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Wave Goodbye: Arguments Incorporated by Reference Are Waived

by | Nov 30, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s patentability determination, finding that the patent challenger waived an argument it attempted to incorporate by reference to another brief. Medtronic, Inc. v. Teleflex Life Scis. Ltd., Case No. 2022-1721 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2023) (Lourie, Prost, Chen, JJ.)

Teleflex owns a patent directed to a method for using a guide extension catheter with a guide catheter. Medtronic challenged the patent in two inter partes review (IPR) proceedings, arguing that certain claims were obvious in light of Ressemann and Itou and that another claim was obvious in light of Ressemann, Itou and Kataishi. Teleflex argued that Itou was not prior art because the claimed invention was conceived prior to Itou’s filing date and was either actually reduced to practice before the critical date or diligently pursued until its constructive reduction to practice date. Medtronic did not contest Teleflex’s demonstration of conception but instead challenged Teleflex’s alleged showings of both actual reduction to practice and diligence until constructive reduction to practice.

The Board ultimately found that Itou did not qualify as prior art and that Medtronic therefore had not shown that the challenged claims were unpatentable. One of the issues before the Board was whether in vivo testing was required for actual reduction to practice because the claims at issue were method claims reciting “advancing . . . a guide catheter . . . through a main blood vessel to an ostium of a coronary artery.” The Board ultimately found that no such testing was required, explaining that Medtronic “was unable to identify any legal precedent requiring in vivo performance of a claimed in vivo method to show actual reduction to practice.” According to the Board, actual reduction to practice could “be verified using a physical model that replicates the anatomy in which the method would likewise be performed in vivo.” Medtronic appealed.

Medtronic challenged the Board’s determination regarding constructive reduction to practice, arguing as follows:

In addressing diligence, the Board simply adopted its earlier erroneous diligence analysis in IPR2020-00132. Appx61–62. Therefore, if this Court vacates the Board’s diligence holding in No. 21-2356, it should likewise vacate the Board’s decision here. Appellant’s Br. at 41.

The Federal Circuit explained that it did not vacate the diligence holding in the prior decision, so Medtronic’s condition precedent had not been met. Medtronic nevertheless urged the Court to decide the diligence question. The Court refused, finding that Medtronic improperly incorporated by reference an argument from another brief. The Court explained that it would be fundamentally unfair to allow Medtronic to use incorporation by reference to exceed the word limit on briefs. The Court observed that parties pursuing appeals must make certain strategic decisions concerning what material to include in their opening briefs, and here, Medtronic affirmatively chose not to include developed arguments on diligence. The Court therefore found that Medtronic waived its challenge to the Board’s diligence finding. With the diligence issue waived and conception stipulated, the Court affirmed [...]

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Distinguishing Drinkware—Provisional Priority Determined Differently in Pre- and Post-AIA Patents

by | Nov 30, 2023 | ,

In a precedential final written decision, the Patent Trial & Appeal Board concluded that a patent does not need to contain a claim supported by a provisional application’s disclosure to draw priority to that provisional for prior art purposes post America Invents Act (AIA). Penumbra, Inc. v. RapidPulse, Inc., IPR2021-01466, paper 34 (PTAB Mar. 10, 2023) (designated precedential Nov. 15, 2023) (Melvin, Cotta, Wisz, APJs).

Penumbra filed an inter partes review (IPR) petition targeting a patent directed to a “thrombectomy system,” which is a system for removing blood clots in the brain. Penumbra challenged the claims on four different grounds, and each included the Tiegen reference. Therefore, the petition would fail if the Tiegen reference was not prior art.

The challenged patent was filed on July 18, 2019, and drew priority to a provisional application filed on October 24, 2018. Tiegen drew priority to two provisional applications—one dated December 12, 2018, and another dated July 24, 2018. Whether Tiegen was prior art thus depended on whether the challenged patent could draw priority to its provisional application, and whether Tiegen could draw priority to its July 24, 2018, provisional. RapidPulse challenged Tiegen on both bases.

First, the Board assessed the proper priority date for the challenged patent. The Board explained that in order for the patent to draw priority to its provisional application, that provisional application had to provide written support for the challenged patent’s claims. Penumbra argued that the challenged patent’s provisional application did not have written support for the claimed “prevent[ing] forward flow.” RapidPulse responded, arguing that the disclosure of a “minimal amount of momentum from the fluid column” disclosed the claimed “preventing forward flow.” Forward flow generates momentum from the fluid column, so minimizing momentum required preventing fluid flow, according to RapidPulse. RapidPulse also pointed to embodiments that had substantially no forward flow from the distal end of the system.

