Patents Archives - Page 54 of 108

Patents

Significant Third-Party Discovery Too Complex for ITC Early Disposition Program

by Jay Reiziss and Paul Devinsky | Oct 22, 2020 | Patents, Technology

The US International Trade Commission (ITC) denied a proposed respondent’s request to use the early disposition program to determine whether a complainant met the domestic industry requirement in a Section 337 investigation. The ITC concluded that the issues proposed for resolution were too complex to be decided within 100 days of institution because significant third-party discovery was likely necessary. Certain Video Processing Devices, Components Thereof, and Digital Smart Televisions Containing Same, Comm’n Order, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-1222 (Oct. 14, 2020).

The early disposition program aims to limit unnecessary litigation and save time and resources for litigants and the ITC by resolving obvious and fatal deficiencies in a complainant’s case before the parties embark on a full Section 337 investigation. The program provides for an initial determination by the presiding administrative law judge within 100 days of institution on potentially dispositive issues. The administrative law judge may hold expedited hearings and stay discovery of any other issues during the pendency of the 100-day proceeding. The ITC has indicated that appropriate issues for resolution include domestic industry, importation, standing and patent subject matter eligibility.

Complainant DivX, LLC, a video software technology company, relied on its licensee’s assembly of smart TVs in the United States to satisfy the domestic industry requirement. Proposed respondent Realtek Semiconductor Corporation, a chipmaker for consumer electronics, argued that DivX would be unlikely to meet the domestic industry requirement because DivX’s licensee stopped identifying several of its products as “Assembled in the USA” to avoid deceiving consumers in connection with a petition filed before the Federal Trade Commission. Realtek also argued that DivX could not identify smart TVs as the domestic industry product for purposes of the economic prong and a different video processor product for purposes of the technical prong. Realtek sought to resolve these issues through the early disposition program, and DivX opposed. Although neither party raised the issue of third-party discovery, the ITC denied Realtek’s request because such discovery was likely necessary, making adjudication within 100 days impracticable.

Practice Note: The ITC places great emphasis on the expeditious adjudication of Section 337 investigations because of the ITC’s statutory mandate to complete them at the earliest practicable time. The early disposition program builds on that mandate and can provide an even speedier timeframe by streamlining and resolving dispositive issues within 100 days of institution. A proposed respondent should consider requesting early disposition for clear weaknesses in a complainant’s case where the issue to be decided is not complex and does not require significant discovery. While the ITC does not grant use of the early disposition program often, where it has done so, several cases have ended with withdrawal of the complaint or termination before a hearing.

Federal Circuit Restores Induced Infringement Verdict Against Teva

by April E. Weisbruch | Oct 15, 2020 | Patents

Addressing the issue of whether a generic pharmaceutical company can be found to induce infringement even when all patented uses have been “carved out” of the label (resulting in a so-called “skinny label”), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that circumstantial evidence of inducement was sufficient. The Court relied on evidence that defendant stated its drug was a “complete replacement” for plaintiff’s drug covered by the asserted patent. GlaxoSmithKline LLC et al. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., Case Nos. 18-1976, -2023 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 2, 2020) (Newman, J.) (Prost, C.J., dissenting). The Court reinstated a jury verdict against Teva Pharmaceuticals, ordering it to pay GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) $235 million.

GSK brought suit against Teva in 2014 in response to Teva’s attempt to market a generic form of carvedilol, developed and marketed by GSK under the brand name Coreg®. Coreg® was US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved for three separate indications: hypertension, congestive heart failure (CHF), and left ventricular dysfunction following a myocardial infarction (post-MI LVD). After March 2007, however, no GSK Orange-Book-listed patent covered the hypertension or post-MI LVD indications. A reissue patent that issued in January 2008 remained in force for CHF.

In 2002, Teva filed an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) with the FDA. Before Teva’s carvedilol product was finally approved in September 2007, Teva amended its ANDA and proposed label to “carve out” the CHF indication according to 21 USC § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii)—often referred to as a “section viii carve-out.” Thus, Teva’s carvedilol “skinny label” was only indicated for hypertension and post-MI LVD, neither of which was, at that time, covered by any GSK patent.

