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Exploring the Latest in Intellectual Property Law
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PTO Seeks Permanent Rules Regarding Motion to Amend Practice Before Board

by | Mar 14, 2024 |

On March 4, 2024, the US Patent & Trademark Office published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeking to revise its Motion to Amend (MTA) pilot program practice in connection with certain America Invents Act (AIA) proceedings. 89 Fed. Reg. 15531 (Mar. 4, 2024). The PTO set a May 3, 2024, deadline for stakeholders to submit written comments in response to the proposed rules.

The MTA pilot program has evolved since its inception nearly five years ago and has been extended to September 16, 2024. The proposal seeks to make permanent certain provisions of the pilot program in response to the PTO’s May 2023 request for comments. The rules would apply to the existing consolidated set of rules relating to trial practice for inter partes review (IPR), post-grant review (PGR) and derivation proceedings in trial proceedings under the AIA.

Under the existing MTA pilot program, patent claims challenged during an AIA trial proceeding provide the patent owner with two options when proposing substitute claims in response to a petitioner’s opposition. The first option gives the patent owner the ability to file an MTA so that the Patent Trial & Appeal Board can issue preliminary non-binding guidance regarding the likelihood of an invalidation decision. The PTO proposes to revise its rules of practice to provide for the issuance of preliminary guidance in response to an MTA and to provide a patent owner with the option of filing one additional revised MTA.

The Board’s preliminary guidance typically would come in the form of a short paper issued after a petitioner files its opposition to the MTA and typically would provide the Board’s preliminary views on the MTA, specifically whether the MTA meets the statutory and regulatory requirements for an MTA, whether the parties have met their respective burdens of proof and whether the substitute claims are likely to be found unpatentable. However, the preliminary guidance would not be binding on the Board.

The proposed provisions would also provide the Board with greater authority to raise new grounds of unpatentability based on a preponderance of evidence standard. The new grounds of unpatentability could rely on the entirety of the record, including all prior art of record. The guidance would be accompanied by citations to the evidence in support of these new grounds. Further, where no opposition is filed or other circumstances constitute a lack of opposition, the prior art of record may further include references obtained from the PTO (i.e., examiners) in response to a request from the Board.

The proposed provisions would allow a patent owner to file a revised MTA after receiving a petitioner’s opposition to the original MTA or after receiving the Board’s preliminary guidance. Under the current pilot program, a revised MTA must be preauthorized for “good cause.” Under the revised provisions, the patent owner would be able to file a revised MTA without preauthorization. A revised MTA would replace the original MTA and must include new proposed substitute claims in place of the originally proposed claims. [...]

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That’s So Metal: Narrow Limitation Doesn’t Contradict Broader One

by | Mar 14, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s indefiniteness determination, finding that two claim limitations – one broad and one narrow – were not contradictory since it was possible to meet the requirements of both. Maxell, Ltd. v. Amperex Technology Limited, Case No. 23-1194 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 6, 2024) (Prost, Taranto, Chen, JJ.)

Maxell owns a patent directed to a rechargeable lithium-ion battery. Maxell filed suit against Amperex alleging infringement. Following claim construction proceedings, the district court found the claims to be indefinite based on two limitations in the independent claim that recited the variable M1. The relevant claim limitations read:

1- wherein M1 represents at least one transition metal element selected from Co, Ni and Mn, [. . .]

2- wherein the content of Co in the transition metal M1 of the formulae (1) and (2) is from 30% by mole to 100% by mole[.]

The district court found that these two limitations contradicted each other because limitation 1 recited Co (cobalt) as an optional transition metal selected from a Markush group for M1, whereas limitation 2 recited a minimum Co content of 30% in M1. The district court reasoned that the claims were indefinite because limitation 1 did not require the presence of cobalt, whereas limitation 2 did. In its claim construction order, the district court stated that simultaneous recitation that a claim element is both optional and required is a “contradiction on its face.” Maxell appealed.

