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Sliced and Diced: Operating Manuals Are Printed Publications

by | Feb 15, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s non-obviousness determination, finding that the Board erred in determining that an operating manual did not qualify as printed publication prior art. Weber, Inc. v. Provisur Technologies, Inc., Case Nos. 22-1751; -1813 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 8, 2024) (Reyna, Hughes, Stark, JJ.)

Provisur owns two patents related to advanced high-speed mechanical slicers used in food processing facilities that precisely slice and package food items such as meats and cheeses. The key components recited in the patent claims are a “loading apparatus” designed to load food items, a “feeding apparatus” responsible for supplying food items to a slicer, and a “stop gate” intended to regulate the assembly of food items prior to their entry into the slicing mechanism.

Weber filed inter partes review (IPR) petitions challenging the validity of several claims of the patents based on certain operating manuals. During the IPR proceedings, the Board determined that Weber’s operating manuals did not qualify as prior art printed publications because they were distributed selectively and subject to confidentiality restrictions. The Board also concluded that the prior art combinations, which included Weber, failed to disclose crucial claim limitations, notably the “disposed over” and “stop gate” limitations. The Board found the challenged claims not unpatentable. Weber appealed.

Weber argued that the Board erred in determining that the operating manuals were insufficiently accessible to constitute printed publications, specifically contending that the Board misapplied the Federal Circuit’s 2009 decision in Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp. The Court agreed. It explained that unlike Cordis, where academic monographs were limited to distribution among a select few, Weber’s operating manuals were intended for distribution to purchasers of the machines and others to provide instructions on food slicer usage and maintenance. The Court explained that the evidence in the form of delivery records and email exchanges showed that manuals were available to customers upon purchase or request. The Federal Circuit also noted that the manuals were not bound by any confidentiality restrictions. The Court thus concluded that the operating manuals qualified as printed publications.

Turning to claim construction, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s interpretation of the “disposed over” and “stop gate” limitations. Consistent with long-standing precedent, the Court emphasized the importance of examining intrinsic evidence, including the claims themselves, the specification and the patent’s prosecution history. Weber argued that the claims’ language implied a broader feed apparatus positioning over the loading apparatus without strict alignment requirements. Supported by expert opinions, Weber contended that neither the claim language nor the specification mandated direct alignment. The Court agreed with Weber. The Court emphasized that “disposed over” demanded only a general positioning of the feed apparatus above the loading apparatus, not a direct positioning as the Board had construed.

Similarly, concerning the “stop gate” limitation, the Federal Circuit agreed that the Board’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence because evidence, such as the manuals, disclosed the claimed conveyer mechanism in a manner sufficient to establish its [...]

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Even a Non-Explicit Claim Construction Can Be Erroneous

by | Feb 15, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board decision finding the challenged patent claims not obvious over the prior art. The Court found that the Board, after concluding that no claim construction was required, implicitly construed the claim limitation at issue and did so erroneously. Google LLC v. EcoFactor, Case Nos. 22-1750; -1767 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 7, 2024) (Reyna, Taranto, Stark, JJ.)

Google filed a petition for inter partes review (IPR) challenging claims of an EcoFactor patent related to dynamic climate control systems that factor outside weather conditions and thermal conditions inside the home to balance comfort and energy savings. The challenged claims define a method for reducing the cycling time of a climate control system involving “retrieving a target time at which [the] structure [(e.g., a house)] is desired to reach a target temperature.” The challenged method claims recite a step of “determining a first time prior to said target time at which [the] climate control system should turn on to reach the target temperature by the target time.” The relevant claim limitation reads:

[D]etermining a first time prior to said target time at which said climate control system should turn on to reach the target temperature by the target time based at least in part on [i] said one or more thermal performance values of said structure, [ii] said performance characteristic of said climate control system, [iii] said first internal temperature, [iv] said first external temperature, and [v] the forecasted temperature.