After a trial, the jury found that Teva had willfully induced infringement of GSK’s patent and awarded GSK $235 million in damages. The district court then granted Teva’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding that the inducement verdict was not supported by substantial evidence. GSK, the district court reasoned, had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Teva’s alleged inducement (as opposed to other factors) had actually caused even at least one physician to prescribe generic carvedilol for CHF. GSK appealed.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit overturned the grant of judgment as a matter of law, reasoning that the “intent element” of inducement may be proven through circumstantial evidence. The Court noted that the jury had received evidence of, e.g., “Teva’s promotional materials [referring] to Teva’s carvedilol tablets as AB rated equivalents of the Coreg® tablets,” press releases identifying Teva’s product as “Generic Coreg® Tablets,” Teva’s Monthly Prescribing References, and testimony from GSK’s cardiologist witness that physicians are “completely reliant” on information provided by the generic companies. The majority concluded that this was “ample record evidence . . . to support the jury verdict of inducement.”

Chief Circuit Judge Prost authored a lengthy dissent warning of the broad implications of the majority’s ruling, including contravening the congressional design and intent of the generic approval system, and potentially stifling innovation by giving rise to [...]

Continue Reading

Non-Respondent’s Product Cannot Be Adjudicated for Infringement in Context of General Exclusion Order

by Jay Reiziss and Paul Devinsky | Oct 15, 2020 | Patents

The US International Trade Commission issued a general exclusion order (GEO) excluding from entry into the United States products infringing patents directed to luxury vinyl tile, but vacated findings in the Initial Determination (ID) adjudicating infringement for products belonging to entities not named as respondents in the investigation. The Commission explained that a finding should not be made as to whether a non-respondent’s product infringes a patent in the context of a GEO, but instead the analysis should be limited to whether the “alleged” infringement supports a finding that there is a pattern of violation of Section 337. Certain Luxury Vinyl Tile and Components Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-1155, Comm’n Op. (Oct. 5, 2020).

The ITC instituted an investigation against multiple respondents. The administrative law judge granted summary determination of violation by certain defaulting respondents and recommended a GEO. Unlike limited exclusion orders (LEO), which only prohibit infringing goods imported by a named respondent in an investigation, GEOs prohibit entry of the infringing products regardless of the source. GEOs are issued when necessary to prevent circumvention of an LEO or when there is a pattern of violation and it is difficult to identify the source of infringing products. In connection with the request for a GEO in this investigation, the complainants accused two additional products from non-respondents of infringement. In the ID, the administrative law judge analyzed the two products and determined that they infringed the asserted patents.

The Commission determined to review the ID in part. On review, the Commission determined that a GEO was appropriate, but vacated the findings of the ID that adjudicated infringement of the asserted patents by the two products belonging to the non-respondents. The Commission explained that in considering a GEO, a finding should not be made as to whether a non-respondent’s product infringes a patent and instead the analysis should be limited to whether there is a pattern of violation of Section 337. The Commission therefore vacated the infringement findings to avoid confusion and possible prejudice to the non-respondents in future proceedings.

Practice Note: A GEO is an attractive remedy for companies confronted by widespread infringement by imported products originating from sources that are difficult to identify or companies that dissolve and re-emerge as new entities and can therefore circumvent an LEO. The Commission has now made it easier to obtain a GEO because “alleged” infringement by products from a non-respondent can be used to show a pattern of violation warranting a GEO without a full adjudication of infringement for those products.

Product-by-Process Analysis Applies to Method of Treatment Claims

by Paul Devinsky | Oct 8, 2020 | Patents

In a case relating to use of recombinant human interferon-β (IFN-β) proteins for the treatment of viral diseases, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that a “product-by-process” analysis applies even when the product-by-process limitation is nested within a method of treatment claim. Biogen MA Inc. v. EMD Serono, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-1133 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 28, 2020) (Linn, J.).

The claims at issue relate to a method of treating a viral condition, a viral disease, cancers or tumors by administration of a pharmaceutically effective amount of recombinant IFN-β. The claims contained a product-by-process limitation that partially defined the recombinant IFN-β in terms of the method or process by which it is made:

a recombinant polypeptide produced by a non-human host transformed by a recombinant DNA molecule comprising a DNA sequence selected from the group consisting of . . .

It was undisputed that native IFN-β proteins comprise sequences identical to those recited in the claims at issue, and that native IFN-β had been used in the prior art to treat viral conditions. At issue was whether the use of native IFN-β to treat viral conditions anticipated the use of recombinantly produced IFN-β for the claimed treatment.

