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The Alice Eligibility Two-Step Dance Continues

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion, holding that patent claims directed to abstract ideas and lacking inventive steps that transform abstract ideas into patent-eligible inventions fail the Alice two-step test and are not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Hawk Tech. Sys., LLC v. Castle Retail, LLC, Case No. 22-1222 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 17, 2023) (Reyna, Hughes, Cunningham, JJ.)

35 U.S.C. § 101 states that laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas are not patentable. The Supreme Court of the United States in Alice v. CLS Bank Int’l (2014) articulated a two-step test for examining patent eligibility: a patent claim falls outside § 101 if it is directed to a patent-ineligible concept such as an abstract idea and lacks elements sufficient to transform the claim into a patent-eligible application.

Hawk Technology sued Castle Retail alleging infringement of its patent directed to security surveillance video operations in Castle Retail’s grocery stores. The patent relates to a method of viewing multiple simultaneously displayed and stored video images on a remote viewing device of a video surveillance system using result-based functional language. Castle Retail moved to dismiss on the basis that the claims were not patent eligible under § 101. After conducting a technology briefing, the district court granted the motion. The district court ruled that the claims were abstract because surveillance monitoring is a common business practice and the claims recited little more than taking video surveillance and digitizing it for display and storage in a conventional computer system, and the claims did not limit the abstract idea to a new technological improvement in video storage/display that could transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Hawk Technology appealed.

The Federal Circuit, reviewing de novo, affirmed. Addressing Alice step one, the Court found that the patent’s required functional results of receiving/digitizing video images, converting images to selected format and storing/displaying/transmitting the images were similar to claims that the Court previously ruled as abstract. The results-oriented claim language failed to concretely recite how the claimed invention improved the functionality of video surveillance systems and was therefore abstract. Regarding Alice step two, the Court analyzed the claim elements, both individually and as an ordered combination in light of the specification, for transformative elements. The Court explained that although the claims recited the purported inventive solution and referenced specific tools/parameters, they neither showed how monitoring and storage was improved nor required anything other than off-the-shelf, conventional computer, network and display technology for gathering, sending and presenting the specified information.

Procedurally, the Federal Circuit found that the motion to dismiss was not decided prematurely because the technology briefing was purely a procedural step conducted in each patent case and there was no evidence that the district court’s decision hinged on new facts constituting matters beyond the pleadings. Hawk had argued that because the district court considered Castle’s testimony and evidence, it was required to convert the [...]

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PTO Seeks Comments on Role of Artificial Intelligence in Inventorship

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) published a Request for Comments Regarding Artificial Intelligence and Inventorship seeking input from stakeholders on inventorship issues that may arise as artificial intelligence (AI) and emerging technologies play a greater role in the innovation process. The deadline to submit comments is May 15, 2023.

As background, the PTO held its inaugural AI and Emerging Technologies Partnership meeting, during which panelists discussed AI’s increasing role in innovation, in June 2022. Although there appeared to be consensus that AI cannot “conceive” of inventions, some panelists contended that AI is merely a tool like any other tool used in the inventive process, while others pointed to situations in which AI systems can output patentable inventions or contribute at the level of a joint inventor. While the PTO has been exploring the contours of inventorship law with respect to AI-generated inventions, in August 2022, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued its decision in Thaler v. Vidal, finding that inventorship is limited to natural persons. The Court explained, however, that it was not confronted with “the question of whether inventions made by human beings with the assistance of AI are eligible for patent protection.”

Recognizing the uncertainty surrounding the role of AI inventorship in the wake of the Thaler decision, the PTO seeks public comment on several questions, including the following:

1. How is AI, including machine learning, currently being used in the invention creation process?

2. How does the use of an AI system in the invention creation process differ from the use of other technical tools?

3. If an AI system contributes to an invention at the same level as a human who would be considered a joint inventor, is the invention patentable under current patent laws?

4. Do inventions in which an AI system contributed at the same level as a joint inventor raise any significant ownership issues?

