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PTO Proposes Trademark Application Filing Changes, Fee Adjustments

by Peter Brunovskis, PhD | Apr 4, 2024 | Trademarks

On March 26, 2024, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register concerning changes to trademark application filings and fee adjustments in trademark cases for 2025. The PTO solicits written comments from the public on the proposed rule changes on or before May 28, 2024. The proposed rules seek to generate sufficient multiyear revenue for trademark operations in future years based on projections described in the notice.

The changes are recommended to support the PTO’s strategic goals and objectives, including optimizing trademark application pendency through the promotion of efficient operations and filing behaviors, issuing accurate and reliable trademark registrations, and encouraging access to the trademark system for stakeholders.

The proposal seeks to incentivize more complete and timely filings, improve prosecution, adjust 31 trademark fees and impose 12 new fees while discontinuing six existing fees. The proposal also seeks to consolidate the present Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) filing options (i.e., TEAS Plus and TEAS standard) into a single electronic filing option. The single option would include most of the same requirements as TEAS Plus, while eliminating those under TEAS Standard. The new filing framework would discontinue the previous filing fees and fees for failing to meet the requirements of a TEAS Plus application. Similar to TEAS Plus, however, applicants complying with the proposed requirements in their initial filing would pay the lowest fees.

The proposed fee adjustments would:

Set the fee for a base application at $350 using the ID Master List (which is $100 more than the current fee for a TEAS Plus application)
Discontinue current fees for filing an application under the Madrid Protocol
Require surcharge fees between $100 and $200 for applications that are noncompliant with the base filing requirements
Require an additional $200 fee per class for the identification of goods and services entered in the free-form text field to incentivize use of the Trademark ID Manual for such identifications instead
Require an additional $200 fee for each additional group of 1,000 characters in the free-form text field; identifications directly from the ID Manual would not incur these fees
Increase fees by $50 for filing amendments to allege use (AAU) and statements of use (SOU), with fees being discounted $100 for electronic filings
Increase post-registration maintenance fees from $50 to $75
Increase the letter of protest fee from $50 to $150.

Regarding the proposed fee adjustments, the notice describes changes to 37 CFR 2.6 and 7.6. The notice further describes changes to 37 CFR 2.22 and 2.71 with respect to base application fees and amendments to correct informalities, respectively.

For further details, see the Federal Register notice.

What Use Does § 271(e)(1) Safe Harbor “Solely” Protect?

by Christopher M. Bruno | Apr 4, 2024 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed that the 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) safe harbor protecting certain infringing acts undertaken for regulatory approval applied to an alleged infringer’s importation of transcatheter heart systems while attending a trade conference, finding the importation reasonably related to submitting information to the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA) for medical device approval. Edwards Lifesciences Corp. v. Meril Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd., Case No. 22-1877 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 25, 2024) (Stoll, Cunningham, JJ.) (Lourie, J., dissenting).

The fact pattern in this case is unusual. Meril, a manufacturer of a transcatheter heart system approved for sale in Europe but not in the United States, brought two demonstration samples to San Francisco with lawyer-generated instructions that the samples could not be used, sold or offered for sale in the US. Meril presented at a trade booth during a cardiovascular medical device conference. It was undisputed that the samples never left a bag that was first kept at a hotel and later brought to the conference and placed in a storage room.

Edwards Lifesciences nevertheless sued for infringement based on importation. The district court found that Meril’s importation was reasonably related to its attempts to secure regulatory approval because they were for the purposes of recruiting investigators for a clinical trial Meril had made initial efforts to commence (as required to market this type of device in the US). Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement on grounds that the safe harbor under § 271(e)(1) applied. Edwards appealed.

Edwards argued that the district court erred by not finding a genuine material dispute of fact relating to Meril’s subjective intent (i.e., whether, notwithstanding some evidence, Meril actually intended the importation to relate to FDA approval). Edwards also challenged whether the importation was solely related to FDA approval and argued that the non-use of the devices to recruit investigators rendered the safe harbor inapplicable.

