments are due no later than 11:59 pm (EST) on November 15, 2023.

Less Is More: IPR Claim Amendments May Not Enlarge Claim Scope

by Amol Parikh | Sep 14, 2023 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a decision from the Patent Trial & Appeal Board denying a motion to amend claims during an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding, explaining that a claim amendment is improper if a proposed claim is broader in any respect relative to the original claims, even if it is overall narrower. Sisvel International S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., et al., Case Nos. 22-1387; -1492 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 1, 2023) (Prost, Reyna, Stark, JJ.)

Sisvel owns two patents directed to methods and apparatuses that rely on the exchange of frequency information in connection with cell reselection between a mobile station (or user cell phone) and a central mobile switching center. Sierra Wireless filed petitions for IPR alleging that claims of Sisvel’s patents were unpatentable as anticipated and/or obvious in view of certain prior art. During the IPR proceeding, the Board determined that the claim term “connection rejection message” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning of “a message that rejects a connection.”

The Board also denied Sisvel’s motion to amend the claims of one of the patents, finding that the amendments would have impermissibly enlarged the claim scope. the Board focused on a limitation relating to “setting a value,” comparing the original claims’ requirement with that of the proposed substitute claims. The original claims required that the value be set “based at least in part on information in at least one frequency parameter” of the connection rejection message while the substitute claims recited that the value may be set merely by “using the frequency parameter” contained within the connection rejection message. The Boeasoneasoned that in the proposed substitute claim, the value that is set need not be based on information in the connection rejection message, and thus the claim was broader in this respect than the original claims. After denying the motion to amend, the Board concluded that the original claims were unpatentable. Sisvel appealed.

Sisvel challenged the Board’s construction of “connection rejection message,” arguing that the term should be limited to a message from the specific cellular networks disclosed in the specification. The Federal Circuit rejected Sisvel’s argument, finding that the intrinsic evidence provided no persuasive basis to limit the claims to any particular cellular network disclosure. Having agreed with the Board’s construction, the Court affirmed the unpatentability determination.

Sisvel also challenged the Board’s refusal to permit Sisvel to amend the claims. Sisvel argued that the Board had incorrectly found that the proposed substitute claims were broader than the original claims because when all the limitations were considered as a whole, the scope of the substitute claims was narrower than the original claims.

Citing 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(3), the Federal Circuit noted that when a patent owner seeks to amend its claims during an IPR, the amended claims “may not enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent.” The Court explained that removal of a claim requirement can broaden the resulting amended claim and concluded that such was the case [...]

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Whisk-y Business: Notice Alone Is Sufficient for Preliminary Injunction

by Alexander Piala, PhD | Sep 7, 2023 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that only notice of a preliminary injunction (PI) motion, and not perfected formal service, is needed to assert jurisdiction to issue an injunction. Whirlpool Corp. v. Shenzhen Sanlida Elec. Tech. Co., Ltd., Case No. 22-40376 (5th Cir. Aug. 25, 2023) (Barksdale, Southwick, Higginson, JJ.)

Shenzhen Sanlida sells stand mixers within the United States, primarily through online sales. Whirlpool filed a complaint for trademark infringement and dilution against Sanlida, arguing that Sanlida’s mixers were too close in appearance to Whirlpool’s iconic KitchenAid stand mixer. Shortly after filing its complaint, Whirlpool requested a PI hearing. In its request, Whirlpool provided evidence that Sanlida had actual notice of the pending hearing. The district court granted the request and scheduled a hearing.

Counsel for Whirlpool and Sanlida attended the hearing. At the hearing, Sanlida argued it had never been properly served under the Hague Convention and that without service, the district court could not assert personal jurisdiction over it. The district court disagreed and granted the PI. Sanlida filed an emergency motion to stay the order, but the district court rejected Sanlida’s request. Sanlida appealed.

Sanlida argued that the district court did not have the power to issue a PI and that it abused its discretion in awarding the injunction. The Fifth Circuit found no error or abuse and affirmed.

The Fifth Circuit explained that service is not a prerequisite to issuing a PI. Citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, the Court explained that the only requirement for issuing a PI is notice to the adverse party. Since it was undisputed that Sanlida had notice of the PI hearing, the Court found that the district court had the power to issue the PI. In doing so, the Court distinguished this case—where there was no dispute that the district court would have personal jurisdiction over Sanlida after the process was perfected—from cases where personal jurisdiction was a live question at the PI hearing.

Turning to the merits of the PI, the Fifth Circuit addressed the four factors the district court had to consider before issuing the injunction: likelihood of success on the merits, threat of irreparable injury, balance of harms and public interest.

