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Re-Poster Child for § 230: Immunity under the CDA for Reposting Content of Another

by | Mar 31, 2022 |

The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision to dismiss claims for defamation under the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 USC § 230, and for copyright infringement under the fair use doctrine. Monsarrat v. Newman, Case No. 21-1146 (Kayatta, Lipez, Gelpí, JJ.).

The parties’ dispute arose from a series of posts on a community message board. Residents of the Davis Square neighborhood in Massachusetts maintained a Live Journal forum for several years. In response to a revision of the Live Journal terms of service in 2017, Ron Newman, a member of the community, copied the entirety of the content from the Live Journal forum to another online platform: Dreamwidth. The copied content included a series of allegedly defamatory posts about Jonathan Monsarrat and a post that Monsarrat had copyrighted. Monsarrat sued Newman for both defamation and copyright infringement. Newman moved to dismiss the defamation claim under the CDA, § 230, and the copyright claim under the fair use doctrine. After the district court granted the motions, Monsarrat appealed.

The First Circuit first addressed the defamation claim under § 230. Newman argued that § 230 provided him immunity from defamation. Specifically, § 230 states “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” It also provides a shield from state law claims that would be “inconsistent with this section.” Courts apply a three-part analysis to determine whether a defendant is entitled to immunity under § 230:

  1. Is the defendant a “provider or user of an interactive computer service”?
  2. Is the claim based on “information provided by another information content provider”?
  3. Does the claim treat the defendant “as the publisher or speaker” of that information?

Monsarrat did not challenge the fact that Newman was a “user” under the first prong. Regarding the second prong, the analysis hinged on whether Newman was an “information content provider,” which in turn relied on whether Newman was responsible for the allegedly defamatory content in whole or in part. The factual record showed that Newman did nothing but copy the allegedly defamatory posts that had been created by another. Monsarrat unsuccessfully argued that Newman was responsible because Newman copied the posts from Live Journal to a different digital platform with an allegedly different audience. The First Circuit was not persuaded, ruling that providing essentially the same content on a different platform did not make a defendant responsible for that content under § 230. Regarding the third prong, Monsarrat’s complaint clearly alleged that Newman was acting as a publisher. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the defamation claim under § 230.

Monsarrat’s copyright claim related to a Live Journal post by Monsarrat in the Davis Square forum. He had created a post with a link to Live Journal’s harassment policy, a quotation from the policy and a brief message regarding his attempts to report the abuse he felt he had suffered by other [...]

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Change the Look of the Room: Appeal Transferred to Federal Circuit

by | Jan 6, 2022 | ,

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit transferred an appeal of a preliminary injunction enjoining alleged copyright and trademark infringement to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit because the operative complaint included six counts of patent infringement and thus arose under patent law. Hudson Furniture, Inc. et al. v. Lighting Design Wholesalers Inc., Case No. 20-3299 (2d Cir. Dec. 21, 2021) (Livingston, CJ; Kearse, Lee, JJ.) (per curiam).

Hudson filed a complaint against Lighting Design alleging patent, trademark and copyright infringement. The district court granted Hudson’s preliminary injunction and enjoined Lighting Design from alleged infringement of Hudson’s copyrights and trademarks. The district court also denied Lighting Design’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and its motion for reconsideration permitting alternative service of process. Lighting Design appealed the rulings to the Second Circuit.

Hudson asked the Second Circuit to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the appeal arose from a complaint involving patent law claims and thus fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292 and 1295, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals involving any action that arises under any act of US Congress relating to patents. An action arises under patent law when a well-pleaded complaint establishes that (1) federal law creates the cause of action or (2) the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law.

The Second Circuit agreed that exclusive jurisdiction rested with the Federal Circuit, explaining that the operative complaint included six counts of patent infringement, and the appeal concerned the district court’s ruling on a motion for injunctive relief involving patent law and non-patent law claims. The Court rejected Lighting Design’s argument that patent law did not constitute a substantial part of the overall success of the case since Hudson failed to secure preliminary injunctive related to the patent law claims. The Court explained that Lighting Design’s argument focused on only the second basis for Federal Circuit jurisdiction (whether the right to relief depends on a “substantial question” related to patent law). The Court found that even if it accepted Lighting Design’s argument, the fact that federal patent law created the cause of action was sufficient to establish Federal Circuit jurisdiction under the first basis of jurisdiction. While the Second Circuit agreed with Hudson, it declined to dismiss the appeal and instead opted to transfer the appeal to the Federal Circuit because the original appeal was timely filed in good faith and transferring the appeal was in the interest of justice.