Penumbra responded by explaining that the provisional application required forward flow in some embodiments, and nothing in the specification stated that the flow should be prevented. The Board agreed, explaining that the provisional application included embodiments with forward flow, and while the provisional recited some embodiments with small amounts of forward flow, the provisional did not indicate that the low forward flow was significant. The Board observed that “one cannot disclose a forest in the original application, and then later pick a tree out of the forest.”

Having determined that the priority date of the challenged patent was July 18, 2019, the Board turned to the priority date of Tiegen. The Board distinguished the present case over Dynamic Drinkware, a 2015 US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit case. Dynamic Drinkware states that for prior art purposes, a prior art patent can only draw priority to a provisional application if the prior art patent contains a claim supported by that provisional application. The Board explained that Dynamic Drinkware does not apply post-AIA. Instead, the Board found that, based on the language of AIA 35 [...]

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TikTok Makes It Out of West Texas to Sunny Northern California

by | Nov 16, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted a writ of mandamus ordering the transfer of a case, finding that the district court’s denial of the motion to transfer “was so patently erroneous” that the extreme measure was appropriate. In re TikTok, Inc., Case No. 23-50575 (5th Cir. Oct. 31, 2023) (Smith, Southwick, Wilson, JJ.)

In the underlying case, Beijing Meishe Network Technology Co. sued TikTok in the US District Court for the Western District of Texas, alleging infringement, trade secret misappropriation and false advertising. All claims stemmed from the theory that a former Meishe employee disclosed copyrighted source code for video and audio editing software to TikTok, which TikTok then implemented into its app. Meishe and TikTok are Chinese companies, and both the alleged disclosure and TikTok’s alleged code implementation occurred in China, assisted by TikTok engineers in California. TikTok has no engineers in Texas but does maintain a business office there, although not within the Western District.

TikTok moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 to transfer the case to the Northern District of California. The district court took 11 months to rule on the motion, and in the meantime the case continued through discovery. After the district court denied the motion, TikTok petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamus.

The sole issue on mandamus was the propriety of the district court’s refusal to transfer venue. To succeed on a writ of mandamus, a petitioner must satisfy the reviewing court regarding the following questions:

  1. Are there other ways to obtain the desired relief?
  2. Is the reviewing court’s right to issue the writ “clear and indisputable”?
  3. Is the writ appropriate, given the circumstances?

The Fifth Circuit focused on the second question, its right to issue the writ. In the Fifth Circuit, the 2008 en banc In re Volkswagen case mandates an eight-factor test that a district court must consider in deciding a § 1404 transfer motion. No one factor is dispositive, and the Fifth Circuit has cautioned against tallying the yes/no results or denying transfer just because most factors are neutral. Unsurprisingly, in the 15 years since Volkswagen, district courts applying these factors have reached inconsistent results. Even the Fifth Circuit has reached “conflicting outcomes” when reviewing these cases. The Fifth Circuit therefore took the opportunity to address each factor.

The Fifth Circuit found that two factors weighed in favor of transfer:

  • The relative ease of access to sources of proof
  • The cost of attendance of willing witnesses

Regarding ease of access to proof, the Fifth Circuit clarified that factfinders analyze “relative ease of access, not absolute ease of access” to documents and other physical evidence. The district court had determined that this factor was neutral, given that most documentation was electronic. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, explaining that while the source code was electronically stored, it was protected by a high level of security clearance. Only certain TikTok employees based in California and China were able to access the code. Using the relative metric, [...]

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A Step Forward for Choreography and Copyright

by | Nov 16, 2023 |

In a rare ruling on infringement of a copyright on choreography, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a copyright infringement action, holding that the district court erred in its application of the substantial similarity standard in terms of the line between animation and choreography, and remanded for further proceedings. Hanagami v. Epic Games, Inc., Case No. 22-55890 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2023) (Murguia, C.J.; Paez, Nguyen, JJ.)

Kyle Hanagami, a Los Angeles-based choreographer with a substantial social media following, brought this action against Epic Games, creator of the blockbuster video game Fortnite. Hanagami alleged that Epic infringed his copyrighted choreography by incorporating a portion of his dance work into a virtual animation, known as an “emote,” that players can purchase for video game avatars to perform. Hanagami has created choreography for famous pop stars and globally recognized brands. The five-minute choreographic work at issue in this action was originally published on YouTube in November 2017 and had received almost 36 million views as of Hanagami’s original March 2022 complaint.

