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UPC Court of Appeal Rules on Suspending First Instance Enforcement, Managing Director Liability

by | Nov 21, 2024 | ,

The Court of Appeal (CoA) of the Unified Patent Court (UPC) addressed a request for suspensive effect of an appeal and ruled that managing directors of an alleged patent-infringing company cannot be held liable as “intermediaries” under Article 63 of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPCA). Koninklijke Philips NV v. Belkin GmbH, UPC_CoA_579/2024, ORD_53377/2024 (UPC CoA Oct. 29, 2024) (Rombach, J.)

In contrast to German law (for example), appeals before the UPC generally do not have suspensive effect (See Article 74(1) of the UPCA). Thus, first instance decisions are immediately enforceable under Article 82 of the UPCA and Rule 354 of the UPC Rules of Procedure (RoP), which can have significant economic implications, particularly in the context of injunctions against the affected companies. To mitigate such effects, an application for suspensive effect may be filed under Rule 223.1 of the RoP.

In the present case, Philips initiated an infringement action against the Belkin Group before the Local Division Munich (CFI_390/2024), targeting not only the Belkin Group but also its subsidiaries’ managing directors. In its first instance decision, the Munich court ruled in favor of Philips and granted an injunction against Belkin and its subsidiaries’ managing directors, classifying the latter as “intermediaries” within the meaning of Article 63(1), Section 2 of the UPCA. Belkin appealed and requested suspensive effect under Rule 223.1 of the RoP.

The CoA partially granted this request, ordering suspensive effect with regard to the injunction against the managing directors. The CoA ruled that the suspensive effect of an appeal is an exception that can only be ordered in special circumstances. This involves determining whether the appellant’s interest in maintaining the status quo until the decision of the appeal exceptionally outweighs the respondent’s interest in enforcement. The CoA clarified that such circumstances exist where the decision being appealed is manifestly wrong. Whether this is the case – and whether there is, therefore, an evident violation of the law – is assessed on the basis of the factual findings and legal considerations of the first instance decision. If these findings or legal considerations prove to be untenable on summary examination, suspensive effect must be ordered.

In the present case, the CoA found a manifest error of law in the classification of the managing directors as “intermediaries” within the meaning of Article 63 of the UPCA and Article 11 of Directive 2004/48. It reasoned that managing directors, acting in their official capacity, represent the company itself and are not external to it. Therefore, the appellant company cannot be a “third party” in relation to its CEO. Accordingly, liability under Article 63(1), Section 2 of the UPCA as an intermediary cannot arise solely from the CEO functioning as a managing director.

Consequently, the CoA granted suspensive effect for the injunction against the managing directors but dismissed the application for suspensive effect in all other respects.

Practice Note: Practitioners should carefully consider the rule exception framework when applying for suspensive effect before the UPC. To be successful, a convincing, case-specific justification [...]

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Moving to Recuse? Too Little, Too Late

by | Nov 14, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that waiting until well after an adverse summary judgment motion to move for a district court judge’s recusal is untimely and moot, especially where an appeal from the adverse decision is already filed and where the recusal motion is based on public information. Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit LLC, et al., Case No. 22-1526 (Fed Cir. Nov. 1, 2024) (Taranto, Prost, Reyna, JJ.) (nonprecedential).

Cellspin filed a complaint for patent infringement against Fitbit and others in October 2017. In February 2021, Fitbit amended its corporate disclosure statement to reflect the completion of its acquisition by Google (an indirect subsidiary of Alphabet). Almost a year later, in January 2022, Fitbit and the other defendants moved for summary judgment of noninfringement in their respective cases, and in June 2022, the district court granted summary judgment.

Months later, in January 2023, after the grant of summary judgment and the filing of notices of appeal from that grant, Cellspin filed a motion to recuse the district court judge based on the judge’s mutual fund investments that were likely to invest in Google. The consulting firm for which the judge’s husband worked also sold Google services, but the judge’s spouse did not do work for Google. The district court denied the motion on the merits as untimely and because the district court lacked authority to vacate the summary judgment that was already on appeal.

