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Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
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Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
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Chickening Out: Reason for Trademark Abandonment Irrelevant Without Proof of Intent to Resume

by | Oct 3, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed a district court’s summary judgment decision finding that the prior owner of a trademark for fresh chicken had abandoned the mark by failing to use it for three years and failing to show an intent to resume use of the mark. To-Ricos, Ltd. v. Productos Avícolas Del Sur, Inc., Case No. 22-1853 (1st Cir. Sept. 19, 2024) (Montecalvo, Lipez, Thompson, JJ.)

PAS, a Puerto Rico corporation, sold Pollo Picú branded chicken from 2005 to 2011. The Picú trademark consists of a cartoon chicken with the phrase “Pollo Picú” underneath it:

While Pollo Picú was once a well-recognized brand in Puerto Rico, PAS encountered administrative and financial challenges. In 2006 and 2009, it failed to file declarations with the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) attesting to the use of the mark as required by Section 8 of the Lanham Act. The PTO therefore canceled the Picú trademark registration. PAS stopped selling chicken bearing the mark after its bank froze PAS’s financing in 2011. The bank filed suit in January 2012 under a preexisting loan agreement in which PAS had granted the bank a lien over PAS’s assets, including the Picú mark. PAS offered to sell the company to To-Ricos, PAS’s main competitor, but no sale occurred.

In October 2014, PAS and the bank signed a settlement agreement requiring PAS to pay a stipulated sum by December 2014 or the bank would foreclose on most of PAS’s assets, but not the Picú mark. The agreement provided that the bank would retain its lien over the mark until the foreclosure proceedings concluded. PAS failed to make the payment, but the bank did not exercise its foreclosure rights. In June 2017, PAS moved for the Commonwealth Court to order the bank to foreclose on PAS’s assets or declare PAS free of its obligations to the bank. The Commonwealth Court granted the motion in November 2019.

In April 2016, To-Ricos applied to register the Picú mark with the PTO. Three months later, PAS applied to re-register the same mark and filed an opposition to To-Ricos’s application. A year later, PAS licensed the right to use the Picú mark in the United States to IMEX. IMEX sold chicken under the mark for a few months but stopped after To-Ricos sent cease and desist letters.

In June 2019, To-Ricos began selling Picú branded chicken. It also filed a lawsuit against PAS, seeking a declaratory judgment establishing To-Ricos as the legal owner of the Picú mark. To-Ricos moved for summary judgment, arguing that PAS had abandoned its mark. PAS opposed. The district court agreed with To-Ricos, noting that PAS admitted to not having used the mark in commerce for at least three consecutive years prior to To-Ricos’s application, and that PAS had not demonstrated its intent to resume use of the mark within that period. PAS appealed.

PAS [...]

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Rewind: Federal Circuit Grants En Banc Rehearing Over Royalty Damages

by | Oct 3, 2024 |

The en banc US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a per curiam order vacating its previous panel decision upholding a district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial on damages. In that decision, the Federal Circuit found that the plaintiff’s damages expert adequately demonstrated the economic comparability of prior license agreements to a hypothetical negotiation between the parties. Now, the Court has granted the defendant’s petition for rehearing en banc. EcoFactor, Inc. v. Google LLC, Case No. 23-1101 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2024) (per curiam) (Moore, C.J.; Lourie, Dyk, Prost, Reyna, Taranto, Chen, Hughes, Stoll, Stark, JJ.) Judge Prost dissented in part in the original panel decision.

EcoFactor sued Google over Nest thermostats allegedly infringing EcoFactor’s HVAC patent. The initial appeal revolved around the validity of the patent, the infringement verdict, and the damages awarded. Google argued that the patent was directed to an abstract idea and therefore was patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. §101. Google also argued that the district court erred in its rulings on noninfringement and damages. The Federal Circuit majority upheld the district court’s decisions, finding genuine issues of material fact on patent validity, substantial evidence of infringement, and admissible expert testimony supporting the damages award. The Court dismissed Google’s challenge to the expert’s use of license agreements for calculating royalties, as the Court found the methodology reasonable. However, Judge Prost’s dissent in the original panel decision criticized the damages calculation, arguing that the expert’s methodology lacked rigor, particularly for failing to apportion the patented technology’s value from other licensed patents.