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What a Deal! Car Dealers Retain Control over Their Own Data

by | Nov 11, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s conclusion that there is no conflict between an Arizona statute aimed at strengthening privacy protections for consumers whose data is collected by car dealers and the Copyright Act provision that grants the owner of a copyrighted work the exclusive right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies.” CDK Global LLC v. Mark Brnovich, et al., Case No. 20-16469 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2021) (Miller, J.)

Car dealers use specialized dealer management software (DMS), which at its core is a database containing information about a dealer’s customers, vehicles, accounting, parts and services. Some of the data includes personal information, such as social security numbers and credit histories. The data is used for a variety of tasks, from financing to inventory management. Dealers also rely on separate software applications for various aspects of their business, such as marketing and customer relations. For those applications to properly function, they must access the data stored in a dealer’s DMS.

CDK is a technology company that licenses DMS to dealers. In the past, CDK allowed dealers to share access to the DMS with third-party companies that would integrate data from the DMS with other software applications. Recently, however, CDK began to prohibit the practice and instead offered its own data integration services to dealers.

In 2019, the Arizona legislature enacted a statute, known as the Dealer Law, to ensure that dealers retain control over their data. There are two provisions of the Dealer Law central to this case. First, the statute prohibits DMS providers from taking any actions (contractual, technical or otherwise) to prohibit a dealer’s ability to protect, store, copy, share or use the data stored in its DMS. Second, the statute requires DMS providers to adopt and make available a standardized framework for the exchange, integration and sharing of data.

CDK sued the attorney general of Arizona for declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting a range of claims. In one of its claims, CDK argued that the Dealer Law is preempted by the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. CDK asserted that the Dealer Law conflicts with the Copyright Act because the Dealer Law grants dealers and their authorized integrators the right to access CDK’s systems and create unlicensed copies of its DMS, its application programming interfaces (APIs) and its data compilations. CDK argued that in all three respects, the statute conflicts with 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), which grants the owner of a copyrighted work the exclusive right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies.” The district court dismissed most of the claims but allowed the copyright preemption claims and a few others to proceed. Following a hearing, the district court denied a preliminary injunction. CDK appealed.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that CDK presented no evidence that the Dealer Law would require the embodiments of CDK’s DMS to persist for a period of more than transitory duration. The Court explained that the reproduction right set forth in [...]

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Oh the Horror: No Work for Hire in Friday the 13th Screenplay

by | Oct 14, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a summary judgment grant, ruling that an author was an independent contractor when writing the screenplay for a horror film and entitled to authorship rights, and therefore entitled to exercise his copyright § 203 termination right. Horror Inc. v. Miller, Case No. 18-3123 (2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2021) (Carney, J.)

Victor Miller is an author who has written numerous novels, screenplays and teleplays. Sean Cunningham is a producer, director and writer of feature films and is the general partner of Manny Company. Miller and Cunningham were close friends who began working together around 1976 and collaborated on five motion pictures in their first five years working together. Miller was a member of the Writers Guild of America, East (WGA) and was a signatory of their Minimum Basic Agreement (MBA), which was the collective bargaining agreement at the time.

In 1979, the success of the horror film Halloween inspired Cunningham to produce a horror film. Cunningham reached out to Miller and they orally agreed that Miller would write the screenplay for their upcoming project. The two came to an agreement using the WGA standard form. Miller then began developing the screenplay and the two worked closely together in discussing ideas for the film. Miller picked his working hours but was responsible for completing drafts based on the production schedule of the film. Cunningham had no right to assign additional works to Miller beyond the screenplay.

The dispute concerns whether, for Copyright Act purposes, Miller was an employee or independent contractor of Manny Company, of which Cunningham was the general partner. Cunningham argued that he taught Miller the key elements of a successful horror film, that he gave significant contributions and that he had final authority over what ended up in the screenplay. Miller agreed that Cunningham gave notes but stated that Cunningham never dictated what he wrote. The parties agreed that Cunningham did provide the ideas for making the movie killings “personal,” that the killer remain masked and that they kill a major character early. Miller received “sole ‘written by’ credit” as the screenwriter.