The Federal Circuit found no contradiction between the two limitations, explaining that “[i]t is perfectly possible for a selected [M1] to satisfy both of these limitations.” The Court reasoned that in the context of Maxell’s patent, it was of no import that the two requirements (i.e., that M1 must comprise cobalt, nickel (Ni) or manganese (Mn), and that M1 must comprise at least 30% cobalt) were recited in separate clauses. It was enough that both limitations could be simultaneously satisfied. The Court further reasoned that the inclusion of two requirements in a claim did not create an otherwise nonexistent contradiction because the claim language must be read as a whole and not merely on a limitation-by-limitation basis. The Court also looked to the prosecution history to provide context for the ordering of the claim limitations at issue and explained that limitation 2 was added during prosecution to overcome a prior art reference that primarily used nickel as a transition metal.

The Federal Circuit explained that contrary to the district court’s characterization, the subject claim limitations did not grant options. Instead, they stated requirements that must be met to fall within the scope of the claimed invention. The Court noted that, rather than contradicting limitation 1, limitation 2 narrowed it. If limitation 2 had been recited in a dependent claim, there would be no contradiction, notwithstanding that proper construction of a dependent claim requires importation of all limitations from the claims from which it depends. The same conclusion applied when both limitations were [...]

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Gentlemen, Start Your Engines: Even Bland Works Support Copyright

by | Mar 7, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed an award of profit disgorgement and attorneys’ fees in a copyright infringement case, holding that even “workaday” or “humdrum” subject matter can support a valid copyright. Premier Dealer Servs. Inc. v. Allegiance Adm’rs LLC, Case No. 23-3394 (6th Cir. Feb. 26, 2024) (Sutton, C.J.; Clay, Bloomekatz, JJ.)

Premier and Allegiance both administered car dealers’ loyalty programs. Customers enrolled in these programs were required to meet certain conditions (such as changing the car’s oil at predetermined intervals), and if a part under warranty broke, the dealer would help the car owner initiate a claim through the loyalty program administrator. In conjunction with administering these programs, Premier created a loyalty certificate. The certificate collected the customer’s personal information and provided the program’s terms and conditions. Premier registered its certificate for copyright protection in 2008.

In 2018, Tricolor – one of Premier’s large, long-standing customers – switched its program to Allegiance. When Allegiance took over, it repurposed Premier’s loyalty certificate by simply updating the administrator’s contact information. Allegiance and Tricolor continued to use the otherwise unaltered certificate. Premier sued for copyright infringement.

The district court found that the certificate’s “dull” subject matter did not preclude copyright protection, enjoined Allegiance from further copyright infringement, and awarded Premier disgorgement of Allegiance’s profits as well as attorneys’ fees, totaling more than $1 million. Allegiance appealed, challenging the certificate’s copyrightability and the damages calculations.

As to the copyrightability of the certificate, the Sixth Circuit explained that while copyright requires originality, it is a low threshold that can be shown by making “non-obvious choices” or evidencing some creative spark. “[A]rtistic merit” is not necessarily required. The Court noted three categories that copyrights will not cover:

  • Facts that already exist in the world (although the expression of facts may be copyrightable)
  • Merger, “when there is only a single way to express a given set of facts” and
  • Scenes a faire, in which industry norms require expressing facts in a particular way.

Premier’s copyright was registered and therefore presumed valid, meaning the burden was on Allegiance to rebut that presumption. The Sixth Circuit rejected Allegiance’s challenge to the originality of Premier’s copyright, primarily because copyrights “protect all manner of works – mundane or lofty . . . so long as they satisfy the modest imperatives of originality.” Allegiance argued that Premier’s forms collected client information in a way that was unoriginal, because there was only one way to collect the information (merger) and because the layout was typical for the industry (scenes a faire). The Court looked to areas in which Premier indicated creativity, noting that its forms differed from other loyalty program certificates in evidence. Further, Premier made the creative choice to allow program members to select from various schedules for oil changes, instead of a single predetermined timetable. This and other evidence suggested choice, ideas and creativity, despite the functionality of the loyalty certificates.

The Sixth Circuit hinted at how Allegiance might have better established the [...]

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Rock On: Clichéd Song Themes Don’t Infringe Copyright

by | Mar 7, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s summary judgment grant to an alleged song copier, finding neither evidence of factual copying nor striking similarity between the two songs. Kirk Johnston v. Chad Kroeger et al., Case No. 23-50254 (5th Cir. Feb. 19, 2024) (Jones, Haynes, Douglas, JJ.) (per curiam) (non-precedential).