In August 2020, Epic released a version of Fortnite that included a new emote called “It’s Complicated.” The allegedly copied choreography consisted of a two-second combination of eight bodily movements set to four beats of movement, which Hanagami alleged “contain[ed] the most recognizable portion” of his choreography. Hanagami brought federal claims alleging direct and contributory infringement of a copyright, as well as a state law unfair competition claim.

The district court granted Epic’s motion to dismiss wherein Epic asserted that Hanagami had not plausibly alleged that the Fortnite emote displayed “substantial similarity” to his choreographic work. Hanagami appealed.

At issue in this appeal was whether the district court had properly applied the Ninth Circuit’s two-part test for substantial similarity in assessing Hanagami’s infringement allegations. The first part, called the “extrinsic test,” focuses only on the protectable elements of the plaintiff’s expression and assesses the objective similarities between the original and the allegedly infringing work. The second part, referred to as the “intrinsic test,” gauges similarity of expression from the perspective of the ordinary reasonable observer and is reserved for the trier of fact. Hence, at the pleadings stage, only the extrinsic test is applied.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in its application of the extrinsic test in two ways. First, the district court incorrectly analyzed Hanagami’s choreography as a series of unprotectable “poses,” rather than as a movement sequence that includes expressive elements such as body position, timing, use of space, energy, pauses and repetition. The Court explained that when a dance work is properly analyzed as a selection and arrangement of movements, Hanagami “plausibly alleged that the creative choices he made in selecting and arranging elements . . . are substantially similar to the choices Epic made in creating the emote.” Second, the district court erred in dismissing Hanagami’s claim because the choreography in the emote was “short” and a “small component” of the original work. The Ninth Circuit [...]

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Resorting to Extrinsic Evidence Is Necessary When Intrinsic Evidence Is Muddied

by | Nov 16, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that the limitation “a pH of 13 or higher” could not be construed using the asserted patents’ intrinsic evidence and therefore remanded to the district court with instructions to consider the extrinsic evidence and its impact on claim construction. Actelion Pharms. Ltd v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., Case No. 22-1889 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 6, 2023) (Reyna, Stoll, Stark, JJ.)

Mylan Pharmaceuticals sought market entry for its generic epoprostenol—a small molecule hypertension drug—via an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA). Mylan certified under Paragraph IV with respect to two Orange Book-listed patents that Actelion Pharmaceuticals owned. Actelion timely asserted both patents and achieved a favorable claim construction for the term “a pH of 13 or higher.” This limitation is central to the pharmaceutical breakthrough that the asserted patents disclose, which is stably solubilizing the otherwise unstable epoprostenol. The asserted patents teach that epoprostenol bulk solutions’ pH should preferably be adjusted to about 12.5 to 13.5. Mylan contended that this language meant the claim should not encompass anything below pH 13 (i.e., leaving only a fraction of the disclosure’s preferred range within the scope of the issued claims). The district court disagreed, adopting Actelion’s position that the limitation encompassed values that “rounded” to pH 13 (i.e., pH 12.5 and above). This prompted a stipulated infringement judgment. Mylan appealed.

The Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s construction de novo, explaining that the district court’s construction was a ruling as a matter of law because no extrinsic evidence was considered. The Court then examined the claim language, specifications and prosecution histories in turn.

Regarding the claim language, the Federal Circuit rejected the parties’ invitations to acknowledge certain prior decisions as articulating bright-line rules. Instead, the Court appeared to endorse analyzing the intrinsic evidence on a case-by-case basis when construing similar range limitations. For example, the Court explained that “there is no blanket rule that ranges, or specifically open-ended ranges, must foreclose rounding.” The Court also rejected the following rules concerning range precision:

  • Avoiding rounding requires terms of precision, such as “precisely” or “exactly.”
  • The absence of approximation language dictates a precise value.

In contrast, the Federal Circuit signaled that district courts should properly account for a range’s technical implications (or at least ranges concerning the pH scale) even if that means looking to extrinsic evidence.

Regarding the specifications and prosecution histories, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s finding that both were inconsistent with Mylan’s position that the disputed limitation reflected a higher degree of precision. The Court concluded that there was little to glean from either, finding that the specifications were as clear as “muddied water” and the prosecution histories provided no insight into the relevant pH range—between pH 12 and pH 13.

The Federal Circuit ultimately concluded that this was an instance in which properly construing a claim limitation required the aid of extrinsic evidence, invoking the Supreme Court of the United States’ guidance from Teva v. Sandoz that extrinsic evidence [...]

