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Size Matters in Obviousness Analysis

by | Oct 29, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part two Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) decisions, finding that the Board erred in its construction of certain claim terms relating to an artificial heart valve that does not require removal of the damaged native heart valve. St. Jude Medical, LLC v. Snyders Heart Valve LLC, Case Nos. 19-2108, -2109, -2140 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 15, 2020) (Taranto, J.).

St. Jude filed two petitions for inter partes review (IPR) of a patent for an artificial heart valve and a system for inserting the valve. Both petitions were instituted by the Board and resulted in final written decisions. In the first decision, the Board found that St. Jude failed to establish unpatentability of the challenged claims, rejecting St. Jude’s contention that all challenged claims were anticipated by and obvious over the Leonhardt prior art reference. In the second decision, the Board found that certain claims were anticipated by the Bessler prior art reference, but rejected St. Jude’s contentions as to all other claims. St. Jude appealed, arguing that the Board erred in the first decision by erroneously construing the term “band” and erred in the second decision by finding that St. Jude failed to prove that a skilled artisan would have made a particular combination of Bessler and the Johnson prior art. Snyders cross-appealed in the second decision as to the claims the Board found were anticipated by Bessler.

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s conclusions in the first decision, finding that not only was the Board’s construction of the term “band” proper, but that it was actually broader than St. Jude’s proposed construction—and that St. Jude expressly accepted the Board’s construction. The Board construed the heart valve band to mean “a structure generally in the shape of a closed strip or ring” (replacing St. Jude’s “circular” with “closed”). In the prior art, Leonhardt discloses a graft material which extends the length of the entire structure. The Federal Circuit agreed with the Board’s finding that Leonhardt’s graft material was “like a sleeve” as opposed to “a closed strip or ring.” St. Jude argued that an ordinary skilled artisan’s understanding of the term “band” does not include a length restriction, that a Leonhardt’s material was just a long band, and that the Board effectively changed its construction of the term. The Federal Circuit, however, was not persuaded by St. Jude’s unlimited-length definition of “band,” instead turning to dictionary definitions that included terms like “thin” and “narrow,” and looking to the patent specification that did not explicitly disclaim any length restrictions. The Court ultimately rejected St. Jude’s arguments, finding that St. Jude should have proposed a claim construction that precluded any limitations on length if it wished to argue such. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s findings as to first decision.

The Federal Circuit next addressed Snyder’s cross-appeal. Snyder disputed the board’s construction of the “size[] and shape[]” of a frame that the patent requires must be inserted [...]

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PTO Seeks Comments on Proposed Rulemaking for Denying Patent Reviews

by | Oct 29, 2020 | ,

The US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) requested public comments on considerations for instituting trials under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA). Comments are due by November 19, 2020.

Patent practitioners have grown accustomed to reviewing the PTO Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) administrative guide, precedential or informative opinions, and other published filings and decisions to discern best practices for filing petitions for and defending against inter partes review, post-grant review, covered business method and derivation proceedings before the Board. For example, the latest Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019) (CTPG) is available here. The PTO is considering codifying or modifying its current policies and practices through formal rulemaking and wishes to gather public comments on its current approach and other approaches suggested by stakeholders.

PTO policies and Board decisions such as General Plastic, Valve Corp. I, Valve Corp. II, NHK Spring and Fintiv set forth factors for analyzing whether to institute an AIA proceeding (and particularly a follow-on or serial petition) or issue a discretionary denial due to the timeline for parallel district court proceedings. Many of these policies and cases are also discussed in the CTPG. The PTO already has received input from stakeholders on these policies that expand on the PTO director’s discretionary authority to institute an AIA trial. Most stakeholder comments suggested that the case-specific analysis outlined in precedential opinions and the CTPG achieves the appropriate balance and reduces gamesmanship—for example, by ensuring that AIA proceedings do not create excessive costs and uncertainty for the patent owner or the system, while allowing meritorious challenges to patents to be heard. However, some stakeholders have proposed that the PTO adopt brightline rules, regardless of the case-specific circumstances, to:

  • Use its discretion to preclude claims from being subject to more than one AIA proceeding
  • Permit more than one AIA proceeding only if the follow-on petitioner is unrelated to the prior petitioner
  • Place no limits on the number of petitions that can be filed or the number of AIA trials that can be instituted against the claims of a patent, so long as the petition complies with statutory timing requirements and the institution threshold of showing that at least one claim of the patent is unpatentable
  • Preclude institution of an AIA trial against challenged claims if the patent owner opposes institution and a related district court or US International Trade Commission (ITC) action (in which any of the challenged claims are or have been asserted against the petitioner, the petitioner’s real-party-in-interest or a privy of the petitioner) is unlikely to be stayed
  • Eliminate any consideration of the status of any district court or ITC actions involving the challenged patent, so long as the petition complies with statutory timing requirements and the institution threshold.

