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Hooked on Precedent or Something New

Highlighting internal disagreement regarding patent eligibility under § 101, a divided panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a series of opinions revising and reissuing a previous opinion on § 101 patent eligibility for a mechanical invention and, in an even split, denied a petition for en banc review. American Axle & Manufacturing, Inc. v. Neapco Holdings LLC, Case No. 18-1763 D.I. 134 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2019) (Dyk, J.) (Moore, J., dissenting); id. D.I. 133 (denying en banc by a 6–6 vote).

In October 2019, a divided Federal Circuit panel in American Axle v. Neapco affirmed a district court finding that method claims for a mechanical invention were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The majority specifically found that the claimed invention was nothing more than a recitation of Hooke’s law, which undoubtedly is a law of nature. Judge Moore dissented, arguing that the majority improperly expanded the § 101 eligibility inquiry beyond its statutory gatekeeping function and distorted patent eligibility under § 101 and enablement under § 112.

Neapco filed a petition for rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc. Several amicus briefs were also filed. Notably, retired Judge Paul R. Michel, formerly the chief judge of the Federal Circuit, filed an amicus brief in support of the en banc petition because he believed the panel’s original decision “conflicts with the Supreme Court’s and [Federal Circuit’s] precedent.”

In view of the petition for rehearing, the original panel modified and reissued its opinion. The Court affirmed its original decision that two of the three independent claims were invalid under § 101 (patent claims 22 and 36); however, the Court reversed its original decision invalidating claim 1. Regarding claims 22 and 36, the majority reiterated that the claims were merely an application of Hooke’s law and that it was simply applying Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent, analogizing this case to the Supreme Court’s 1853 O’Reilly v. Morse decision where the Supreme Court determined the patentability of claims directed to a natural law of using electromagnetic force to transmit messages. When responding to the dissent, the majority reiterated that it was not departing from prior precedent, and that its “holding is limited to the situation where a patent claim on its face and as construed clearly invokes a natural law, and nothing else, to accomplish a desired result.”

Regarding claim 1, the majority reversed its original decision because the claim had an additional limitation that could cause the claim to not merely be an application of Hooke’s law. Because the district court did not address this limitation, the majority remanded the case so the district court could address this issue in the first instance.

Judge Moore maintained her dissent, arguing that the majority was announcing a new patentability test: the “Nothing More” test. She argued that the decision created a new test for instances when claims are directed to a natural law even though no natural law is specifically recited in the claims. Judge Moore further reiterated [...]

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It’s Good to Be the Sovereign, Unless You Have an Exclusive Licensee

Addressing the interaction between state sovereign immunity under the 11th Amendment and joinder under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a “fractured majority” of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that an exclusive licensee could proceed with suit even though state sovereign immunity prohibited involuntary joinder of the patent owner. Gensetix, Inc. v. The Board of Regents of the University of Texas System, Case No. 19-1424 (Fed. Cir. July 24, 2020) (O’Malley, J.) (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Taranto, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

In 2014, Gensetix indirectly licensed two patents covering cancer treatment methods from the University of Texas (UT), a state university. A subsequent confirmation between Gensetix and UT confirmed Gensetix’s exclusive license to the patents-in-suit, which required Gensetix to sue potential infringers and gave UT a secondary right to sue if Gensetix did not bring suit. The parties further agreed to cooperate regarding any infringement suit and that nothing in the agreement would waive UT’s sovereign immunity.

