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CAFC Pulls Final Loose Thread in Nike-Adidas Patent Row

by Paul Devinsky | Sep 22, 2022 | Patents

Issuing a third and final decision, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) decision invalidating the last remaining claim of a Nike footwear textile patent. Nike, Inc. v. Adidas AG, Case No. 21-1903 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 1, 2022) (Prost, Chen, Stoll, JJ.) (non-precedential)

Adidas filed for inter partes review of a patent owned by Nike relating to a knitted shoe upper. After lengthy litigation, including two prior appeals to the Federal Circuit, all claims of the Nike patent were invalidated except for one substitute claim. In its second appeal, Nike successfully argued that the Board did not provide Nike an opportunity to respond to a patentability issue raised sua sponte by the Board, which included reference to a knitting textbook. On remand from the second appeal, the parties were given the opportunity to brief the Board on this new reference and argue which party bears the burden of persuasion for the patentability issue raised sua sponte by the Board.

On the merits, the Board determined that the knitting textbook did teach the disputed limitation, agreeing with adidas that a skilled artisan would have understood the textbook to teach the contested limitation, and that there was adequate reason to combine the textbook’s teachings with those of the other prior art references. The Board also concluded that the burden of persuasion must fall on the Board itself when it raised the patentability issue sua sponte. Nike appealed, arguing that the Board effectively placed the burden of persuasion on Nike.

The Federal Circuit first addressed the burden of persuasion as it relates to the grounds first raised by the Board. The Court found that the Board juxtaposed its arguments with adidas’s and that they both relied on the same disclosures and arguments. Because the Board and adidas’s arguments mirrored each other, the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the petitioner or the Board bears the burden of persuasion. The Court also rejected Nike’s argument that the Board effectively shifted the burden to Nike by stating in its opinion that Nike’s arguments were “unpersuasive” and “inadequate.” The Court cited to its 2016 holding in In re Magnum Oil Tools International, in which it explained that the Board’s language is not the concern but rather the actual placement of the burden of persuasion. The Court found that both the Board and adidas met the burden, and that the burden was not shifted to Nike.

Turning to the Board’s obviousness determinations, the Federal Circuit rejected all of Nike’s arguments. First, Nike argued that the knitting textbook did not teach the claimed method of creating apertures in the fabric by omitting stitches. The Court found that the Board relied on specific disclosures in the reference describing the use of empty needles to product “loop displacement.” Nike also argued that there was no motivation to combine the textbook reference with the other two references and that the Board could not rely on “common sense” [...]

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Sometimes Inactions Speak Louder Than Words

by Sarah J. Fischer | Sep 22, 2022 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a decision granting summary judgment in favor of the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) regarding the propriety of imposing a restriction requirement on a pre-General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) patent. Hyatt v. PTO, Case No. 2021-2324 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 8, 2022) (Moore, Prost, and Hughes, JJ.)

This action arose from the prosecution of a pre-GATT application that claimed priority to applications filed as early as 1983. The issue stems from changes to US patent law limiting patent terms to 20 years from their filing date. The old law provided a grant that lasted 17 years from a patent issuance. As the Federal Circuit noted in early litigation involving Gilbert Hyatt, tying patent term to the grant date “incentivized certain patentees to delay prosecuting their patents by abandoning applications and filing continuing applications in their place.” But the change in law left a gap for so-called transitional applications—those filed but not yet granted before the new law took effect. This “‘triggered a patent application gold rush in the spring of 1995’ by applicants who wanted their patent claims to be governed under the [old law] … This gold rush is ‘often referred to as the ‘GATT Bubble.’’”