The en banc Federal Circuit will now reconsider the practice of using a patent owner’s prior license agreements to determine royalty rates, a method that can become complicated when the scope of licenses varies or when lump sums and royalties are not clearly apportioned.

The en banc order directed the parties to file new briefs limited to the issue of whether “the district court[] adhere[d] to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), in its allowance of testimony from EcoFactor’s damages expert assigning a per-unit royalty rate to the three licenses in evidence in this case.”



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No Boundaries? European UPC Confirms Its International Jurisdiction

by | Oct 3, 2024 | ,

The Court of Appeal (CoA) of the Unified Patent Court (UPC) ruled that the UPC has international jurisdiction for alleged infringement actions that originate outside the UPC’s Member States. Dish and Sling v. AYLO, Case No. UPC-CoA-188/2024 (CoA UPC Sept. 3, 2024) (Grabinski, Pres. CoA; Barutel, Blok, JJ.)

In its ruling, the CoA upheld the order of the Court of First Instance Local Division Mannheim. In the main proceedings, Dish and Sling brought an infringement action against AYLO. The patent in dispute concerned a method for presenting rate adaptive streams from a media player. AYLO was accused of indirectly infringing the patent in numerous UPC Member States, including Germany, by offering and supplying the video files made available for streaming and the media players for streaming videos. AYLO lodged a preliminary objection requesting that the infringement action be dismissed for lack of UPC jurisdiction, Rule 19.1(a) of the UPC Rules of Procedure. After the preliminary objection was rejected, AYLO lodged an appeal against the order of the Local Division Mannheim.

AYLO argued that the UPC does not have international jurisdiction on the basis of Article 7(2) in conjunction with Article 71b(1) of the Brussels I Recast Regulation because the harmful event would not occur in a UPC Member State since AYLO’s servers are located in the United States. The CoA disagreed, explaining that the Article 7(2) phrase “place where the harmful event occurred or may occur” is intended to cover both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to the damage. Consequently, the alleged infringer can be sued in either place.

The UPC has international jurisdiction with respect to an infringement action under two conditions:

  • The European patent in suit has effect in at least one contracting Member State.
  • The alleged damage may occur in that particular Member State.

Therefore, irrespective of the location of AYLO’s server, the UPC had jurisdiction over the infringement action because AYLO’s websites are accessible in Germany where the patent has effect. This access was sufficient to satisfy the likelihood of damage, which was allegedly caused via the internet. Users in Germany can obtain means (media players and video files) that allegedly relate to an essential element of the patented invention and are suitable and intended for putting the invention into practice. The CoA clarified that it is not necessary for a website to be directed at users in the territory of the concerned Member State. The actual availability of access to the website and damage to the European patent owner in a Member State are decisive.

Practice Notes:

  • While UPC courts may consider infringement allegations in a case when evaluating UPC jurisdiction, that consideration is limited to the context of what the patent owner must prove to establish its allegations. Argument as to the specific requirements of the infringement allegations is not necessary. In the reported case, which was based on allegations of indirect infringement, it was not necessary to determine whether AYLOS’s alleged [...]

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Creative License: Fair Use Defense Paints Over Infringement Battle

by | Oct 3, 2024 | ,

Affirming the application of the fair use defense to copyright infringement, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that a district court’s sua sponte invocation of a fair use defense to parallel trademark claims was harmless error. The Court also affirmed that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees based on the prevailing party standard for copyright claims. Keck v. Mix Creative Learning Ctr., L.L.C., Case No. 23-20188 (5th Cir. Sept. 18, 2024) (Jones, Smith, Ho, JJ.)

Michel Keck, a multimedia artist, sued Mix Creative Learning Center, a Texas-based art studio, for copyright and trademark infringement after Mix Creative sold art kits featuring Keck’s dog-themed artwork and a brief biography, intended for at-home learning during the pandemic. Keck had registered her Dog Art series (in the form of decorative works) with the US Copyright Office and her name as a trademark with the US Patent & Trademark Office. Keck claimed that Mix Creative’s art kits violated her rights. After receiving notice of the lawsuit, Mix Creative promptly ceased selling its kits.