The Federal Circuit rejected all three challenges. Canvassing the Federal Circuit’s decades of prior case law, the Court concluded that a putative infringer’s intent is irrelevant when determining whether the safe harbor applies. Thus, even if Edwards were correct in challenging Meril’s intent, there would still be no material factual dispute. On the issue of whether the importation activity was solely related to FDA approval, the Court, discussing the use of “solely” in terms of the safe harbor provision, reiterated prior cases’ determination that the uses need not be solely related to FDA approval, but rather, that the only uses that would be protected were those within the safe harbor. Finally, the Court again deemed the non-use of the devices irrelevant, as nothing in the statute required actual use.

Judge Lourie dissented, not because he necessarily viewed the district court’s or the majority’s application as squarely incorrect under existing precedent, but because he believed that existing precedent did not expressly give proper weight to the statute’s use of the word “solely.” Applying a plain text analysis, Judge Lourie argued that the safe harbor [...]

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Mandamus Denied but Jurisdictional Door Left Open a Crack

by Thomas DaMario | Apr 4, 2024 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied a patent owner’s writ of mandamus seeking to prevent a defendant from amending its answer to add an affirmative licensing defense, but also noted that the defense was added only after the district court found that there were no remaining claims. In re VLSI Technology LLC, Case No. 24-116 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 18, 2024) (Moore, Taranto, Chen, JJ.)

VLSI asserted four patents against Intel in the Northern District of California. In December 2023, the district court granted summary judgment that two of the patents were not infringed and denied summary judgment of noninfringement on the remaining two patents. The parties additionally submitted cross motions for summary judgment on a licensing defense that turned on a forum selection clause, but the court denied both motions. To deprive the court of jurisdiction, VLSI granted Intel a covenant not to sue for infringement of the remaining two patents in the case. Two days later, Intel moved to amend its answer to add a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that Intel was licensed to VLSI’s entire patent portfolio. The district court granted Intel’s motion, and VLSI filed a mandamus petition to block Intel’s amendment.

The Federal Circuit denied VLSI’s petition for two primary reasons. First, the Court determined that VLSI had not shown that it had no other available means of obtaining relief. The district court expressly invited the parties to brief issues pertaining to Intel’s licensing defense in subsequent briefing, and VLSI had since filed a motion to dismiss pertaining to this very issue. The Court also noted that VLSI could raise this issue on appeal after a final judgment. Second, the Court determined that VLSI failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Intel to amend its answer, finding that Intel acted diligently in seeking to amend its answer and that VLSI had long since known about the potential defense.

With respect to the substantive issue of whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit declined to offer an opinion at this stage. Nevertheless, in an apparent message to the court below, the final sentence of the Court’s opinion reads, “[w]e only note that Intel’s motion to amend its answer was filed after the court determined there were no remaining claims, such that no case or controversy remained before the court.”

Is Evidence of All Claimed Elements in Prior Art Enough? Not Without Motivation to Combine

by Sydney E. McDermott | Apr 4, 2024 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board obviousness decision, finding that disclosure in the prior art of all recited claim elements across multiple references, without more, does not establish obviousness unless there is evidence of a motivation to combine. Virtek Vision Int’l ULC v. Assembly Guidance Systems, Inc., Case No. 22-1998 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 27, 2024) (Moore, C.J.; Hughes, Stark, JJ.)

Virtek holds a patent that discloses “an improved method for aligning a laser projector with respect to a work surface.” Lasers are used to “project a template image onto a work surface to direct manufacturing processes.” The patent discloses a two-step process that improves efficiency over the prior art.

Aligned Vision petitioned for inter partes review (IPR), challenging all of the patent’s claims. Aligned Vision asserted four combinations of prior art references over which it contended the claims were obvious. In its Final Written Decision, the Board found that some of the claims were unpatentable as obvious, but others were not.

The Board determined that certain claims, which depended from the independent claim, would have been obvious over two combinations of references: Keitler and Briggs, and Briggs and Bridges. In pertinent part, the independent claim recites “identifying a pattern of the reflective targets on the work surface in a three dimensional coordinate system.” Save for the 3D claim element, all the other claim elements were disclosed in Bridges and Keitler. The Board found that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to use the 3D coordinate system disclosed in Briggs instead of the angular direction systems in Keitler or Bridges. The Board reasoned that this combination would have been obvious to try because Briggs disclosed both 3D coordinates and angular directions.