Hyatt, a prolific inventor, is named in a series of pre-GATT applications filed in 1995 during the GATT bubble. Since then, he has continued to prosecute these applications. As a result of various litigations, the PTO stayed the prosecution of many of these applications between 2003 and 2012. In 2013, over Hyatt’s objections, the PTO required him to select eight claims from an application containing 200 for prosecution. In 2015, the PTO issued a non-final rejection on said claims. Hyatt responded by essentially rewriting the claims in their entirety. The examiner then issued a restriction requirement between the original and amended claims, which would require Hyatt to submit a new application with the new claims, which would be subject to the new law. The restriction requirement was based on the “applicant-action exception,” which allowed the PTO to issue a restriction requirement when the examiner could not have previously made one because of the actions of the applicant. The authority for the PTO action was rooted in Rule 129 (b)(1) (ii), which in relevant part provides:

(1) In an application … that has been pending for

at least three years as of June 8, 1995 … no requirement

for restriction . . . shall be made or maintained

in the application after June 8, 1995, except where:

…

(ii) The examiner has not made a requirement for

restriction in the present or parent application

prior to April 8, 1995, due to actions by the applicant

…

After the PTO issued a restriction requirement, Hyatt filed an action in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging that the PTO violated the Administrative Procedure Act because the restriction requirement was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in [...]

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No Second Bite at the Apple: Dismissal under Duplicative-Litigation Doctrine

by Art Dykhuis | Sep 22, 2022 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a second case between the same parties and asserting the same patent under the duplicative-litigation doctrine. Arendi S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs. Inc., Case No. 2021-1967 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 7, 2022) (Prost, Chen, Stoll, JJ.)

Arendi sued LG and others for infringement of several patents. Pursuant to Delaware’s local rules requiring identification of accused products, Arendi identified hundreds of LG products as infringing four asserted claims of the patent relevant on appeal. For those accused products, Arendi provided one “exemplary” infringement claim chart for LG’s Rebel 4 phone. LG objected to Arendi, stating that it should have provided charts for all accused products.

As the litigation proceeded, the parties agreed on eight products as representative but, despite LG’s repeated objection, Arendi did not provide claim charts for any additional products during fact discovery. Instead, Arendi’s opening expert report on infringement provided claim charts for seven non-Rebel 4 representative products for the first time. LG moved to strike those portions of the expert report. The district court granted that motion. Arendi did not supplement its claim charts in response to the court’s order and instead filed another complaint in Delaware, thus creating a second concurrent case asserting the same patent against LG. After the district court granted LG’s motion to dismiss the second suit, Arendi appealed.

The Federal Circuit explained the standard for assertion of the duplicative-litigation doctrine, which “prevents plaintiffs from ‘maintain[ing] two separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court … against the same defendant.’” Whether two cases involve the same subject matter depends on the extent of factual overlap of the asserted patents and accused products. There was no dispute that the same patent was asserted in both cases, but Arendi disputed that the cases involved the same accused products, citing the district court’s order striking its expert report as evidence that the non-Rebel 4 products were not at issue in the first case.

Like the district court, the Federal Circuit disagreed. The Court distinguished between accusing products and satisfying discovery obligations regarding those products. Arendi listed the non-Rebel 4 products in its disclosure of accused products, served interrogatories about them, received discovery on them and included non-Rebel 4 products in its expert report. Thus, even though Arendi “failed to fulfill its discovery obligations” as to those products, which made its expert report untimely, the non-Rebel 4 products were still accused, at issue and litigated in the first case. Thus, dismissal of the second case under the duplicative-litigation doctrine was not an error.

Practice Note: In a footnote, the Federal Circuit acknowledged the similarity of the duplicative-litigation doctrine to res judicata (claim preclusion). Although both doctrines involve an inquiry into whether claims in the second suit are repetitious, unlike res judicata, the duplicative-litigation doctrine does not require a final judgment in the first case.

It Can Take Three Appeals to Make a Claim Construction Go “Right”—or Three Bites by Apple

by McDermott Will & Emery | Sep 22, 2022 | Patents

In a nonprecedential opinion on remand from the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and a US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) Director-granted request for review, the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) reconstrued claim terms it had previously construed in consideration of the patent specification, prosecution history and Federal Circuit construction of similar terms in a related case. Apple Inc. v. Personalized Media Communications, LLC, IPR2016-00754, IPR2016-01520 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 8, 2022) (Turner, APJ.)