Applying Ninth Circuit law and reviewing for abuse of discretion, the Federal Circuit found that Cellspin’s behavior in waiting until well after it had lost on summary judgment, and almost two years after Google’s acquisition of Fitbit became final, “raises obvious concerns of lack of equity and strategic misuse of recusal.” The sources Fitbit cited for the judge’s spouse and the activities of the spouse’s employer were also public well before the summary judgment motion was granted, as were the judge’s financial disclosures.

While there is no specific time limit for seeking recusal, the Federal Circuit (citing its 1989 decision in Polaroid v. Eastman Kodak) noted that “timeliness is a well-established consideration in application of the [recusal] statute. In deciding motions to vacate orders issued by an allegedly disqualified judge, the courts have used ‘untimely’ as a synonym for ‘unfair’ when the circumstances, like those present here, are such that a grant of the motion would produce a result inequitable, unjust, and unfair.”

The Federal Circuit also noted that the risk of injustice to the parties from denying vacatur would also be essentially nonexistent here because the Federal Circuit’s concurrent holding on the summary judgment appeal against other defendants had preclusive effect, resolving Cellspin’s infringement assertions against Fitbit as well.

Practice Note: Any motion for recusal should be promptly filed when grounds for the motion become apparent.



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Equivalence Requires Element-by-Element Proof With Linking Argument

by | Nov 7, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court determination that a patent owner had not provided the “particularized testimony and linking argument” required to demonstrate equivalence under the doctrine of equivalents. NexStep, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, Case No. 2022-1815 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 2024) (Chen, Taranto, JJ.) (Reyna, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In his dissent, Judge Reyna criticized the majority for ignoring the totality of the evidence presented by the patent owner and imposing a new rule requiring patentees to always present expert testimony to prove infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.

NexStep owns a patent directed to a “concierge device” for assisting users with obtaining customer support for smart devices. The claims are directed to a concierge device that initiates a technical support session in response to “a single action” (i.e., a single button press) by a user. After the claimed “single action,” the concierge device conveys consumer device identification information for the product at issue, identifies an appropriate technical support team for the product, and causes the home gateway to initiate a support session for the device and forward the consumer device information during the session.

NexStep sued Comcast for patent infringement, asserting that three tools in Comcast’s mobile smartphone application infringed the concierge device patent: Xfinity Assistant, Troubleshooting Card, and Diagnostic Check. Each of these tools assists users with troubleshooting a given device in response to the user pressing a series of buttons on a smartphone’s display. At trial, NexStep argued that pressing a series of buttons literally met the single action limitation because a single action could comprise a series of steps. By way of illustration, NexStep’s expert explained that throwing a baseball – a single action – required multiple steps: “[W]hen you throw a baseball, you pick it up, you orient it, you get it in your palm, you throw it.”

The jury returned a verdict of no literal infringement but found infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Comcast moved for judgment as a matter of law, which the district court granted after finding that NexStep had failed to offer the “particularized testimony and linking argument” required to demonstrate equivalence. NexStep appealed.

The Federal Circuit emphasized that the doctrine of equivalents provides a “limited exception” to the principle that the claim defines the scope of the patentee’s exclusivity rights, and that a finding under the doctrine of equivalents is “exceptional.” To guard against overbroad applications of this exception, the Court’s precedent imposes specific evidentiary requirements necessary to prove infringement under the doctrine. The patent owner must provide proof on an element-by-element basis and from the perspective of someone skilled in the art, “for example through testimony of experts or others versed in the technology; by documents . . . and . . . by the disclosures of the prior art.” Finally, the patent owner must provide “particularized testimony and linking argument as to the insubstantiality of the differences between the claimed invention and the [...]