5. Is there a need for the PTO to expand its current guidance on inventorship to address situations in which AI significantly contributes to an invention? How should the significance of a contribution be assessed?

6. Should the PTO require applicants to provide an explanation of contributions AI systems made to inventions claimed in patent applications? If so, how should that be implemented, and what level of contributions should be disclosed? Should contributions to inventions made by AI systems be treated differently from contributions made by other (e., non-AI) computer systems?

7. What additional steps, if any, should the PTO take to further incentivize AI-enabled innovation (e.g., innovation in which machine learning or other computational techniques play a significant role in the invention creation process)?

8. What statutory changes, if any, should be considered as to US inventorship law, and what consequences do you foresee for those statutory changes?




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PTO to Begin Issuing Electronic Patent Grants

On February 28, 2023, the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issued a final rule announcing it would begin issuing electronic patent grants (eGrants) starting April 18, 2023. These eGrants are the official copies of patent grants in an electronic format. During a limited transition period, the PTO will also provide a bound paper version as a ceremonial copy. Once the transition period is over, a bound paper version will be available for a nominal fee. The PTO did not specify when the transition period would end. The Federal Register notice can be found here.

To implement the eGrant, the PTO is removing and reserving 37 CFR 1.315, which states that “[t]he patent will be delivered or mailed upon issuance to the correspondence address of record.” Because patents will be issued electronically, the PTO will no longer physically deliver the patent grant by mailing it to the correspondence address. Instead, the eGrant will issue electronically via the Patent Center.

In addition to the ceremonial paper copy, for a fee, the PTO will still offer certified copies (in accordance with 37 CFR 1.13) and presentation copies. The PTO will no longer accept orders for advance copies of issued patents.

By moving to eGrants, the interval between issue fee payment and patent issuance will be shorter. Thus, applicants will need to be more diligent in filing continuations, divisionals and Quick Path Information Disclosure Statements. For example, Issue Notifications will be available electronically via the Patent Center after the issue fee is paid, usually on the Wednesday or Thursday before the patent issues. The PTO envisions that for those who do not participate in the e-Office action program, a patent may issue electronically before the applicant even receives the mailed Issue Notification.




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DC Circuit to Disputes Ancillary to Patent Matters: “You Can’t Sit with Us”

For the first time, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed whether appeals of discovery orders ancillary to a patent suit are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The DC Circuit joined its sister circuits and held in the affirmative. Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft Zur Förderung Der Angewandten Forschung E.V. v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., Case No. 22-7001 (DC Cir. Feb. 17, 2023) (Srinivasan, Henderson, JJ., Edwards, Sr. J.)

In February 2017, Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft Zur Förderung commenced a civil action for patent infringement against Sirius XM Radio in the District of Delaware. During discovery, Fraunhofer subpoenaed for deposition Sirius XM’s former Chief of Marketing Officer, My-Chau Nguyen, a resident of Washington, DC.

After Nguyen failed to appear for her deposition, she filed a motion in the US District Court for the District of Columbia to quash the subpoena. Fraunhofer responded with a cross-motion to compel Nguyen’s deposition and a motion for sanctions. The DC district court denied Nguyen’s motion to quash, ordered her to sit for deposition, found her in contempt for failing to appear for deposition in the first instance, and expressed an intent to award sanctions upon Fraunhofer’s submission of documentation reflecting fees and costs. Fraunhofer appealed to the DC Circuit.

The DC Circuit first addressed whether it had jurisdiction to consider Nguyen’s challenge to the district court’s order compelling her deposition in light of the fact that Nguyen’s deposition had already been taken at the time of appeal. The Court held that Nguyen’s challenge was moot because “[n]umerous courts have held that an appeal from enforcement of a subpoena becomes moot once the party has complied with the subpoena.” Therefore, the Court reasoned that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Nguyen’s subpoena challenge because she had already complied with the subpoena at the time of the appeal.