In March 2016, Apple filed a petition to institute an inter partes review (IPR) against a patent (’635 patent) owned by Personalized Media Communications, LLC (PMC). After PMC filed its Patent Owner Preliminary Response (POPR), the Board instituted the IPR on some, but not all, of Apple’s requested grounds. Per Board procedure, PMC filed its Patent Owner Response (POR) and a contingent motion to amend its patent’s claims. In response, Apple filed a reply and an opposition to the contingent motion, and PMC filed a reply to Apple’s opposition. After oral argument the Board issued a Final Written Decision (754-FWD) finding all challenged claims unpatentable and denying the contingent motion to amend. PMC first sought rehearing of the Board’s decision and, after rehearing was denied, appealed the Board’s decision to the Federal Circuit.

Similarly, in July 2016, Apple filed another petition against the same PMC patent. After considering PMC’s POPR, the Board instituted an IPR on some of Apple’s requested grounds. PMC again filed a POR and a contingent motion to amend, to which Apple filed a reply and opposition (to which PMC filed its reply and Apple a sur-reply). Again, the Board held an oral hearing and issued a Final Written Decision (FWD) finding all challenged claims unpatentable and denying the contingent motion to amend. PMC again sought rehearing of the Board’s decision and, after rehearing was denied, appealed the Board’s decision to the Federal Circuit.

On appeal of each proceeding, PMC moved, and the Federal Circuit granted remand in light of and consistent with the 2021 Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Arthrex, Inc., where a five-justice majority found that the appointment of Board administrative patent judges was unconstitutional and a seven-justice majority concluded that the remedy was to vest the PTO Director with authority to overrule Board decisions.

On remand to the PTO, PMC filed a request for director review, which the Commissioner for Patents (performing the functions and duties of the PTO Director) granted. The Commissioner’s Granting Order agreed with PMC’s argument that the Board, in these two cases, had construed the claim terms “encrypted” and “decrypted” in a manner that could include “scrambling and descrambling operations on digital information, but could also include … on analog information” and was inconsistent with the Federal Circuit’s partial reversal of the Board’s construction in yet another IPR proceeding (755-IPR regarding another related PMC patent) between Apple and PMC. As to the related patent IPR, the Federal Circuit ultimately construed “encrypted digital information transmission including encrypted information” as “… limited [...]

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PTO Director Lays Out Limits on “Roadmapping” as Factor for Discretionary IPR Denials

by Brennen Baylor | Sep 15, 2022 | Patents

Exercising its discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) denied institution of two inter partes reviews (IPRs) based on its understanding of its own precedential 2017 decision in Gen. Plastic Indus. Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha. US Patent & Trademark Office Director Kathi Vidal subsequently reversed the Board’s ruling in a precedential sua sponte decision clarifying how to apply the seven factors set forth in General Plastic. Code200, UAB v. Bright Data, Ltd., IPR2022-00861; -00862, Paper 18 (PTAB Aug. 23, 2022) (Vidal, Dir. of PTO).

In General Plastic, the Board addressed the practice of filing seriatim petitions attacking the same patent, where each petition raises a new ground for invalidity. The Board considers the General Plastic factors when determining whether to deny IPR institution to ensure efficient post-grant review procedures and prevent inequity. The seven factors are as follows:

Whether the same petitioner previously filed a petition directed to the same claims of the same patent
Whether at the time of filing of the first petition the petitioner knew of the prior art asserted in the second petition or should have known of it
Whether at the time of filing of the second petition the petitioner had already received the patent owner’s preliminary response to the first petition or had received the Board’s decision on whether to institute review in the first petition
The length of time that elapsed between the time the petitioner learned of the prior art asserted in the second petition and the filing of the second petition
Whether the petitioner provided adequate explanation for the time elapsed between the filings of multiple petitions directed to the same claims of the same patent
The finite resources of the Board
The requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) to issue a final determination no later than one year after the date on which the PTO Director notices institution of review.