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Can’t Stop the FRAND: Navigating SEP Licensing Disputes

by | Nov 7, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a district court’s decision to deny an antisuit injunction prohibiting a patent owner from enforcing injunctions that it obtained in Columbia and Brazil on standard essential patents (SEPs). Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, et al. v. Lenovo (United States), Inc., Case No. 24-1515 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 24, 2024) (Prost, Lourie, Reyna, JJ.)

Lenovo and Ericsson entered into negotiations to cross-license their SEPs to each other. SEPs are patents declared essential to complying with a technical standard. Because SEPs by definition must be practiced to comply with a given standard, SEP holders wield significant power over standard implementers during licensing negotiations. Standard setting organizations therefore typically have an intellectual property policy under which SEP holders agree to license their SEPs on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms. Here, the parties agreed that the FRAND commitment was a contract, governed by French law, that each party could enforce against the other, and that the FRAND commitment included an obligation to negotiate in good faith over licenses to SEPs.

After the parties were unsuccessful in reaching agreement, Ericsson sued Lenovo in US district court alleging that Lenovo infringed four of Ericsson’s US SEPs related to the 5G wireless communication standard. Ericsson also alleged that Lenovo breached its FRAND commitment by failing to negotiate in good faith and asked the district court to determine a FRAND rate for a global cross-license between the parties. Lenovo counterclaimed, alleging that Ericsson infringed four of Lenovo’s 5G US SEPs and asking for a similar outcome. Lenovo also asked the district court to enter an antisuit injunction prohibiting Ericsson from enforcing the preliminary injunctions Ericsson obtained in Colombia and Brazil that prohibited Lenovo from infringing Ericsson’s Columbian and Brazilian 5G SEPs. The district court denied Lenovo’s motion, following the antisuit injunction framework in the Ninth Circuit’s 2012 decision in Microsoft v. Motorola. The district court concluded that the instant suit was not dispositive of the foreign action, which was a threshold requirement to enter such an injunction. Lenovo appealed.

The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s determination, finding that a party with a FRAND commitment must negotiate in good faith over a license to its SEPs before it pursues injunctive relief based on those SEPs. Interpreting the “dispositive” requirement, the Court concluded that the “requirement can be met even though a foreign antisuit injunction would resolve only a foreign injunction (and not the entire foreign proceeding), and even though the relevant resolution depends on the potential that one party’s view of the facts or law prevails in the domestic suit.” Here, the Court found that the requirement was met because the “FRAND commitment precludes Ericsson from pursuing SEP-based injunctive relief unless it has first complied with the commitment’s obligation to negotiate in good faith over a license to those SEPs.” If the district court were to determine that Ericsson had not complied with that obligation, that determination would dictate the impropriety of Ericsson pursuing SEP-based injunctive relief. Accordingly, the [...]

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Promises, Promises: Covenant Not to Sue for Patent Infringement Includes Downstream Users

by | Oct 31, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed that a district court did not err in applying ordinary rules of contract construction to a covenant not to sue and properly found that under the patent exhaustion doctrine, the covenant encompassed downstream users. Fuel Automation Station, LLC v. Energera Inc., Case Nos. 23-1123; -1358 (10th Cir. Oct. 21, 2024) (Carson, Rossman, Federico, JJ.)

Fuel Automation Station (FAS) and Energera compete in the manufacture of automated fuel delivery equipment and related services. Energera holds patents related to its fuel delivery equipment. In 2016 and 2018, Energera sued FAS, alleging that it infringed two of its patents. The parties resolved the suits with a single settlement agreement in 2019. The agreement described the scope of the patent rights at issue and provided mutual covenants not to sue.

Less than a year later, FAS contracted with a Canadian corporation to operate its fuel automation equipment. Energera sued the Canadian corporation for infringement of one of its patents. FAS intervened, then separately sued Energera seeking a declaration that the covenant not to sue authorized FAS to sell or lease its own equipment and, therefore, the patent exhaustion doctrine prohibited Energera from suing downstream users, such as the Canadian corporation. FAS also brought two breach of contract claims asserting that Energera violated the settlement agreement and its included covenant since it was prohibited from suing the Canadian corporation for downstream use or from suing or “otherwise engag[ing]” FAS in legal proceedings.