Kirk Johnston is a musician and songwriter who plays guitar for the Texas rock band Snowblind (now called Snowblind Revival). In 2001, he wrote a song called “Rock Star.” Four years later, the Canadian rock band Nickelback released a song called “Rockstar” that became one of its most popular singles. In 2020, Johnston sued Nickelback, its record label and its music publishing company for copyright infringement. Nickelback moved for summary judgment, and the district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge. The judge recommended summary judgment in favor of Nickelback, finding no genuine dispute of material fact as to factual copying and finding that the two songs did not sound alike. The district court accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed Johnston’s infringement claim. Johnston appealed.

The Fifth Circuit reviewed the motion of summary judgment de novo. With respect to the element of factual copying, Nickelback’s members and executives claimed that they had never even heard of Johnston’s song. The Court found Johnston’s circumstantial evidence that Nickelback had access to his song unpersuasive. Johnston said that access could be inferred from the fact that the two bands were “moving in relatively the same circles” and that executives associated with Nickelback likely attended Snowblind’s shows. The Court said that Johnston’s arguments regarding the likelihood that Nickelback had access to his song “Rock Star” required “leaps of logic” not supported by the record and were “mere speculation.”

Johnston also unsuccessfully argued that the district court erred by not applying the “more discerning ordinary observer test” and by considering all versions of the songs on the record rather than just the “stripped down” versions. The Fifth Circuit pointed out that those standards only apply under a substantial similarity analysis, which requires a plaintiff to establish factual copying. Because there was no proof of access, much less copying, Johnston had to show a “striking similarity” between his song and Nickelback’s hit.

Johnston argued that his expert demonstrated that there were clear lyrical and musical similarities between the hooks of the songs, both of which concern the desire to be a rock star. However, the Fifth Circuit noted that the expert’s analysis was unpersuasive as to both the musical and lyrical similarities; concluding that neither was sufficiently similar to preclude all explanations but copying. The other themes in the song that Johnston pointed to as strikingly similar were “making lots of money,” “connections to famous people” and “references to sports.” The Court pointed out that as a general matter, those categories “are mere clichés of being a rockstar that are not unique to the rock genre.” As the Court put it, “[s]inging about being a rockstar is not [...]

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I Hear Ya – No Intent to Deceive, No Inequitable Conduct

by | Mar 7, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s finding that the asserted patents were not unenforceable for inequitable conduct, determining that statements made by counsel to the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) to revive an abandoned application were not shown to have been made with deceptive intent. Freshub, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., Case No. 2022-1391 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 26, 2024) (Reyna, Taranto, Chen, JJ.)

Freshub sued Amazon for infringement of patents directed to voice processing technology. Amazon denied infringement and defended on the basis that the patents should be declared unenforceable based on inequitable conduct by Freshub’s parent company, Ikan Holdings, during prosecution of the application at the PTO. Amazon alleged that Ikan improperly revived an earlier-abandoned parent application from which the asserted patents descend.

The predicate facts are as follows: In June 2011, the PTO issued a final office action rejecting the claims of the parent application. Ikan failed to respond to the office action, rendering the application abandoned in January 2012. In January 2017, Ikan petitioned the PTO to revive the application. In support of its revival petition, Ikan’s counsel asserted that “[t]he entire [five-year] delay in filing the required reply . . . was unintentional.” “[R]elying on petitioner’s duty of candor and good faith,” the PTO granted the petition, eventually resulting in issuance of the three patents-in-suit.

At trial, a jury found that Amazon did not infringe the asserted patents. The district court subsequently conducted a bench trial on inequitable conduct and found that Amazon had failed to prove inequitable conduct by clear and convincing evidence. Freshub appealed, arguing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law that Amazon infringed. Amazon cross-appealed, seeking reversal of the district court’s inequitable conduct ruling.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination of failure to prove inequitable conduct, finding that Amazon had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that Ikan misrepresented or omitted material information with the specific intent to deceive the PTO. The Court focused its analysis on deceptive intent, finding that the district court did not commit clear error in rejecting Amazon’s inequitable conduct defense.

The Federal Circuit noted that the record was minimal due to the passage of time and the limited testimonial and documentary evidence available, as well as the many unchallenged claims of attorney-client privilege. Nevertheless, both parties presented evidence concerning Ikan’s intent between 2012 and 2017.

