USPTO extends deadline for requesting director review of decisions instituting trial

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) updated its director review process by extending the deadline for requesting director review of decisions made in Patent Trial & Appeal Board proceedings from 14 to 30 days.

Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.75(c)(1), a request for director review must be filed within the time period set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), unless the director grants an extension for good cause. Section 42 generally requires that a request for director review be filed within 14 days of a decision instituting trial or 30 days of a final decision or a decision denying institution.

In a precedential order in Light & Wonder, Inc. v. Evolution Malta Ltd., IPR2025-01072, Paper 30 (Director June 22, 2026), however, the director waived the 14-day deadline and extended it to 30 days. The USPTO has now incorporated that change into its published director review process.

The updated process explains that the deadline may be extended in exceptional circumstances, provided that “the trial has not progressed meaningfully.” Examples of exceptional circumstances include:

  • Dismissal of all or substantially all claims in co-pending litigation
  • Findings of fact and conclusions of law rendering all or substantially all challenged claims invalid in litigation
  • Violation of a Sotera stipulation

Parties seeking an extension based on exceptional circumstances must email Director_PTABDecision_Review@uspto.gov, copy counsel for all parties, and explain in three sentences or fewer why an extension is warranted. The remaining parties will then be given an opportunity to respond.




Who decides trademark strength: Judge or jury?

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the strength of a trademark in a likelihood-of-confusion analysis under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 is a question of law for the court or a question of fact for the jury. RiseandShine Corp. v. PepsiCo, Inc., Case No. 24-1016 (Supr. Ct. June 29, 2026).

RiseandShine sued PepsiCo in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging that PepsiCo’s Mtn Dew Rise Energy drink infringed RiseandShine’s RISE marks for cold-brew coffee products. The district court granted RiseandShine a preliminary injunction, but the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated and remanded.

The Second Circuit concluded that the district court erred in its analysis of the strength of the RISE marks and the similarity of the parties’ marks. Treating trademark strength as a question of law, the Second Circuit found that the RISE marks were weak because of the “strong logical associations between ‘Rise’ and coffee.” After reviewing images of the parties’ cans, the Second Circuit also concluded that the district court erred in finding PepsiCo’s mark confusingly similar to the RISE marks.

On remand, the district court entered summary judgment for PepsiCo, relying on the Second Circuit’s determination that the RISE marks were “inherently weak as a matter of law” and that the similarity factor “weigh[ed] strongly against” RiseandShine. The Second Circuit affirmed, reiterating that trademark strength is a question of law.

RiseandShine petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. The question presented is: Whether trademark strength is a question of fact in a likelihood-of-confusion analysis under 15 U.S.C. § 1114.




Back on track: Contextual inquiry required before applying § 112(f) to software claim element

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded a district court’s indefiniteness ruling based on an insufficient means-plus-function analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) while affirming the denial of judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and a new trial following a jury verdict finding a related patent invalid as anticipated. TrackTime, LLC v. Amazon.com Services LLC, Audible, Inc., Case No. 24-1102 (Fed. Cir. July 2, 2026) (Prost, Taranto, JJ; Kovner, J., sitting by designation.)

TrackTime sued Amazon and Audible for patent infringement, asserting two related patents directed to time-synchronized transcript technology for audio and video files. One patent relates to methods for annotating and sharing time-synchronized transcripts on mobile devices. The other relates to “tap-to-jump” technology, which allows a user to tap a word in a transcript and jump to the corresponding point in the associated audio or video file.

The district court issued a claim construction order finding the annotation-and-sharing patent invalid for indefiniteness. The court concluded that the claim terms “executable program code configured to facilitate annotation” and “executable program code configured to synchronously play multimedia” were means-plus-function terms that recited functions without sufficient corresponding structure. Because the specification did not adequately disclose structure for performing those functions, the district court held the terms indefinite.

The tap-to-jump patent proceeded separately to a jury trial. The jury found the asserted claim invalid on multiple grounds, including anticipation by a prior art program called LiveNote, and found no infringement. The district court later denied TrackTime’s post-trial motions for JMOL and a new trial. TrackTime appealed both the indefiniteness ruling on the annotation-and-sharing patent and the denial of JMOL and a new trial on the tap-to-jump patent.

The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the indefiniteness ruling on the annotation-and-sharing patent, finding the district court’s § 112(f) analysis insufficient considering the Federal Circuit’s intervening decision in Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp. (2022). In Dyfan, the Court explained that determining whether a limitation should be construed under § 112(f) requires a full contextual analysis, including whether the claim language recites sufficient structure when viewed in light of the specification, the surrounding claim language, and how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the term.

The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not conduct the full inquiry required by Dyfan because it failed to consider extrinsic evidence regarding usage in the field and how a skilled artisan would understand the disputed “executable program code” limitations. The Court declined to decide the § 112(f) issue in the first instance, leaving it to the district court on remand to determine whether the disputed limitations, read in context, recited sufficient structure for performing the claimed annotation and synchronous-play functions on a mobile device.

The Federal Circuit reached a different result on the tap-to-jump patent. TrackTime argued that LiveNote failed to disclose three limitations, namely “performing a data lookup,” a “mobile computing device,” and a “touch-sensitive input interface.” The Court rejected each argument. It found that TrackTime [...]

