IP UPDATE
Exploring the latest in intellectual property law
IP UPDATE
Exploring the latest in intellectual property law
Copyrights
Subscribe to Copyrights's Posts

No Protectable Code: No Literal or Nonliteral Copying

by | May 15, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling that a plaintiff failed to establish copyright protection for its software platforms, drawing a distinction between “literal” copying (direct duplication of source code) and “nonliteral” copying (reproduction of structure, sequence, or user interface). InfoDeli, LLC v. Western Robidoux, Inc., et al., Case No. 20-2146 (8th Cir. May 5, 2025) (Gruender, Kelly, Grasz, JJ.)

InfoDeli partnered with Western Robidoux, Inc. (WRI), a commercial printing and fulfillment firm co-owned by family members, in 2009 to form a joint venture. The agreement leveraged InfoDeli’s expertise in developing custom webstore platforms and WRI’s capacity for printing and fulfillment. Their collaboration served major clients such as Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica Inc. (BIVI) and CEVA Animal Health, LLC, both providers of animal health products. InfoDeli built webstores enabling the companies’ sales teams to order promotional materials, which WRI then fulfilled. InfoDeli developed the Vectra Rebate platform for CEVA, allowing marketing staff to issue customer coupons that were also fulfilled by WRI.

By early 2014, tensions emerged. Without informing InfoDeli, WRI hired a competitor, Engage Mobile Solutions, to replace InfoDeli’s platforms for CEVA and BIVI. Engage used open-source software, in contrast to InfoDeli’s proprietary systems. WRI also shared InfoDeli-developed content with Engage to aid the transition. Shortly thereafter, WRI abruptly terminated its joint venture with InfoDeli.

InfoDeli sued WRI, CEVA, BIVI, and Engage for copyright infringement, tortious interference, and violations of the Missouri Computer Tampering Act related to certain webstores. The defendants counterclaimed conversion and tortious interference. The district court ruled in favor of the defendants on the copyright claims and denied InfoDeli’s motion on the counterclaims. After a jury sided with the defendants, InfoDeli filed motions for judgment and a new trial, both of which were denied. InfoDeli appealed.

The Eighth Circuit found that InfoDeli failed to prove its platforms were protected by copyright. The Court distinguished between “literal” and “nonliteral” copying, explaining that literal copying referred to direct duplication of original source code while nonliteral copying involved reproducing the overall structure or user interface. The district court had already determined that the nonliteral elements of InfoDeli’s platforms were not copyrightable. On appeal, InfoDeli did not challenge this determination regarding the individual elements. Instead, InfoDeli argued that the platforms should be protected “as a whole,” claiming that the interrelationship of elements made them protectable. However, the Eighth Circuit found that InfoDeli did not explain how the elements’ arrangement exhibited the required creativity for copyright protection.

InfoDeli further argued that the district court erred in not considering the verbatim copying of its source code. However, since InfoDeli’s complaint only alleged infringement of nonliteral elements, the Eighth Circuit found that the district court properly focused on those claims.

InfoDeli also argued that the district court erred by relying on InfoDeli’s expert’s list of protectable elements for the BIVI platform. However, the Court rejected this claim, pointing to precedent holding that when a plaintiff identifies specific elements as protectable, it effectively concedes that the remaining elements [...]

Continue Reading



read more

Human Authorship Required: AI Isn’t an Author Under Copyright Act

by | Mar 27, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld a district court ruling that affirmed the US Copyright Office’s (CO) denial of a copyright application for artwork created by artificial intelligence (AI), reaffirming that human authorship is necessary for copyright registration. Thaler v. Perlmutter, Case No. 23-5233 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 2025) (Millett, Wilkins, Rogers, JJ.)

Stephen Thaler, PhD, created a generative AI system that he named the Creativity Machine. The machine created a picture that Thaler titled, “A Recent Entrance to Paradise.” Thaler applied to the CO for copyright registration for the artwork, listing the Creativity Machine as the author and Thaler as the copyright owner.