Next, the Court addressed whether it had jurisdiction to assess the merits of Nguyen’s challenge to the district court’s finding of contempt and intent to award sanctions. The Court determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider these issues.  The Court explained that because “the underlying litigation between Fraunhofer and Sirius XM in the District of Delaware arises under an Act of Congress relating to patents[,]” Nguyen’s discovery dispute in the DC district court was “ancillary to a patent suit.” The DC Circuit reasoned that only the Federal Circuit is vested with jurisdiction over appeals “arising under . . . any Act of Congress related to patents[.]” (28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).) Holding similarly to other circuits, the Court concluded that because Nguyen’s discovery dispute was ancillary to a patent matter, the ability to decide the merits of her appeal was solely within the province of the Federal Circuit.

The DC Circuit found that it did not have the authority to transfer Nguyen’s challenges to the Federal Circuit, however. The DC Circuit concluded that it was forced to dismiss rather than transfer because “this appeal could not have been brought [...]

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Are You Ready for the UPC? Act Now to Prepare for its Opening on June 1

On February 17, 2023, Germany ratified the Agreement on the Unified Patent Court (UPC) and triggered the UPC’s entry into force on June 1, 2023. The UPC will revolutionize patent enforcement across Europe and impact companies around the world that hold European patents or conduct business in Europe.

Owners of existing European patents or pending applications can “opt out” of the UPC’s jurisdiction for an initial transitional period of at least seven years. Companies must act now if they want to opt out before the court officially opens.

Understanding the UPC

The UPC will have exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement and invalidity actions in its member states for patents granted by the European Patent Office (EPO), including existing European patents and new European patents with unitary effect (unitary patents). There are currently 17 EU Member States participating in the UPC (Germany, France, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden and Slovenia). Additional EU Member States may join the UPC in the future.

The UPC will have local and regional divisions in its member states, with a central division in Paris and Munich and a Court of Appeal in Luxembourg.

As a streamlined patent enforcement venue, the UPC will provide several new benefits to patent owners, including faster decisions with limited discovery and lower cost, and the possibility of injunctive relief throughout the member states. At the same time, the UPC will allow revocation of a patent in a single action with effect for all member states, alongside the possibility to oppose a European patent before the EPO.

European Freedom to Operate

Because of the UPC’s structure and incentives, patent litigation will likely increase in Europe, which will heighten the intellectual property (IP) infringement risk for companies doing business in Europe. If a company has not already done so, it should promptly review its competitors’ European patent estates to assess the potential risks and develop a defense strategy to avoid a surprise attack from a competitor after June 1, 2023.

European Enforcement Actions

Although the UPC is new and untried, it has the incentive to provide strong relief for those who trust it. If a company needs to bring a patent infringement action against a competitor and would like to do so in a fast, cost-effective manner, with the possibility of significant remedies, the UPC should be considered as a potential venue. The company should review its portfolio and infringement evidence to assess its opportunities.

Deciding Whether to Opt Out

The right to opt out European patent filings from the UPC’s jurisdiction will be available for an initial transitional period of seven years, which may extend to 14 years. It will be possible to reverse an opt-out, but not if the patent has been enforced or attacked in national court.

McDermott’s UPC Resource Center explores the various advantages and disadvantages of both staying in and opting out of the UPC.




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When It Comes to Claim Construction, Prosecution History and Specification Rule

Addressing claim constructions across two patents that ultimately led to noninfringement findings by a district court, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed one construction because it was supported by the prosecution history but reversed another because it was unsupported by the specification. SSI Techs., LLC v. Dongguan Zhengyang Elec. Mech. Ltd., Case Nos. 21-2345, 22-1039 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 13, 2023) (Reyna, Bryson, Cunningham, JJ.)