Continue Reading




Construing claims to fit the brand

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s claim construction and grant of a preliminary injunction, concluding that an accused infringer’s proposed construction would have produced the “highly improbable” result of excluding the patentee’s Orange Book-listed drug from the scope of the asserted claims. Otsuka America Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Hetero Labs Limited, Case No. 25-2016 (Fed. Cir. July 1, 2026) (Bryson, Stoll, JJ.) (Dyk, J., dissenting in part)

Otsuka sued Hetero Labs, alleging that Hetero Labs’ generic drug product would infringe Otsuka’s patent rights. Otsuka moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Hetero Labs from entering the market. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Otsuka was likely to succeed on its infringement claim. Hetero Labs appealed, arguing that the district court erred in construing the asserted claims.

The central dispute concerned how to calculate the patent’s claimed weight ratio. The representative claim requires administering dextromethorphan in combination with quinidine, with the proviso that the “weight to weight ratio of dextromethorphan to quinidine is 1:0.5 or less.” The district court construed “dextromethorphan” and “quinidine” to include their pharmaceutically acceptable salts. Under that construction, the claimed ratio is calculated using the full weight of the compounds as administered – for example, the full weight of dextromethorphan hydrobromide rather than only the dextromethorphan active moiety. Hetero Labs, by contrast, argued that when the compounds are administered as salts, the ratio must be calculated using only the weight of the active moieties.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s construction, concluding that the intrinsic evidence supported construing “dextromethorphan” and “quinidine” to include both the free base compounds and their pharmaceutically acceptable salts. The Court found that the patent claims, specification, and prosecution history consistently used those terms to encompass the compounds in the form in which they are administered. The Court also found that extrinsic evidence supported its construction. Relying in part on its 2007 decision in Osram GmbH v. ITC, the Court explained that Hetero Labs’ proposed construction would produce the “highly improbable” result of excluding Otsuka’s Orange Book-listed Nuedexta product – the very product the patent was intended to protect – from the scope of the claims. The Court also rejected Hetero Labs’ indefiniteness argument, concluding that the claims were not rendered indefinite simply because they encompassed formulations using either free bases or pharmaceutically acceptable salts.

Judge Dyk, dissenting in part, concluded that the district court’s construction was inconsistent with both the intrinsic evidence and the purpose of the claimed invention. According to Judge Dyk, the invention depended on maintaining a specific ratio of dextromethorphan to quinidine to ensure that:

  • Dextromethorphan achieved a therapeutic effect
  • Quinidine slowed the metabolism of dextromethorphan
  • Patients were not exposed to excessive amounts of quinidine

In his view, calculating the claimed ratio using the full weight of pharmaceutically acceptable salts rather than only the active moieties distorted that relationship by incorporating the weight of carrier ions that have no therapeutic significance. Judge Dyk also disagreed with the majority’s reliance [...]

Continue Reading




Unintentional delay: USPTO shortens threshold for additional information requirement

On June 24, 2026, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) revised its practice of requiring additional information for certain petitions based on unintentional delay and changed the conditions under which the corresponding higher petition fee applies. The new rule is effective August 13, 2026.

In March 2020, the USPTO clarified that additional information would generally be required for petitions based on unintentional delay in the following three circumstances:

  • A petition to revive an abandoned application filed more than two years after the application became abandoned.
  • A petition to accept a delayed maintenance fee payment filed more than two years after the patent expired for nonpayment.
  • A petition to accept a delayed priority or benefit claim filed more than two years after the priority or benefit claim was due.

The USPTO required petitioners to provide additional information when a petition was filed more than two years after the relevant deadline. The additional information was intended to establish the facts and circumstances surrounding the entire period of delay and demonstrate that the entire delay was “unintentional.” The USPTO reasoned that the two-year threshold would reduce uncertainty and unpredictability concerning patent rights.

Under the new rule, the USPTO has shortened the threshold for requiring additional information from two years to one year. The USPTO explained that the one-year threshold will further increase certainty and predictability concerning patent rights by requiring applicants and patentees to provide an adequate explanation establishing that the entire delay was unintentional. According to the USPTO, such an explanation “safeguards a patentee’s rights by establishing on the record that the delay was unintentional, and protects the public by prohibiting revival, reinstatement, entry of a benefit or priority claim, or excuse of delay” when a party cannot establish that the delay was unintentional. The USPTO also explained that the revised threshold will promote efficiency by encouraging applicants to monitor their patent files and promptly address errors.

The new rule extends this one-year threshold to petitions seeking to excuse an applicant’s failure to act within prescribed time limits under the Hague Agreement in connection with international design applications. The USPTO emphasized, however, that it retains discretion to require additional information whenever there is a question whether a delay was unintentional, regardless of the length of the delay.

Because the revised rule increases the evidentiary requirements and the cost of reviewing petitions filed after an extended delay, the USPTO also revised the threshold for when the higher petition fee applies. Under the new rule, the higher fee applies to petitions filed more than one year after the applicable deadline, rather than more than two years after the deadline. According to the USPTO, applying the higher fee at the one-year threshold will further encourage applicants to file petitions promptly, benefiting applicants by reducing delays in the examination process and promoting greater certainty and predictability regarding patent rights.

Practice note: Petitioners filing a petition to revive an abandoned application more than one year after the application became abandoned, a petition to [...]

Continue Reading




STAY CONNECTED

TOPICS

ARCHIVES