When considering product-by-process claims, the Federal Circuit has long held that “an old product is not patentable even if it is made by a new process.” See, e.g., Amgen v. Hoffmann-La Roche (Fed. Cir. 2009). The district court granted Biogen’s judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) motion and reversed the jury verdict on anticipation, reasoning that the Amgen analysis did not apply here because the claims were directed to a method of treatment and not a product. Further, the “source limitations” (i.e., the limitations requiring that the IFN-β be produced using recombinant methods) overcame the shortcoming of the prior art. Namely, the unavailability of native IFN-β in sufficient quantity to facilitate practical treatment “lies at the heart of the benefit of this invention” and should be given “force and effect in the anticipation analysis.” Serono appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed, explaining that the nesting of the product-by-process limitation within a method of treatment claim does not change the proper construction of the product-by-process limitation itself. The Federal Circuit reasoned that “an old method of administration of an old product made by a new process is not novel and cannot be patented.” Further, the Court found that the district court erred in considering the advantages of the recombinant process—the new capability of manufacturing sufficient quantities of IFN-β through recombinant technology—as a reason not to apply the product-by-process analysis. The proper anticipation analysis does not turn on the source of the claimed polypeptide, but on a comparison of the claimed recombinant polypeptide and the prior art native polypeptide.

In granting JMOL, the district court alternatively reasoned that under a product-by-process analysis, the native IFN-β could not anticipate recombinant IFN-β, because the prior art did not disclose that the native and recombinant IFN-β shared an identical three-dimensional structure or that [...]

Continue Reading

No Due Process Violation When New Panel Hears Substantive Arguments

by McDermott Will & Emery | Oct 8, 2020 | America Invents Act, Patents

Affirming a Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) non-obviousness determination, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the Board did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning a patent owner who engaged in ex parte communications by having a new panel hear the merits of the petition. Apple Inc. v. Voip-Pal.com Inc., Case Nos. 18-1456, -1457 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2020) (Reyna, J.).

Voip-Pal sued Apple for allegedly infringing two of its patents directed to routing communications between two different types of networks: public and private. Apple then petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of several claims from both patents, arguing they were invalid as obvious. The Board ultimately found the claims were not invalid because Apple did not provide evidentiary support as to the motivation to combine multiple references.

During the IPR proceedings, Voip-Pal’s former CEO sent six letters to various parties, copying members of Congress, the President, federal judges and administrative patent judges at the Board criticizing the IPR system, complaining about the cancellation rate and requesting judgment in favor of Voip-Pal. The letters did not discuss the underlying merits of Apple’s petitions. In view of Voip-Pal’s conduct, Apple requested that the Board sanction Voip-Pal by entering adverse judgment against Voip-Pal or by vacating the final written decisions and assigning a new panel to preside over “constitutionally correct” new proceedings going forward.

For the sanctions proceeding, a new panel replaced the initial panel and determined that Voip-Pal had engaged in sanctionable conduct, and further determined that it would preside over Apple’s petition for rehearing. The new panel found that Apple failed to show the initial panel had misapprehended or overlooked any matter, and even if the final panel were to accept Apple’s view of the prior art, it would not reach a different conclusion. Apple appealed.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit first addressed whether the appeal was moot. Before oral argument, the Court found in separate proceedings that some, but not all, of the claims at issue were invalid. Apple argued that this case mooted the entire appeal, even though the claims did not entirely overlap. Starting with the overlapping claims, the Court found that the appeal was moot in regards to these claims because Apple no longer had the potential for injury. However, the Court rejected Apple’s argument that the appeal was moot under a theory of claim preclusion in regards to the non-overlapping claims. The Court explained that any preclusive effect from the other appeal must be decided by a future court in any subsequent action brought by Voip-Pal. Thus, any discussion regarding claim preclusion would be advisory in nature and outside the scope of the Court’s Article III jurisdiction.

Turning to the merits, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or Apple’s due process rights. The Board’s rules provide that “[t]he Board may impose a sanction” and explains that “[s]anctions include entry of one or more” of eight defined actions. Although the Board’s sanctions imposed [...]