These contrasting views prompted the PTO to issue a request for comments on the factors that should be considered as part of a balanced assessment of the relevant circumstances when exercising its discretion to institute an AIA trial. The PTO [...]

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Only Human: Broadest Reasonable Interpretation Standard Applies to Intentionally Expired Patent

by | Oct 22, 2020 | ,

Affirming an invalidity finding by the Patent and Trial Appeal Board (PTAB), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the claims of the now-expired patent should be construed under the broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) standard, and not under the Phillips standard, because the patent owner intentionally gave up the remainder of the patent term only after the appeal was fully briefed. Immunex Corp. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, Case Nos. 19-1749, -1777 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 13, 2020) (Prost, C.J.).

Immunex owns a patent directed to human antibodies that inhabit certain receptors to treat inflammatory diseases such as arthritis. After being sued for infringement, Sanofi and Regeneron (collectively, Sanofi) requested inter partes review (IPR) of the patent, which the PTAB instituted. Based on the IPR filing date and because the patent was unexpired during the pendency of the IPR proceeding, the PTAB used the BRI standard to construe various claim terms. Had the patent been expired, the PTAB would have used the more stringent Phillips standard to construe the claims. Ultimately, the PTAB found all of the challenged claims unpatentable. Immunex appealed.

After appellate briefing was complete, Immunex filed a terminal disclaimer of its patent. The US Patent and Trademark Office accepted the terminal disclaimer, and as a result the patent term expired approximately two months before oral argument. Immunex then filed a citation of supplemental authority informing the Federal Circuit of the terminal disclaimer and asking the Court to change the applicable claim construction standard from BRI to Phillips.

The Federal Circuit found that the application of the BRI standard to Immunex’s patent was appropriate. Although the PTAB currently applies the Phillips claim construction standard in all newly filed IPRs, at the time that Sanofi filed its IPRs, the PTAB applied the Phillips standard only to expired patents. For unexpired patents, it applied the BRI standard. The Court noted that the use of the Phillips standard in cases where the patent expired during the appellate process should not be an absolute, particularly when the patent term expired at an unexpected early date, such as through the filing of a terminal disclaimer.

The Federal Circuit further affirmed the PTAB’s claim construction under the BRI standard and the invalidity finding predicated on that claim construction. The issue on appeal was whether a “human antibody” must be entirely human (as asserted by Immunex) or whether it may also be “partially human,” including “humanized” (as asserted by Sanofi and construed by the PTAB). The Court agreed with the PTAB and found that the patent’s specification supported the conclusion that the BRI of “human antibody” “includes both fully human and partially human antibodies.” The Court also found that “human antibodies” in the context of the patent-in-suit is a broad category that encompasses both partially and completely human antibodies. The Court therefore affirmed the PTAB’s finding.

The Federal Circuit also commented on the PTAB’s departure from an earlier claim construction ruling by a district court in which “human” was construed to mean “fully [...]

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Inventor Uses Abstention to Avoid Getting “Screwed”

by | Oct 22, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a declaratory judgment complaint related to patent validity under the federal abstention doctrine because the issue had been decided in state court. Warsaw Orthopedic, Medtronic Inc., et al. v. Rick C. Sasso, M.D., Case No. 19-1583 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 14, 2020) (Newman, J.).

Warsaw Orthopedic and Medtronic (collectively, Medtronic) filed a declaratory judgment complaint against Sasso, a surgeon and inventor. The district court dismissed the complaint, without prejudice, under the doctrine of federal court “abstention” because of a concurrent lawsuit in state court between the same parties and concerning the same dispute. As described by the respective plaintiffs, the state court case is “a contract case for payment of patent rights,” and the federal case is “a patent case in which payment requires valid patents.”