On the first factor—likelihood of success—the Fifth Circuit found that the district court made no clear error. The two components of the likelihood of success analysis are validity and likelihood of confusion. On both points, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s finding. While Sanlida argued that Whirlpool’s trademark was invalid because it covered “functional” elements, the Court found insufficient factual support for that argument. Nothing in the record showed that Whirlpool’s mixer head shape had any effect on the “cost or quality” of the mixer. Nor did Sanlida point to any evidence showing that the housing shape would put competitors at a “significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.” Without a showing on either element, Sanlida failed to rebut the presumption of validity. Sanlida also failed to show [...]

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Sins of the Fathers? Grandparent IPR Factors into Current Institution Decision

by Kyle Sorenson, PhD | Sep 7, 2023 | America Invents Act, Patents

US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) Director Kathi Vidal vacated and remanded a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision denying institution of an inter partes review (IPR) because the Board improperly applied the precedential Advanced Bionics framework in rendering its decision. Keysight Tech., Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc., IPR2022-01421 (PTAB Decision Review Aug. 24, 2023) (Vidal, Dir.)

Keysight Tech. petitioned for an IPR proceeding against a patent owned by Centripetal Networks, challenging the validity of all claims. After the Board denied institution, Director Vidal issued a sua sponte director review decision, vacating and remanding the Board’s decision.

The Centripetal patent is the great-grandchild of, and shares the same disclosure as, an earlier Centripetal patent that was subject to an IPR proceeding during the pendency of the presently challenged patent. The Final Written Decision (FWD) in the earlier IPR found all claims of the patent unpatentable. The patent owner included that FWD in an Information Disclosure Statement (IDS) submitted during the prosecution of the presently challenged patent, and the examiner initialed it as having been considered.

In its decision denying institution, the Board cited the guidance of Advanced Bionics, which articulates a framework that requires that the Board determine the following:

Whether the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments made in the petition were previously presented to the PTO during prosecution of the challenged patent
Whether the PTO erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims when it allowed the claims of the patent.

If both factors are met in the affirmative, the Board should not exercise its discretion to deny institution.

Here, the Board found that the first factor of the Advanced Bionics framework was met because the petitioner’s arguments in its petition were the same or substantially the same as those in the FWD in the IPR of the grandparent patent. However, the Board found that the second part of the framework was not satisfied and therefore denied institution.

Although Director Vidal agreed with the Board’s findings under the first factor, she vacated the Board’s findings pursuant to the second factor after determining that this factor was also met. Director Vidal found that the PTO erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims for the following reasons:

The challenged patent and the grandparent were directed to the same subject matter.
The prior art references submitted to the PTO during the prosecution of the challenged patent were the same as those asserted in earlier IPR and were considered by the examiner through the patent owner’s IDS.
In the grandparent IPR, the Board held all of the claims of the patent unpatentable due to these same prior art references.
The examiner’s statement of reasons for allowing the challenged patent was that the claims were directed to limitations that appeared in both the currently challenged claims and the claims found unpatentable in the grandparent patent.

As the director noted, the overlap between the claim limitations in the [...]

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It’s a Taking: Copyright Deposit Requirement Violates Fifth Amendment

by Eleanor B. Atkins | Sep 7, 2023 | Copyrights

Addressing the issue for the first time, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that the Copyright Act of 1976’s requirement to deposit two copies of a work with the Library of Congress within three months of the work’s publication was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Valancourt Books, LLC v. Merrick B. Garland and Shira Perlmutter, Case No. 21-5203 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 2023) (Srinivasan, Henderson, Edwards, JJ.)

Valancourt Books is a small business in Richmond, Virginia, which publishes rare and out-of-print fiction on an on-demand basis (i.e., in response to a specific customer request). Despite never having sought copyright registration for any of its works, Valancourt received a letter in 2018 from the US Copyright Office (CO) demanding a complete copy of 341 books published by Valancourt “for the use or disposition of the Library of Congress.” Failure to comply would subject Valancourt to fines of up to $250 per work plus the total retail price of the copies and an additional $2,500 for repeated failure to comply. Valancourt responded that it could not afford to submit copies of all the requested works, noting that some of the works contained material in the public domain and offering instead to sell copies of the works to the CO at cost. In response, the CO narrowed the list of requested copies to 240 works.

Valancourt sued seeking a declaration that the application of Section 407 of the Copyright Act is unconstitutional under the First and Fifth Amendments and an injunction against its enforcement. The CO offered Valancourt the option to electronically submit the deposits, but Valancourt declined. The parties both moved for summary judgment. After considering whether the CO’s offer to accept electronic copies had mooted the dispute, the district court concluded that the CO’s offer had merely narrowed the dispute to one of electronic deposit copies and granted summary judgment to CO on the constitutional claims. Valancourt appealed.