Following discovery, both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mix Creative on Keck’s copyright claim, finding fair use, and also granted summary judgment on the trademark claim sua sponte, as both parties had agreed that the fair use defense applied to both claims. The district court further awarded Mix Creative more than $100,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs, although it declined to hold Keck’s attorneys jointly and severally liable.

Keck appealed, challenging the copyright fair use finding and the district court’s sua sponte application of the fair use defense to the trademark claim. Mix Creative challenged the district court’s refusal to hold Keck’s attorneys jointly and severally liable for fees.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of the fair use defense to Keck’s copyright claims. The Court focused on the first and fourth factors of the fair use defense (respectively, the purpose and character of the use and the effect of the use on the potential market for or value of the original work), noting that the courts typically give these two factors special attention.

On the first factor, the Fifth Circuit found Mix Creative’s use to be transformative. Although Mix Creative is a commercial enterprise, the art kits served an educational purpose, distinct from the decorative purpose of Keck’s original works. As a result, the likelihood of Mix Creative’s kits serving as a substitute for Keck’s original works in the market was low.

The fourth factor also favored Mix Creative, as the Fifth Circuit found no evidence that Mix Creative’s kits would harm the market value of Keck’s original decorative works. In fact, the Court suggested that the kits might enhance Keck’s reputation and sales by providing her with free advertising. Furthermore, Mix Creative operated in a different market (educational rather than decorative), and Keck had not demonstrated any history of selling derivative works for children’s art lessons. The [...]

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Dolly Pardon: American Girl Can Sue Foreign Counterfeiter for Internet Sales

by | Sep 26, 2024 | ,

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit clarified its standards for establishing personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants that conduct business over the internet. American Girl, LLC v. Zembrka, DBA www.zembrka.com; www.daibh-idh.com, Case No. 21-1381 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2024) (Cabranes, Parker, Kahn, JJ.)

In 2021, American Girl, the famous doll manufacturer, filed suit against Zembrka in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York. American Girl brought multiple claims under the Lanham Act, including claims for trademark counterfeiting and trademark infringement, for advertising and sales of counterfeit American Girl dolls through Zembrka’s websites. Zembrka is located in and operates from the People’s Republic of China. American Girl was granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) that enjoined Zembrka from marketing, manufacturing, or distributing counterfeit American Girl products and from advertising counterfeit or confusingly similar American Girl marks.

Zembrka appealed and moved to dissolve the TRO and dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Zembrka argued that it did not transact or do business in New York as required to establish personal jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). American Girl asserted, with supporting evidence, that customers in New York could place orders through Zembrka’s interactive websites by inputting payment, billing, and shipping information, and that customers were sent confirmations of their orders to shipping addresses in New York. American Girl’s counsel purchased and paid for allegedly counterfeit American Girl merchandise through Zembrka’s website and received order confirmation emails. Zembrka conceded at oral argument that the allegedly counterfeit American Girl dolls were available via its website for purchase by people in New York.

The TRO was served on Zembrka. Two weeks later, Zembrka canceled the orders and refunded the payments for the purchases made by American Girl’s counsel. The district court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, reasoning that because American Girl did not provide evidence that the allegedly counterfeit goods had shipped to New York, no business was transacted under § 302(a)(1). American Girl moved for reconsideration, providing evidence of other purchases of allegedly counterfeit merchandise by New York customers. It also produced evidence showing that New York customers purchased more than $41,000 worth of other Zembrka products over the past year via PayPal. The district court denied the motion because American Girl still did not demonstrate that any of the allegedly infringing products were actually delivered to New York, and customer payments were refunded. American Girl appealed.