Continue Reading

One Claim Construction Error Is Enough to Trigger New Trial on Infringement

by McDermott Will & Emery | Oct 8, 2020 | Patents, Technology

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit re-affirmed that incorrect construction of even a single claim element can be grounds for a new trial on infringement. Network-1 Technologies, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Company, Case Nos. 18-2338, -2339, -2395, -2396 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 24, 2020) (Prost, C.J.).

Network-1 Technologies sued Hewlett-Packard (HP) for patent infringement. HP defended on the grounds that the patent was invalid and that it did not infringe. The jury found the patent not infringed and invalid as obvious. Following post-trial motions, the district court denied Network-1’s request for a new trial on infringement but granted its motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on validity. The court found that HP should have been estopped from raising certain obviousness challenges as a consequence of certain obviousness challenges raised by a third party in a prior inter partes review (IPR) that were essentially the same as HP’s obviousness challenge here. Network-1 appealed the district court’s final judgment that HP did not infringe, arguing that the district court erred in its claim construction. HP cross-appealed on the issues of IPR estoppel under 35 USC § 315(e)(2) and invalidity because of a claim improperly broadened in re-examination.

On appeal, Network-1 contended that the district court erroneously construed the claim terms “main power source” and “low level current.” In order to prevail, Network-1 had to establish not only that at least one jury instruction on claim construction was legally erroneous, but that the error had prejudicial effect. Under Federal Circuit precedent, an incorrect claim construction that removes from the jury a basis on which it reasonably could have reached a different verdict can be an incorrect jury instruction. As the Court explained in Avid Tech. v. Harmonic (Fed. Cir. 2016), “[a]n erroneous claim construction on one element is harmless ‘only if a reasonable jury would have been required by the evidence to find non-infringement even without the error.’”

The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court correctly construed the term “low level current” but erred in its construction of “main power source” to exclude AC power sources on the basis of expert testimony that receipt of AC power by a network device would render it inoperable. The Court deemed this error for two reasons:

- Even though the network device cannot receive AC power, the record established that “data nodes” or network switches were commonly used to convert AC power to DC power as needed to power the network device. Because nothing in the patent claims precluded the conversion of AC power to DC power, it was error for the district court to add such a limitation.
- The district court erred by adding a limitation to the claims to carve out certain inoperable embodiments, in this case embodiments that do not convert AC to DC. The Federal Circuit has previously explained that it is improper to add limitations to a claim to exclude only certain inoperable embodiments (Cordis v. Medtronic (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Here, [...]
  
  Continue Reading

Overcoming Heavy Burden Required to Succeed on Venue-Related Writ of Mandamus

by Amol Parikh | Sep 29, 2020 | Patents, Technology

Addressing a venue challenge, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied a petition for a writ of mandamus because the challenger did not demonstrate it had no adequate alternative means to obtain desired relief since meaningful review could occur after final judgment was entered. In re. Google, Case No. 20-144 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 18, 2020) (Reyna, J.).

Personalized Media Communications (PMC) sued Google in the Eastern District of Texas for infringement of six patents related to adaptive video streaming. PMC initially asserted venue was proper based on the presence of several Google Global Cache (GGC) servers at facilities owned by internet service providers (ISPs) located within the district. Google moved to dismiss for improper venue. While Google’s motion was pending, the Federal Circuit issued its decision in In re. Google, rejecting a venue argument asserted by a different plaintiff against Google that was also premised on the presence of GGC servers, and finding that a regular and established place of business requires the regular physical presence of an employee or other agent of the defendant conducting the defendant’s business at the alleged place of business.

After the Federal Circuit’s decision, PMC asserted a different venue theory based on Google’s agreements with Communications Test Design (CTDI) to warehouse, refurbish, repair and ship hardware products, such as Google’s cellphones and speakers, from a CTDI facility located in the Eastern District of Texas. The district court agreed with PMC and denied Google’s motion, finding that CTDI was acting as Google’s agent and was conducting Google’s business from its facility. Google filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to vacate the district court’s order.

The Federal Circuit denied Google’s petition. The Court explained that a party seeking a writ bears the heavy burden of demonstrating that it has no adequate alternative means to obtain the desired relief and that the right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable. Without providing an explanation, the Court found that although Google raised viable arguments based on the law of agency and the Court’s precedent, it was not satisfied that Google’s right to a writ was clear and indisputable. The Court concluded that Google can obtain meaningful review of the district court’s venue ruling after final judgment in the case.