In 1999, Medtronic and Sasso entered into an agreement that provided for quarterly royalty payments based on Medtronic’s sales of medical devices using Sasso’s inventions related to screw delivery systems and methods. The agreement does not terminate until “the last to expire of the patents included in Intellectual Property Rights, or if no patent application(s) issue into a patent having valid claim coverage of the Medical Device, then seven (7) years from the Date of First Sale of the Medical Device.” Two patents issued for the invention at issue, and Medtronic made royalty payments from 2002 to 2018.

In 2014, Sasso filed a lawsuit in Indiana state court for breach of contract and damages because Medtronic was not paying royalties on all relevant devices. Medtronic argued that Sasso was seeking royalties for products not covered by a valid patent claim. The district court granted Sasso’s motion for summary judgment on the term of the agreement and on patent validity as a defense to payment, stating that the monies to be paid under the agreement depend on the issuance of the patents and their expiration—not their validity. At trial, the jury found that Medtronic had breached the agreement and awarded damages. Medtronic filed an appeal to the Indiana Court of Appeals.

Medtronic also filed a declaratory judgment action in Indiana district court. Medtronic alleged that no valid claim of the patents covered the Medtronic products for which Sasso sought royalties. The district court dismissed the action without prejudice, stating that the state court had already entered judgment in favor of Sasso and no order from the district court could undo that judgment—only the Indiana Court of Appeals and the Indiana Supreme Court have authority to review that judgment.

Medtronic appealed to the Federal Circuit, asserting that the district court’s “abstention” was an abuse of discretion. Medtronic argued that because the agreement required valid claim coverage, and patent validity is within exclusive federal jurisdiction, the district court had an obligation to receive and resolve the dispute.

The Federal Circuit found that the district court had reasonably relied on the Supreme Court’s Wilton/Brillhart abstention doctrine (1995), which provides support for district courts to dismiss or [...]

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Define Frustration: Appealing from Decision in Suit Against Co-Owner’s Wholly Owned Subsidiary with Major Issues Still Undecided

by | Oct 22, 2020 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a grant of summary judgment of non-infringement and remanded for resolution of numerous factual issues in a case addressing “extremely frustrating” issues involving the litigant’s failure to differentiate statutory prerequisites for bringing suit under 35 USC §262 and Article III standing, waiver of a co-owner’s right to refuse to join a patent enforcement action, and the existence of an express or implied license. AntennaSys, Inc. v. AQYR Techs., Inc., Case No. 19-2244 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 7, 2020) (O’Malley, J.).

AntennaSys and Windmill International are co-owners of the patent in suit. AntennaSys and Windmill entered into a license agreement pursuant to which Windmill acquired an exclusive license to AntennaSys’s one-half interest in the patent in two separate markets. In exchange, AntennaSys was entitled to a royalty of 3% of gross sales. Windmill was also required to create a wholly owned LLC, GBS Positioner, which would own both the license interest and Windmill’s ownership interest in the patent. In the event that Windmill failed to meet the minimum sales targets, the exclusive license became non-exclusive and either party was granted the right to commence a lawsuit against “third party” infringers.

Windmill did not meet its sales targets. AntennaSys subsequently brought suit against AQYR Technologies, a wholly owned subsidiary of Windmill, for patent infringement and several state-law claims. The suit named Windmill as a co-defendant. Following claim construction, AntennaSys conceded that it could not prevail on its patent infringement claim under the court’s construction of one of the claim terms. In an apparent attempt to moot the affirmative defenses of invalidity and unenforceability, AntennaSys sought summary judgment of non-infringement, which the district court granted. Additionally, after a hearing where AntennaSys admitted that its state law claims were dependent on the success of its patent infringement claim, the court entered judgment in favor of defendants on the state law claims. AntennaSys appealed.

AntennaSys challenged the district court’s claim construction. Windmill and AQYR countered that the Federal Circuit need not reach the merits because AntennaSys “lacks standing” to bring an infringement action in federal court absent joining co-owner Windmill as a co-plaintiff.

The Federal Circuit agreed that the need to join Windmill as a co-plaintiff was a threshold question, but stressed that the issue did not affect AntennaSys’s Article III standing. Instead the issue stemmed from AntennaSys’s ability to satisfy the statutory prerequisites for bringing an infringement action. Under 35 USC § 262, each joint owner of a patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention without the consent of, and without accounting to, the other owners. Furthermore, in order to bring an action for infringement, all co-owners must be joined as plaintiffs. The Court acknowledged two exceptions to this rule: (1) when any patent owner has granted an exclusive license, and (2) when a co-owner waives its right to refuse to join an infringement action.