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All the Way Up to the Second Circuit, and Back

by | Nov 16, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated a grant of summary judgment made prior to discovery, holding that the district court abused its discretion in finding a draft contract agreement admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 1003 notwithstanding sworn testimony questioning its contents. Eric A. Elliott, aka Fly Havana v. Joseph Anthony Cartagena et al., (2d. Cir. Oct. 17, 2023) (Merriam, Nardini, JJ.)

The dispute in this case centered on whether Eric Elliott was properly credited and compensated for his contribution in writing the song “All the Way Up.” Both Elliott and Joseph Anthony Cartagena (also known as “Fat Joe”) acknowledged that Elliott had signed an agreement regarding the song, but both parties were unable to locate the original agreement. Instead, Cartagena submitted a draft that he claimed was an authentic duplicate. This draft purported to assign all of Elliott’s rights to the song to an entity.

Elliott disputed the authenticity of the draft, claiming that there were numerous additional and different material terms in the agreement he signed. Nonetheless, the district court found the evidence admissible under FRE 1003 and 1004 and entered summary judgment in favor of defendants prior to discovery being conducted in the case. Elliot appealed.

The Second Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion and vacated. FRE 1002, also known as the “best evidence rule,” states that “[a]n original writing . . . is required in order to prove its content unless these rules or a federal statute provides otherwise.” If an original document is unavailable, a duplicate may still be admissible under FRE 1003, which states: “A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as the original unless a genuine question is raised about the original’s authenticity or the circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate.”

Here, the district court relied on Cartagena’s sworn testimony that he printed the draft at the complex where he lived and brought it with him to a meeting with Elliott. The district court disregarded Elliott’s sworn testimony in response to Cartagena, which suggested that the draft was not identical to the version Elliott signed. While the draft specified that the rights to the song would be assigned to an entity, Elliott averred that the version he signed “seemed to state that [he] was going to be compensated and credited as a writer.” Given this factual dispute, the Second Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the draft as a duplicate under FRE 1003 and granting summary judgment, particularly without the benefit of discovery.

The Second Circuit concluded that there was a genuine factual dispute as to whether Elliott validly assigned all his rights and whether any such purported assignment precluded Elliott’s claims. Given the issues regarding the authenticity of the draft and the genuine dispute of material fact, the Court found summary judgment improper.

However, a duplicate may also be admissible under FRE 1004, which states: “[a]n original is not required and other evidence of the content [...]

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Still Exceptional: Fee-Shift Appropriate in View of Noninfringement Stipulation

by | Nov 16, 2023 |

In a split decision, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s award of more than $5 million in attorneys’ fees, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the underlying case “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285 or in calculating the total fees awarded. In re PersonalWeb Tech., Case No. 21-1858 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 3, 2023) (Reyna, Lourie, JJ.) (Dyk, J., dissenting).

Under 35 U.S.C. § 285, a “court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” In Octane Fitness (2014), the Supreme Court of the United States held that an exceptional case is “simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated,” and the court considers the totality of the circumstances in making this determination.

PersonalWeb’s litigation positions at issue date back to 2011, when PersonalWeb first asserted five patents against an e-commerce company. After an unfavorable claim construction ruling, PersonalWeb stipulated to dismiss the action, and the district court entered the dismissal with prejudice.

In 2018, PersonalWeb asserted the patents against customers of the e-commerce company. The e-commerce company intervened and filed a new action against PersonalWeb seeking a declaratory judgment to bar the infringement actions against the customers based on the 2011 dismissal. Some of the cases proceeded while others were stayed. The district court granted summary judgment against PersonalWeb on claims directed to two allegedly infringing products for two separate reasons: because of the Kessler doctrine and claim preclusion, and because PersonalWeb conceded that it could not prevail after an unfavorable claim construction order.

The district court also entered an award of attorneys’ fees and costs against PersonalWeb, finding the case to be “exceptional” for the following reasons:

  • The infringement claims were “objectively baseless and not reasonable when brought because they were barred due to a final judgment in the [2011 action].”
  • PersonalWeb frequently changed its infringement positions to overcome the hurdle of the day.
  • PersonalWeb unnecessarily prolonged this litigation after claim construction foreclosed its infringement theories.
  • PersonalWeb’s conduct and positions regarding the customer cases were unreasonable.
  • PersonalWeb submitted declarations that it should have known were inaccurate.

