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A Maze-Like Path and Laundry List Don’t Provide Written Description

by | Mar 16, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) decision that there was insufficient written description in the asserted priority applications to support a genus claim because of a lack of ipsis verbis disclosure and insufficient blaze marks. The Court concluded that the priority applications did not support an early priority date. Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., Case No. 21-2168 (Fed. Cir. March 6, 2023) (Lourie, Dyk, Stoll, JJ.)

Gilead filed a petition for inter partes review (IPR) challenging Minnesota’s patent directed to phosphoramidate prodrugs preventing virus reproduction or cancerous tumor growth. Gilead’s US Food & Drug Administration-approved drug, sofosbuvir, is marketed by Gilead to treat chronic hepatitis C infections and falls within claim 1 of the patent.

The 2014 application that issued as the challenged patent claimed priority to four applications. In the IPR, Gilead argued that the claims were anticipated by a Gilead-owned patent publication (Sofia). The publications used in the decision are as follows:

NP3 and NP2 have the same disclosure. NP2 and P1 contain similar disclosures, which the Board called NP2-P1. The broader claim in NP2-P1 has a relationship of genus to the narrower subgenus claims in the patent at issue. There was no dispute that Sofia disclosed every limitation of each challenged claim. The Board held that NP2-P1 failed to provide a sufficient written description to support the asserted priority date of the challenged claims, which were therefore found to be anticipated by Sofia. Minnesota appealed.

Minnesota argued the following to the Federal Circuit:

  • The Board erred in holding that the NP2-P1 applications have insufficient written description.
  • The Board ran afoul of Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requirements.
  • Minnesota is a sovereign state entity immune from IPR.

35 U.S.C. § 120 sets forth requirements for a patent application to benefit from a filing date of an earlier application. Minnesota asserted that the NP2-P1 priority applications literally described or provided blaze marks to the challenged subgenus claims. The Federal Circuit disagreed, explaining that written description for a genus claim of chemical compounds raises “particular issues,” requiring a description of the outer limits of the genus and either a representative number of members or structural features common to the members of the genus. The Court found that the asserted priority applications (NP2-P1) did not provide such description and the challenged claims were not entitled to the filing dates of those applications.

The Federal Circuit found that the asserted priority applications did not provide ipsis verbis disclosure of the challenged subgenus claim. The Court quoted an oft-noted saying associated with Yogi Berra, a catcher for the New York Yankees some 50 years ago, about a notable failure to provide direction: “when one comes to a fork in the road, take it.” The Court also cited its 1996 decision in [...]

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Claim Duality: Multiple Dependent Claims Can Be Both Patentable and Unpatentable

by | Mar 9, 2023 |

Addressing, for the first time, the issue of patentability of multiple dependent claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112, fifth paragraph, the Director of the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) granted rehearing and modified the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s (Board) Final Written Decision after finding that the patentability of a multiple dependent claim should be considered separately as to each of the claims from which it depends. Nested Bean, Inc. v. Big Beings US Pty. Ltd. et al., IPR2020-01234 (PTO Feb. 24, 2023) (Vidal, Dir.) (precedential).

Nested filed a petition for inter partes review challenging claims 1 through 18 of a patent owned by Big Beings. Claims 1 and 2 were independent, and claims 3 to 16 were multiple dependent claims, which depended directly from either claim 1 or 2. The Board granted institution and ultimately issued a Final Written Decision finding that Nested did not establish that claims 1, 17 and 18 were unpatentable, but that Nested had established that claims 2 through 16 were unpatentable.

Big Beings filed a Request for Director review, noting that each of claims 3 to 16 were multiple dependent claims that depended from both claims 1 and 2. Big Beings argued that because the Board found that Nested failed to show that claim 1 was unpatentable, the Board should have also found that Nested failed to show that claims 3 through 16, as depending from claim 1, were unpatentable. The Director granted review.