The primary issue on appeal was whether American Girl sufficiently established that Zembrka transacted business in New York for the purposes of § 302(1)(a). The Second Circuit found that this requirement was easily satisfied, explaining that the district court had incorrectly interpreted the Second Circuit’s 2010 decision in Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills as requiring a shipment to be an essential component of “transacting business.” It was enough that American Girl provided evidence that New York customers submitted orders and payments for allegedly counterfeit merchandise through Zembrka’s websites: “Section 302(a)(1) [...]

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When Can Same Claim Limitation Have Different Meanings? When It’s Functional, Of Course

by | Sep 26, 2024 |

Addressing for the first time whether a functional limitation must carry the same meaning in all claims, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that it need not, vacating a district court decision to the contrary. Vascular Sol. LLC v. Medtronic, Inc., Case No. 2024-1398 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2024) (Moore, Prost, JJ.; Mazzant, Dist. J., by designation).

The seven patents asserted by Teleflex syin this case all come from a common application and are directed to a “coaxial guide catheter that is deliverable through standard guide catheters by utilizing a guidewire rail segment to permit delivery without blocking use of the guide catheter.” The asserted patents all share a common specification. However, the asserted claims differ in how they refer to the “side opening.” Some claims include the side opening as part of the “substantially rigid portion/segment” while other claims recite that the side opening is separate and distal to the “substantially rigid portion/segment.”

This case has a long procedural history involving an initial preliminary injunction motion and multiple inter partes reviews (IPRs). At the second preliminary injunction stage, Medtronic and the district court grouped the asserted limitations into two mutually exclusive groups:

  • Group One, which included the “substantially rigid portion/segment” claim limitation.
  • Group Two, which “required that the side opening not be in the substantially rigid portion” (emphasis supplied).

In denying Medtronic’s preliminary injunction motion, the district court questioned “how a skilled artisan could possibly be expected to understand the scope of a patent when the same device could simultaneously infringe two mutually exclusive claims within that patent.”

The district court then proceeded to claim construction. It rejected both parties’ initial constructions and appointed an independent expert – former US Patent & Trademark Office Director Andrei Iancu – to propose a construction. Teleflex argued that Iancu should adopt a split construction (i.e., one construction for the Group One limitations and another construction for the Group Two limitations). Medtronic argued that the claims were indefinite. Iancu rejected both proposed constructions but agreed with the district court on the mutual exclusivity of the two groups. The district court determined that all claims that included the “substantially rigid portion/segment” were indefinite, and since all the asserted claims included that term, the parties stipulated to final judgment. Teleflex appealed.

Teleflex argued that the district court erred in determining that the boundary of the substantially rigid portion must be the same for all claims. Medtronic argued that the claims were indefinite.

The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court erred when it determined that the Group One and Group Two limitations were mutually exclusive and indefinite. The Federal Circuit cautioned that affirming the district court’s conclusion would mean that claims in a patent cannot vary in how they claim the disclosed subject matter and that independent claims must be entirely consistent with other independent claims, neither of which is a restriction in how patentees may claim subject matter. The Federal Circuit explained that at the claim construction stage [...]

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A New Vision: Collateral Estoppel Doesn’t Extend to Related Claims

by | Sep 19, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court order excluding expert validity testimony based on collateral estoppel stemming from an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding of a related patent, finding that an unpatentability decision in an IPR does not collaterally estop a patentee from making validity arguments about related claims in a district court litigation. ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., Case Nos. 22-1755; 24-2221 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 6, 2024) (Lourie, Mayer, Stark, JJ.)

This case has a long and complicated history. In 2011, ParkerVision sued Qualcomm for alleged infringement of eight patents related to wireless communications technology. In October 2013, a jury returned verdicts rejecting Qualcomm’s invalidity defense, finding 11 claims across four patents to be infringed by Qualcomm, and awarded $172 million in damages to ParkerVision.

In June 2014, the district court granted Qualcomm’s motion for a judgment as a matter of law on noninfringement, which the Federal Circuit affirmed in late 2015. Meanwhile, ParkerVision filed a second case against Qualcomm in May 2014 alleging infringement of 11 more patents. That case was stayed in favor of a Section 337 investigation that ParkerVision filed against Qualcomm at the International Trade Commission.