Three years later, Gensetix sued Baylor College of Medicine and others for patent infringement. Before filing the complaint, Gensetix asked UT, the legal patent owner, to join suit. UT declined, and Gensetix named it as an involuntary plaintiff. UT moved to dismiss itself from the lawsuit based on its sovereign immunity, and Baylor moved to dismiss because UT was a required party that could not be joined because of its sovereign immunity. The district court agreed with UT and Baylor, concluding that UT’s sovereign immunity prevented Gensetix from joining UT as a plaintiff and that the suit could not proceed without UT. Gensetix appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed. The majority opinion, authored by Judge O’Malley, held that UT’s sovereign immunity prohibited its joinder as an involuntary plaintiff, but that Gensetix could proceed in its suit against Baylor notwithstanding UT’s absence. The Court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that UT’s 11th Amendment state sovereign immunity prohibited UT’s involuntary joinder. Reasoning that “[i]t is immaterial that there are no claims against UT, or that UT is named an involuntary plaintiff rather than an involuntary defendant,” the Court held that “Rule 19(a)(2) cannot be used to drag an unwilling UT into federal court” because “[t]he Eleventh Amendment serves to prevent ‘the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals’ against its will.” As for the exclusive licensee’s ability to proceed without UT, the Court explained that the district court abused its discretion by giving “controlling weight” to UT’s sovereign immunity, by failing to appreciate the alignment of interests between Gensetix and UT, and by ignoring that the license eliminated the risk of multiple suits because UT could not sue after Gensetix had done so.

Although both conclusions commanded a majority, they were different majorities. In a separate opinion, Judge Taranto agreed that UT could not be joined, but would also have held that Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel—a Supreme Court case requiring dismissal of claims where an absent [...]

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PTAB May Reject Substitute Claims Under Any Basis of Patentability

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered for the first time whether a district court’s invalidity determination, when made final after all appeals are exhausted, divests the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) of jurisdiction in a co-pending inter partes review (IPR) proceeding involving the same claims, and held that it does not. The Court also held that in an IPR proceeding, the PTAB is free to reject proposed substitute claims for failing to meet the subject matter eligibility requirements of § 101. Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Hulu, LLC, Case No. 19-1686 (Fed. Cir. July 22, 2020) (Wallach, J.) (Dyk, J., dissenting).

Hulu filed an IPR petition challenging claims of Uniloc’s patent directed to adjustable software licensing for digital products. After the PTAB instituted review, Uniloc filed a motion for substitute claims, conditional on whether the PTAB found the original claims unpatentable. Before the PTAB issued its final determination and before it ruled on the motion for substitute claims, a district court, in a related proceeding, held Uniloc’s asserted claims invalid as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Shortly thereafter, the PTAB issued a final written decision finding the challenged claims unpatentable over the prior art, and it found the substitute claims unpatentable under § 101. Uniloc appealed the PTAB’s use of § 101 to invalidate its substitute claims.

While Uniloc’s appeal of the Hulu IPR was pending, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s invalidity finding as to the original claims. With respect to the Hulu appeal, the Federal Circuit ordered the parties to address whether the appeal was moot in view of the ultimate finality with respect to invalidity of the original claims, thereby divesting the PTAB of jurisdiction over the IPR.

The majority held that the finality of the district court’s invalidity finding did not necessarily divest the PTAB of authority to consider substitute claims. It determined that the mootness issue was waivable, and that Hulu had waived the argument because it failed to raise mootness during the pendency of the IPR at the time the district court issued its decision. Even if Hulu had not waived the argument, the majority found that the PTAB’s authority to consider substitute claims does not depend on any live dispute about the original claims, as long as the motion to amend in the IPR was timely filed.

As to the PTAB’s rejection of the claims under § 101, the majority held that although the PTAB is restrained in an IPR proceeding to invalidating a patent’s original claims only under the anticipation and obviousness grounds raised in the petition, the PTAB may use other invalidity tools as a “new ground of rejection” for substitute claims, including for lack of patentable subject matter under § 101. The majority also suggested that other grounds of patentability would be within the scope of the PTAB’s authority, including rejections under the various subsections of § 112. The majority was concerned that limiting the PTAB’s review might force it to issue substitute claims that fail to meet all the statutory [...]

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Eighth Circuit Cools Off Antitrust Claims Based on Alleged Patent Fraud

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment dismissing antitrust and tortious interference claims based on fraudulent procurement of patents where the plaintiff failed to show a knowing and willful intent to deceive the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). Inline Packaging, LLC v. Graphic Packaging International, LLC, Case No. 18-3167 (8th Cir. June 18, 2020) (Smith, J.).

Inline Packaging and Graphic Packaging are manufacturers of susceptor packaging, a specialized food packaging used for microwaving frozen foods. Graphic developed the susceptor design in partnership with Nestlé in 2005. The packaging was redesigned from a prior patent obtained several years earlier. Although Graphic’s computer-aided design drafter was listed as the sole inventor of the redesigned packaging claimed in the asserted patent, Nestlé’s engineer provided feedback that was implemented into the design, including the addition and deletion of certain features of the packaging.