35 U.S.C. § 112, fifth paragraph, states, in relevant part, “[a] multiple dependent claim shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the particular claim in relation to which it is being considered.” Big Beings argued that the statute requires the Board to separately consider the patentability of alternative dependencies of a multiple dependent claim. Nested responded by arguing that the statute should be read so that if any version of a multiple dependent claim is found unpatentable over the prior art, then all versions of the claim should be found unpatentable.

The Director found that this was an issue of first impression. Relying on 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(c) and 35 U.S.C. § 282, the Director concluded that “a multiple dependent claim is the equivalent of several single dependent claims. Thus, in the same way that the unpatentability of multiple single dependent claims would each rise or fall separately, so too should the dependent claims covered by a multiple dependent claim.” The Director also noted that the Federal Circuit in Dow Chemical and Dayco Products explained that “not addressing claim validity on an individual basis is an error and contravenes 35 U.S.C. 282[.]” The PTO Director concluded, quoting the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), that “a multiple dependent claim must be considered in the same manner as a plurality of single dependent claims.”



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Patent Law Principles Apply to Claim Scope: Orange Book Delisting and Listing and Regulations

by | Mar 9, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ordered that the only Orange Book patent asserted in a lawsuit must be delisted since its claims were directed to the computer-implemented distribution system and not a method of use. Jazz Pharms., Inc. v. Avadel CNS Pharms., LLC, Case No. 23-1186 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 24, 2023) (Lourie, Reyna, Taranto, JJ.)

Jazz Pharmaceuticals holds a new drug application (NDA) for Xyrem, an oral sodium oxybate solution prescribed to help those with certain narcolepsies manage cataplexy. Sodium oxybate itself is no longer covered by patents because it has been used in relation to narcolepsy since the 1960s. For this reason, Jazz built its patent portfolio around Xyrem’s formulation, use and distribution.

Jazz uses a single-pharmacy distribution system for Xyrem, known as a risk evaluation mitigation strategy (REMS). Implementing REMS was a condition of Xyrem’s US Food & Drug Administration (FDA) approval because it mitigates safety risks of dangerous active pharmaceutical ingredients such as sodium oxybate. One of Jazz’s patents is directed to this REMS distribution system. Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) 505(b)(2) NDA (Hybrid NDA) approval is similarly conditioned on implementing a REMS that is sufficiently comparable to any that the NDA holder must implement. The FDA eventually determined that single-pharmacy systems were unnecessary for Xyrem and potentially detrimental.

Avadel submitted a hybrid NDA for a drug that requires only a single nightly dose, unlike Xyrem, which requires a patient to wake up during the night to ingest a second dose. Avadel’s application also proposed a more lenient REMS that utilizes multiple pharmacies. In view of these differences, Avadel believed that it could avoid a lengthy FDA approval process because all of Jazz’s Xyrem Orange-Book-listed patents seemed addressable without making any Paragraph IV certifications. As for the REMS patent, Avadel filed a statement under 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(B) because the patent was listed as claiming a method of use and Avadel was not seeking approval for the REMS system to which that patent’s claims were directed.

Jazz sued Avadel asserting seven patents, of which the REMS patent was the only Orange-Book-listed patent. Avadel asserted a counterclaim requesting that the district court order Jazz to delist the REMS patent from the Orange Book. The district court subsequently held a Markman hearing finding that the REMS patent’s claims were directed to a system and not a method. The district court granted Avadel’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the REMS patent did not claim “the drug for which the application was approved” and thus had to be delisted from the Orange Book. Jazz appealed.

Jazz argued that because the FDA permitted the REMS patent to be Orange Book listed, Avadel was prohibited from availing itself of the statutory delisting provision. The Federal Circuit disagreed, concluding that the language of the delisting provision was only concerned with whether a listed patent met the provisions’ conditions at the time of the triggering litigation.

Jazz also argued that there was no evidence that Congress imported patent-law [...]

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Compelling Clarity: PTO Director Explains Compelling Merits Test

by | Mar 9, 2023 |

US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) Director Katherine K. Vidal issued a precedential opinion clarifying the standard under which the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) can institute on an inter partes review (IPR) petition despite the Fintiv factors militating toward denial. CommScope Techs. LLC v. Dali Wireless, Inc., IPR2022-01242 (PTO Feb. 27, 2023) (Vidal, Dir.) (precedential).