Practice Note: The Federal Circuit was also concerned that the district court did not move more quickly to resolve Google’s venue challenge. Significant work in the case had already been done, and the trial date is currently set for November 2020. If the venue is later found to be improper, the case will be transferred and a new trial will occur.

Full of Hot Air? PTAB Joinder Decisions Under § 315(c) Are Appealable

by Paul Devinsky | Sep 16, 2020 | Patents

Addressing whether it has jurisdiction to review joinder decisions made by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reissued a prior decision explaining that a joinder decision is reviewable because the decision occurs after the inter partes review (IPR) proceeding institutes. Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, Case Nos. 18-1400, -1401, -1402, -1403, -1537, -1540, -1541 (Fed. Cir. Opinion Issued: Mar. 18, 2020, Opinion Reissued: Sept. 4, 2020) (Prost, C.J.) (Prost, C.J., concurring with additional views).

Windy City Innovations filed a complaint accusing Facebook of infringing four patents that collectively have 830 claims. Facebook filed a motion requesting that Windy City be forced to limit the number of asserted claims to 40 by the time of Facebook’s one-year IPR filing deadline, but the district court denied the motion. One year after it was served with the complaint, Facebook filed petitions for IPR on a subset of the 830 claims.

Five months after Facebook filed its petitions, Windy City narrowed its case to a subset of claims, including claims that were not subject to Facebook’s IPR petitions. After the PTAB instituted review based on Facebook’s petitions, Facebook immediately filed two new IPR petitions. Because the one-year time bar had passed, Facebook also filed a motion under § 315(c) to join the new IPR petitions to its now-instituted proceedings. The PTAB granted Facebook’s motion for joinder and ultimately issued a final written decision with a mixed result, cancelling some claims and finding others not unpatentable. Both parties appealed

The Federal Circuit found that the PTAB erred in allowing Facebook to use § 315(c) to join itself to its earlier-filed petitions. The Court explained that the statutory language was unambiguous, finding that the ordinary usage of “joining a person as a party to a proceeding” means that the joined party must necessarily be someone who is not already a party. The Court further explained that allowing same-party joinder would impermissibly allow the Director to join new issues to an existing proceeding. The Court found that § 315(c) only authorizes the Director to join (1) a person (2) as a party (3) to an already instituted IPR. The language does not authorize the joined party to bring new issues into the already instituted IPR proceeding. The Court found this understanding consistent with other subsections of § 315, where there is a clear distinction between § 315(c), which refers to the joinder of a person as a party, and § 315(d), which refers to the consolidation of multiple proceedings and the issues in each. The Court was sympathetic to Facebook’s policy concerns regarding patents with a large number of claims that may not be narrowed to a manageable number of asserted claims before the one-year time-bar. Nevertheless, it found that policy considerations could not overcome the unambiguous language of the statute. The Court therefore vacated the PTAB’s final written decisions as to the later-filed petitions.

After the Court issued its original opinion, Facebook filed a petition for panel rehearing, [...]

Continue Reading

Logic to Modify: Even Deceptive Intent Does Not Bar Inventorship Correction

by Paul Devinsky | Sep 16, 2020 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a district court invalidity determination finding that judicial estoppel prevented a patent owner from relisting an inventor previously removed for strategic litigation purposes. Egenera, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., Case Nos. 19-2015, -2387 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 28, 2020) (Prost, C.J.).

Egenera sued Cisco for infringement of a patent directed to a reconfigurable virtual network that included a “logic to modify” and transmit received messages. In response Cisco petitioned for inter partes review (IPR). During the IPR’s pendency, Egenera realized that all claim limitations were conceived of before inventor Schulter began working at the company, and petitioned the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to remove Schulter as a listed inventor. The Patent and Trial Appeal Board (PTAB) declined to institute Cisco’s IPR, and the PTO granted Egenera’s petition to remove Schulter shortly thereafter.

During the litigation, the district court construed the patent claims’ “logic” terms as means-plus-function elements and concluded that the “logic to modify” limitation corresponded to a “tripartite structure” described in the specification. Cisco then asserted invalidity under pre-America Invents Act (AIA) § 102(f), contending that Schulter invented the tripartite structure, and that the patent therefore did not list all inventors. Egenera attempted to re-correct inventorship to include Schulter, but the court rejected the attempt. The district court found the patent invalid under § 102(f), reasoning that judicial estoppel precluded Egenera from “resurrecting” Schulter’s inventorship. Egenera appealed both the means-plus-function construction and the judicial estoppel finding.