In 2014, Nestlé held an auction to select the next manufacturer of its susceptor packaging. Nestlé originally selected Inline as the supplier of its susceptor packaging, but later awarded 90% of the susceptor packaging business to Graphic after Graphic notified Nestlé that Inline would likely infringe on Graphic’s patents. In June 2015, Graphic initiated patent litigation against Inline. In July 2015, Inline brought an antitrust suit against Graphic alleging that Graphic monopolized the susceptor packaging market using anticompetitive practices in violation of federal and state antitrust laws. To support its antitrust claims, Inline alleged that Graphic fraudulently procured the asserted patents, made baseless litigation threats and engaged in predatory discount bundling through the use of multi-year supply agreements. At the time the lawsuit was initiated, Graphic was the dominant supplier of susceptor packaging, with an almost 95% share of the US market. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Graphic, dismissing Inline’s claims. Inline appealed.

The Eighth Circuit reviews grants of summary judgment de novo to determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists and whether judgment is entitled as a matter of law. Here, all inferences were viewed in the light most favorable to Inline. Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolizing, or attempting to monopolize, any part of the trade or commerce among the several states. To prove a violation of Section 2, a claimant must show that an entity possessed monopoly power in the relevant market and willfully acquired or maintained such monopoly power through anticompetitive conduct rather than as the result of fair competition (e.g., by means of a superior product or business acumen).

The Eighth Circuit first considered whether Graphic fraudulently procured the asserted patents. Patent fraud, also known as Walker Process fraud, can support a monopolization claim where the defendant procured the patent at issue by knowing and willful fraud on the PTO, or maintained and enforced the patent with knowledge of the fraudulent manner in which it was obtained. Knowing and willful fraud requires an intent to deceive or inequitable conduct. The Court reasoned that this standard requires clear and convincing [...]

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Unnamed Respondent Has Standing to Seek Rescission of ITC General Exclusion Order

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a US International Trade Commission (ITC) decision denying a petition for rescission of a general exclusion order (GEO) prohibiting importation of products accused of patent infringement, because a post-investigation invalidity attack is not a changed condition warranting rescission. Mayborn Grp., Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Case No. 19-2077 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 2020) (Lourie, J.).

Several parties filed a complaint at the ITC against several respondents, not including Mayborn Group, Ltd., and Mayborn USA, Inc. The complaint alleged infringement of a patent disclosing a self-anchoring beverage container that prevents spills. The complainants sought a GEO barring importation of infringing goods by any party, including unnamed respondents such as Mayborn. In contrast to GEOs, limited exclusion orders only prohibit infringing goods imported by named respondents in an investigation. The ITC instituted an investigation, and the administrative law judge determined that two respondents were in default and liable for unfair acts (patent infringement) in connection with importation. The defaulting respondents did not raise any invalidity challenge during the investigation. On the administrative law judge’s recommendation, the ITC issued a GEO.

Following issuance of the GEO, Mayborn continued to import potentially infringing products. The complainants notified Mayborn that they were working with US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to enforce the GEO against Mayborn’s importations. In response, Mayborn petitioned the ITC to rescind the GEO pursuant to its power to rescind or modify an order if there is a change in the conditions that led to the GEO. Mayborn argued that the “changed condition” requirement was satisfied because it contends the asserted claims are invalid.. The ITC denied Mayborn’s petition, holding that a petitioner’s asserted discovery of invalidating prior art after the issuance of a GEO was not a changed condition. Mayborn appealed, arguing that the ITC erred in rejecting its request for rescission. The ITC alleged that Mayborn lacked standing to appeal because Mayborn’s alleged injury stemmed from the complainants’ threat to enforce the GEO rather than any act by the ITC.