In denying institution in this case, the Board explained that the petitioner’s failure to stipulate that it would not pursue the same grounds in district court “weigh[ed] strongly in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution and outweigh[ed] the fact that the Board did not substantively address the merits of the prior petition.” Director Vidal disagreed, reasoning that when a first petition is not decided on its merits, a follow-on petition affords a petitioner the opportunity to receive substantive consideration. Director Vidal further explained that factor 1 “must be read in conjunction with factors 2 and 3.” Application of factor 1 in a vacuum strips context from a petitioner’s challenges and creates an inappropriate bright-line rule for denying institution.

Proper application of the General Plastic factors requires consideration of the potential for abuse by a petitioner. Director Vidal noted the problem of “roadmapping” raised in General Plastic (i.e., using one or more Board decisions to create a roadmap for follow-on filings until the petitioner finds a ground that results in institution). A denial decision based solely on the [...]

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Present-Tense Claim Terms Not Sufficient to Require Actual Operation

by Alexander P. Ott | Sep 15, 2022 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a US International Trade Commission (Commission) decision that found no violation of Section 337 due to noninfringement. The Court disagreed with the Commission that the use of present-tense claim terms required actual operation to be shown to prove infringement, but nevertheless affirmed the Commission’s finding because the patentee failed to establish that the accused products were capable of carrying out the claimed functionality. INVT SPE LLC v. ITC, Case No. 20-1903 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2022) (Newman, Taranto, Chen, JJ.)

In 2018, INVT filed a complaint at the Commission alleging a Section 337 violation by various cell phone companies. INVT asserted that five of its patents were infringed by the 3G and LTE networking standards used by mobile devices (such as cell phones) to communicate with base stations (such as cell phone towers). INVT withdrew two of the asserted patents during the course of the investigation, and the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an initial determination holding that there was no Section 337 violation because none of the three remaining patents were infringed. The Commission did not disturb that decision on review, and INVT appealed on two of the three asserted patents in June 2020.

Briefing during the appeal was extended several times, and as a result, oral argument did not occur until November 2021. The Federal Circuit then asked for supplemental briefing regarding whether there could be any relief on one of the patents scheduled to expire in March 2022. The Court ultimately issued its decision at the end of August 2022, more than two years after the appeal was filed.

In its decision, the Federal Circuit first held that the appeal was moot as to the expired patent. For the remaining patent, the dispute over infringement resolved to the question of whether the claims required actual operation or could instead be met by mere capability. On that point, the Court reversed the ALJ’s determination that the claims required actual operation. According to the Court, the present-tense claim language used (i.e., “a data obtaining section that demodulates and decodes”) was not significantly different from the sort that is usually interpreted to merely require capability (e.g., “for demodulating and decoding”). But the Court then held that the actual operation of the base stations was relevant to determining whether the accused mobile devices were capable of performing one of the particular claimed functions. The Court thus affirmed the finding of no infringement because INVT had failed to show that the base stations actually operated in a way that would allow the mobile devices to be capable of carrying out the claimed functionality.

Alexander Ott appeared for respondent ZTE at the Commission in this matter.

Check Your Expert Skills and Standing

by Sarah J. Fischer | Sep 8, 2022 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed a portion of an appeal from the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) regarding obviousness because the patentee did not have standing to challenge the decision regarding one of the claims. The Court also affirmed-in-part because the definition of person of ordinary skill in the art applied by the Board was not unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence. Best Medical International, Inc. v. Elekta Inc., Case Nos. 21-2099; -2100 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 29, 2022) (Hughes, Linn, Stoll, JJ.)