As the license in this case had morphed into non-exclusive status, the question became whether [...]

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Significant Third-Party Discovery Too Complex for ITC Early Disposition Program

by and | Oct 22, 2020 | ,

The US International Trade Commission (ITC) denied a proposed respondent’s request to use the early disposition program to determine whether a complainant met the domestic industry requirement in a Section 337 investigation. The ITC concluded that the issues proposed for resolution were too complex to be decided within 100 days of institution because significant third-party discovery was likely necessary. Certain Video Processing Devices, Components Thereof, and Digital Smart Televisions Containing Same, Comm’n Order, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-1222 (Oct. 14, 2020).

The early disposition program aims to limit unnecessary litigation and save time and resources for litigants and the ITC by resolving obvious and fatal deficiencies in a complainant’s case before the parties embark on a full Section 337 investigation. The program provides for an initial determination by the presiding administrative law judge within 100 days of institution on potentially dispositive issues. The administrative law judge may hold expedited hearings and stay discovery of any other issues during the pendency of the 100-day proceeding. The ITC has indicated that appropriate issues for resolution include domestic industry, importation, standing and patent subject matter eligibility.

Complainant DivX, LLC, a video software technology company, relied on its licensee’s assembly of smart TVs in the United States to satisfy the domestic industry requirement. Proposed respondent Realtek Semiconductor Corporation, a chipmaker for consumer electronics, argued that DivX would be unlikely to meet the domestic industry requirement because DivX’s licensee stopped identifying several of its products as “Assembled in the USA” to avoid deceiving consumers in connection with a petition filed before the Federal Trade Commission. Realtek also argued that DivX could not identify smart TVs as the domestic industry product for purposes of the economic prong and a different video processor product for purposes of the technical prong. Realtek sought to resolve these issues through the early disposition program, and DivX opposed. Although neither party raised the issue of third-party discovery, the ITC denied Realtek’s request because such discovery was likely necessary, making adjudication within 100 days impracticable.

Practice Note: The ITC places great emphasis on the expeditious adjudication of Section 337 investigations because of the ITC’s statutory mandate to complete them at the earliest practicable time. The early disposition program builds on that mandate and can provide an even speedier timeframe by streamlining and resolving dispositive issues within 100 days of institution. A proposed respondent should consider requesting early disposition for clear weaknesses in a complainant’s case where the issue to be decided is not complex and does not require significant discovery. While the ITC does not grant use of the early disposition program often, where it has done so, several cases have ended with withdrawal of the complaint or termination before a hearing.



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Federal Circuit Restores Induced Infringement Verdict Against Teva

by | Oct 15, 2020 |

Addressing the issue of whether a generic pharmaceutical company can be found to induce infringement even when all patented uses have been “carved out” of the label (resulting in a so-called “skinny label”), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that circumstantial evidence of inducement was sufficient. The Court relied on evidence that defendant stated its drug was a “complete replacement” for plaintiff’s drug covered by the asserted patent. GlaxoSmithKline LLC et al. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., Case Nos. 18-1976, -2023 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 2, 2020) (Newman, J.) (Prost, C.J., dissenting). The Court reinstated a jury verdict against Teva Pharmaceuticals, ordering it to pay GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) $235 million.

GSK brought suit against Teva in 2014 in response to Teva’s attempt to market a generic form of carvedilol, developed and marketed by GSK under the brand name Coreg®. Coreg® was US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved for three separate indications: hypertension, congestive heart failure (CHF), and left ventricular dysfunction following a myocardial infarction (post-MI LVD). After March 2007, however, no GSK Orange-Book-listed patent covered the hypertension or post-MI LVD indications. A reissue patent that issued in January 2008 remained in force for CHF.

In 2002, Teva filed an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) with the FDA. Before Teva’s carvedilol product was finally approved in September 2007, Teva amended its ANDA and proposed label to “carve out” the CHF indication according to 21 USC § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii)—often referred to as a “section viii carve-out.” Thus, Teva’s carvedilol “skinny label” was only indicated for hypertension and post-MI LVD, neither of which was, at that time, covered by any GSK patent.