Valancourt challenged the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Valancourt’s First and Fifth Amendment claims and the district court’s conclusion that the dispute had been limited to one about electronic copies. The DC Circuit agreed, stating that the CO’s “offer did not moot Valancourt’s challenge to the demand for physical copies” because “[a] party’s voluntary cessation of challenged conduct does not moot the challenged [requirement] unless it is ‘absolutely clear’ that the challenged conduct will not recur after the litigation.” Accordingly, the Court considered only the demand for physical (rather than electronic) deposits.

With respect to Valancourt’s constitutional challenges, the DC Circuit concluded that Section 407’s requirement for physical deposit copies violated the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause as there was no benefit received by the copyright owner in response to the deposit: “A demand for personal property would not be a taking . . . if it involved a voluntary exchange for a governmental benefit.” In this case, however, no such benefit existed. Pursuant to the Copyright Act, copyright attaches automatically upon fixation of a [...]

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Back to the Future: Prior Third-Party Settlement Doesn’t Impact Future Trademark Licensees

by Gaylon C. Hollis | Sep 7, 2023 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that under certain circumstances a trademark licensee can bring a claim against a third party for unfair competition under the Lanham Act even if the licensing agreement does not expressly authorize it to do so. Overhead Door Company of Kansas City v. OGD Equipment Company, LLC, Case No. 22-10985 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 22, 2023) (Branch, Brasher, JJ.; Winsor, Dist. J., sitting by designation).

This appeal involved three parties: D.H. Pace Company, Overhead Door Corporation and Overhead Garage Door (OGD). All three companies are involved in selling and servicing garage doors. Pace is a licensee of Overhead. Under its license, Pace is permitted to advertise and promote the trade name OVERHEAD DOOR COMPANY. OGD is a competitor of Overhead and Pace. Prior to the current appeal, Overhead and OGD had been involved in litigation involving OGD’s alleged trademark infringement and unfair trade practices, which resulted in a settlement. As a part of the settlement, OGD and Overhead could not bring suits against each other. However, the settlement terms were not expressly binding on any current or future licensees of Overhead.

In the current litigation, Pace filed suit against OGD for unfair competition in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, deceptive trade practices and various state trademark infringement violations. Pace alleged that OGD was leading consumers to believe that it was the same company as, or was affiliated with, Overhead (Pace’s licensor). In response, OGD moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The district court ruled that the licensing agreement between Pace and Overhead was a contractual bar to relief because the agreement did not affirmatively give Pace the right to sue. The district court also ruled that as a non-exclusive licensee, Pace lacked standing to bring its suit. The district court held that because Pace’s trademark rights were derived from a licensing agreement with Overhead, by discharging rights in the prior settlement with OGD, Overhead also discharged Pace’s right to sue.

Through a de novo review, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the district court’s grant of summary judgment against Pace. As the district court recognized, under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, parties other than the owner of the mark can bring suit, but here the district court barred Pace’s claims based on the licensing agreement, Pace’s status as a non-exclusive licensee and the settlement agreement between OGD and Overhead. In reversing, the Eleventh Circuit held that none of these reasons was sufficient to bar Pace’s claims.

According to the Eleventh Circuit, the licensing agreement did not bar Pace from suing since there were no contractual term imposing a bar. While a licensee’s right to sue can be restricted, there was nothing in the licensing agreement at issue that limited Pace’s right to sue. The license agreement did not address trademark enforcement or either party’s ability to sue.

The Eleventh Circuit explained that the district court misread the Eleventh Circuit’s 2019 decision in Kroma Makeup v. Boldface [...]

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Rimini, Meeny, Miny, Moe: Ninth Circuit Affirms Most PI Violation Findings, Reverses Others

by Kathleen Lynch | Sep 7, 2023 | Copyrights

Addressing the boundaries of a permanent injunction awarded to a major software developer, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit largely agreed that the defending developer was in contempt for violating the order but reversed on certain issues where the district court overextended the injunction. Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., Case No. 22-15188 (9th Cir. Aug. 24, 2023) (Bybee, Bumatay, JJ.; Bennett, Dist. J., sitting by designation).

Oracle creates enterprise software to carry out business functions. Oracle’s customers buy licenses to its products, which require updates and technical support. These necessary support services can be outsourced to third-party vendors, such as Rimini.