The district court calculated the attorneys’ fees to be more than $5 million and costs to be more than $200,000. PersonalWeb appealed.

PersonalWeb argued that the district court erred in awarding fees and, even if fees were warranted, the court erred in assessing almost $2 million of the $5 million award. The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in any of its findings related to the fee grant, agreeing with the district court’s application of the Kessler doctrine. In Kessler, the Supreme Court ruled that after a final judgment of noninfringement, follow-up suits by the same patentee over the same non-infringing product against customers of the party [...]

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See Here: No Standing Based on Vague Future Plans or Adverse Priority Findings

by | Nov 16, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal from a final written decision in an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding, finding that the petitioner lacked standing because it suffered no injury in fact. Allgenesis Biotherapeutics Inc. v. Cloudbreak Therapeutics, LLC, Case No. 22-1706 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 7, 2023) (Moore, Stoll, Cunningham, JJ.)

Allgenesis Biotherapeutics filed an IPR petition challenging a patent owned by Cloudbreak Therapeutics. The challenged patent discloses compositions and methods for treating the eye condition pterygium. During the IPR proceeding, Cloudbreak disclaimed all but two of the claims. The Patent Trial & Appeal Board issued a final written decision finding that Allgenesis failed to show that the remaining two claims were unpatentable. As part of its decision, the Board made a priority decision that a Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) application belonging to Allgenesis was not prior art to Cloudbreak’s patent. Allgenesis appealed.

Article III of the US Constitution limits the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to adjudication of “cases” or “controversies,” which means the appellant must have (1) suffered an injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant and (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.

Allgenesis attempted to establish Article III standing based on two separate arguments. First, Allgenesis argued that it had standing based on potential infringement liability. To support that argument, Allgenesis offered a declaration by its vice president of finance that included information about a Phase II trial completed three years prior and a related 2020 publication. That declaration, however, did not identify any specific plan to conduct a Phase III trial or to seek US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval, and instead only contained generic statements that the project was not abandoned. While Allgenesis’s briefing and oral argument included statements that it planned to engage in a Phase III trial, the Federal Circuit determined that there was no record support for this claim. The Court found that the evidence before it did not constitute the necessary concrete plans to convey standing to appeal the final written decision. Allgenesis also attempted to rely on its own failed attempts at seeking a settlement from Cloudbreak, but the Court concluded that this was insufficient to show a substantial risk of infringement.

Allgenesis’s second argument was that the Board’s priority decision created an injury in fact. Allgenesis argued that the Board’s determination about the priority date of Cloudbreak’s patent affected Allgenesis’s patent rights because it would have a preclusive effect on Allgenesis’s pending applications. The Federal Circuit was unpersuaded and explained that collateral estoppel does not attach to a non-appeal priority decision from an IPR decision. To the extent that an examiner did reach the same conclusion as the Board, Allgenesis would be free to appeal that decision.

Practice Note: For Board petitioners seeking to establish standing to appeal unfavorable final written decisions, it is necessary to develop sufficient support to show standing in fact. For life sciences companies working in drug development, declarations [...]

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Status Quo Has Few Defenders at PREVAIL Act Senate Subcommittee Hearing

by and | Nov 16, 2023 | ,

On November 8, 2023, the US Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property heard testimony from four witnesses on the proposed Promoting and Respecting Economically Vital American Innovation Leadership (PREVAIL) Act. Although the PREVAIL Act includes several provisions regarding transparency and independence, its thrust is its dramatic alteration of Patent Trial & Appeal Board post-grant review (PGR) and inter partes review (IPR) proceedings, including their relationship to co-pending district court litigation, with the goal of incentivizing innovation by reducing costs and making such challenges less likely to be successful.

We previously reported on the provisions of the proposed PREVAIL Act when it was introduced. The biggest changes under consideration include the introduction of a standing requirement, a heightened burden of proof from preponderance-of-the-evidence to clear-and-convincing evidence, a stronger estoppel to thwart costly and unnecessary co-pending actions in court and at the Board, and the separation of the Board’s institution and decision-making functions.

Three witnesses spoke in favor of the PREVAIL Act before the subcommittee, emphasizing that the Board failed to live up to the purposes and intentions of the America Invents Act (AIA). These witnesses were Representative Lamar Smith, a co-sponsor of the AIA; Michelle Armond, co-founder of the law firm Armond Wilson LLP and a practitioner before the Board; and Joseph Kiani, founder of Masimo Industries.