SSI owns two patents directed to sensors for determining the characteristics of fluid in a container such as a fuel tank. One patent, referred to as the transducer patent, describes an exemplary sensor system containing a “level” transducer and a “quality” transducer. The two transducers use ultrasonic sound waves and time of flight to determine both a level of fluid in a given tank and a quality (i.e., concentration of diesel exhaust fluid). The other patent, referred to as the filter patent, describes a similar system but attempts to address the problem of erratic measurement results that may occur because of air bubbles embedded in the fluid. This patent claims a “filter” covering the sensing area that substantially prohibits gas bubbles from entering the sensing area.

Dongguan Zhengyang Electronic Mechanical (DZEM) produces systems that determine the quality and volume of diesel exhaust fluid that are used in emission-reduction systems for diesel truck engines. SSI accused DZEM of infringing both patents. In the district court action, DZEM brought a motion for summary judgment of noninfringement based on the court’s construction of certain terms that appear in the asserted claims. With reference to the transducer patent, the claims recite the need to “determine whether a contaminant exists in the fluid based on . . . a dilution of the fluid [] detected while the measured volume of the fluid decreases.” The district court determined that this claim element required that the contaminant determination actually consider the measured volume of the fluid. The district court predicated its determination on the prosecution history, having found that this term was amended to include the disputed term and that the applicant’s intention was to incorporate the specific error-detection capability recited in the specification. The parties had previously agreed that the DZEM products did not base the contamination determination on any consideration of the measured volume. As a result, the district court granted DZEM’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement on the transducer patent.

Regarding the filter patent, the district court adopted DZEM’s construction of the term “filter,” which was “a porous structure defining openings, and configured to remove impurities larger than said openings from a liquid or gas passing through the structure.” DZEM’s accused sensors includes a rubber cover with four apertures. The district court found that the rubber cover was not “porous” because the apertures were “relatively large” when compared with the disclosed embodiments in the specification. As a result, the court granted DZEM’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement on the filter patent. SSI appealed.

SSI challenged both constructions. Regarding the transducer patent, SSI argued that [...]

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No First Place Trophy Here: Public Demo at Trade Show Found Invalidating

Addressing the public use bar of pre-America-Invents-Act (AIA) 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision to invalidate a patent because the patent owner’s disclosure of a prior art device at a trade show more than one year before the patent’s priority date was an invalidating prior public use. Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., Case No. 21-2246 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 2023) (Prost, Reyna, Stoll, JJ.)

Minerva sued Hologic for infringement of a patent directed to surgical devices for a procedure called endometrial ablation, which stops or reduces abnormal uterine bleeding. The patent had a priority date of November 7, 2011, and the asserted claim included the term “the inner and outer elements have substantially dissimilar material properties” (SDMP term). The district court construed the SDMP term to mean that the “inner and outer frame elements have different thickness and different composition.”

On completion of discovery, Hologic moved for summary judgment of invalidity, arguing that the asserted patent claims were anticipated under the public use bar of pre-AIA § 102(b). According to Hologic, more than a year before the patent’s priority date, Minerva brought a device called Aurora to the 38th Global Congress of Minimally Invasive Gynecology sponsored by the American Association of Gynecologic Laparoscopists (AAGL 2009)—an event dubbed the “Super Bowl of the industry.” During the AAGL 2009 conference, Minerva had a booth with 15 fully functional Aurora devices, gave a presentation discussing the Aurora devices and distributed brochures. In light of the record, the district court granted summary judgment that the asserted claims were anticipated under the public use bar. Minerva appealed.

Minerva raised three arguments on appeal. First, Minerva argued that disclosure of the Aurora device at AAGL 2009 was not a “public use” because Minerva “merely displayed” the device. Second, Minerva argued that there was no disclosure of the “invention” of the asserted claim because the Aurora device disclosed at AAGL 2009 lacked the SDMP term. Third, Minerva argued that the invention was not “ready for patenting” because Minerva was still improving the SDMP technology at the time of AAGL 2009, so the device did not function for its intended purpose of ablating “live human” tissue. The Federal Circuit addressed each argument in turn.