Horror Inc. (successor to Georgetown Horror) financed the project and was given complete control over the screenplay and film. Manny assigned its rights in the film and screenplay to Horror, which registered the copyrights. In the registration, Horror was listed as the film’s work made for hire author with a credit given to Miller for the screenplay. The initial film was a huge hit and has spawned 11 sequels.

In 2016, Miller attempted to reclaim his copyright ownership by invoking his termination rights under 17 U.S.C. § 203 and served notices of termination to Manny and Horror. The two responded by suing Miller and seeking a declaration that the screenplay was a “work for hire,” and therefore Miller could not give a valid termination notice. The district court granted summary judgment to Miller, stating that Miller was the author as he did not prepare the screenplay as [...]

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No Immunity: State Right of Publicity Law is § 230 “Law Pertaining to Intellectual Property”

by | Oct 7, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), does not preclude claims based on state intellectual property laws, reversing in part a district court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s state law claims for violation of her right of publicity. Hepp v. Facebook, Case Nos. 20-2725; – 2885 (3d Cir. Sept. 23, 2021) (Hardiman, J.) (Cowen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

In 2018, Karen Hepp, a Philadelphia newscaster, discovered a photo of herself making its way around the internet. The picture, taken without Hepp’s knowledge or consent, depicts her smiling in a convenience store and was posted in two locations online. The first post was a Facebook advertisement promoting a dating service, which encouraged users to “meet and chat with single women near you.” The second post was to Imgur and was subsequently linked to a Reddit thread, where it spurred a flurry of indecent user commentary. Hepp sued Facebook, Imgur and Reddit for violations of Pennsylvania’s right of publicity statute. The district court dismissed Hepp’s claims with prejudice, holding that all three companies were entitled to immunity as internet service providers under § 230(c). Hepp appealed.

The Third Circuit found that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Imgur and Reddit on a “purposeful availment” minimum contacts basis and affirmed dismissal of the claims against those parties.

With respect to Facebook, the Third Circuit considered whether it was immune under § 230(c). Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act was intended to promote the internet, specifically by preserving “the vibrant and competitive free market …unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” Accordingly, § 230(c) provides Good Samaritan protection for internet service providers, encouraging them to host and moderate third-party content by immunizing them from some publisher liability regarding certain moderation decisions. However, pursuant to § 230(e)(2), such immunization does not “limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.”

The first question addressed by the Third Circuit was whether § 230(e)(2) can apply to state law claims generally. The Court acknowledged that precious few cases interpreting § 230’s intellectual property provision exist, and that the existing cases present a clear split on whether § 230(e)(2) applies only to federal intellectual property claims. The Court, adhering to what it regarded as the most natural reading of § 230(e)(2), (i.e., that a state law can be a “law pertaining to intellectual property law”) determined that application of § 230(e)(2) was not limited to federal claims. The Court was not persuaded by Facebook’s policy arguments regarding a purported increase in uncertainty regarding the contours of § 230(c) immunity if state law intellectual property claims, which vary from state to state, were exempt from such immunity.

The second question the Third Circuit addressed was whether Hepp’s right of publicity claim arose from a “law pertaining to intellectual property.” In finding that it did, the Court relied on a survey of legal dictionaries and determined that the term “intellectual property” [...]

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A Tale of Two Authors: Determining Ownership Rights of Novels Adapted for Theatre

by | Sep 30, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the district court’s opinion and order that Roberto Ramos Perea, the playwright who adapted the novels of prominent Puerto Rican author Enrique Laguerre for theatre, was not a proper copyright owner. Perea v. Editorial Cultural Inc., Case Nos. 19-2119, -2129 (1st Cir. Sept. 13, 2021) (Thompson J.) The issue before the Court was whether Editorial, a publishing company, was liable for copyright infringement after it printed and sold 20,000 copies of the theatrical adaptations of two novels (La Llamarada and La Resaca) written by Laguerre and adapted by Ramos.

In 2001, Laguerre contracted with Producciones Teatro Caribeño, authorizing Ramos to create the adaptation of La Resaca and retain the moral rights (protecting the link between Ramos and his work). The parties again contracted in 2003 for the adaptation of La Llamarada. Laguerre and Editorial entered into a contract in 2002 that gave Editorial the right to print “one edition” of the “dramatic adaptation of La Resaca” for seven consecutive years from the first printing date. Editorial received the right to print up to 25,000 copies of La Llamarada (the novel) in exchange for royalties.