FAS moved for summary judgment on its declaratory judgment count, which the district court granted. However, the court denied both parties’ later motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether the settlement agreement covered the asserted patent, finding that an ambiguity in the agreement created genuine issues of material fact. A jury subsequently found that the agreement did cover the asserted patent and that Energera breached the covenant. Energera appealed.

After first determining that the district court’s summary judgment ruling was an appealable legal ruling on the issue of the scope of the covenant, the Tenth Circuit found that the district court correctly interpreted the covenant to include downstream users. In the covenant, Energera promised “not to sue [FAS] or otherwise engage [FAS] in any domestic or foreign legal or administrative proceeding” related to the Patent Rights. Citing dictionary definitions of “engage” in its analysis, the Tenth Circuit found that the term “otherwise engage” reasonably could show the parties’ intent to prohibit Energera from suing FAS’s downstream users. The Court then invoked the patent exhaustion doctrine, which it called “the brooding omnipresence in the sky of patent law.” The Court explained that if a patent holder promises not to sue an entity for patent infringement when the entity sells or leases an item, “the doctrine recognizes an inherent promise not to sue downstream users of those items.” Otherwise, the Court pointed out, no reasonable customer would want to buy or lease a patented item from an authorized seller.

As to whether the [...]

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Pre-Markman Claim Construction Is OK, Within Limits

by | Oct 31, 2024 |

In an appeal stemming from the denial of a preliminary injunction and dismissal of the complaint, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit clarified its precedent and explained that a district court may construe claims at the motion to dismiss Rule 12(b)(6) stage, but only to the extent necessary to decide the motion. UTTO Inc. v. Metrotech Corp., Case No. 23-1435 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 18, 2024) (Prost, Taranto, Hughes, JJ.)

UTTO sued Metrotech in the US District Court for the Northern District of California for patent infringement and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage under California law. UTTO also moved for a preliminary injunction. The asserted patent describes and claims methods for detecting and identifying “buried assets,” which refers to underground utility lines. The district court denied the preliminary injunction because of UTTO’s failure to show a likelihood of success on the merits for infringement based on the district court’s construction. The district court adopted a construction of the term “group” as requiring at least two data points per buried asset. The district court then dismissed the original complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted but allowed UTTO to amend, explaining that infringement of the claims as construed at the preliminary injunction stage was not pled.

UTTO then filed an amended complaint, which the district court also dismissed, noting that UTTO failed to plead facts supporting infringement of other limitations under the claim construction issued at the preliminary injunction stage. The district court again granted UTTO leave to amend, which UTTO did. But the district court dismissed that third complaint as well, this time with prejudice, citing the claim construction in its order at the preliminary injunction stage.

On appeal, UTTO (citing 2018 Federal Circuit precedent Nalco v. Chem-Mod) challenged the district court’s claim construction and its reliance on a claim construction in an order denying summary judgment to dismiss a complaint. The Federal Circuit explained that claim construction by a district court “to resolve . . . particular claim construction issues in [a] case” may be necessary and is not categorically barred at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. The Court explained that there is a “logical relationship of claim construction” between “infringement and the normal function of courts deciding whether to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” An infringement analysis first requires an analysis of the scope and meaning of the claims asserted and then the “properly construed claims” are compared to the accused device or method. Often, claims are construed based on intrinsic evidence alone, which the Federal Circuit concluded “is not different in kind from the interpretation of other legal standards, which is proper and routine in ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6).” As an example, the Court cited its routine dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) in connection with motions under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

The Federal Circuit cautioned that not all claim construction issues need to be construed at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, but only those issues necessary to decide a [...]