During the IPR proceedings, the parties disputed whether a prior art reference disclosed a method involving determining a first time prior to the target time based on a first internal temperature. Google argued that the prior art taught a calculation of a first time prior to the target time based on thermal performance values (input [i]) calculated from internal temperature values (input [iii]). EcoFactor argued that each of the inputs in the claim limitation was a distinct value not dependent on or calculated from any other input. Based on the claim language, the Board determined that claim construction was unnecessary and concluded that inputs [i] – [v] of the relevant claim limitation were separate inputs using different data. The Board concluded that Google had not shown that the challenged claims were unpatentable, reasoning that Google’s theory of obviousness relied on a single input as the basis for both input [i] and input [iii].

Google appealed. Google argued that although the Board stated that no construction was necessary, it incorrectly construed the claim limitation to require five discrete inputs.

The Federal Circuit agreed with Google, finding that the Board’s assessment of the claim limitation implicitly established the claim scope by requiring inputs [i] – [v] to be completely separate. The Court reasoned that the plain claim language did not provide any indication that none of the listed inputs could be based on any other input(s). Imputing this requirement into the limitation was therefore an act of claim construction.

The Federal [...]

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McDermott IP Focus 2024 | Session 1: The Weaponization of Prosecution Laches

by and | Feb 13, 2024 |

McDermott is committed to providing insightful commentary on intellectual property (IP) developments from around the world to our Japanese clients. In light of that effort, we are pleased to announce that our free webinar series, McDermott IP Focus, will continue in 2024.

During these sessions, we will explore global developments in IP, including disputes, transactions, and procurement, with a significant focus on what Japanese companies need to know during this ever-changing business landscape.

The first session will take place on February 21, 2024, and focus on the use and weaponization of prosecution laches. Discussion topics will include:

  • The recent surge in using prosecution laches as a defensive weapon
  • New US case law addressing prosecution laches
  • Using prosecution laches against patentees
  • Best practices for defending against prosecution laches

Click here for additional information and to register.



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Deception Inspection: Attorney Faces Discipline for Citing Fake Law

by | Feb 8, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit referred an attorney for potential further disciplinary measures after the attorney cited a nonexistent case created by ChatGPT. Park v. Kim, Case No. 22-2057 (2d Cir. Jan. 30, 2024) (Parker, Nathan, Merriam, JJ.) (per curiam).

Minhye Park sued David Dennis Kim for an action related to a wage dispute. During the district court proceedings, Park continually and willfully failed to respond to and comply with the district court’s discovery orders. Kim eventually moved to dismiss based on Park’s failure to comply with court orders and discovery obligations. Park opposed. After weighing the requirements of Rules 37 and 41(b), the district court concluded that dismissal was appropriate. Park appealed.

The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal, concluding that Park’s noncompliance amounted to “sustained and willful intransigence in the face of repeated and explicit warnings from the court that the refusal to comply with court orders . . . would result in the dismissal of [the] action.”

Separately, the Second Circuit addressed the conduct of Park’s attorney during the appeal, including a citation to a nonexistent case that was generated using the artificial intelligence (AI) tool ChatGPT. After receiving Park’s reply brief, the Court ordered Park to submit a copy of one of the cited decisions. Park’s attorney responded that she was “unable to furnish a copy of the decision,” explaining that she had difficulty locating a relevant case through traditional legal research tools and therefore used ChatGPT to provide the case caption ultimately cited in the brief.

The Second Circuit found that citation to a nonexistent case suggests conduct that falls below the basic obligations of counsel, and thus referred the attorney to the Court’s Grievance Panel for further investigation and consideration of a referral to the Court’s admission committee. The Court explained that any attorney appearing before it is bound to exercise professional judgment and responsibility, which impose a duty to certify that any papers filed with the court are well grounded in fact and legally tenable. Recognizing that ChatGPT is a significant technological advancement, the Court explained that the use of such tools does not excuse an attorney from separately ensuring that submissions to the Court are accurate or legally tenable. The Court concluded that referral to the Grievance Panel was warranted because the brief presented a false statement of law and the attorney made no inquiry at all, let alone a reasonable inquiry into the validity of the arguments presented. The Court also ordered the attorney to provide a copy of the ruling to her client.