Best Medical International (BMI) owns a patent directed to a method and apparatus for conformal radiation therapy of tumors using a pre-determined radiation dose. The Board instituted two inter partes review (IPR) petitions filed by Varian Medical Systems and Elekta. During the pendency of the IPR proceeding, a parallel ex parte re-examination was ongoing. After institution of the IPRs, the examiner in the re-examination rejected claim 1, which BMI subsequently cancelled “without prejudice or disclaimer.” After BMI cancelled claim 1, the Board issued its final written decision in the IPR proceedings. The Board noted that BMI had cancelled claim 1 during re-examination, but concluded that claim 1 had “not yet been canceled by a final action” because BMI had “not filed a statutory disclaimer of claim 1.” The Board therefore considered the merits of Elekta’s patentability challenge and determined that claim 1 was unpatentable as obvious. The Board issued a split decision as to the other claims, finding one claim patentable and the others unpatentable. BMI appealed.

The Federal Circuit began by analyzing whether BMI had standing to challenge the Board’s invalidation of the now cancelled claim 1. BMI attempted to invoke Munsingwear vacatur, which allows courts to vacate underlying decisions on issues that have become moot during their pendency. As an initial matter, the Court found that the Board had the authority to invalidate the claim because it was not finally cancelled at the time the Board issued its final written decision. Regarding BMI’s vacatur argument, Elekta argued that BMI lacked standing to challenge the decision related to the cancelled claim. BMI countered that it had suffered an injury sufficient to create Article III standing because it believed that collateral estoppel might be applied by the examiner regarding other claims in another patent subject to re-examination. The Court was unpersuaded by this argument, in part because BMI could not cite any case law where collateral estoppel was applied in that fashion. The Court found that Munsingwear vacatur was inappropriate because the mooting event did not happen during the pendency of the appeal—it happened before the appeal was filed. The Court therefore concluded that BMI lacked standing to challenge the Board’s decision regarding the now cancelled claim.

Turning to the other claims the Board found unpatentable, BMI challenged the Board’s finding that a person of ordinary skill in the art must have formal computer programming experience. The Federal Circuit recited the non-exhaustive list of factors used to determine the requisite level of [...]

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PTO Extends Public Comment Period on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance

by Amol Parikh | Sep 8, 2022 | Patents

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) seeks public feedback on its existing patent subject matter eligibility (SME) guidance. The guidance was put in place in 2019. As noted in the PTO’s July 25, 2022, blog post, the 2019 revisions to the SME guidance resulted in a large decrease in 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejections. However, the PTO believes that greater consistency can be achieved in patent examination in view of the statutory language of § 101 and the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l. The PTO’s goal is to impart clarity and certainty into patent eligibility. In addition to working with Congress on potential changes to the law and looking for opportunities in the courts, the PTO is updating its SME guidance and requests public input. In its July 25 blog post, the PTO requested that comments be submitted by September 15, 2022. In response to overwhelming interest, however, the PTO will now accept feedback via the Federal eRulemaking Portal until October 15, 2022.

IPR Estoppel Applies to Claim Not Addressed During Pre-SAS Proceeding

by McDermott Will & Emery | Sep 1, 2022 | Patents

In the companion district court case to the Supreme Court’s 2019 Thryv v. Click-to-Call decision regarding the scope of review for inter partes review (IPR) decisions, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed what it characterized as “a rather unusual set of circumstances” to find that the accused infringer was estopped from challenging in district court the validity of a claim for which the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) had refused to institute IPR. Click-to-Call Techs. LP v. Ingenio, Inc., Case No. 22-1016 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 17, 2022) (Stoll, Schall, Cunningham, JJ.)

Click-to-Call filed suit against Ingenio alleging patent infringement of 16 claims. Ingenio filed a petition for IPR challenging the 16 claims and one additional dependent claim. The Board only partially instituted the IPR, and in its final written decision addressed and found persuasive un-patentability grounds based on a Dezonno reference but refused to consider grounds based on a Freeman reference (leaving one of the asserted claims unaddressed). Ingenio had successfully requested a stay of the district court suit pending resolution of the IPR. During the appeal of the Board’s decision regarding the IPR, the Supreme Court in SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, overruled the practice of partial institutions. However, Ingenio never sought remand under SAS for the Board to consider its challenge to the unaddressed asserted claim.