Smith testified that Congress enacted the AIA because it recognized the potential for Board proceedings to be abused, and according to Smith, that is exactly what has happened. Each of the three witnesses testified that well-funded litigants have exploited Board procedures to overwhelm small businesses by forcing them into expensive duplicative proceedings in multiple forums. For example, Kiani posited that the Board posed an existential threat to startups, attributing findings of invalidity against his company’s patents to the AIA’s invalidation-friendly procedures.

Armond explained to the subcommittee how the PREVAIL Act would streamline Board proceedings and harmonize them with district court and International Trade Commission (ITC) litigation. According to Armond, in the wake of the AIA, both the Board and district courts have failed to offer uniform standards for deciding whether to stay a proceeding in their forum pending resolution of a parallel proceeding in the other. The PREVAIL Act would resolve this problem by requiring litigants to select only one forum in which they may raise their invalidity arguments. Armond argued that using the same clear-and-convincing-evidence standard in Board review proceedings and other litigation would harmonize the Board with district courts and the ITC by ensuring that different forums reach the same invalidity decision.

Joseph Matal, former US Patent & Trademark Office interim director and acting solicitor, and current principal of Clear IP, LLC, was the lone dissenting witness at the hearing. According to Matal, the PREVAIL Act’s proposal to require a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard in Board review proceedings is misguided because Board judges possess the requisite agency expertise to second-guess patent examination decisions. Additionally, Board judges often have more time to evaluate the patents and more information than the examiner. According to Matal, [...]

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Unfair Play: Unjust Enrichment for Copying and Using Non-Trade-Secret Spreadsheet

by | Nov 9, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of an unjust enrichment claim, finding that unjust enrichment claims do not necessarily rise or fall with trade secret misappropriation claims and may be advanced where there is a dispute as to whether a contract’s scope covers the parties’ disagreement. Pauwels v. Deloitte LLP, Case No. 22-21 (2d Cir. Oct. 6, 2023) (Sacks, Robinson, JJ.) (Jacobs, J., dissenting in part).

Andre Pauwels is a contractor who was retained without written agreement by The Bank of New York Mellon and its parent company (collectively, BNYM) to work on investment valuation. In 2014, while working for BNYM, Pauwels developed the “Pauwels Model” for valuation, which was implemented in Excel spreadsheets. Pauwels typically would send BNYM only the outputs from the Pauwels Model. According to Pauwels, the Pauwels Model and spreadsheets were confidential and proprietary, although the spreadsheets were not password-protected, encrypted or labeled confidential, and Pauwels sometimes shared the spreadsheets with BNYM.

In 2016, BNYM engaged Deloitte and related entities (collectively, Deloitte) to take over Pauwels’s duties. Pauwels never authorized BNYM to share the Pauwels Model spreadsheets with Deloitte, and BNYM assured Pauwels that Deloitte was not using those spreadsheets. In April 2018, Pauwels discovered that BNYM had given Deloitte the spreadsheets and that Deloitte had copied the Pauwels Model. BNYM terminated its relationship with Pauwels in May 2018.

In March 2019, Pauwels sued BNYM and Deloitte for trade secret misappropriation, unfair competition and unjust enrichment and further alleged that BNYM committed fraud and negligent misrepresentation. After BNYM and Deloitte moved to dismiss, the district court granted the motion in relevant part. The district court dismissed the unjust enrichment claim as duplicative of the trade secret misappropriation claim, citing the 2009 Second Circuit case Faiveley Transp. Malmo v. Wabtec for the proposition that “where an unfair competition claim, and a misappropriation claim arise from the same factual predicate . . . the two claims generally rise or fall together.” The district court dismissed the remainder of the claims for failure to plausibly allege the existence of trade secrets, that BNYM and Deloitte had “misappropriated” anything, or that Pauwels suffered damages. Pauwels appealed.

The Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of Pauwels’s unjust enrichment claim as to BNYM. Initially, the Court found that Pauwels’s unjust enrichment claim was not duplicative of his trade secret misappropriation claim, distinguishing Faiveley Transp. and explaining that misappropriation is not an element of unjust enrichment claims. The Court rejected BNYM’s argument that Pauwels’s unjust enrichment claim was precluded by the contract between the parties. The Court found that Pauwels could maintain his claim because there was “a bona fide dispute . . . whether the scope of an existing contract covers the disagreement between the parties.” According to Pauwels, he was engaged and paid for his advice and expertise only, meaning that BNYM had no right to benefit from the Pauwels Model spreadsheets by sharing them with Deloitte. According to BNYM, [...]

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