Qualcomm then filed 10 petitions for IPR, six of which targeted one of ParkerVision’s patents. While the challenged apparatus claims of that patent were found unpatentable during the IPR, the challenged method claims survived. The district court statutory stay (during the Commission proceeding) was lifted in December 2018. Prior to trial, the district court granted Qualcomm’s Daubert motions seeking to exclude ParkerVision’s expert’s testimony on invalidity due to collateral estoppel arising from the IPRs, and the expert’s testimony on infringement for being unreliable. The district court granted Qualcomm’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement based on its finding that the asserted claims were materially similar to the claims from the first case. ParkerVision appealed.

In July 2024, after the briefing was completed and the Federal Circuit held oral argument, the Court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction and returned it to the district court because Qualcomm’s invalidity counterclaims had not been adjudicated. The parties then filed a joint motion at the district court seeking entry of a final judgment, which was granted in August 2024. ParkerVision appealed again.

The Federal Circuit reinstated ParkerVision’s initial appeal and reversed the district court’s determination. On the summary judgment of noninfringement, the Court rejected the collateral estoppel finding because the district court failed to conduct claim construction to determine whether the scope of the claims was the same as in the first case. As for the district court’s exclusion of expert validity testimony due to the IPRs, the Federal Circuit concluded that because of the different legal standards for proving invalidity (preponderance versus clear and convincing), a finding underlying an unpatentability decision in an IPR does not collaterally estop a patentee from making validity arguments regarding related claims in district court litigation.

Finally, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court had abused its discretion [...]

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Stay Focused: New Point of View of Patent Eligibility

by | Sep 19, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s decision that the asserted claims were patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, finding that the district court improperly characterized the claims at an “impermissibly high level of generality.” Contour IP Holding LLC v. GoPro, Inc., Case Nos. 22-1654; -1691 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 9, 2024) (Prost, Schall, Reyna, JJ.)

Contour owns two patents related to portable point-of-view (POV) video cameras. The patents disclose a hands-free POV action sports video camera configured for remote image acquisition control and viewing. The key embodiment describes “dual recording” where the camera generates video recordings “in two formats, high quality and low quality.” The lower quality file is streamed to a remote device for real-time adjustment of bandwidth limiting video parameters while the higher quality version of the recording is saved for later viewing.

In 2015, Contour sued GoPro, alleging that several GoPro products infringed the asserted patents. In 2021, Contour again sued GoPro, alleging that several newer products infringed the same patents. In 2021, after the district court granted partial summary judgment that GoPro’s accused products infringed the claims in the first lawsuit, GoPro filed a motion in the second lawsuit challenging the claims as patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. GoPro relied heavily on the Federal Circuit’s 2021 decision in Yu v. Apple in its arguments for ineligibility. The district court initially denied the motion, but when GoPro raised the issue again at summary judgment, the district court agreed with GoPro and found the claims patent ineligible under § 101.

At step one of the Alice eligibility test the district court found that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of creating and transmitting video at two different resolutions and adjusting the video’s settings remotely. At Alice step two, the district court found that the claim recited only functional, result-oriented language without indicating that physical components behaved in any way other than their basic generic tasks. Contour appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that when read as a whole, the claim was directed to a specific means that improved a relevant technology and required “specific, technological means – parallel data stream recording with the low-quality recording wirelessly transferred to a remote device – that in turn provide a technological improvement to the real time viewing capabilities of a POV camera’s recordings on a remote device.”

The Federal Circuit found that the district court’s decision was based on an “impermissibly high level of generality” that led to its incorrect conclusion that the claims were related to an abstract idea. The Court also disagreed with GoPro’s argument that Yu was dispositive in this case, explaining that in Yu, there was no dispute that the “idea and practice of using multiple pictures to enhance each other has been known by photographers for over a century.” The Court determined that Contour’s claim enabled a POV camera, with its dual recording capability, to operate differently than it otherwise [...]