This case is the byproduct of a 13-year battle that Oracle initiated on the grounds that Rimini’s support services constituted copyright infringement. Rimini made generic versions of Oracle software on Rimini computers to develop updates and bug fixes (local hosting) and supported clients by using development environments created pursuant to a different client’s license (cross-use). After multiple appeals and remands, the case resulted in a permanent injunction prohibiting Rimini from reproducing or cross-using Oracle software unless pursuant to a customer license. Rimini revamped its support services and sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement. After Oracle was permitted to conduct discovery into potential violations of the injunction, the district court held a bench trial on 10 possible violations. The district court found Rimini in contempt for five of the 10 alleged violations (issues 1–4 and 8). On two others (issues 7 and 9), the district court found no contempt but enjoined Rimini from continuing a specific copying practice. The district court sanctioned Rimini $630,000, calculated according to statutory damages available under the Copyright Act.

Rimini appealed each contempt finding, the injunction and the sanctions.

First, the Ninth Circuit addressed the five contempt findings, sorted into three groups:

Local hosting (issue 1)
Cross-use (issues 2–4)
Database copying (issue 8).

On issue 1, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The lower court had found that Rimini received copyrighted files from its clients. Instead of following internal policies requiring them to quarantine or report these files, Rimini employees forwarded and saved them locally. Based on the plain language of the PI, this was a clear violation.

On issues 2–4, regarding cross-use, the Ninth Circuit also affirmed. Rimini used one client’s environment to modify and test updates that the client did not need and were intended for other clients. Since the injunction specifically prohibited cross-use, this was a violation. Rimini lodged multiple failed arguments, including that the injunction only prohibited cross-use in “generic” (non-client) environments, so its use of one client’s environment to support another client was allowed. The Court disagreed that the injunction was so specific.

On issue 8 (database copying), however, the Ninth Circuit reversed. The district court held Rimini in contempt for making copies of an Oracle database file on Rimini systems. When the client uploaded the file to Salesforce for Rimini to provide technical assistance, a copy was automatically created on Rimini’s system. Here, the [...]

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The End Is Not So Near: Patent Term Adjustments Count in Obviousness-Type Double Patenting Determinations

by Jake B. Vallen | Sep 7, 2023 | Patents

Addressing for the first time how patent term adjustments (PTAs) interact with obviousness-type double patenting (ODP), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that when members of a patent family have different expiration dates due to PTAs, the earlier expiring family members can be used as a basis for an ODP invalidity challenge against the later expiring family members. In re Cellect, LLC, Case Nos. 2022-1293; -1294; -1295; -1296 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 28, 2023) (Lourie, Dyk, Reyna, JJ.)

Cellect owns several patents directed to devices with image sensors, such as personal digital assistant devices and phones. Each patent claims priority from a single application. None of the patents were subject to a terminal disclaimer, and each was granted PTA under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) because of PTO delay during prosecution. Had the patents not been granted PTA, each one would have expired on the same date as the original application.

After Cellect sued for infringement, the defendant requested ex parte reexaminations and asserted that the patents were unpatentable based on ODP. During the reexaminations, the Examiner “determin[ed] that the challenged claims were obvious variants of Cellect’s prior-expiring reference patent claims” because “although the ODP invalidating reference patents form a network across the four ex parte reexamination proceedings, all invalidated claims can be traced back to the single family member [now expired] patent that did not receive a grant of PTA.” The Patent Trial & Appeal Board affirmed the Examiner’s finding. Cellect appealed.

The Federal Circuit began with the inquiry for determining unpatentability based on ODP and whether, in that context, a patent’s expiration date includes a duly granted PTA under 35 U.S.C. § 154. While the Court recognized that the relevant expiration date for an ODP analysis where a patent received a patent term extension (PTE) is the pre-PTE expiration date, the Court concluded that, in the context of patents that have received PTAs, the relevant expiration date for analyzing ODP is the expiration date accounting for the PTA regardless of whether a terminal disclaimer has been filed. The Court reasoned that when determining whether claims are unpatentable for ODP, PTA and PTE, they “should be treated differently” because each is governed by different statutes that were designed to address different circumstances. While both PTAs and PTEs were intended to recover lost patent terms, PTAs were designed to extend patent terms because of administrative delays in patent processing and preclude the extension of a patent term past a terminal disclaimer. PTEs were designed to extend a patent term because of regulatory delays in product approval and are not foreclosed by a terminal disclaimer. As such, the Court reasoned that not contemplating a PTA when analyzing ODP would “frustrate the clear intent of Congress” because “when a terminal disclaimer has been entered in a patent subject to PTA, no patent (or claim) may be extended beyond the disclaimed expiration date.”

The Federal Circuit next considered whether examiners are required to consider “equitable concerns” such as good faith when [...]