Practice Note: The Second Circuit noted that several courts around the United States have proposed or enacted rules addressing the use of AI tools before a court but explained that such rules are unnecessary to inform attorneys that court submissions should be accurate.



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Bling It On: Laches Prevents Profit Disgorgement in Diamond-Studded Trademark Battle

by | Feb 8, 2024 |

In a dispute involving allegedly counterfeit luxury watches, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s finding of trademark infringement and its finding that a laches defense prevented disgorgement of profits. Rolex Watch USA, Incorporated v. BeckerTime, L.L.C., Case No. 22-10866 (5th Cir. Jan. 26, 2024) (Douglas, King, Willett, JJ.)

Rolex is a luxury watch seller with legally protectable interests in numerous trademarks. BeckerTime modifies Rolex-branded watches by adding diamonds, aftermarket bezels, and bands not authorized by Rolex and then sells them as “Genuine Rolex” watches. Rolex filed a lawsuit against BeckerTime, alleging trademark infringement and seeking an injunction and disgorgement of profits. After a bench trial, the district court concluded that BeckerTime infringed Rolex’s trademark but refused to order disgorgement of profits based on BeckerTime’s laches defense. This appeal followed.

On the issue of infringement, BeckerTime argued that the district court erroneously applied the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis without considering the Supreme Court’s decision in Champion Spark Plug v. Sanders (1947). In Champion, the Supreme Court held that a defendant in a trademark infringement case was not obligated to remove trademarks from repaired or reconditioned products. This ruling was grounded in the distinction that these products were distinctly marketed as “repaired or reconditioned” as opposed to brand new items. The Supreme Court clarified that a misnomer exception would only be applicable if the extent or nature of the repair or reconditioning was so profound that using the original name would be misleading, even if terms such as “used” or “repaired” were added to describe the item.

In drawing a comparison to Champion, the Fifth Circuit differentiated BeckerTime’s actions from mere repairs or reconditioning. Unlike the defendant in Champion, BeckerTime went beyond restoration, actively modifying Rolex watches by incorporating diamonds, aftermarket bezels and bracelets or straps. Consequently, the watches BeckerTime sold were materially distinct from those offered by Rolex. The Court reasoned that BeckerTime’s alterations amounted to customization rather than mere restoration, as was the case in Champion. Applying the misnomer exception from Champion, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, asserting that BeckerTime’s customized watches created a likelihood of confusion among consumers and thereby infringed upon Rolex’s trademark.

On the issue of disgorgement of profits, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of laches to deny an award of disgorgement. Rolex argued that BeckerTime’s deliberate counterfeiting precluded laches, while BeckerTime responded that Rolex had failed to show the required unclean hands or undue prejudice to justify disgorgement. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that Rolex had failed to establish unclean hands by BeckerTime, as the evidence did not show intentional infringement. The Court also agreed that the delay in filing the lawsuit caused undue prejudice to BeckerTime by enabling it to build a successful business.

While Rolex sought a complete ban on BeckerTime’s use of non-genuine bezels and dials on its modified Rolex watches, the Fifth Circuit only partially agreed. Recognizing the potential for consumer confusion, the Court ordered [...]

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Carolina Calling: Sources of Proof Favor Transfer

by | Feb 8, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a district court order denying transfer, finding that the sources of proof, compulsory process and localized interest factors all favored transfer. In re Honeywell Int’l Inc., Case No. 23-152 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 2024) (Dyk, Bryson, Taranto, JJ.) (per curiam) (nonprecedential)

Lone Star SCM Systems filed a lawsuit against Honeywell in the Western District of Texas, Waco Division (West Texas) asserting infringement of four patents related to radio frequency identification technology. Honeywell moved to transfer the suit to the Western District of North Carolina (West Carolina), where Hand Held Products, a Honeywell subsidiary that designed, manufactured, imported and sold certain accused products, is headquartered. Honeywell argued that it had identified five potential Hand Held witnesses who would be subject to the transferee’s subpoena power and that relevant and material evidence would be more likely to exist in the transferee district.