The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that Mayborn’s post-investigation invalidity challenge was not a basis for rescission of the GEO. The Court first addressed the ITC’s standing argument, and determined that Mayborn had standing because it was injured by the GEO and the GEO was enforced by the ITC. The ITC or CBP could act to enforce the GEO at any time. Mayborn had also lost sales and incurred other harm stemming from the complainants’ threats to assert the GEO, including reputational injury, market share loss and damaged business relationships. Standing did not require the ITC to have already barred importation of Mayborn’s products.

After finding that Mayborn had standing, the Federal Circuit determined that Mayborn’s invalidity challenge was not a permissible basis to seek rescission of the GEO for two reasons. First, although patent invalidity is an affirmative defense to patent infringement, the ITC is constrained to adjudicating patent validity only when a respondent raises an invalidity defense during an [...]

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Independently Performed, Publicly Disclosed Prior Work Can Lead to Joint Inventorship

Addressing an inventorship decision that added two co-inventors to patents covering cancer treatments, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed that the co-inventors’ work constituted joint inventorship even though it was performed independently and publicly disclosed prior to conception of the claimed invention. Dana-Farber Cancer Institute v. Ono Pharma. Co., Ltd., Case No. 19-2050 (Fed. Cir. July 14, 2020) (Lourie, J.).

In 2015, Dana-Farber filed an inventorship correction claim seeking to add two of its researchers as inventors to six patents covering cancer treatments that named inventors who had assigned the patents to Ono Pharmaceutical. After an eight-day bench trial, the district court judge issued a 111-page decision agreeing that Dana-Farber’s researchers were joint inventors for all six patents. Ono appealed.

Ono first argued that, as a matter of law, the contributions from Dana-Farber’s researchers were too far removed from the claimed invention because their contributions had been independently performed and publicly disclosed prior to conception, and thus constituted prior art to the patents. The Federal Circuit acknowledged that simply informing another inventor about the state of the prior art does not make one a joint inventor. However, the Court contrasted that situation with a genuine contribution by a participant in a collaborative enterprise that lasted over a year, where the contribution happened to be published shortly before conception. The Court stated that such a situation may be sufficient to lead to joint inventorship.

Ono also contested the district court’s factual determination that Dana-Farber’s researchers contributed to the invention as claimed. Specifically, Ono argued that the contributions from Dana-Farber’s researchers did not relate to the claimed subject matter of an antibody for a particular receptor. Dana-Farber responded that, as found by the district court, all six patents had the same core invention of blocking a particular ligand-receptor interaction and thus the identification of the relevant ligand by Dana-Farber’s researchers was properly considered part of the conception of all claims. The Federal Circuit agreed and affirmed the district court.




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Delicate Balance: Details of Parallel Proceeding Tip Scales for Discretionary Denial

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) designated two decisions informative as they relate to weighing factors for determining how a parallel district court proceeding may impact the Board’s determination of whether to discretionarily deny institution under § 314(a).

In Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., Case No. IPR2020-00019, Paper 15 (USPTO May 13, 2020) (Horner, APJ) (designated informative on July 13, 2020), the Board had previously requested supplemental briefing in a pre-institution order in this case (itself now designated by the Board as precedential) regarding six factors for weighing the impact of the parallel district court proceeding on whether to discretionarily deny institution.

As to factor (1), whether the district court action is stayed or evidence exists that a stay may be issued, the Board weighed this factor as neutral because neither party had requested a stay and the district court had given no indication as to whether it would entertain a stay. Absent definitive statements by the district court as to the specific case, the Board declined to infer how a judge might rule if a motion were to be filed.

Under factor (2), the proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision, the Board found this factor weighed slightly in favor of a discretionary denial. Even though the district court’s initial trial date had been pushed back, the new date was still two months earlier than the Board’s one-year deadline for issuing a final written decision. In addition, the new date appeared to be relatively certain, and mere speculation about the further delays being typical was not enough to weigh this factor in favor of a discretionary denial.

As to factor (3), the court’s and parties’ investment in the parallel proceeding, the Board found this weighed somewhat in favor of discretionary denial. Even though expert reports had not been served, the district court had already issued a detailed Markman order construing seven claim terms, and the parties had already served their final invalidity contentions.

Under factor (4), the extent of overlap of the issues raised in the petition compared to those raised in the parallel proceeding, the Board found this factor favored discretionary denial because the Petitioner was pursuing the same prior art on the same claims in district court.