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Almost Paradise? No Authorship for AI “Creativity Machine”

by Kavya Rallabhandi | Aug 31, 2023 | Copyrights

The US District Court for the District of Columbia agreed with the US Copyright Office’s denial of a copyright application that sought to register visual art generated by artificial intelligence (AI) because US copyright law only protects works of human creation. Thaler v. Perlmutter, Case No. CV 22-1564 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2023) (Howell, J.)

The Copyright Act of 1976 provides immediate copyright protection to any work of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression. Applicants may submit their works to the Copyright Office for registration, during which works are reviewed for eligibility for copyright protection. the Copyright Office then registers eligible works, affording the registration owner certain legal benefits and presumptions.

Stephen Thaler, the owner of an AI computer system called the “Creativity Machine,” claimed that his AI independently generated the below visual art entitled “A Recent Entrance to Paradise.”

Thaler sought to register the work with the Copyright Office. The copyright application described the art as “autonomously created by a computer algorithm running on a machine,” identified the Creativity Machine as the author and listed Thaler as the copyright claimant under the work-for-hire doctrine. The Copyright Office denied Thaler’s application because the work lacked human authorship, which is an essential element of a valid US copyright. Thaler twice requested reconsideration of the copyright application, and the Copyright Office twice refused to register the work because of the human authorship requirement. Thaler timely appealed the Copyright Office’s denial to the District Court for the District of Columbia, and both parties moved for summary judgment.

Under the authority of the Administrative Procedure Act, the district court reviewed the Copyright Office’s final agency action through the arbitrary and capricious standard of review (5 U.S.C. § 704). The district court first analyzed whether the AI computer system could own the copyright, then determined whether Thaler was a proper claimant under the work-for-hire doctrine. The district court held that the Copyright Office did not err in denying Thaler’s copyright registration application because US copyright law only protects works of human—not machine—creation. Although copyright law was designed to adapt with the times, the district court stated that there is an underlying and consistent understanding that human creativity is the driving force of copyrightability. While the tools humans use to create copyrightable works (fixed in tangible mediums) are ever evolving and range from pencils to computers, human authorship is a bedrock requirement to copyrightability such that the tools themselves cannot be listed as copyright authors. The district court further held that the plain text of the 1976 Copyright Act requires human authorship since it states that the originator of the copyrightable work must have the capacity for intellectual, creative or artistic labor—a standard that AI has yet to meet. Because AI computers cannot be copyright authors, the district court did not address the work-for-hire [...]

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Cover-Up Isn’t Covered Under VARA

by Vincent Li, PhD | Aug 31, 2023 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) does not prohibit covering an artist’s mural where there is no damage to the mural. Samuel Kerson v. Vermont Law School, Inc., Case No. 21-2904 (2d. Cir. Aug. 18, 2023) (Livingston, Cabranes, Kovner, JJ.)

In 1993, Samuel Kerson and Vermont Law School entered into a written agreement for Kerson to paint two murals on the walls of the law school’s community center. The completed murals were publicly viewable and depicted several distinct scenes spanning the history of US slavery, from the capture of Africans in their homelands through the abolitionist movement.

Because of complaints from community members regarding how the murals presented Black people, the law school considered options for the murals’ removal. The school decided to conceal the murals behind a barrier of fabric-cushioned acoustic panels. The panels were constructed such that they were suspended approximately two inches away from the murals’ surface and did not touch the murals.

Kerson filed suit seeking to enjoin the installation of the acoustic panels on the theory that they amounted to a violation of his rights under VARA. Under the relevant part of VARA, the author of a “work of visual art” “shall have the right”:

(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right, and

(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right.

17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(a)(3)(A)-(B).

In the district court, Kerson argued that blocking the public from viewing his work of art would amount to the “destruction” or “intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification” of the murals. The district court disagreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the law school. Kerson appealed.

Kerson argued that permanently concealing the murals with a solid barrier of acoustic panels modified and thus “destroy[ed]” his work. The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that covering a work of art did not amount to “destruction” under VARA. The Court explained that Kerson’s argument did not comport to the conventional understanding of the word “destruction” under the plain meaning of the statute. The acoustic panels were designed to not touch the murals, let alone destroy them.

The Second Circuit also rejected Kerson’s argument that covering a work of art amounts to “modification.” Under VARA, “modification” would entail a change to the work of art that alters some portion of it without radically transforming the whole. For example, an additional brush stroke, erasure of content or the reorganization of a movable component would be a modification of a work of art. Modifications do not include concealing the entire work behind a solid barrier.

The Second Circuit also rejected Kerson’s argument that concealing the murals was [...]

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