With respect to the direct appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the Board erred as a matter of law regarding motivation to combine. “It does not suffice to meet the motivation to combine requirement to recognize that two alternative arrangements such as an angular direction system using a single camera and a 3D coordinate system using two cameras were both known in the art.” Rather, the patent challenger must show that a skilled artisan would swap the element in one reference for an element in another reference. “The mere fact that these possible arrangements existed in the prior art does not provide a reason that a skilled artisan would have substituted the one-camera angular direction system in Keitler and Bridges with the two-camera 3D coordinate system disclosed in Briggs.”

Here, the patent challenger presented no argument in the IPR petition regarding why a skilled artisan would make this substitution, other than that the two different coordinate systems were “known to be used.” Specifically, Briggs made no mention of any benefits the 3D system might provide over the angular system. Aligned Vision’s expert testified multiple times that he could not provide a reason to combine the references, and Aligned Vision presented no evidence that “there are a finite number of [...]

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Same Product in Different Packaging May Constitute Separate Market for Antitrust Purposes

by Sydney E. McDermott | Mar 28, 2024 | Antitrust, Patents

Addressing an issue of first impression, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that two medications that contain the same ingredients but are packaged in different forms constitute separate markets for purposes of assessing antitrust violations. Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Novartis Pharma AG, Case No. 22-0427 (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 2024) (Parker, Lee, Merriam, JJ.)

Regeneron sued Novartis in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging antitrust violations under the Sherman Act and New York state law claims. The specific products at issue were prescription medications used to treat the overproduction of vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF). VEGF is a naturally occurring protein but, if overproduced, can lead to eye disorders, including permanent blindness. Both Regeneron and Novartis produce medication to combat overproduction of VEGF. The first form of anti-VEGF medications developed was packaged into vials and administered in a two-step process where a physician draws the product into a syringe then injects the product into the patient’s eye. However, a newer version of anti-VEGF drugs come in a prefilled syringe (PFS) designed to be administered in one step. The PFS packaging carries a significantly lower risk of complications and infections. PFSs have become the “preferred way [to] administer [] anti-VEGF medications.” Novartis moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). After the district court granted the motion, Regeneron appealed.

The district court reasoned that original and newer products competed in the same market because they were the exact same medication, just sold in different forms. The Second Circuit disagreed. PFSs reduce the likelihood of complications and have become the preferred form of administration for treatment of VEGF overproduction over vials. The Second Circuit concluded that the district court improperly focused its analysis on whether the two products were “functional substitutes” and not on whether they were “economic substitutes.” The Second Circuit concluded that the district court had applied the improper standard for the relevant market and should instead consider whether the two drugs are economic substitutes. That is to say, the district court should look to whether the different packaging for the VEGF treatments are reasonably interchangeable by consumers. Regeneron alleged they are not due to PFSs’ preferred status among physicians (although PFSs are more costly than vials).

As to the state law claims, the district court dismissed Regeneron’s tortious interference claims as untimely. On appeal, Regeneron argued that Novartis should be equitably estopped from invoking the statute of limitation because the defendants “took steps to prevent Regeneron from learning of Novartis’s tortious interference until after the statute of limitation period had expired.” The Second Circuit found that Novartis concealed a co-inventor’s role in the procurement of a patent, which Regeneron only found out about during subsequent patent litigation, and that such concealment was in violation of a contract. Thus, the Court “conclude[d] that [Regeneron’s] allegations were sufficient to permit Regeneron to invoke equitable estoppel.” Additionally, the complaint “plausibly alleged a claim for tortious interference with contract.”

All That Glitters: Use of Registered Mark To Describe Watch Color Was Fair Use

by Karen Gover | Mar 28, 2024 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of summary judgement to a luxury-watchmaker defendant, holding that its use of a registered and incontestable trademarked term was fair use because it was used descriptively and in good faith. Solid 21, Inc. v. Breitling U.S.A., Inc., Case No. 22-366 (2d Cir. Mar. 14, 2024) (Wesley, Sullivan, JJ.) (Park, J., dissenting). The case is notable for its analysis of the fair use defense’s good faith prong, which, as the Second Circuit majority notes, “is not litigated frequently.” This was also the element that provoked Judge Park’s dissent, who argued that the majority’s analysis attempts to resolve factual disputes about Breitling’s intentions that should, instead, go to a jury.