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House Backs Senate With Its Own Proposed NO FAKES Act to Control Digital Replicas

by | Sep 19, 2024 |

Following the introduction of the NO FAKES Act of 2024 in July by a bipartisan group of US Senators, US Representatives Adam Schiff (D-CA), María Elvira Salazar (R-FL), Madeleine Dean (D-PA), Nathaniel Moran (R-TX), Rob Wittman (R-VA), and Joe Morelle (D-NY) introduced the identically named companion legislation, Nurture Originals, Foster Art, and Keep Entertainment Safe (NO FAKES) Act, in the US House of Representatives on September 12, 2024. The language of both bills is substantially identical, with the intended purpose to create federal protection of “…intellectual property rights in the voice and visual likeness of individuals, and for other purposes.”

As described by Representative Schiff’s office in a news release announcing the bill, the House’s NO FAKES Act is intended to:

  • Recognize that every individual has a federal intellectual property right to their own voice and likeness, including an extension of that right post-mortem
  • Empower individuals to take action against parties that knowingly create, post, or profit from unauthorized digital replicas of them
  • Provide a safe harbor for platforms if they take down offending materials when they discover them or upon receiving proper takedown notices
  • Maintain protections for innovation and free speech
  • Provide a federal solution to a patchwork of state laws and regulations by January 2, 2025 – at least as it relates to digital replicas of individuals.

The rights established under the House’s NO FAKES Act will preempt any cause of action under state law for the protection of an individual’s voice and visual likeness rights in connection with a digital replica. We will continue to watch whether these bills are passed in identical form and signed by the incoming US president in 2025.



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The Conversation Continues: Some Post-Patent-Termination Royalties Are Acceptable

by | Sep 12, 2024 |

For the second time in less than two weeks, a circuit court decided an appeal hinging on the Brulotte rule, which holds that patent royalties are impermissible when based on payments for the use of expired patents. Like the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit upheld a royalty agreement that purported to require payments after patent expiration. Ares Trading S.A. v. Dyax Corp., Case No. 23-1487 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2024) (Krauser, Porter, Chung, JJ.)

Dyax is a biotechnology company engaged in “phage display” research – a laboratory process used to identify antibody fragments for use in developing medications. Dyax holds multiple patents related to phage display, including licenses to patents owned by Cambridge Antibody Technology (CAT). Dyax and Ares entered a licensing agreement. Dyax’s main obligation was to use its phage display technology to identify antibody fragments and then provide those fragments to Ares so that Ares could incorporate them into commercial medications, including one called Bavencio. In exchange, Ares agreed to pay Dyax at various research milestones and pay royalties for identified products, including Bavencio. Although Bavencio was first sold in 2017, the last CAT patent expired in 2018.

After learning of the Brulotte rule, Ares tried to renegotiate its contract obligations. When renegotiation attempts failed, Ares sued Dyax, seeking multiple related declaratory judgments revolving around its argument that its royalty obligations to Dyax were unenforceable under Brulotte. Dyax countersued on six claims, including for declaratory judgment that Brulotte did not apply. The district court found the royalty obligation enforceable and not in violation of Brulotte. Ares appealed.

Ares asked the Fourth Circuit to reconsider the applicability of the Brulotte rule and to relatedly find that Dyax had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Fourth Circuit first examined its own jurisdiction in the context of the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals. Of the 10 total claims and counterclaims, nine arose under Massachusetts contract law. According to the Fourth Circuit, these were not “substantial” patent law claims and thus regional circuit appellate jurisdiction was appropriate.

The Fourth Circuit next turned to the Brulotte prohibition on post-termination royalties and found no violation because “Ares’ royalty obligation is not calculated based on activity requiring post-expiration use of inventions” covered by Dyax or CAT patents. The Court emphasized the policies underpinning the federal patent regime and the Brulotte rule, particularly the importance of inventions entering the public space once a patent expires to allow continued innovation and general use of the once-patented invention. The Court also explained its understanding of the nuances of Brulotte, as informed by the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Kimble v. Marvel. For instance, a court’s inquiry must focus on post-expiration use, so where “royalties are not calculated based on activity requiring post-expiration use, they do not hinder post-expiration use ‘on their face’ and Brulotte is not implicated.” In the present case, this was a key delineation because the Fourth Circuit found that Ares’ [...]

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