The district court denied Honeywell’s motion. The district court analyzed public- and private-interest factors outlined in the Fifth Circuit’s 2008 In re Volkswagen of Am. decision and concluded that although Lone Star could have brought its suit in West Carolina, Honeywell had failed to demonstrate that West Carolina was clearly more convenient. The district court acknowledged that the bulk of the evidence was located in West Carolina but ultimately concluded that the convenience to potential party witnesses favored West Texas, pointing to several Lone Star witnesses who resided in the Northern District of Texas. The court found that the public-interest factors were neutral or similarly offsetting. The district court also found that West Carolina’s local interest favored transfer, but judicial efficiency did not because a transfer would have required relocating this suit away from two co-pending Lone Star infringement suits.

Honeywell petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus. The Federal Circuit determined that the district court’s denial of Honeywell’s transfer motion was patently erroneous. The Federal Circuit explained that the district court’s findings regarding potential party witness convenience and judicial efficiency were contrary to recent Fifth Circuit and Federal Circuit precedent. Regarding the potential party witnesses, the Federal Circuit cited the Fifth Circuit’s 2023 In re TikTok decision, explaining that it was improper to place witnesses residing outside of West Texas but still within the state of Texas on par with those residing in West Carolina. Regarding judicial efficiency, the Federal Circuit found that Lone Star’s position differed little from the circumstances that the Federal Circuit considered in its 2021 In re Samsung Elecs. decision, where the other suits involved different defendants with different hardware and software. Consistent with Samsung, the Federal Circuit concluded that Lone Star’s co-pending suits did not favor West Texas because the other cases were likely to involve significantly different discovery, evidence and issues. The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s decision and ordered the district court to grant Honeywell’s transfer motion.



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Rules of Evidence Require Weighing Relevance of Evidence Against Potential Prejudice

by | Feb 8, 2024 | ,

The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the exclusion of a drug patent in a medical malpractice case, finding that the highly technical language of the patent would more likely confuse a lay jury than be probative of the issues in the case. Ward v. Schaefer, Case No. 22-1547 (1st Cir. Jan. 29, 2024) (per curiam).

In 2018 Edmund Ward sued his doctor, Ernst Schaefer, claiming that Dr. Schaefer had fraudulently induced Ward to participate in an experimental drug protocol and had otherwise failed to obtain his informed consent. Ward was born with a rare genetic disorder that caused his body to not produce a blood enzyme, lecithin-cholesterol acyltransferase (LCAT), that is critical for cholesterol production. As a result, Ward was at risk of kidney failure and would require either regular dialysis or a kidney transplant. When Ward met Dr. Schaefer, Ward’s condition was deteriorating. Dr. Schaefer suggested that Ward might be a suitable candidate for an experimental enzyme therapy with a drug called ACP-501, and Ward, under an expanded access application, was granted permission to start an experimental protocol.

Ward traveled from his home in Massachusetts to a National Institutes of Health (NIH) facility in Bethesda, Maryland, to receive infusions of ACP-501 and was monitored by Dr. Schaefer in Massachusetts. Unfortunately, Ward’s condition did not improve under the experimental protocol but instead worsened because he was compelled to delay dialysis treatments while using ACP-501. Ward stopped the experimental protocol; began regular dialysis; and sued Dr. Schaefer, the NIH doctors and the drug manufacturer. The district court dismissed the claims against most of the plaintiffs, but the claims of fraud and failure to obtain informed consent against Dr. Schaefer went to trial. Ward’s signed consent form was admitted into evidence at trial, but he claimed he had no memory of discussing it with his doctors or signing it. The jury found in favor of Dr. Schaefer on all claims. Ward appealed.

Ward argued that the court erred in refusing to allow the introduction of the patent for ACP-501 because the patent specified that it was a method for reducing arterial cholesterol in patients not suffering from LCAT deficiency. Ward argued that this language in the patent made clear that the drug was not appropriate for patients like him. The district court ruled that the patent was inadmissible because it had been offered without foundation, and that it had nothing to do with the issues of fraud and informed consent. On appeal, the First Circuit offered a different analysis but arrived at the same outcome, holding that the Fed. R. Evid. 403 balancing test “disposes of the matter.”