“Red gold” and “rose gold” are terms used to describe a gold-copper alloy that causes gold to have a pinkish hue. Sellers of men’s watches sometimes prefer the term “red gold” because “rose gold” sounds effeminate. Solid 21 is a luxury watch and jewelry business that sells a collection of jewelry and watches under the RED GOLD mark, which was registered in 2003 and now has incontestable status. Breitling is a Swiss company that makes and sells luxury watches, some of which it advertises as available in “red gold,” among other color choices. Solid 21 filed a trademark infringement suit against Breitling, alleging that its use of the term “red gold” was “likely to cause confusion, reverse confusion, mistake, and/or deception as to the source” of Breitling’s watches. Breitling moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the term “red gold” was generic, and the trademark registration was invalid, or alternatively, that its use of the term fell under the Lanham Act’s fair use defense, which allows use of a protected mark to describe one’s goods so long as the use is in good faith and not used as a mark.

Initially, the district court denied Breitling’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Breitling could have used terms like “rose gold” to describe its products and thus did not satisfy the descriptive use requirement. However, on reconsideration, the district court decided that the mere existence of alternative terms for the alloy did not preclude summary judgment, and that Breitling’s materials showed clearly that it was using the term “red gold” descriptively to indicate hue. The district court also found that Breitling satisfied the good faith element, even if Breitling was aware of Solid 21’s RED GOLD mark. Solid 21 appealed.

The Second Circuit affirmed, finding that Breitling’s advertising materials clearly showed that it used the term “red gold” as a descriptor for color and not as a mark. The Court rejected the argument that this conclusion as to descriptive use was undermined by the availability of the term “rose gold” as an alternative descriptor and pointed out that Solid 21 bears the risk of some consumer confusion in choosing to trademark a descriptive term that describes a color of metal. Finally, the Court found that Breitling’s use of [...]

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PTO to Patent Examiners: Make Interpretation of Means-Plus-Function Claims Clear in the Record

by Peter Brunovskis, PhD | Mar 28, 2024 | Patents

On March 18, 2024, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issued a memorandum to patent examiners addressing means-plus-function and step-plus-function claim limitations and how to clearly articulate, in the prosecution record, the PTO’s interpretation of such claim limitations. The goal of the memorandum is to ensure consistency in connection with the examination of such limitations, provide both the applicant and the public with notice regarding the claim interpretation used by the patent examiner, and provide the applicant an opportunity to advance a different claim interpretation early in the prosecution.

As stated in 35 U.S.C. §112(f), “[a]n element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” The memorandum does not suggest any changes in interpretation of the statute.

One aspect of the memorandum is to remind examiners of the resources and guidance available when examining means-plus-function and step-plus-function claim limitations, specifically MPEP §§ 2181-2187 and refresh training. In accordance with the guidance, the primary steps when examining such claim elements include:

Determining whether a claim limitation invokes § 112(f)
Ensuring the record is clear with respect to invoking § 112(f)
Evaluating the description necessary to support a § 112(f) claim limitation under §§ 112(a) and (b).

To determine whether a claim limitation invokes §112(f), the guidance instructs examiners to employ the three-prong analysis set forth in MPEP § 2181, subsection I. Using this analysis, recitation of the terms “means” or “step” in association with functional language, rather than structure, material or acts for performing that function, should be interpreted as claim limitations invoking § 112(f). However, where these terms are accompanied by structure, materials or acts for performing the function, § 112(f) is not invoked. On the other hand, a limitation reciting functional language along with a generic placeholder term instead of “means,” which fails to recite sufficiently definite structure for performing the function, would nonetheless invoke § 112(f), according to a proper analysis. Examples of such generic placeholders include “mechanism for,” “module for,” “device for,” “unit for,” “component for,” “element for,” “member for,” “apparatus for,” “machine for” and “system for.”