This opinion follows the Director’s Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials memorandum (Guidance Memo) and her opinion in OpenSky Indus. v. VLSI Tech. In the guidance memo, the Director explained that when there is “compelling evidence of unpatentability,” the Board may decline to exercise its discretion to deny IPR institution.

In this case, Dali Wireless sued CommScope in the district court, alleging infringement of its patent. CommScope filed a petition to institute an IPR proceeding against the asserted patent. The Board granted the petition and instituted an IPR proceeding while the district court litigation was ongoing.

In granting the petition, the Board acknowledged that it would normally perform a Fintiv analysis to determine whether it should deny the petition in light of the parallel district court proceeding. However, considering the Guidance Memo and the “compelling invalidity challenge” presented by the petitioner, the Board skipped the Fintiv analysis and instituted on the petition. The Director instituted sua sponte review.

Recognizing some ambiguity in both OpenSky and the guidance memo, the Director made her decision precedential to clarify:

My Guidance Memo states that “the PTAB will not deny institution based on Fintiv if there is compelling evidence of unpatentability.” Although I now recognize that this instruction could be read to allow for a compelling merits determination as a substitute for a Fintiv analysis, that was not my intent. By that instruction, I intended for PTAB panels to only consider compelling merits if they first determined that Fintiv factors 1–5 favored a discretionary denial . . . . In circumstances where . . . the Board’s analysis of Fintiv factors 1–5 favors denial of institution; the Board shall then assess compelling merits. In doing so, the Board must provide reasoning sufficient to allow the parties to challenge that finding and sufficient to allow for review of the Board’s decision.

A determination of whether the petition presents a compelling merits case for invalidity requires a merits case that meets a higher standard than the “reasonable likelihood” test required by 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).

The Director found that the Board’s decision was deficient in both parts of the analysis. The Board did not perform any analysis of the Fintiv factors but instead went straight to a determination of whether the petition presented a compelling invalidity challenge. In connection with that determination, the Board failed to provide any reasoning that explained why it found the merits case presented in the petition compelling.

Finding that the Board’s reasoning was conclusory, the Director vacated the Board’s decision to institute IPR review and remanded for further proceedings consistent with her decision.

Practice Note: Less [...]

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Little Weight Given to Conclusory Expert Declaration That Repeats IPR Petition Verbatim

by | Mar 2, 2023 |

The US Patent & Trademark Office Director affirmed and designated as precedential a Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board) decision denying institution of an inter partes review (IPR) petition where the expert declaration presented conclusory assertions without underlying factual support and repeated verbatim the petitioner’s argument. Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (Wood, Grossman, Tartal, APJs); Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624 (Feb 10, 2023) (Vidal, Dir.)

Bytemark owns a patent directed to a method and system for distributing electronic tickets. According to the patent, a user can procure and store an electronic ticket on a device such as a mobile phone, and when the user presents the ticket, the ticket taker can verify the ticket by inspecting a visual object that a human can perceive without a machine scan. In addition to using a validating visual object, the patent teaches data integrity checking to ensure that the ticket data and the software managing that ticket data on the user’s device has not been altered improperly. As to the data integrity concept, the claims of the patent recite a server that is configured to “store in a data record associated with the user account a data value indicating the fraudulent activity” (fraud limitation).

Xerox filed an IPR petition challenging certain claims of the patent as obvious over the Terrell prior art reference in combination with various secondary references. Xerox argued that Terrell disclosed that after fraudulent activity is detected, “the purchaser of the ticket could be blocked from further use of the system or pursued in respect of their potential fraud.” Xerox asserted that a skilled artisan would understand that such blocking would require recording the blocking in a data record associated with that user’s account, and would find it obvious that blocking the account of the purchaser from further use of the system would include storing a data value indicating the fraudulent activity in a data record associated with the user account.