Under factor (5), the parties in the district court action were the same as the IPR, so this factor weighed in favor of discretionary denial.

As to the catch-all factor (6), including considering the merits of the challenge, the Board found that there were key weaknesses in the petition that helped tip the scales toward discretionary denial. In sum, the Board found that the weight of the factors tipped toward exercising its discretion to deny institution.

In Sand Revolution II, LLC v. Continental Intermodal Group–Trucking LLC, Case No. IPR2019-01393, Paper 24 (USPTO June 16, 2020) (Flax, APJ) (designated informative on July 13, 2020), the Board came to slightly different conclusions for some of the factors, ultimately granting the Petitioner’s request [...]

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Joined Parties Have Rights Too

In vacating an unpatentability decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the rights of a joined party to an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding applies to the entirety of the proceedings and includes the right of appeal. Fitbit, Inc. v. Valencell, Inc., Case No. 19-1048 (Fed. Cir. July 8, 2020) (Newman, J.).

Apple petitioned the Board for IPR of certain claims of a patent owned by Valencell. The Board granted the petition in part, instituting review of certain claims and denying review of other claims. After institution of the Apple IPR, Fitbit filed an IPR petition for the instituted claims and moved for joinder with Apple’s IPR. The Board granted Fitbit’s petition, granted the motion for joinder and terminated Fitbit’s separate proceeding.

After the Apple/Fitbit IPR hearing, but before any Final Written Decision was issued, the Supreme Court decided SAS Institute v. Iancu (IP Update, Vol. 21, No. 5), holding that the America Invents Act requires that all patent claims challenged in an IPR petition must be reviewed by the Board if the petition is granted. Accordingly, the Board re-instituted the Apple/Fitbit IPR to add the previously denied patent claims. The Board’s Final Written Decision found the originally instituted claims unpatentable, but the newly instituted claims not unpatentable. After the decision, Apple withdrew from the proceeding. Fitbit appealed the decision as to newly instituted claims that had been found not unpatentable.

On appeal, Valencell challenged Fitbit’s right to appeal as to the newly instituted claims. 35 U.S.C. § 319 provides that “[a]ny party to the inter partes review shall have the right to be a party to the appeal.” Valencell argued that Fitbit does not have the status of “party” for purposes of appeal because Fitbit did not request review of the newly instituted claims in its initial IPR petition, did not request leave to amend its initial petition after the Supreme Court’s decision in SAS Institute and did not submit a separate brief with respect to the non-instituted claims after the joined IPR was re-instituted. Valencell also argued that because the Board stated that Fitbit would have “limited participation, if at all, and required Fitbit to seek authorization from the Board before filing any papers,” Fitbit was not a full participant in the joined IPR.

Fitbit responded that Valencell did not object to Fitbit’s joinder and did not object to or seek to qualify Fitbit’s continued participation after the Board re-instituted the joined IPR to include the new claims, so there was only one IPR. Fitbit also cited the Board’s statement in granting its joinder motion that the “[d]ecision addressing the status of each challenged claim in this proceeding applies to all parties.” Fitbit acknowledged that it did not seek to file a separate brief after the new claims were added to the IPR, but claimed no separate brief was needed to present the issues.

The Federal Circuit agreed with Fitbit, finding that the circumstances [...]

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Third Parties Not Responsible for Defective Motion to Seal

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that a district court did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration of a previous order denying a litigant’s defective motion to seal  with regard to the litigant’s own information, but vacated and remanded for further consideration with regard to third-party information. Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Apple, Inc., Case Nos. 19-1922, -1923, -1925, ‑1926 (Fed. Cir. July 9, 2020) (Mayer, J.).

Uniloc sued Apple for patent infringement in the Northern District of California. Apple moved to dismiss. The briefing on the motion included material that Uniloc had designated as highly confidential. Both parties filed motions to seal. Uniloc’s motions to seal covered quotations from published opinions and matters of public record, among other things. Uniloc’s supporting declarations included only boilerplate assertions of harm from disclosure. Non-party Electronic Frontier Foundation asked Uniloc to narrow its redactions, and when Uniloc declined, Electronic Frontier moved to intervene for the purpose of opposing Uniloc’s sealing motions. The district court denied the motions to seal as overbroad under the local rules, which require such motions to be narrowly tailored.