After a trial, the jury found that Teva had willfully induced infringement of GSK’s patent and awarded GSK $235 million in damages. The district court then granted Teva’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding that the inducement verdict was not supported by substantial evidence. GSK, the district court reasoned, had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Teva’s alleged inducement (as opposed to other factors) had actually caused even at least one physician to prescribe generic carvedilol for CHF. GSK appealed.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit overturned the grant of judgment as a matter of law, reasoning that the “intent element” of inducement may be proven through circumstantial evidence. The Court noted that the jury had received evidence of, e.g., “Teva’s promotional materials [referring] to Teva’s carvedilol tablets as AB rated equivalents of the Coreg® tablets,” press releases identifying Teva’s product as “Generic Coreg® Tablets,” Teva’s Monthly Prescribing References, and testimony from GSK’s cardiologist witness that physicians are “completely reliant” on information provided by the generic companies. The majority concluded that this was “ample record evidence . . . to support the jury verdict of inducement.”

Chief Circuit Judge Prost authored a lengthy dissent warning of the broad implications of the majority’s ruling, including contravening the congressional design and intent of the generic approval system, and potentially stifling innovation by giving rise to [...]

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Non-Respondent’s Product Cannot Be Adjudicated for Infringement in Context of General Exclusion Order

by and | Oct 15, 2020 |

The US International Trade Commission issued a general exclusion order (GEO) excluding from entry into the United States products infringing patents directed to luxury vinyl tile, but vacated findings in the Initial Determination (ID) adjudicating infringement for products belonging to entities not named as respondents in the investigation. The Commission explained that a finding should not be made as to whether a non-respondent’s product infringes a patent in the context of a GEO, but instead the analysis should be limited to whether the “alleged” infringement supports a finding that there is a pattern of violation of Section 337. Certain Luxury Vinyl Tile and Components Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-1155, Comm’n Op. (Oct. 5, 2020).

The ITC instituted an investigation against multiple respondents. The administrative law judge granted summary determination of violation by certain defaulting respondents and recommended a GEO. Unlike limited exclusion orders (LEO), which only prohibit infringing goods imported by a named respondent in an investigation, GEOs prohibit entry of the infringing products regardless of the source. GEOs are issued when necessary to prevent circumvention of an LEO or when there is a pattern of violation and it is difficult to identify the source of infringing products. In connection with the request for a GEO in this investigation, the complainants accused two additional products from non-respondents of infringement. In the ID, the administrative law judge analyzed the two products and determined that they infringed the asserted patents.

The Commission determined to review the ID in part. On review, the Commission determined that a GEO was appropriate, but vacated the findings of the ID that adjudicated infringement of the asserted patents by the two products belonging to the non-respondents. The Commission explained that in considering a GEO, a finding should not be made as to whether a non-respondent’s product infringes a patent and instead the analysis should be limited to whether there is a pattern of violation of Section 337. The Commission therefore vacated the infringement findings to avoid confusion and possible prejudice to the non-respondents in future proceedings.

Practice Note: A GEO is an attractive remedy for companies confronted by widespread infringement by imported products originating from sources that are difficult to identify or companies that dissolve and re-emerge as new entities and can therefore circumvent an LEO. The Commission has now made it easier to obtain a GEO because “alleged” infringement by products from a non-respondent can be used to show a pattern of violation warranting a GEO without a full adjudication of infringement for those products.



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Product-by-Process Analysis Applies to Method of Treatment Claims

by | Oct 8, 2020 |

In a case relating to use of recombinant human interferon-β (IFN-β) proteins for the treatment of viral diseases, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that a “product-by-process” analysis applies even when the product-by-process limitation is nested within a method of treatment claim. Biogen MA Inc. v. EMD Serono, Inc., et al., Case No. 19-1133 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 28, 2020) (Linn, J.).

The claims at issue relate to a method of treating a viral condition, a viral disease, cancers or tumors by administration of a pharmaceutically effective amount of recombinant IFN-β. The claims contained a product-by-process limitation that partially defined the recombinant IFN-β in terms of the method or process by which it is made:

a recombinant polypeptide produced by a non-human host transformed by a recombinant DNA molecule comprising a DNA sequence selected from the group consisting of . . .