The CO denied Thaler’s application because “a human being did not create the work.” Thaler twice sought reconsideration of the application, which the CO denied because the work lacked human authorship. Thaler subsequently sought review in the US District Court for the District of Columbia, which affirmed the CO’s denial of registration. The district court concluded that “[h]uman authorship is a bedrock requirement of copyright.” Thaler appealed.

The DC Circuit reaffirmed that the Creativity Machine could not be considered the author of a copyrighted work. The Copyright Act of 1976 mandates that to be eligible for copyright, a work must be initially authored by a human being. The Court highlighted key provisions of the Copyright Act that only make sense if “author” is interpreted as referring to a human being. For instance:

  • A copyright is a property right that immediately vests in the author. Since AI cannot own property, it cannot hold copyright.
  • Copyright protection lasts for the author’s lifetime, but machines do not have lifespans.
  • Copyright is inheritable, but machines have no surviving spouses or heirs.
  • Transferring a copyright requires a signature, and machines cannot provide signatures.
  • Authors of unpublished works are protected regardless of their nationality or domicile, yet machines do not have a domicile or national identity.
  • Authors have intentions, but machines lack consciousness and cannot form intentions.

The DC Circuit concluded that the statutory provisions, as a whole, make human activity a necessary condition for authorship under the Copyright Act.

The DC Circuit noted that the human authorship requirement is not new, referencing multiple judicial decisions, including those from the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, where appellate courts have consistently ruled that authors must be human.

Practice Note: Only humans, not their tools, can author copyrightable works of art. Images autonomously generated are not eligible for copyright. However, works created by humans who used AI are eligible for copyright depending on the circumstances, how the AI tool operates, and to what degree the AI tool was used to create the final work. Authors whose works are assisted by AI should seek advice of counsel to determine whether their works are copyrightable.



read more

Religious Texts, Copyrights, and Estate Law: A Case of Strange Bedfellows

by | Feb 13, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part a case involving a deceased religious leader who owned the copyrights to works reflecting his teachings. The Court found that the copyrighted works were not works for hire under copyright law, that the leader therefore had the right to license his copyrights, and that the subsequent owner of the copyrights (not a statutory heir) also had the right to terminate licenses. Aquarian Foundation, Inc. v. Bruce Kimberley Lowndes, Case No. 22-35704 (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 2025) (Hawkins, McKeown, de Alba, JJ.)

Aquarian Foundation is a nonprofit religious organization founded by Keith Milton Rhinehart. During his time as the leader of Aquarian, Rhinehart copyrighted his spiritual teachings. An Aquarian member, Bruce Lowndes, claimed that he obtained a license from Rhinehart in 1985. Upon Rinehart’s death in 1999, he left his estate, including interests in copyrights, to Aquarian. In 2014, Aquarian discovered that Lowndes was uploading Rhinehart’s teachings online and sent Lowndes takedown requests pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). In 2021, Aquarian sent Lowndes a letter terminating Lowndes’ license and sued Lowndes for copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and false designation of origin.

After a bench trial, the district court concluded that Rhinehart’s works were not works for hire under either the 1909 or the 1976 Copyright Act, so Rhinehart had the authority to grant Lowndes an unrestricted license. The district court also found that Aquarian did not have the authority to terminate the license as a nonstatutory heir and should have given Lowndes two years notice. The district court denied attorneys’ fees. Both parties appealed the district court’s ruling on ownership and attorneys’ fees, and Aquarian appealed the ruling on its lack of authority to terminate the license.

The Ninth Circuit, finding no clear error, affirmed the district court’s holding that Rhinehart’s works were not works for hire under either the 1909 or the 1976 Copyright Act. Under the 1909 Act’s “instance and expense” test, the Court found that “the creation and maintenance of the works was Rhinehart’s purview, and not the church’s domain.” Under the 1976 Act, which applies agency law, the Court similarly found that Rhinehart’s creation of the works was outside the scope of his employment as Aquarian’s president and secretary. Therefore, under either act, Rhinehart’s works were not works for hire, making Rhinehart the copyright owner. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that as owner, Rhinehart had authority to grant the license to Lowndes. The Court also found that Lowndes’ license to “use copyrighted materials ‘without restriction’” referenced “a coming World Wide Network,” so Lowndes did not breach the license by posting the works online.