An important caveat in the memorandum states that “[e]stablishing the interpretation of § 112(f) limitations in writing during prosecution is critical in supporting the agency goal of establishing a clear prosecution record.” The guidance advises examiners that form paragraphs are available in support of meeting this objective, which serve to inform “the applicant, the public, and the courts . . . as to the claim construction the examiner used during prosecution. This further informs the applicant, the public, and the courts (and the PTO for any post-grant review procedures) as to how the examiner searched and applied prior art based on the examiner’s interpretation of the claim.”

The memorandum further emphasizes the need to [...]

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New PTAB Claim Construction? Give the Parties Review Opportunity

by Benjamin Ediger, Ph.D. | Mar 28, 2024 | Patents

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) Director vacated Final Written Decisions issued by the Patent Trial & Appeal Board that presented a sua sponte construction of a claim term in dispute, holding that the parties were not provided adequate notice of the Board’s new construction. Assa Abloy AB v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty., Ltd., IPR2022-01006, -01045, -01089 (PTAB Decision Review Mar. 15, 2024) (Vidal, PTO Dir.)

The Board issued Final Written Decisions in three inter partes reviews (IPRs), holding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that any of the challenged claims were unpatentable. The petitioner requested Director Review, raising three issues concerning the Final Written Decisions’ treatment of the claim term “biometric signal”:

The Board’s construction newly added a limitation that neither the petitioner nor the patent owner proposed
The Board’s construction was erroneous
The Board inconsistently addressed this claim limitation among the IPRs at issue.

The Director decided that review was appropriate.

The Director explained that in view of the petitioner’s and patent owner’s divergent post-institution positions regarding this limitation, the Board had authority to construe “biometric signal” even though its institution decisions indicated that the Board would give this claim term its plain and ordinary meaning. The petitioner argued that the term meant “the input and output of the biometric sensor,” and the patent owner argued that the term meant a “physical attribute of the user” (i.e., a fingerprint, facial pattern, iris, retina or voice). The Board held that it meant “a physical or behavioral biometric attribute that provides secure access to a controlled item.”

The Director vacated and remanded the Final Written Decisions, explaining that the Board failed to provide the petitioner and the patent owner reasonable notice of its new construction or the opportunity to present arguments concerning it, as required under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Director noted that neither party requested the Board’s inclusion of a construction that required an attribute of the claimed signal to “provide[] secure access to a controlled item” and concluded this was the sort of “difficult to imagine” sua sponte construction that the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held (in its 2021 decision in Qualcomm v. Intel) lacked sufficient notice if appearing for the first time in a Final Written Decision.

The Director instructed that on remand the Board should authorize the petitioner to file a supplemental briefing that addresses the Board’s construction and its application to the asserted prior art and authorize the patent owner to respond to the petitioner’s supplemental briefing.

The Director also noted that the patent owner’s proposed claim construction in the IPRs was similar to the construction that the Board adopted in its institution decisions in other IPRs challenging two of the patents at issue. In recognition of this situation, the Director also invited the petitioner, in its supplemental briefing, to address the perceived inconsistencies in these claim constructions.

Strong Signal: Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Defendant Based on Confluence of Factors

by Kathleen Lynch | Mar 21, 2024 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that a district court had personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant’s website that purposefully targeted a US-based audience. DISH Network, LLC v. Bassam Elahmad, Case No. 23-20180 (5th Cir. Mar. 8, 2024) (Willett, Wilson, Ramirez, JJ.) (per curiam).

DISH Network sued Bassam Elahmad, a German resident doing business as Elahmad.com, for contributory copyright infringement, alleging that Elahmad unlawfully provided access to DISH’s copyrighted Arabic language channels. DISH alleged that Elahmad found, combined and organized illegal streams and loaded links onto Elahmad.com. DISH sent more than 60 copyright infringement notices to Elahmad, who never responded or removed the content. Although Elahmad resided in Germany, DISH argued that any court in the United States had jurisdiction over him under Fed. R of Civ. Pro. 4(k)(2) because his website reached into and targeted the US. DISH also argued that Elahmad was not subject to jurisdiction in any particular US state. The district court disagreed, concluding that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Elahmad because DISH’s complaint did not allege that any conduct had occurred in Texas. The district court twice denied DISH’s motions for default judgment and dismissed the complaint. DISH appealed.