Uniloc sought an extension of time and ultimately filed a motion for leave to seek reconsideration. In that motion, it agreed to make public more than 90% of the material it had originally sought to seal. It also filed a new motion to seal the remainder. In support, it attached a much more specific declaration supporting sealing the more limited set of materials, as well as several declarations of third-party licensees, who stated that disclosure of their confidential information would be harmful to them. The court denied the motion seeking leave as not meeting the local rules’ requirements for reconsideration. The court also denied the narrower motion to seal, reasoning that Uniloc should have filed a proper motion to seal in the first instance. Uniloc appealed.

Uniloc argued that the district court had abused its discretion in denying the narrower motion to seal. In considering Uniloc’s argument, the Federal Circuit distinguished between Uniloc’s information and third-party information. Applying Ninth Circuit law, the Court held that the district court had not abused its discretion by strictly enforcing its local rules with regard to Uniloc’s information. Uniloc had violated the local rules in its motion to seal and subsequent motion for reconsideration. Moreover, the Court explained that notwithstanding the submission of a narrowly tailored motion, the burden is always on the moving party to provide compelling reasons for sealing, which Uniloc had failed to do.

Next, the Federal Circuit explained that third-party information “calls for an analysis not dependent on the overbreadth rationale” because third parties should not be harmed by a litigant’s failure to follow the local rules. Because the district court’s analysis had been based on overbreadth, the Court found that the district court “failed to make findings sufficient to allow us to adequately assess whether it properly balanced the public’s right of access against the interests of the third parties in shielding their . . [...]

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Technical Issues Affirm Patent Validity but Preclude Pre-Suit Damages

In a split decision, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the subject matter eligibility of claims directed to collection, comparison and classification of information. The Court also unanimously found that the patent owner was not entitled to pre-suit or enhanced damages because it failed to prove pre-suit patent marking by its licensees. Packet Intelligence LLC v. Netscout Systems, Inc., Case No. 19-2041 (Fed. Cir. July 14, 2020) (Lourie, J.) (Reyna, J., dissenting in part).

This dispute began when Packet Intelligence sued Netscout for infringing three of its patents that were directed to a system and method for monitoring packets exchanged over a computer network. The case was tried before a jury, which found the patents-in-suit valid and infringed. The jury further determined that Packet Intelligence was entitled to pre-suit and post-suit damages, as well as enhanced damages. Netscout filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law that Packet Intelligence was not entitled to pre-suit damages, which the district court denied. Following a bench trial, the district court held that the claims of the patents-in-suit were not invalid under 35 USC § 101. Netscout appealed.

Netscout challenged the district court’s § 101 decision and the denial of Netscout’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on pre-suit damages. In a split panel decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination on subject matter eligibility under § 101. Netscape specifically argued that the claims were directed to an abstract idea because the claims were merely directed to the collection, comparison and classification of information.

The majority reiterated that the Federal Circuit has recognized that software-based innovations may be deemed patent-eligible subject matter at Alice step 1. For example, in Enfish, the Court held that software claims were valid at step 1 because the claims were directed to a technical improvement over conventional systems. Similarly, in SRI International, the Court held that software claims were valid because the claims at issue were “necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to solve a specific problem in the realm of computer networks.” Applying these principles, the majority found that the claims were patent eligible because they presented a technical solution to a technical problem. Notably, the majority relied on the patent specification’s disclosures regarding the invention’s improvements over conventional systems.

Judge Reyna dissented. In his view, the claims were directed to an abstract idea because they lacked specific technological means for the collection, analysis and display of data. Because a concrete technical solution was absent, Reyna argued that the claims were distinguishable from the SRI International case on which the majority relied. He would have found the claims invalid under step 1 and remanded the case to the district court to fully address Alice step 2.

Regarding pre-suit damages, the Federal Circuit unanimously held that Packet Intelligence was not entitled to such damages. The primary issue was whether a Packet Intelligence licensee had properly complied with the marking requirements in order to provide the required constructive notice to [...]

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