The Ninth Circuit also affirmed that the testamentary transfer of copyrights to Aquarian was permitted by both the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts: “Both the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts allow for the transfer of a copyright by will. 17 U.S.C. § 42 (repealed) (providing that copyrights ‘may be bequeathed by will’); [...]

Continue Reading



read more

Assessing Inputs: Determining AI’s Role in US Intellectual Property Protections

by | Feb 6, 2025 |

The US Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) issued additional guidance on the contribution of artificial intelligence (AI) in its January 2025 AI Strategy. Similarly, the US Copyright Office issued part two of its “Copyright and Artificial Intelligence” report, addressing the copyrightability of AI- or partially AI-made works. Both agencies appear to be walking a fine line by accepting that AI has become increasingly pervasive while maintaining human contribution requirements for protected works and inventions.

In its published strategy, the PTO states that its vision is to unleash “America’s potential through the adoption of AI.” The strategy describes five focus areas:

  • Advancing the development of intellectual property policies that promote inclusive AI innovation and creativity.
  • Building best-in-class AI capabilities by investing in computational infrastructure, data resources, and business-driven product development.
  • Promoting the responsible use of AI within the PTO and across the broader innovation ecosystem.
  • Developing AI expertise within the PTO’s workforce.
  • Collaborating with other US government agencies, international partners, and the public on shared AI priorities.

The PTO stated that it is still evaluating the issue of AI-assisted inventions but reaffirmed its February 2024 guidance on inventorship for AI-assisted inventions. That guidance indicates that while AI-assisted inventions are not categorically unpatentable, the inventorship analysis should focus on human contributions.

Likewise, the Copyright Office discussed public comments regarding AI contributions to copyright, weighing the benefits of AI in assisting and empowering creators with disabilities against the harm to artists working to make a living. Ultimately the Copyright Office affirmed that AI, when used as a tool, can generate copyrightable works only where a human is able to determine the expressive elements contained in the work. The Copyright Office stated that creativity in the AI prompt alone is, at this state, insufficient to satisfy the human expressive input required to produce a copyrightable work.



read more

Vimeo’s Fleeting Interaction With Videos Doesn’t Negate Safe Harbor Protections

by | Jan 23, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision, granting Vimeo qualified protection under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) safe harbor provision. Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, Inc., Case Nos. 21-2949(L); -2974(Con) (2d Cir. Jan. 13, 2025) (Leval, Parker, Merriam, JJ.) This case addresses, for the second time, whether Vimeo had “red flag knowledge” of the defendant’s copyrighted works under the DMCA.

DMCA Section 512(c) provides a safe harbor that shelters online service providers from liability for indirect copyright infringement on their platforms under certain conditions. Congress provided two exceptions that would remove the safe harbor protection:

  • Actual or red flag knowledge of infringing content
  • The ability to control content while receiving a financial benefit directly attributable to the accused infringement activity.

EMI, an affiliate of Capitol Records, vehemently opposed Vimeo’s inclusion of videos containing EMI’s music on its site and initiated the present suit in 2009. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Vimeo, dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims on the ground that Vimeo was entitled to the safe harbor protection provided by Section 512(c). EMI appealed.

In a 2016 appeal (Vimeo I ), the Second Circuit considered Vimeo’s activities under the DMCA. In Vimeo I, the Court (in the context of an interlocutory appeal) ruled that the copyright holder must establish that the service provider (e.g., Vimeo) had “knowledge or awareness of infringing content,” and that the service provider bore the initial burden to prove it qualified for the DMCA safe harbor, whereupon the burden shifted to the copyright holder to prove a disqualifying exception.