Bytemark responded that Terrell, at most, taught blocking a ticket purchaser from further use of the Terrell system based on potential fraud, but nowhere indicated that this would be achieved by using a data value indicating fraudulent activity, as opposed to some other manner of blocking a user, such as deleting the user’s account or reporting the user for fraud. Bytemark further argued that Xerox’s argument that a skilled artisan would find the fraud limitation obvious was conclusory and an improper attempt to use a skilled artisan’s common knowledge to supply a wholly missing claim limitation without evidentiary support.

The Board agreed with Bytemark, finding that Xerox did not provide sufficient evidence or persuasive reasoning to support either of Xerox’s arguments. The Board explained that Terrell taught blocking the purchaser rather than the account of the purchaser and that it was far from clear that blocking the purchaser would “require” recording the blocking in a record in the purchaser’s account, as opposed to deleting the purchaser’s account altogether. The Board noted that the [...]

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Free Speech Shines Bright, Illuminates Patent Owner’s Right to Allege Infringement

by | Mar 2, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s preliminary injunction prohibiting a patent owner from communicating its view that a competitor infringed, finding that the speech restriction was improper because the infringement assertions were not objectively baseless. Lite-Netics, LLC v. Nu Tsai Capital LLC, Case No. 23-1146 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 17, 2023) (Lourie, Taranto, Stark, JJ.)

Lite-Netics and Nu Tsai Capital d/b/a Holiday Bright Lights (HBL) compete in the market for holiday string lights. Both companies use similar magnetic mechanisms that allow users to secure the end of the lights. Lite-Netics owns several patents that describe and claim magnetically secured decorative lights. In June 2017, Lite-Netics sent a cease-and-desist letter to HBL demanding that it stop selling lights alleged to infringe Lite-Netics’s patents. After remaining silent for five years, Lite-Netics sent another cease-and-desist letter in April 2022 demanding that HBL either explain why its products did not infringe the Lite-Netics patents or stop selling the products.

When HBL refused to stop selling the allegedly infringing products, Lite-Netics sent communications to HBL’s customers notifying them of their infringement claim and threatening “all legal rights and remedies” to stop the sale of HBL’s products. Lite-Netics then filed a lawsuit against HBL for infringement of the patents. HBL asserted counterclaims, including tortious interference with business relationships, defamation under Nebraska law and bad faith patent-infringement communications. HBL also sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Lite-Netics from publishing further accusatory statements. Finding that HBL would likely succeed on its tortious interference and defamation claims and that Lite-Netics’ infringement allegations were “objectively baseless,” the district court granted the preliminary injunction. Lite-Netics appealed.

The Federal Circuit reversed the district court, finding that in cases where an injunction restricts a party’s rights to First Amendment protected speech about its federal patent rights, federal law preempts state tort law. The Court explained that federal law requires a higher “bad faith” standard of proof for a preliminary injunction that would impinge on those federal rights. The Court found that HBL had failed to show that Lite-Netics’s allegations and the publication of its allegations were made in bad faith or that those allegations were objectively baseless. The Court therefore reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.



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The Alice Eligibility Two-Step Dance Continues

by | Mar 2, 2023 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion, holding that patent claims directed to abstract ideas and lacking inventive steps that transform abstract ideas into patent-eligible inventions fail the Alice two-step test and are not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Hawk Tech. Sys., LLC v. Castle Retail, LLC, Case No. 22-1222 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 17, 2023) (Reyna, Hughes, Cunningham, JJ.)

35 U.S.C. § 101 states that laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas are not patentable. The Supreme Court of the United States in Alice v. CLS Bank Int’l (2014) articulated a two-step test for examining patent eligibility: a patent claim falls outside § 101 if it is directed to a patent-ineligible concept such as an abstract idea and lacks elements sufficient to transform the claim into a patent-eligible application.