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No Leave, No Appeal: UPC Court of Appeal Denies Request for Discretionary Review

by | Oct 24, 2024 | ,

The Court of Appeal (CoA) of the Unified Patent Court (UPC) ruled that if a party wishes to appeal against a procedural order, and leave to appeal has not already been granted in the order, the party must first apply to the Court of First Instance for leave to appeal. Only if such an application is rejected is it then possible to request a discretionary review by the CoA (pursuant to Rule 220.3 of the UPC Rules of Procedure (RoP)). Suinno Mobile & AI Technologies Licensing Oy v. Microsoft Corporation (_586/2024, APL_ 54732/2024) (UPC CoA Oct. 9, 2024) (Simonsson, Standing J.)

In the proceedings between Suinno and Microsoft before the UPC Central Division Paris (Court of First Instance in these proceedings), the latter ordered the claimant, Suinno, to provide security for costs. There was no indication in the order that it could be appealed.

Suinno did not request that the Court of First Instance grant leave to appeal, but instead directly lodged a request for discretionary review of the order with the CoA.

The CoA deemed this request inadmissible and dismissed the appeal. The standing judge (see Rules 345.5 and .8 of the RoP) noted that the Court of First Instance had neither granted nor denied leave to appeal and the first instance order did not contain any reference to Article 73 of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPCA) and Rule 220.2 of the RoP, contrary to Rule 158.3 of the RoP.

However, this did not relieve Suinno from its obligation to request a grant of leave to appeal from the Court of First Instance. Absent an express grant or refusal of a grant, there is no implied grant of leave to appeal, notwithstanding that the Court of First Instance did not mention the possibility of requesting leave to appeal. The CoA cited Rule 158 of the RoP but noted that the absence of the indication referring to Article 73 of the UPCA and Rule 220.2 of the RoP cannot be understood as an implied grant.

Practice Note: A discretionary review by the CoA pursuant to Rule 220.3 of the RoP is only permissible if the Court of First Instance has expressly granted or expressly refused to grant leave to appeal, which is in line with other CoA decisions on this issue (See, e.g., CoA, Order of August 21, 2024; UPC_CoA_454/2024, APL_44552/2024, para 21; Order of October 15, 2024, CoA_UPC 01/2024, ORD_41423/2024 in the main proceedings ACT_588685/2023, UPC_CFI_440/2023, para 6).

Even if, contrary to the RoP, a first instance decision of the UPC does not contain any indication that an appeal may be filed in accordance with the UPCA and the RoP (but is silent on the issue of appeal in general), there is no positive effect for a party wishing to appeal the decision; it is still necessary to request a grant of leave to appeal from the Court of First Instance. [...]

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No Matter How You Slice and Dice It, Conclusory Evidence Can’t Support Entire Market Value Damages

by | Oct 10, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the entire market value rule was not applicable where conclusory expert testimony was the only evidence that a product’s infringing features drove consumer demand, and therefore reversed. Provisur Techs., Inc. v. Weber, Inc., Case No. 23-1438 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 2, 2024) (Moore, C.J.; Taranto, Cecchi, JJ.)

Provisur sued Weber in the Western District of Missouri over three patents related to slicing and packaging meats and cheeses. The jury determined that Weber willfully infringed several claims of the three asserted patents and awarded damages. Following the trial, Weber moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on the issues of infringement and willfulness, and a new trial on infringement, willfulness, and damages. The district court denied Weber’s motion in its entirety. Weber appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment with respect to two of the asserted patents but reversed the infringement finding on the sole asserted claim of the third patent. Provisur’s infringement theory was that the consumer could program the device to infringe the limitations of the claim. However, at trial, Provisur provided no evidence that it was actually possible for the consumer to configure the device to practice the claim or that any consumer had ever done so. Some of the software necessary to be configured in an infringing manner was not accessible to the consumer. Instead, only Weber service technicians could access it. Provisur also proffered no evidence that the devices had ever actually been configured to infringe the claims, instead only offering evidence that the claims could have been infringed.