Knowledge of Infringement

In Vimeo I, the Second Circuit cited its 2012 decision in Viacom Int’l v. You Tube and  explained that red flag knowledge incorporates an objective standard. The facts actually known to the service provider must be sufficient such that a reasonable person would have understood there to be infringement that was not offset by fair use or a license. Vimeo I clarified that service provider employees who are not experts in copyright law cannot be expected to know more than any reasonable person without specialized understanding.

The Second Circuit explained that this knowledge analysis is a fact-intensive one, and that copyright owners cannot rely on service provider employees’ generalized understanding to prove red flag knowledge for any video (or other work). The Vimeo I court also noted that the DMCA did not place a burden on service providers to investigate whether users had acquired licenses. In Vimeo I, the Second Circuit further instructed that because the legal community cannot agree on a universal understanding of fair use, it would be unfair to expect “untutored” service provider employees to determine whether a given video is not fair use on its face.

Right and Ability to Control

In analyzing what constitutes the right and ability to control, the Second Circuit emphasized that Congress’ purpose behind the DMCA was to effect a compromise between rightsholders and safe harbor claimants: “Congress recognized that the [...]

Continue Reading



read more

Untwisting the Fixation Requirement: Flexible Rules on Moveable Sculptures

by | Jan 23, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court’s dismissal of a claim of copyright infringement for kinetic and manipulable sculptures, finding that movable structures were sufficiently “fixed” in a tangible medium for copyright purposes. Tangle, Inc. v. Aritzia, Inc., et al., Case No. 23-3707 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2024) (Koh, Johnstone, Simon, JJ.)

Tangle, a toy company, holds copyright registrations for seven kinetic and manipulable sculptures, each made from 17 or 18 identical, connected 90-degree curved tubular segments. These sculptures can be twisted or turned 360 degrees at the joints, allowing for various poses. Aritzia, a lifestyle apparel brand, used similar sculptures in its retail store displays, leading Tangle to file a lawsuit alleging copyright and trade dress infringement. Aritzia’s sculptures were larger, were a different color, and had a chrome finish.

The Copyright Act requires that a work of authorship be “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). At the pleading stage, the district court concluded that the sculptures were not fixed and thus dismissed Tangle’s copyright claim. The district court also dismissed the trade dress claim for failure to provide adequate notice of the asserted trade dress. Tangle appealed.

While the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s dismissal of the trade dress claim, it disagreed with the district court’s ruling on the copyright claim. Comparing the kinetic, movable sculptures to music, movies, and dance, the Court found that Tangle’s dynamic sculptures were entitled to copyright protection and that Tangle adequately alleged valid copyrights in its sculptures. The Court held that the works’ ability to move into various poses did not, by itself, support the conclusion that they were not “fixed” in a tangible medium for copyright purposes.

The Ninth Circuit held that under the “extrinsic test” test, which looks at “the objective similarities of the two works, focusing only on the protectable elements of the plaintiff’s expression,” as set forth in the Court’s 2018 decision in Rentmeester v. Nike, Tangle plausibly alleged copying of its protected works by alleging that the creative choices it made in selecting and arranging elements of its copyrighted works were substantially similar to the choices Aritzia made in creating its sculptures.

Since Aritzia failed to dispute that Tangle had properly alleged copying, the Ninth Circuit stated that Tangle only needed to show that the sculptures were substantially similar to prove infringement. Applying its 2004 decision in Swirsky v. Carey, the Ninth Circuit explained that “substantial similarity can be found in a combination of elements, even if those elements are individually unprotected.”