Hawk Technology sued Castle Retail alleging infringement of its patent directed to security surveillance video operations in Castle Retail’s grocery stores. The patent relates to a method of viewing multiple simultaneously displayed and stored video images on a remote viewing device of a video surveillance system using result-based functional language. Castle Retail moved to dismiss on the basis that the claims were not patent eligible under § 101. After conducting a technology briefing, the district court granted the motion. The district court ruled that the claims were abstract because surveillance monitoring is a common business practice and the claims recited little more than taking video surveillance and digitizing it for display and storage in a conventional computer system, and the claims did not limit the abstract idea to a new technological improvement in video storage/display that could transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Hawk Technology appealed.

The Federal Circuit, reviewing de novo, affirmed. Addressing Alice step one, the Court found that the patent’s required functional results of receiving/digitizing video images, converting images to selected format and storing/displaying/transmitting the images were similar to claims that the Court previously ruled as abstract. The results-oriented claim language failed to concretely recite how the claimed invention improved the functionality of video surveillance systems and was therefore abstract. Regarding Alice step two, the Court analyzed the claim elements, both individually and as an ordered combination in light of the specification, for transformative elements. The Court explained that although the claims recited the purported inventive solution and referenced specific tools/parameters, they neither showed how monitoring and storage was improved nor required anything other than off-the-shelf, conventional computer, network and display technology for gathering, sending and presenting the specified information.

Procedurally, the Federal Circuit found that the motion to dismiss was not decided prematurely because the technology briefing was purely a procedural step conducted in each patent case and there was no evidence that the district court’s decision hinged on new facts constituting matters beyond the pleadings. Hawk had argued that because the district court considered Castle’s testimony and evidence, it was required to convert the [...]

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PTO Seeks Comments on Role of Artificial Intelligence in Inventorship

by | Mar 2, 2023 |

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) published a Request for Comments Regarding Artificial Intelligence and Inventorship seeking input from stakeholders on inventorship issues that may arise as artificial intelligence (AI) and emerging technologies play a greater role in the innovation process. The deadline to submit comments is May 15, 2023.

As background, the PTO held its inaugural AI and Emerging Technologies Partnership meeting, during which panelists discussed AI’s increasing role in innovation, in June 2022. Although there appeared to be consensus that AI cannot “conceive” of inventions, some panelists contended that AI is merely a tool like any other tool used in the inventive process, while others pointed to situations in which AI systems can output patentable inventions or contribute at the level of a joint inventor. While the PTO has been exploring the contours of inventorship law with respect to AI-generated inventions, in August 2022, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued its decision in Thaler v. Vidal, finding that inventorship is limited to natural persons. The Court explained, however, that it was not confronted with “the question of whether inventions made by human beings with the assistance of AI are eligible for patent protection.”

Recognizing the uncertainty surrounding the role of AI inventorship in the wake of the Thaler decision, the PTO seeks public comment on several questions, including the following:

1. How is AI, including machine learning, currently being used in the invention creation process?

2. How does the use of an AI system in the invention creation process differ from the use of other technical tools?

3. If an AI system contributes to an invention at the same level as a human who would be considered a joint inventor, is the invention patentable under current patent laws?

4. Do inventions in which an AI system contributed at the same level as a joint inventor raise any significant ownership issues?

5. Is there a need for the PTO to expand its current guidance on inventorship to address situations in which AI significantly contributes to an invention? How should the significance of a contribution be assessed?

6. Should the PTO require applicants to provide an explanation of contributions AI systems made to inventions claimed in patent applications? If so, how should that be implemented, and what level of contributions should be disclosed? Should contributions to inventions made by AI systems be treated differently from contributions made by other (e., non-AI) computer systems?

7. What additional steps, if any, should the PTO take to further incentivize AI-enabled innovation (e.g., innovation in which machine learning or other computational techniques play a significant role in the invention creation process)?

8. What statutory changes, if any, should be considered as to US inventorship law, and what consequences do you foresee for those statutory changes?