The First Circuit noted that the patent’s description of ACT-501 “is of absolutely no relevance to Dr. Schaefer’s alleged failure to apprise Ward of the potential risks and rewards of taking the drug through expanded access.” The Court went on to point out that even if the single sentence in the patent pointing to its exclusion for patients with LCAT [...]

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Google It: Federal Copyright Law Preempts California Causes of Action

by | Feb 1, 2024 |

Addressing a state law-based challenge to the way search results are displayed on copies of websites, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that copyright preemption precluded a website owner from invoking state law to control how the websites are displayed. Best Carpet Values, Inc. v. Google LLC, Case No. 22-15899 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 2024) (Wallace, Thomas, Forrest, JJ.)

Best Carpet Values filed a class action against Google asserting California state law claims for trespass to chattels, implied-in-law contract and unjust enrichment based on the way Google’s search app displayed their websites on Android phones. If an Android user used the search app to navigate to a website, the app delivered a copy of the website, which was displayed with a frame at the bottom of the page saying, for example, “VIEW 15 RELATED PAGES” and which allowed the user to click a button to expand the frame to display half-page banners advertising related websites. For Best Carpet (the class representative), these displayed results included websites for its direct competitors and even news stories about Best Carpet’s owner. Best Carpet argued that Google thereby occupied valuable space on Best Carpet’s websites, obtaining all the benefits of advertising from its use of that space without paying for such advertising.

Google moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. After the district court denied the motion to dismiss, Google moved to certify the order for interlocutory appeal. The district court granted Google’s motion and certified four questions for interlocutory review that it believed were potentially dispositive. The Ninth Circuit found that only two of the interlocutory questions were dispositive:

  • Whether prior Ninth Circuit authority, Kremen (2003), should be extended to protect as chattel the copies of websites displayed on a user’s screen
  • Whether preemption under copyright law precluded state law from controlling how websites are displayed on a user’s screen.

On the issue of whether a website display can be protected as chattel, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the “chattels” at issue were copies of Best Carpet’s websites. The Ninth Circuit reasoned, however, that they could not serve as the basis for a trespass claim because Best Carpet had no cognizable property interest in the website copies on an app user’s Android phone. The Court reasoned that website copies – unlike a website’s domain name – were not “capable of precise definition” or “capable of exclusive control,” and there was no “legitimate claim to exclusivity” over the website copies (citing Kremen).

As for the copyright preemption issue, the Ninth Circuit considered the two-part test for determining whether the Copyright Act preempted the state law claims. The first prong assesses whether the subject matter of the state law claim falls within the subject matter of the relevant provisions of the Copyright Act. Here, the parties agreed that commercial websites are copyrightable, and after considering the body of precedent interpreting the relevant provisions of the [...]

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Stay in the Know: Informational Message Is Not a Source Identifier

by | Feb 1, 2024 |

Addressing whether the mark EVERYBODY VS. RACISM was registrable, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board’s final refusal to register the mark because it failed to function as a source identifier. In re: GO & Assoc., LLC, Case No. 22-1961 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 13, 2023) (nonprecedential) (Fed. Cir. Jan. 22, 2024) (precedential) (Lourie, Reyna, Hughes, JJ.)

On June 2, 2020, GO & Associates filed a trademark application seeking registration on the principal register of EVERYBODY VS. RACISM, identifying the goods and services as various apparel “promoting public interest and awareness of the need for racial reconciliation and encouraging people to know their neighbor and then affect change in their own sphere of influence.”

In a non-final office action, the examining attorney refused to register the mark, asserting that it “failed to function as a source identifier for GO’s goods and services.” The examiner noted that the mark “merely convey[ed] support of, admiration for, or affiliation with the ideals conveyed by the message.” The examiner presented examples of the mark being used in informational settings, such as by referees in the National Basketball Association; in YouTube videos; on clothing; and in titles of rap songs, podcasts and church sermons. Although GO presented evidence that the mark had hardly been used or searched prior to its use in May 2020, the examining attorney continued to reject the application. The examiner found that “the ornamental uses of the mark only reinforced the fact that consumers would likely view the mark as a sentiment rather than a source.” The examiner also noted that the applicant’s first use of the mark coincided with the “general timeline of the heated anti-racism protests throughout the nation in the wake of the George Floyd killing.”