Next, the Federal Circuit assessed willfulness. Weber’s primary argument was that the district court improperly allowed expert testimony in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 298, which states that a party’s failure “to obtain the advice of counsel with respect to any allegedly infringed patent . . . may not be used to prove that the accused infringer willfully infringed the patent.” Provisur’s expert, who testified about industry standards for intellectual property management, “did not distinguish between legal and non-legal services when testifying about consulting a third party.” The Court concluded that that portion of the testimony was inadmissible and the remaining evidence could not support a finding of willfulness.

Finally, the Federal Circuit addressed the damages issue, specifically focusing on the reasonable royalty award. The infringing features were subparts of a larger accused product – which had many non-infringing features. The accused product contained multiple separate machines unrelated to the alleged invention.

Provisur’s royalty award was predicated on its use of the entire market value rule, where the base to which the royalty rate is applied is the cost of the entire accused product as opposed the cost of just the infringing part. The Federal Circuit noted that the entire market value rule is an acceptable theory, but it requires a showing that the infringing part “is the basis for customer demand.”

Provisur’s damages expert used the entire market value rule in calculating the [...]

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End of an Era: PTO Terminates AFCP 2.0 Amid Fee Concerns

by | Oct 10, 2024 |

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) announced the termination of the After Final Consideration Pilot Program (AFCP) 2.0, effective December 15, 2024. 89 Fed. Reg. 79899 (Oct. 1, 2024).

Launched in 2013, AFCP 2.0 aimed to streamline the patent examination process following a final rejection by allowing applicants to submit amendments without incurring additional fees. The program provided examiners with extra time to review these amendments, conduct additional searches, and potentially schedule interviews with applicants to discuss the results.

Since 2016, applicants have filed more than 60,000 AFCP 2.0 requests annually. The PTO noted that the high usage was due in part to the program’s benefits being provided at no direct cost to participants. However, the PTO estimated that it has incurred more than $15 million in costs due to the program. Consequently, on April 3, 2024, the PTO proposed a new fee to recuperate costs affiliated with AFCP 2.0 requests. This proposal sparked concerns among commenters about AFCP 2.0.

In light of these concerns, the PTO has decided to allow the AFCP 2.0 program to expire. Although the program was initially set to end on September 30, 2024, the PTO extended it to accommodate those currently participating or preparing to use the program. The final date to submit a request under the program is December 14, 2024.



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Got Pillaged? Not If You Didn’t Follow the APA and FTCA

by | Oct 10, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court decision dismissing claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) relating to “pillaged patents.” The Federal Circuit found that dismissal was appropriate because the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies and the claims were barred under collateral estoppel. Winfrey v. Dep’t of Com., Case No. 24-1260 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2024) (Prost, Hughes, Cunningham, JJ.) (per curiam).

Eula Winfrey filed a pro se complaint in district court seeking “relief for the issue of two pillaged patents,” one of which was directed to a “step-up diaper” and the other to a “stroller buddy.” Winfrey claimed that the PTO “improperly denied her two patent applications and wrongfully deemed the applications to be abandoned,” and that she was the true inventor of Huggies Pull-Ups diapers. Interpreting Winfrey’s requests for relief as claims under the FTCA and the APA, the district court dismissed the claims related to the step-up diaper patent application for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court found that Winfrey never presented an administrative claim to the PTO as required by the FTCA and that she did not file a petition to revive the application after the PTO deemed it abandoned. The district court also dismissed Winfrey’s APA claim related to the stroller buddy patent application based on collateral estoppel because Winfrey had previously litigated that claim. Winfrey appealed.

Applying Eleventh Circuit law, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all of Winfrey’s claims. Addressing the FTCA claim first, the Court noted that “nowhere in any of her extensive filings before this court do we find evidence that Ms. Winfrey filed the requisite administrative claim to bring a claim for money damages against the USPTO.” The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s dismissal of claims related to the stroller buddy application based on collateral estoppel, finding that Winfrey had brought the claim unsuccessfully three times. Finally, with respect to the APA claim for the step-up diaper patent application, the Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies after finding that Winfrey failed to “present any evidence that she filed a petition with the USPTO to revive her application or challenge its abandonment determination.”



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