The Federal Circuit first addressed whether Egenera could correct inventorship absent any judicial estoppel. The Court looked to the plain meaning of post-AIA § 256, which provides that “the error of omitting inventors . . . shall not invalidate the patent . . . if it can be corrected.” Notably, post-AIA § 256 removed the requirement that an inventorship error occur “without . . . deceptive intent.” The Federal Circuit stated it plainly: “‘Error’ is simply the incorrect listing of inventors” and does not exclude even deceptive intention. The Court explained that the inequitable conduct rules provide a safety valve for such actions, not § 256. The Court also noted that at the time Egenera removed Schulter as an inventor, no one had argued that “logic to modify” was means-plus-function language, which it presumptively was not. Egenera’s preferred construction of that term was consistent with its assertion that Schulter was not an inventor. The omission of Schulter as inventor was thus an “error” within the scope of § 256.

The Federal Circuit next turned to whether Egenera was judicially estopped from relisting Schulter as an inventor. Applying the First Circuit’s New Hampshire factors, the Federal Circuit looked to whether Egenera’s positions were inconsistent, whether its first position was successfully accepted by the court, and whether Egenera would derive an unfair advantage if not estopped. The Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in finding Egenera’s changing inventorship positions inconsistent. The Court explained that inventorship is complex and can depend on claim [...]

Continue Reading

Structural Limitations Are Not Met by Imaginary Demarcation Lines

by Amol Parikh | Sep 9, 2020 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s claim construction of the term “end plate” that required a flat external surface, and its construction of the term “protrusion extending outwardly from the end plate” that required a demarcation between the protrusion and end plate. The Federal Circuit therefore prohibited an infringement theory premised on an end plate being inside the accused product and a protrusion that was not demarcated from the end plate. Neville v. Foundation Constructors, Inc., Case No. 20-1132 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 27, 2020) (Chen, J.).

Neville owns patents directed to foundation piles, which are tubular structures placed into the ground to provide stability for the foundations built over them. One set of claims requires an “end plate having a substantially flat surface disposed perpendicular to the centerline of the tubular pile.” Another set of claims requires “at least one protrusion extending outwardly from the end plate.”

Neville filed a lawsuit alleging that Foundation Constructors’ pile tips infringed the patents. The district court granted summary judgment of non-infringement, reasoning that the plain meaning of “end plate having a substantially flat surface” did not encompass “an interior surface facing into the rest of the pile tip.” Examining the intrinsic record, the district court concluded that “the patent applicant intended the ‘substantially flat surface’ of the end plate to refer to the side of the end plate facing outward.” The court found that the accused products did not have such an “end plate.” As to claims requiring a protrusion extending outwardly from the end plate, the court reasoned that “[b]ecause the end piece of the accused pile tip is a single, conically-shaped piece, there is not a demarcation of where an ‘end plate’ should end and the ‘protrusion’ should begin,” and non-infringement was therefore appropriate. Neville appealed.

Neville argued that the district court’s ruling of non-infringement was based on an incorrect claim construction and should therefore be overturned. The Federal Circuit rejected Neville’s arguments and affirmed summary judgment.

The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the phrase “substantially flat surface disposed perpendicular to the centerline of the tubular pile” did not refer to any interior-facing surface. Starting with the language of the claim, the Court found that the word “end” suggested that the relevant surface of the end plate is the external one at the second end of the pile tip. The Court found that the specification reinforced the view that the invention was directed to the exterior surface of the end plate as being “substantially flat,” and through this end plate the pile tip applies force to the underlying soil. Neville argued that the specification implicitly taught that an end plate having a substantially flat surface perpendicular to the tubular pile could be fully interior to another portion of the pile tip because the specification disclosed that the pile tip, including the end plate, “could be cast as a single unit.” The Court rejected Neville’s argument, finding that under Neville’s logic, the [...]

Continue Reading

Older Posts »

« Newer Posts

BLOG EDITORS

Paul Devinsky

Amol Parikh

Jodi Benassi

BLOG EDITORS

STAY CONNECTED

TOPICS

ARCHIVES

RECENT POSTS