After the IPR appeal had run its course, the district court lifted the stay and Ingenio moved for summary judgment of invalidity. Ingenio argued that the unaddressed asserted claim (which was the only asserted claim not found unpatentable in the IPR) was invalid based on the same Dezonno reference that Ingenio had used against the other asserted claims. Click-to-Call argued that 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) estopped Ingenio from raising this invalidity ground. Click-to-Call also moved to amend its selection of asserted claims to add two additional claims that were not at issue in the IPR. The district court found that Dezonno anticipated the unaddressed asserted claim and denied Click-to-Call leave to amend its asserted claims. Click-to-Call appealed.

Click-to-Call argued that Ingenio was estopped from asserting invalidity of the unaddressed asserted claim. The Federal Circuit agreed and found that IPR estoppel applied. Specifically, the Court found that district court erred by only analyzing common law issue preclusion, focusing on whether the argument had been “actually litigated” instead of following the language of IPR estoppel under § 315(e)(2), which estops grounds that “reasonably could have [been] raised.” The Court found that the statutory language precluded Ingenio from arguing that Dezonno anticipated the unaddressed asserted claim. The Court explained that Ingenio’s IPR petition included not only a challenge to the unaddressed asserted claim based upon Freeman, but also unpatentability challenges to other claims based on Dezonno. The Court viewed this as evidence of Ingenio’s awareness of Dezonno as an anticipatory ground that it “reasonably could have raised” in the IPR. The Court was unpersuaded by Ingenio’s arguments that there was no estoppel with regard [...]

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PTO Can and Should Use Alice/Mayo Framework to Assess Eligibility

by Mike Baldwin | Sep 1, 2022 | Patents

Addressing a challenge of the Alice/Mayo framework in the context of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) decision finding that patent claims directed to analyzing social security benefit applications were patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. In re Killian, Case No. 21-2113 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 23, 2022) (Taranto, Clevenger, Chen, JJ.)

Jeffrey Killian filed a patent application related to a system and method for determining eligibility for social security disability insurance (SSDI) benefits through a computer network. The examiner rejected the claims under § 101, finding that they were directed to the abstract idea of “determining eligibility for social security disability insurance . . . benefits” and lacked additional elements amounting to significantly more than the abstract idea because the additional elements were simply generic recitations of generic computer functionalities. Killian appealed to the Board, which affirmed the examiner’s rejection. The Board explained that the claims were directed to the patent ineligible abstract idea of “a search algorithm for identifying people who may be eligible for SSDI benefits they are not receiving,” and that the “determining” and “selecting” limitations of the claims could be performed by the human mind and thus were an “abstract mental process.” Killian appealed.

Killian raised several arguments that generally fell into three categories:

The Alice/Mayo standard is indefinite under the APA.
The § 101 analysis for software violated Killian’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.
Step 2 of the Alice/Mayo analysis has no basis in patent law.

Addressing the first argument, the Federal Circuit noted that the APA cannot apply to the decisions of courts because courts are not agencies. Next, the Court dismissed Killian’s argument that all § 101 decisions are void because the Alice/Mayo standard is indefinite. The Court explained that it has routinely found that mental processes are abstract ideas, including claims that were directed to data gathering, analysis and notification on generic computers. The Court found that nothing in Killian’s claims provided an inventive manner to accomplish the claimed method, and thus the § 101 rejection was entirely proper. As a final point, the Court stated that it was bound to Supreme Court precedent and only new overruling precedent would change the analysis it applied.

The Federal Circuit also rejected Killian’s due process argument. Killian argued that his due process rights were violated because he did not have an opportunity to appear in the other cases regarding patent eligibility. As an initial matter, the Court noted that no “void-for-vagueness” doctrine argument was put forward, and the doctrine requires a case-by-case analysis. The Court found that this was not a close case, as data gathering and analysis methods run afoul of established § 101 precedent. Next, the Court addressed the common law approach of not requiring “a single governing definitional context” and a comparison to previously decided cases finding it appropriate. Killian’s due process rights were found to [...]

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