The Ninth Circuit found that the copyrighted and accused sculptures were similar enough to the ordinary observer to constitute infringement because both were comprised of identical, connected 90-degree curved tubular segments that could be twisted and manipulated to create many different poses. The Court further explained that the vast range of possible expressions could afford the sculptures broad copyright protection.



read more

Just Compensation Based on Hypothetical Negotiation

by | Jan 16, 2025 |

In a long-standing copyright dispute on its second visit to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the Court affirmed the modest damages award from the US Court of Federal Claims, ruling that a hypothetical negotiation between the parties would have resulted in a license in the amount awarded by the claims court. Bitmanagement Software GmBH v. United States, Case No. 23-1506 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 7, 2025) (Dyk, Stoll, Stark, JJ.)

In 2016 Bitmanagement sued the US Navy for copyright infringement of its software. The Court of Federal Claims awarded damages based on usage of the software, rather than the number of copies made. In the first appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the claims court that the Navy had an implied license to make copies of the software but was limited as to simultaneous users of the software, a condition that the Navy breached. The Federal Circuit remanded the case with the following instruction:

Because Bitmanagement’s action is against the government, it is entitled only to “reasonable and entire compensation as damages . . . , including the minimum statutory damages as set forth in section 504(c) of title 17, United States Code.” 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b).

The Federal Circuit further instructed the claims court that Bitmanagement was:

. . . not entitled to recover the cost of a seat license for each installation. If Bitmanagement chooses not to pursue statutory damages, the proper measure of damages shall be determined by the Navy’s actual usage of BS Contact Geo in excess of the limited usage contemplated by the parties’ implied license. That analysis should take the form of a hypothetical negotiation. . . . As the party who breached the . . . requirement in the implied license, the Navy bears the burden of proving its actual usage of the . . . software and the extent to which any of it fell within the bounds of any existing license.

Following this mandate, the claims court denied Bitmanagement’s damages demand of almost $86 million and awarded $154,000. Bitmanagement appealed, arguing that it was entitled to damages based on each copy of the software made, rather than damages based on use exceeding the implied license.

The Federal Circuit disagreed, explaining that the law does not require that every award of copyright damages be on a per-copy basis:

. . . whenever the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws of the United States shall be infringed by the United States . . . the exclusive action which may be brought for such infringement shall be an action by the copyright owner against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation as damages for such infringement . . .

As the Federal Circuit noted, the methods used to determine recovery of “actual damages” under § 504 are those “appropriate for measuring the copyright owner’s loss.” Therefore, in § 504(b) cases, the copyright owner must prove “the actual [...]

Continue Reading



read more

Interoperability Doesn’t Imply Derivative Work

by | Jan 9, 2025 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained that to be a derivative work, a program interoperative with another must actually incorporate aspects of the underlying work. The Court further ruled that licensees of a copy of a computer program are not “owners” of the copy and therefore are not entitled to make copies for the purposes permitted by 17 U.S.C. § 117(a). Oracle International Corp. v. Rimini Street, Inc., Case No. 23-16038 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2024) (Bybee, Bumatay, Bennett, JJ.)

Rimini provides third-party support for Oracle software and is a direct competitor with Oracle in the software support services market. For more than a decade, Oracle and Rimini have been involved in what the Ninth Circuit describes as a “pitched copyright war.” This latest battle relates to changes Rimini made to its business model after a district court determined that Rimini had infringed Oracle’s copyrights. Rimini developed a new process for servicing customers using Oracle software and sought a declaratory judgment that its revised process did not infringe Oracle’s copyrights. Oracle counterclaimed for copyright infringement and Lanham Act violations.

The district court found that Rimini created infringing derivative works because its new process interacted and was usable with Oracle software. The district court found that Rimini violated Oracle’s PeopleSoft and Database licensing agreements and made several statements violating the Lanham Act. The court struck Rimini’s affirmative defense to copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 117(a), granted Oracle summary judgment that Rimini infringed Oracle’s copyrights, and issued a permanent injunction against Rimini. Rimini appealed.