To support its position, Freshub relied on the 2017 statement by Ikan’s counsel asserting that Ikan’s delay in filing its reply to the PTO’s final office action was unintentional. The Federal Circuit found this evidence probative, even without the presentation of additional evidence to further explain why the period of non-response was so long. On the other hand, Amazon presented specific evidence that it contended demonstrated deceptive intent. For example:

  • The 2017 statement to revive the parent application was made by the same counsel that prosecuted the application at the time of its 2012 abandonment.
  • Ikan’s counsel [...]

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New PTO Guidance: Use KSR Flexible Approach to Obviousness

by | Mar 7, 2024 |

On February 27, 2024, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) published updated guidance for examiners on how to make a proper determination of obviousness. The guidance expands upon and reinforces the legal framework for obviousness determinations discussed by the Supreme Court in KSR Int’l. v. Teleflex (2007) and Graham v. John Deere Co. (1966) through the lens of post-KSR precedential Federal Circuit cases. The guidance does not have the force and effect of law and is not intended by the PTO to convey any new practice or procedure.

Drawing from more than 30 Federal Circuit cases, the guidance addresses several themes. An overriding theme concerns the implementation of a flexible approach to obviousness and the need for a reasoned explanation when concluding that a claimed invention would have been obvious. In its discussion, the PTO characterizes the flexibility expressed by the KSR court and reiterated by subsequent Federal Circuit cases as mandating a proper understanding of the scope of the prior art and providing appropriate reasons to modify the prior art.

Regarding the scope and content of the prior art, the guidance draws attention to understanding the prior art and all that it may reasonably suggest to a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) who would naturally apply common sense and glean suggestions from the art – even where such suggestions are not explicitly stated. Thus, the obviousness inquiry need not seek out precise teachings regarding a solution to a technological problem but can take account of the inferences, creative steps and common knowledge that a POSITA would employ. In one precedential example, the Federal Circuit held that a POSITA would have combined certain prior art elements based on common knowledge of an industry’s concern for rider stability when using water recreational devices. (Zup v. Nash Mfg. (2018).) The guidance also affirms the need for an evaluation of analogous prior art, which must be evaluated using a flexible approach when considering the “same field of endeavor” and “reasonably pertinent” tests in combination with evidence concerning the knowledge and perspective of a POSITA.

According to the guidance, a flexible approach to obviousness should provide a reasoned explanation with evidentiary support for modifying the prior art. To facilitate compact prosecution, the examiner should clearly articulate this explanation early in the prosecution. The PTO also cautions that wholesale use of “common sense” as a rationale is no substitute for reasoned analysis and evidentiary support. There should be an explanation of why common sense would have compelled a finding of obviousness, especially where limitations are not expressly disclosed in the prior art.

The guidance further emphasizes that decision-makers are not free to ignore relevant evidence before them, including Graham’s secondary considerations or other objective indicia of obviousness, to establish prima facie obviousness. At the same time, conclusory opinions by an expert in a declaration or attorney argument alone should not be accorded weight in the absence of factual support. The guidance notes that in keeping with the flexible approach to obviousness [...]

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Yo-Ho-No Vicarious Liability for Online Piracy Without Financial Benefit

by | Feb 29, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed-in-part, vacated-in-part and affirmed in part a district court decision that found an internet service provider liable for $1 billion in damages for vicarious and contributory copyright infringement. Sony Music Entm’t., et al. v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., Case No. 21-1168 (4th Cir. Feb. 20, 2024) (Harris, Rushing, JJ., Floyd, Sr. J.) (per curiam).

Sony Music along with 52 other music companies filed suit against Cox Communications in July 2018, alleging both contributory and vicarious liability based on copyright infringement by Cox’s customers. Sony argued that Cox knew that some of its customers used its service to download or distribute songs over the internet without permission but chose not to cancel their subscriptions. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) created a safe harbor for internet service providers in such circumstances but a prior case against Cox held that it did not qualify for the safe harbor because “its repeat infringer policy as implemented was inadequate under the DMCA.” In the present case, the jury found Cox liable for vicarious and contributory infringement of all 10,017 copyrighted works alleged to have been infringed and found that Cox’s infringement was willful. The jury awarded Sony more than $99,000 per work infringed, totaling $1 billion in statutory damages. Cox appealed.