It was undisputed that native IFN-β proteins comprise sequences identical to those recited in the claims at issue, and that native IFN-β had been used in the prior art to treat viral conditions. At issue was whether the use of native IFN-β to treat viral conditions anticipated the use of recombinantly produced IFN-β for the claimed treatment.

When considering product-by-process claims, the Federal Circuit has long held that “an old product is not patentable even if it is made by a new process.” See, e.g., Amgen v. Hoffmann-La Roche (Fed. Cir. 2009). The district court granted Biogen’s judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) motion and reversed the jury verdict on anticipation, reasoning that the Amgen analysis did not apply here because the claims were directed to a method of treatment and not a product. Further, the “source limitations” (i.e., the limitations requiring that the IFN-β be produced using recombinant methods) overcame the shortcoming of the prior art. Namely, the unavailability of native IFN-β in sufficient quantity to facilitate practical treatment “lies at the heart of the benefit of this invention” and should be given “force and effect in the anticipation analysis.” Serono appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed, explaining that the nesting of the product-by-process limitation within a method of treatment claim does not change the proper construction of the product-by-process limitation itself. The Federal Circuit reasoned that “an old method of administration of an old product made by a new process is not novel and cannot be patented.” Further, the Court found that the district court erred in considering the advantages of the recombinant process—the new capability of manufacturing sufficient quantities of IFN-β through recombinant technology—as a reason not to apply the product-by-process analysis. The proper anticipation analysis does not turn on the source of the claimed polypeptide, but on a comparison of the claimed recombinant polypeptide and the prior art native polypeptide.

In granting JMOL, the district court alternatively reasoned that under a product-by-process analysis, the native IFN-β could not anticipate recombinant IFN-β, because the prior art did not disclose that the native and recombinant IFN-β shared an identical three-dimensional structure or that [...]

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No Due Process Violation When New Panel Hears Substantive Arguments

by | Oct 8, 2020 | ,

Affirming a Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) non-obviousness determination, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the Board did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning a patent owner who engaged in ex parte communications by having a new panel hear the merits of the petition. Apple Inc. v. Voip-Pal.com Inc., Case Nos. 18-1456, -1457 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2020) (Reyna, J.).

Voip-Pal sued Apple for allegedly infringing two of its patents directed to routing communications between two different types of networks: public and private. Apple then petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of several claims from both patents, arguing they were invalid as obvious. The Board ultimately found the claims were not invalid because Apple did not provide evidentiary support as to the motivation to combine multiple references.

During the IPR proceedings, Voip-Pal’s former CEO sent six letters to various parties, copying members of Congress, the President, federal judges and administrative patent judges at the Board criticizing the IPR system, complaining about the cancellation rate and requesting judgment in favor of Voip-Pal. The letters did not discuss the underlying merits of Apple’s petitions. In view of Voip-Pal’s conduct, Apple requested that the Board sanction Voip-Pal by entering adverse judgment against Voip-Pal or by vacating the final written decisions and assigning a new panel to preside over “constitutionally correct” new proceedings going forward.

For the sanctions proceeding, a new panel replaced the initial panel and determined that Voip-Pal had engaged in sanctionable conduct, and further determined that it  would preside over Apple’s petition for rehearing. The new panel found that Apple failed to show the initial panel had misapprehended or overlooked any matter, and even if the final panel were to accept Apple’s view of the prior art, it would not reach a different conclusion. Apple appealed.

On appeal, the Federal Circuit first addressed whether the appeal was moot. Before oral argument, the Court found in separate proceedings that some, but not all, of the claims at issue were invalid. Apple argued that this case mooted the entire appeal, even though the claims did not entirely overlap. Starting with the overlapping claims, the Court found that the appeal was moot in regards to these claims because Apple no longer had the potential for injury. However, the Court rejected Apple’s argument that the appeal was moot under a theory of claim preclusion in regards to the non-overlapping claims. The Court explained that any preclusive effect from the other appeal must be decided by a future court in any subsequent action brought by Voip-Pal. Thus, any discussion regarding claim preclusion would be advisory in nature and outside the scope of the Court’s Article III jurisdiction.

Turning to the merits, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or Apple’s due process rights. The Board’s rules provide that “[t]he Board may impose a sanction” and explains that “[s]anctions include entry of one or more” of eight defined actions. Although the Board’s sanctions imposed [...]

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