During the district court action, both sides moved for partial summary judgment on the infringement claim. Editorial argued that, pursuant to the Laguerre-Caribeño contracts, Laguerre reserved the printing rights to the adaptations to himself exclusively, and Ramos therefore was not entitled to damages for infringement. Ramos argued that he owned the copyrights in the the adaptations and was entitled to recover for infringement because “(1) Laguerre authorized Ramos to create the Adaptations, therefore those creative works belong to him, or, alternatively, (2) La Resaca and La Llamarada were in the public domain when the Adaptations were written (meaning they were available for public use) and as such Laguerre’s authorization was not required.” The district court eliminated the playwright, Ramos, as the copyright owner and, following a jury trial, entered a judgment against Editorial Cultural awarding damages to Laguerre’s heirs. In dismissing Ramos’ claim, the district court exclusively relied on the language of the Laguerre-Caribeño contracts, under which Laguerre retained publishing rights. The issue on appeal involved which party owned the publishing rights to the adaptations when Editorial sold them in 2013.

The district court did not consider whether the novels were in the public domain when Ramos created his adaptations. Under the 1909 Copyright Act, works created before 1978 retained copyright protection for 28 years (plus an additional 28 years if renewed). The novels were written in 1935 (La Llamarada, not renewed) and 1949 (La Resaca, never registered in the Copyright Office). The First Circuit explained it is clear that both novels had passed into the public domain well before the contracts were signed.

Reviewing the summary judgment orders de novo, the First Circuit found that when Ramos adapted the novels into the play scripts in 2001 and 2003, Laguerre had no copyright interest in either of these novels (or any work derived from them) and [...]

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De Minimis Defense Doesn’t Protect Minimal Use of Concededly Infringing Material

by | Sep 23, 2021 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant in a copyright case based on a “minimal usage” or de minimis use defense. Richard N. Bell v. Wilmott Storage Services, LLC, et al., Case Nos. 19-55882, -56181 (9th Cir. July 26, 2021) (Wardlaw, J.) (Clifton, J., and Choe-Groves, J., concurring).

Richard Bell took a photo of the Indianapolis skyline and published it on various websites. Eleven years later, he registered the photo with the US Copyright Office. Bell later conducted an online reverse image search of his photo to identify potential infringers and subsequently filed more than 100 copyright infringement lawsuits. One of the sites on which Bell found the photo was VisitUSA.com. The image was only available to those who had conducted a reverse image search or knew the precise web address to the photo. Wilmott Storage Services purchased VisitUSA.com in 2012. In 2018, Bell notified Wilmott that it was displaying the photo without his permission. Wilmott removed the photo in response to Bell’s request. In 2019, Wilmott continued to display a copy of the photo, but at a slightly different address than before. Wilmott explained that its webmaster was supposed to remove the photo but instead only changed the file name. Wilmott subsequently removed the photo.

Bell sued Wilmott for copyright infringement in 2018, asserting that Wilmott infringed his right to “display the copyrighted work publicly” by making it accessible to the public on Wilmott’s server. Assuming infringement, Wilmott filed for summary judgment based on the affirmative defenses of de minimis use, fair use and the statute of limitations. The district court granted summary judgment to Wilmott on the de minimis use defense. Although Wilmott conceded that an identical copy of the photo was hosted on its server, the district court found no infringement. Bell appealed.

The Ninth Circuit noted that it had not previously addressed the issue of whether one “publicly displays” a work where it is accessible only to members of the public who either possess the specific pinpoint address or who perform a particular type of online search—here, a reverse image search. Applying Ninth Circuit precedent from Perfect 10, the Court concluded that Wilmott publicly displayed the photo.

The Ninth Circuit also found that there was no place for an inquiry into whether there was de minimis copying because the “degree of copying” was total since the infringing work was an identical copy of the copyrighted photo. The Court explained that it and a majority of other circuits do not view the de minimis doctrine as a defense to infringement but rather as an answer to the inquiry whether an infringing work and copyrighted work are substantially similar so as to make the copying actionable. The Court reiterated that the de minimis defense applies to the amount of copying, not to the extent of the defendant’s use of the infringing work. The Court also explained that the de minimis copying defense is [...]