The appeal garnered noteworthy amici in support of both sides. Cox was supported by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the American Library Association and the Center for Democracy and Technology, among others. Sony was supported by the National Music Publishers’ Association, the Songwriters of North America, the Nashville Songwriters Association International and the Copyright Alliance.

Cox raised many questions of law concerning the scope of secondary liability and what constitutes a compilation or derivative work in the digital age. The Fourth Circuit upheld the jury verdict finding Cox liable for contributory copyright infringement, rejecting Cox’s arguments that its service was also used for lawful activity and that its contribution must amount to aiding and abetting the infringement. The Court explained that “supplying a product with knowledge that the recipient will use it to infringe copyrights is exactly the sort of conduct sufficient for contributory infringement.” The Court concluded that the jury saw sufficient evidence that Cox knew specific users were repeatedly infringing but chose not to terminate their service.

The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed the jury’s verdict of vicarious liability, finding that Cox did not profit from its subscribers’ acts of infringement and so did not meet the legal prerequisite for that form of secondary liability. Reviewing landmark cases on vicarious liability, the Court explained that “the crux of the financial benefit inquiry is whether a causal relationship exists between the infringing activity and a financial benefit to the defendant . . . the financial benefit to the defendant must flow directly from the third party’s acts of infringement to establish vicarious liability.” Since Sony failed to show that Cox profited from its subscribers’ infringing activity, it failed to establish vicarious liability.

The [...]

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Not Admitted to PTO Bar? No Problem.

by | Feb 29, 2024 |

On February 21, 2024, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that would give parties the option to designate a non-registered practitioner as lead counsel in proceedings before the Patent Trial & Appeal Board. 89 Fed. Reg. 13017 (Feb. 21, 2024) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).

37 CFR 42.10(a) currently requires each party to designate a lead counsel and at least one back-up counsel. The lead counsel must be a registered practitioner. Non-registered practitioners can serve as back-up counsel pro hac vice, but only upon a showing that they are an experienced litigating lawyer serving as back-up counsel and that they possess significant familiarity with the subject matter at issue. Permission for back-up status requires grant of a pro hac vice motion filed by counsel presenting specific statements of fact showing good cause for admission, as well as an affidavit or declaration by counsel attesting to good standing before the courts, familiarity with the PTO’s Patent Trial Practice Guide and the Board’s Rules of Practice for Trial set forth in part 42 of 37 C.F.R., and familiarity with the subject matter at issue.

The proposed changes to 37 C.F.R. 42.10 would:

  • Permit non-registered practitioners to serve as lead counsel for a party in Board proceedings as long as at least one other counsel designated to appear on behalf of the party is a registered practitioner.
  • Permit parties to proceed without back-up counsel upon a showing of good cause. A party may show good cause by demonstrating that it lacks the financial resources to retain both lead and back-up counsel.
  • Create a new streamlined procedure for pro hac vice recognition of Board-recognized practitioners. This procedure applies to non-registered practitioners who have previously been admitted pro hac vice in a different Board proceeding and have not been subsequently denied pro hac vice recognition in a different Board proceeding.
  • Clarify that those recognized pro hac vice have a duty to inform the Board if the information presented in a request for pro hac vice recognition is no longer accurate or complete.

The PTO seeks public comments on the proposed rulemaking by May 21, 2024, through the Federal eRulemaking Portal. Enter docket number PTO-P-2023-00587 on the homepage and select “search.”

For further details, click here.



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Consider Invention When Assessing Support for Claimed Range

by | Feb 29, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part a Patent Trial & Appeal Board finding that the claims at issue were either invalid under 35 U.S.C. §112 as unsupported by written description or obvious under 35 U.S.C. §103. RAI Strategic Holdings, Inc. v. Philip Morris Products S.A., Case No. 22-1862 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 9, 2024) (Chen, Stoll, Cunningham, JJ.)

RAI owns a patent with claims directed to “electrically powered smoking devices that provide an inhalable vapor by heating tobacco or other substances without significant combustion.” Philip Morris challenged the patent in a post-grant review (PGR).