GO appealed to the Board. The Board found “that the record as a whole show[ed] wide use of the proposed mark in a non-trademark manner to consistently convey an informational, anti-racist message to the public, as opposed to a source identifier of GO’s goods and services,” and affirmed the examiner’s refusal to register the mark. GO appealed to the Federal Circuit.

Affirming the Board’s decision, the Federal Circuit emphasized that the threshold requirement for the issuance of a mark is whether it is source identifying: “what makes a trademark a trademark under the Lanham Act is its source-identifying function.” The mark must identify the source for the public and distinguish that source from others.

The Federal Circuit noted that whether a mark is source identifying depends on “how the mark is used in the marketplace and how consumers perceive it.” In particular, the US Patent & Trademark Office prohibits registering marks that it calls “informational matter” (i.e., “slogans, terms, and phrases used by the public to convey familiar sentiments, because consumers are unlikely to perceive the matter as a trademark or service mark for any goods and services”). Reviewing the Board’s findings for substantial evidence, the Court found that the Board properly weighed the [...]

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Senate Holds Hearing on Legislative Initiative to Address Patent Eligibility

by and | Feb 1, 2024 |

Seeking to undo the current jurisprudence “mess” on the issue of patent eligibility, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Intellectual Property heard testimony on January 23, 2024, on the Patent Eligibility Restoration Act (PERA) (text here). PERA seeks to address the uncertainty and unpredictable outcomes created by the 2014 Supreme Court of the United States decision in Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l.

PERA is the latest iteration of 35 USC § 101 patent eligibility reform that Senators Thom Tillis (R-NC) and Chris Coons (D-DE) have been introducing for years. Although the language has been tweaked over time, the bill’s purpose is to eliminate “[a]ll judicial exceptions to patent eligibility” and in their place codify several categories of inventions as unpatentable, such as mathematical formulas; processes that are substantially economic, financial, business, social, cultural or artistic; processes that are mental or purely natural; unmodified human genes; and unmodified natural materials.

The January 23 hearing featured eight witnesses, divided into two panels. The first panel included:

  • Andrei Iancu, former US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) director
  • Richard Blaylock, testifying on behalf of Invitae Corporation
  • Courtenay Brinckerhoff, partner at Foley & Lardner
  • Phil Johnson, steering committee chair at the Coalition for 21st Century Patent Reform.

The second panel included:

  • The Honorable David Kappos, former PTO director
  • Adam Mossoff, professor at the Antonin Scalia Law School
  • Mark Deem, operating partner of Lightstone Ventures
  • David Jones, executive director of the High-Tech Inventors Alliance.

Harkening back to prior panels, the testimony was largely in favor of reform considering what many characterized as inaction by all other stakeholders. Senators and witnesses alike recognized that legislative reform is likely the only way to gain clarity on § 101 considering the Supreme Court’s failure to take up more than 100 certiorari petitions seeking review, many with the Solicitor General’s endorsement.

During the first panel, Blaylock testified that PERA would improperly provide patent eligibility to new uses of natural phenomena, such as genetic material, and therefore “would stifle innovation and harm patient care in the fields of diagnostic genetic testing and precision medicine.” Iancu testified in response that “all human invention is the manipulation of nature towards practical uses by humans on this planet . . . and it should be eligible for a patent.” Brinckerhoff’s testimony also opposed Blaylock’s view; she explained that considerable research and development is needed to develop new uses for isolated natural products and would be disincentivized without patent eligibility. Brinckerhoff highlighted an important theme at the hearing: “PERA would bring eligibility back in line with other countries” by permitting patents on methods of detecting new diagnostic markers, thus maintaining international competitiveness. Lastly, Johnson testified that “[j]ust because something is eligible doesn’t mean it’s patentable” and stressed the importance of using §§ 102, 203 and 112 as additional filters to determine patentability.

During the second panel, venture capitalist Deem testified that “the United States is failing many of our most innovative startups” because [...]

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