The Federal Circuit found that the district court had correctly determined that the Aurora device at AAGL 2009 was a “public use” since it was shown to individuals other than the inventor under no limitation, restriction or obligation of confidentiality. The undisputed record showed that Minerva pitched the Aurora device to various sophisticated industry members, who were allowed, without confidentiality obligations, to scrutinize the Aurora device closely enough to recognize and understand the SDMP technology Minerva later sought to patent.

The Federal Circuit also concluded that the Aurora device disclosed the SDMP term. The Court found that the inventors conceived of the SDMP technology before AAGL 2009 and that documentation about the Aurora device from before and shortly after the event [...]

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Patenting a Nice Cool Glass of Nicotinamide Riboside? Claims Covering Milk Invalid under § 101

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that claims covering a naturally occurring composition were not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 merely because one component of the composition had been “isolated.” ChromaDex, Inc. v. Elysium Health, Inc., Case No. 2022-1116 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 13, 2023) (Chen, Prost, Stoll, JJ.)

ChromaDex sued Elysium (a former ChromaDex customer) for infringement of its patent directed to dietary supplements containing nicotinamide riboside (NR). Elysium moved for summary judgment, arguing that the asserted claims were invalid under the § 101 prohibition against patenting natural phenomena. After the district court granted summary judgment, ChromaDex appealed.

The asserted claims were directed to a composition comprising:

  • Isolated NR
  • One or more of tryptophan, nicotinic acid or nicotinamide
  • One of 22 carriers
  • Increased NAD+ biosynthesis after eating.

Both parties conceded that milk satisfies every element of the asserted claims with the exception that its NR is not “isolated.” Both parties also conceded that milk is a naturally occurring material and thus not patent eligible under § 101.

On these facts, the issue presented was whether the claim limitation that the NR must be “isolated” (which does not occur in nature) was sufficient to make the claims patent eligible. The Federal Circuit responded “no.”

The Federal Circuit analyzed the asserted claims under two tests: the “markedly different characteristics” test set out in Chakrabarty, and the Alice two-step test (unsure whether Chakrabarty remains controlling precedent).

Under the Chakrabarty test, a claimed composition is not a natural phenomenon if it has “markedly different characteristics” from what occurs in nature. The Federal Circuit found that ChromaDex’s claimed composition had no markedly different characteristics from natural milk. While ChromaDex argued that isolation potentially allowed for unnaturally high concentrations of NR, the claims did not require such concentrations. The claims included compositions structurally and functionally identical to milk and therefore failed the “markedly different characteristics” Chakrabarty test.

Proceeding to the two-part Alice test, under step 1 the Federal Circuit found that the claims were directed to a product of nature because there were no structural differences between the claimed composition and natural milk. Under step two, the Court found that there was no “inventive step” because the claims were merely directed to increasing NAD+ biosynthesis, which was a natural principle that resulted from drinking milk.

Practice Note: During claim drafting, care should be taken to avoid claims that encompass all structural and functional components of a naturally occurring material.




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Review Delayed Is Not Review Denied

Considering whether the US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) Director must complete review of the Patent Trial & Appeal Board’s (Board) inter partes review (IPR) decision within the statutory deadline for a final written decision, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the statute imposes no such requirement. CyWee Group Ltd. v. Google LLC et al., Case Nos. 20-1565, -1567 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 8, 2023) (Prost, Taranto, Chen, JJ.).

In 2018, Google filed two IPR petitions challenging certain claims of CyWee’s patents. The Board issued its final written decisions in January 2020, determining that all challenged claims were unpatentable for obviousness. CyWee appealed to the Federal Circuit in March 2020. In addition to challenging the patentability decision, CyWee challenged the appointment of Board administrative patent judges (APJs) as unconstitutional in view of the Appointments Clause. In March 2021, the Court affirmed the Board’s decisions and rejected CyWee’s constitutional challenge. The Court issued its mandate on June 10, 2020.