The Board issued a final written decision concluding that two dependent claims, which recited limitations requiring a heating member with “a length of about 75% to about 85% of a length of the disposable aerosol forming substance,” lacked § 112 written description support. The specification disclosed ranges of 75% – 125%, 80% – 120%, 85% – 115% and 90% – 110%. The Board explained that written description support was lacking because “the claimed range is different from and substantially narrower than the specific ranges disclosed in the specification.”

The Board found that the remaining claims were unpatentable as obvious based on a combination of prior art references where the heater found in one reference, Robinson, was replaced with the heater from another, Greim. Robinson explained that its heating element could be altered and acknowledged design choices, thus inviting skilled artisans to select an alternate appropriate heating element. Greim disclosed certain advantages to its heater. Thus, the Board found that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to replace Robinson’s heater with that of Greim, rendering the claims obvious. RAI appealed.

Citing its expert, RAI argued that the ranges disclosed in the specification all centered around 100%, so that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would not “conclude that the inventors possessed a range that went no higher than 85%[.]” The Federal Circuit began by summarizing a line of numerical range cases, including:

  • In re Wertheim (CCPA 1976), which found that a described range of 25% – 60%, with examples of 36% and 50%, supported a claim directed to a range of 35% – 60%.
  • In re Blaser (CCPA 1977), which found that a described range of 60° – 200° C supported a claim reciting a range of 80° – 200° C.
  • Kolmes v. World Fibers Corp. (Fed. Cir. 1997), which found that a described range of 4 – 12 turns per inch, and preference for 8 turns per inch, supported claims directed to 8 – 12 turns per inch.
  • In re Baird (CCPA 1965), which found that a relatively unexplained disclosure of 32 – 176° F did not support claims directed to a range from 40° to “at least as low as” 60° F.
  • Indivior UK v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories (Fed. Cir. 2021), which found that:
    • Disclosure of ranges of at least 25%, at least 50% and “any” value [...]

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Badgerow Enforced: District Court Lacks Independent Jurisdiction to Enforce Arbitration Award

by | Feb 29, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s arbitration award because the district court lacked proper subject matter jurisdiction, independent from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), to enforce the award. SmartSky Networks, LLC v. DAG Wireless, LTD, Case No. 22-1253 (4th Cir. Feb. 13, 2024) (Diaz, Thacker, Rubin, JJ.)

SmartSky Networks filed suit in the district court against Wireless Systems Solutions and related companies and individuals over alleged breach of contract, trade secret misappropriation and deceptive trade practices. The parties entered into a business relationship regarding wireless communications in 2017. The relationship was governed by several agreements in the form of statements of work, purchase orders and a teaming agreement.

After filing suit in the district court, SmartSky submitted an arbitration demand against Wireless Systems. The related companies and individuals voluntarily agreed to submit to arbitration with respect to SmartSky’s claims filed against them. Wireless Systems moved to stay the district court action pending arbitration. The arbitration tribunal found in favor of SmartSky and issued an award, which included monetary damages in favor of SmartSky and a permanent injunction against the other parties. Thereafter, SmartSky filed a motion to enforce the award, and the district court confirmed the award. Wireless Systems and the related entities appealed.

The threshold question on appeal was whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award. Wireless Systems argued that the 2022 Supreme Court decision in Badgerow v. Walters dictated that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration award. In Badgerow, the Supreme Court held that a federal district court faced with an application to enforce or vacate an arbitration award under Sections 9 or 10 of the FAA must have a basis for subject matter jurisdiction independent from the FAA and apparent on the face of the application. The Supreme Court further held that “look-through” jurisdiction (when a court looks beyond a petition to compel arbitration to the underlying controversy to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists) only applies to petitions to compel arbitration under Section 4 of the FAA, and that such jurisdiction is not available for Section 9 and 10 applications to confirm, vacate or modify arbitration awards.

Reviewing the district court ruling de novo, the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. The Court reasoned that at the time the parties filed their respective Section 9 and 10 applications, the dispute focused on the enforceability of the arbitral award and not on the issues and claims already resolved by the tribunal. For the district court to find that it had jurisdiction over the contract dispute between the parties, the district court had to “look through” to the civil lawsuit and determine that a federal claim existed. Ruling consistently with Badgerow, the Court determined that “look-through” jurisdiction is not available for Section 9 and 10 applications. The Court reasoned that once the tribunal ordered that all claims between SmartSky and Wireless Systems be arbitrated and the related companies and [...]

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