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IP Ownership Considerations in Multi-jurisdictional Software Development Agreements

by and | Jun 10, 2021 | , , , ,

As a result of the healthcare sector’s growing dependence on software, health IT companies are increasingly taking advantage of globalisation to engage contractors in low wage jurisdictions to develop their user-facing software applications. This can trigger unforeseen legal risks owing to the differing laws across jurisdictions related to the ownership and transfer of intellectual property (IP) rights.

At the most extreme end, best practices in some jurisdictions are unenforceable or even impermissible in others. In view of these issues, it is strongly recommended that a company looking to take advantage of cross-border contracting for critical development eorts should carefully consider the choice of law provisions in their agreements, and engage with local counsel to ensure proper vesting of intellectual property rights.

An inability to demonstrate proper ownership of such rights can be a substantial obstacle for later financings or in corporate activities. Depending on the jurisdictions involved, a contracting company may need to concern itself with at least three types of IP in the software that is developed on its behalf: copyrights, moral or author’s rights, and patents.

Click here to read the full article in our latest edition of International News.



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Not With a Bang but a Whimper

by | May 27, 2021 |

In a non-precedential Order issued by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—on remand from the US Supreme Court’s April 2021 decision upholding Google’s fair use defense to Oracle’s copyright infringement claim—the Court recalled its mandate in the case “solely with respect to fair use,” leaving intact the Federal Circuit’s May 2014 judgment favoring Oracle on the question of copyrightability. Oracle America Inc. v. Google LLC, Case Nos. 17-1118; 1202 (Fed. Cir. May 14, 2021)(PER CURIAM). After recalling its mandate, the Federal Circuit issued its order without further briefing by the parties.



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Tax Court Allows Partial Deduction, Requires Partial Capitalization of Generic Drug Approval Legal Expenses

by | May 13, 2021 |

The US Tax Court determined that a pharmaceutical manufacturer’s legal expenses incurred to defend against a patent infringement suit were eligible for an immediate deduction as ordinary and necessary business expenses, while legal expenses incurred as part of an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) were not eligible for an immediate deduction and thus had to be capitalized and then amortized over 15 years. Mylan, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 156 T.C. No. 10 (Apr. 27, 2021) (Urda, J.)

The ANDA process allows for faster approval of a generic drug if the manufacturer can show that the generic drug is sufficiently similar to an approved brand name drug. As part of the ANDA process, the generic manufacturer must file statements certifying that the generic drug does not infringe any brand drug patents, or that such patents are invalid. The generic manufacturer also must send a notification to the holder of any patents covered by the certification statements.

Mylan filed several ANDAs for generic versions of brand name drugs, including Celebrex, Lunesta and Nexium, during the tax years at issue in the case. Considerable legal expenses were incurred as part of filing the ANDAs and making the required certifications and notifications. As a result of those certifications and notifications, patent holders brought approximately 120 patent infringement suits against Mylan. Mylan defended itself against the infringement suits, incurring litigation expenses.

In general, taxpayers may take an immediate deduction for ordinary and necessary business expenses. However, taxpayers must capitalize expenditures that create or enhance a distinct asset or otherwise generate benefits for taxpayers beyond a single tax year. Special rules apply to determine whether expenses related to an intangible asset should be capitalized. The income tax regulations provide that a “taxpayer must capitalize amounts paid to a governmental agency to obtain, renew, renegotiate, or upgrade its rights under a trademark, trade name, copyright, license, permit, franchise, or other similar right granted by that governmental agency.” Taxpayers must also capitalize an amount paid to facilitate an acquisition or creation of an intangible.

Litigation expenses for patent suits may be deducted or must be capitalized depending on the nature of the litigation. Defense of title claims are treated as the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset and must be capitalized. In contrast, patent infringement claims arise in tort and can be deducted in the year the expense is incurred.

Applying these rules to Mylan’s legal expenses, the Tax Court held that expenses related to the preparation of the ANDA, including the certifications and notices, were capital expenses to acquire or create an intangible asset and had to be recovered incrementally over 15 years. However, the Tax Court held that the costs of defending against patent infringement suits is an ordinary and necessary business expense for a generic drug manufacturer and permitted Mylan to deduct its litigation expenses in the year the expense was incurred.



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