The Fifth Circuit addressed the district court’s application of Rule 4(k)(2) and whether DISH had made a sufficient prima facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction to sustain its case.

Addressing Rule 4(k)(2), which provides personal jurisdiction in any US district court if a defendant is not otherwise subject to jurisdiction in a specific state, the Fifth Circuit clarified that for a finding of personal jurisdiction under this rule, the question is whether a defendant has sufficient minimum contact “with the entire United States, not a forum state.” The Fifth Circuit found that the district court’s analysis focused solely on Elahmad’s Texas contacts – not the entire US – and was therefore reversible error.

Turning to DISH’s burden to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit noted that DISH had properly served Elahmad. DISH therefore only had to satisfy three other conditions: that its claims arose from federal law, that Elahmad was not subject to general jurisdiction in another state, and that exercising jurisdiction would be consistent with the US Constitution. The Court concluded that the first two conditions were easily met because copyright laws are federal and the burden to establish that another state has jurisdiction falls on the defendant. Elahmad had not answered the complaint or joined the appeal. Clearly, he had not met that burden.

The Fifth Circuit found that the third condition was “a closer question” that required consideration of whether Elahmad had sufficient ties to the US to satisfy constitutional due process concerns. Because DISH argued that the district court had only specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant (not general), DISH needed to show that Elahmad purposefully availed himself of “the privilege of conducting activities in the United States,” that DISH’s claim arose out of those contacts, and that it would be [...]

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District Court Subpoena Power Plays “Supporting Role” to PTO Rules

by Eleanor B. Atkins | Mar 21, 2024 | Trademarks

Addressing the subpoena power of district courts to compel evidence for use in US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) proceedings, the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a district court’s decision (albeit on alternative grounds), holding that district courts’ authority to issue subpoenas in support of PTO proceedings is limited by the PTO Rules of Procedure. Xactware Solutions, Inc. v. Buildxact Software Ltd., Case No. 22-1871 (4th Cir. March 13, 2024) (Gregory, Harris, Floyd, JJ.)

Buildxact, an Australian company, filed a trademark application at the PTO for BUILDXACT. Xactware opposed the BUILDXACT application at the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board and requested to depose three of Buildxact’s officers via video. When Buildxact objected indicating it would only allow written depositions (citing the PTO rules, which state that foreign depositions must be in writing unless the parties stipulate otherwise or the deposing party shows good cause), Xactware subpoenaed Buildxact through service on Buildxact’s default agent – the PTO Director – for an in-person deposition of a Buildxact corporate representative.

Buildxact filed a motion in the district court to quash the subpoena. The district court magistrate judge granted Buildxact’s motion, finding that Buildxact, which has no office, employees, or regular business in or near Virginia, did not have sufficient contacts to qualify as “being within” the district. Xactware moved for a review of the order, but the district court agreed with the magistrate judge’s ruling. Xactware appealed.

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 23, the PTO may establish its own rules for depositions in cases before the Board. Additionally, 35 U.S.C. § 24 grants the “clerk of any United States court for the district wherein testimony is to be taken for use in any contested case in the Patent and Trademark Office” the power to “issue a subpoena for any witness residing or being within such district, commanding him to appear and testify before an officer in such district authorized to take depositions and affidavits.”

Xactware argued that Buildxact is “within” the district because it has an agent designated to receive service of process there (i.e., the PTO Director). The PTO argued that even if Buildxact were “within” the district, the subpoena must still be quashed as the deposition was improper under the PTO rules. The Fourth Circuit agreed, noting that it consequently need not address whether Buildxact was “within” the district or not.

The Fourth Circuit held that the district court lacked the authority to issue a subpoena compelling Buildxact’s deposition because the deposition being sought was prohibited by PTO rules and would not be admissible in any PTO proceeding. Looking at the legislative history, the Fourth Circuit noted that the district court’s subpoena power under § 24 is only available to the extent the courts are empowered to aid the PTO: “Section 24 assigns a supportive role to the district courts to ensure the smooth functioning of the [PTO] procedures.” Moreover, the explicit language of § 24 requires that a district court can only subpoena testimony “for use [...]

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