Eleven days later, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its decision in United States v. Arthrex, Inc., holding that APJs’ power to render final patentability decisions unreviewable by an accountable principal officer gave rise to an Appointments Clause violation but this violation could be remedied by, among other things, remanding to the acting PTO Director to decide to rehear the case. In response to a request from CyWee, the Federal Circuit recalled the mandate and remanded “for the limited purpose of allowing CyWee the opportunity to request Director rehearing of the final written decisions,” and required CyWee to inform the Court within 14 days of any decision denying rehearing. On remand, the Commissioner for Patents denied rehearing and ordered that the already-issued final written decisions were final decisions of the PTO. CyWee appealed.

CyWee contended that the post-Arthrex, mandated review by the PTO Director was untimely—and thus violative of due process—because the PTO Director did not have the ability to review the institution decision and final written decision within their respective three-month and one-year statutory deadlines. The Federal Circuit disagreed, calling CyWee’s contentions “meritless.” Rather, the Court found that because the PTO Director had permissibly delegated to the Commissioner for Patents authority to render institution and final decisions to the Board, those decisions were timely so long as the PTO Director’s delegees rendered them within the statutorily prescribed periods. By contrast, the PTO Director’s final review authority—a constitutional necessity born from Arthrex—has no similar statutory deadline.

CyWee also argued that the PTO Director’s later review was too late to satisfy a general requirement that the PTO Director consider the effect of regulations on the PTO’s ability to timely complete instituted IPRs. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument too, finding that even if the statute imposed a general timeliness requirement that was subject to judicial review, nothing about the process afforded to CyWee would have violated such a requirement.

With a different spin on the timeliness issue, CyWee also argued that the Board’s extension [...]

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You Can’t Skirt around Obviousness by Arguing Expectation of Success Must Be Absolute

Affirming an obviousness decision by the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (Board), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained that the expectation of success need only be reasonable and not absolute. Transtex Inc. v. Vidal, Case No. 20-1140 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 3, 2023) (Prost, Reyna JJ.) (Schall, J. dissenting).

Transtex makes aerodynamic trailer skirts, which improve fuel efficiency by reducing air drag. Transtex sued WABCO in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging that WABCO’s trailer skirts infringed several Transtex patents. WABCO responded by filing two inter partes review (IPR) petitions, one of which was against a patent with claims directed to “resilient” trailer skirts and the “resilient” struts used to attach them to a trailer.

WABCO argued that the challenged claims of the patent were obvious over a combination of the Layfield and Rinard references. WABCO submitted expert declarations stating that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that Layfield’s rigid struts could benefit from being constructed of resilient, more flexible material. Accordingly, a skilled artisan would have been motivated to look to other, similar types of trailer components that are also flexible—like that disclosed in Rinard—to improve upon Layfield’s rigid struts. WABCO successfully relied on much of the same expert testimony to argue that a skilled artisan would also have enjoyed a reasonable expectation of success in combining the more rigid struts of Layfield with the compressible materials taught in Rinard because Rinard taught the utility of having compressible “air scoops” at the tail end of a trailer, which would compress downwards when the trailer contacted a loading dock.

The Board agreed with WABCO and found the challenged claims obvious. According to the Board, Layfield taught all of the claim limitations except for a “resilient strut” that could flex both toward the center of the trailer and away from the center of the trailer and then regain its shape while Rinard taught the benefits of using compressible air scoops made out of a resilient material as part of a trailer skirt system. The Board also concluded that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Layfield with Rinard and would have had a reasonable expectation of success, given the predictable nature of the field. Transtex appealed.

The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that substantial evidence in the form of expert testimony supported the Board’s finding that although Layfield taught a more rigid strut instead of a resilient strut as claimed, a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Layfield’s strut with the resilient materials disclosed in Rinard and would have enjoyed a reasonable expectation of success when doing so. The Court concluded that this was a case where the evidence of motivation to combine, which “everyone agrees meets the substantial evidence threshold,” significantly overlapped with the evidence relating to a reasonable expectation of success, so it was correct to conclude that a skilled artisan would have reasonably expected the resiliency benefit that motivated them to combine [...]

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