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PTO to Begin Issuing Electronic Patent Grants

by | Mar 2, 2023 |

On February 28, 2023, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issued a final rule announcing it would begin issuing electronic patent grants (eGrants) starting April 18, 2023. These eGrants are the official copies of patent grants in an electronic format. During a limited transition period, the PTO will also provide a bound paper version as a ceremonial copy. Once the transition period is over, a bound paper version will be available for a nominal fee. The PTO did not specify when the transition period would end. The Federal Register notice can be found here.

To implement the eGrant, the PTO is removing and reserving 37 CFR 1.315, which states that “[t]he patent will be delivered or mailed upon issuance to the correspondence address of record.” Because patents will be issued electronically, the PTO will no longer physically deliver the patent grant by mailing it to the correspondence address. Instead, the eGrant will issue electronically via the Patent Center.

In addition to the ceremonial paper copy, for a fee, the PTO will still offer certified copies (in accordance with 37 CFR 1.13) and presentation copies. The PTO will no longer accept orders for advance copies of issued patents.

By moving to eGrants, the interval between issue fee payment and patent issuance will be shorter. Thus, applicants will need to be more diligent in filing continuations, divisionals and Quick Path Information Disclosure Statements. For example, Issue Notifications will be available electronically via the Patent Center after the issue fee is paid, usually on the Wednesday or Thursday before the patent issues. The PTO envisions that for those who do not participate in the e-Office action program, a patent may issue electronically before the applicant even receives the mailed Issue Notification.



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DC Circuit to Disputes Ancillary to Patent Matters: “You Can’t Sit with Us”

by | Mar 2, 2023 |

For the first time, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed whether appeals of discovery orders ancillary to a patent suit are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The DC Circuit joined its sister circuits and held in the affirmative. Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft Zur Förderung Der Angewandten Forschung E.V. v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., Case No. 22-7001 (DC Cir. Feb. 17, 2023) (Srinivasan, Henderson, JJ., Edwards, Sr. J.)

In February 2017, Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft Zur Förderung commenced a civil action for patent infringement against Sirius XM Radio in the District of Delaware. During discovery, Fraunhofer subpoenaed for deposition Sirius XM’s former Chief of Marketing Officer, My-Chau Nguyen, a resident of Washington, DC.

After Nguyen failed to appear for her deposition, she filed a motion in the US District Court for the District of Columbia to quash the subpoena. Fraunhofer responded with a cross-motion to compel Nguyen’s deposition and a motion for sanctions. The DC district court denied Nguyen’s motion to quash, ordered her to sit for deposition, found her in contempt for failing to appear for deposition in the first instance, and expressed an intent to award sanctions upon Fraunhofer’s submission of documentation reflecting fees and costs. Fraunhofer appealed to the DC Circuit.

The DC Circuit first addressed whether it had jurisdiction to consider Nguyen’s challenge to the district court’s order compelling her deposition in light of the fact that Nguyen’s deposition had already been taken at the time of appeal. The Court held that Nguyen’s challenge was moot because “[n]umerous courts have held that an appeal from enforcement of a subpoena becomes moot once the party has complied with the subpoena.” Therefore, the Court reasoned that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Nguyen’s subpoena challenge because she had already complied with the subpoena at the time of the appeal.

Next, the Court addressed whether it had jurisdiction to assess the merits of Nguyen’s challenge to the district court’s finding of contempt and intent to award sanctions. The Court determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider these issues.  The Court explained that because “the underlying litigation between Fraunhofer and Sirius XM in the District of Delaware arises under an Act of Congress relating to patents[,]” Nguyen’s discovery dispute in the DC district court was “ancillary to a patent suit.” The DC Circuit reasoned that only the Federal Circuit is vested with jurisdiction over appeals “arising under . . . any Act of Congress related to patents[.]” (28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).) Holding similarly to other circuits, the Court concluded that because Nguyen’s discovery dispute was ancillary to a patent matter, the ability to decide the merits of her appeal was solely within the province of the Federal Circuit.

The DC Circuit found that it did not have the authority to transfer Nguyen’s challenges to the Federal Circuit, however. The DC Circuit concluded that it was forced to dismiss rather than transfer because “this appeal could not have been brought [...]

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