Derivative Works

The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s analysis of Rimini’s new process, noting that the district court focused on an “interoperability test,” which does not exist under the text of the Copyright Act or in precedent. In effect, the district court’s test would find that if a product interoperates with a preexisting copyrighted work, then it must be derivative. The Ninth Circuit explained that while the Copyright Act uses broad language to describe derivative works, the derivative work must actually incorporate the underlying work. For Rimini’s new process to be a derivative work, it must incorporate Oracle’s copyrighted work, either literally or nonliterally. The Court found that just because Rimini’s new process interacted with Oracle’s software, that was insufficient to find it was a derivative work.

Affirmative Defense: Section 117(a)

The Copyright Act permits an owner of a copy of a computer program to make a copy or adaptation of that program for certain purposes under 17 U.S.C. § 117(a). The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling, striking Rimini’s affirmative defense under Section 117(a), because the district court erred in determining whether Oracle’s customers “owned” a copy of Oracle’s software, PeopleSoft. The Court explained that to determine whether a party is an “owner of a copy” of a computer program, the courts look to whether the party has “sufficient incidents of ownership” over the “copy” of the software, in view of the totality of the parties’ agreement. Factors that [...]

Continue Reading



read more

Focus on Funk: 40-Year-Old Copyright Claim Is Time-Barred

by | Dec 12, 2024 |

In a summary order, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders in a case involving an ownership dispute over the copyrights to certain compositions by Parliament-Funkadelic bandleader George Clinton, finding that the claim was time-barred based on an admission that the claim was first discovered 40 years ago. Bridgeport Music Inc., et al. v. TufAmerica Inc., et al., Case No. 23-7386-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 2024) (Carney, Bianco, Nardini, JJ.) (nonprecedential).

LeBaron Taylor was a Detroit-based music producer, disc jockey, and record company executive. Clinton recorded music for Taylor’s record label, Revilot Records, before it went bankrupt in the late 1960s. After Revilot’s bankruptcy, Clinton began recording music for Westbound Records, including re-recording some of the compositions that he had previously recorded with Revilot. TufAmerica Inc. (d/b/a Tuff City Records) and Kay Lovelace Taylor, LeBaron Taylor’s widow, are Clinton’s successors-in-interest.

In December 2017, TufAmerica sent a letter to Bridgeport Music and Westbound Records stating that TufAmerica was the rightful owner of the copyrights to certain Clinton compositions and that Bridgeport had infringed on those copyrights. In January 2018, Bridgeport filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that it was the rightful owner of the compositions and thus had not committed copyright infringement. After the case was transferred from the Eastern District of Michigan to the Southern District of New York, TufAmerica filed an amended answer and asserted counterclaims seeking a declaratory judgment that it was the rightful owner of the compositions and alleging that Bridgeport had infringed the copyrights in those compositions.

Bridgeport moved for summary judgment on its affirmative claims and TufAmerica’s counterclaims. The district court found that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding ownership of the compositions, but it granted partial summary judgment in favor of Bridgeport as to TufAmerica’s infringement counterclaims. Bridgeport had submitted a series of agreements in which Clinton assigned ownership in the disputed compositions to Bridgeport Music and exclusive recording rights to Westbound Records, but in his deposition testimony Clinton said that he did not sign the agreements or does not remember signing them.

In its summary judgment response and counterstatement of material facts, TufAmerica admitted that Taylor worked as a disc jockey in the 1970s and played Bridgeport’s recordings of the Clinton compositions on the air. TufAmerica received no royalties. The district court found that TufAmerica’s claims accrued at the time Taylor was put on notice of the alleged exploitation of the work without receiving royalties and that the claims were therefore time-barred by the Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations period. Because the ownership counterclaim was time-barred, the district court granted summary judgment to Bridgeport on the related counterclaims for infringement and damages since the infringement claim could not be properly adjudicated unless ownership was first determined. TufAmerica moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied while also granting the parties’ request to conditionally dismiss Bridgeport’s affirmative claims in the absence of any live dispute between the parties. TufAmerica appealed.

TufAmerica argued that its [...]

Continue Reading



read more

Let’s Not Get It On: Battle of the Greatest Hits

by | Nov 14, 2024 |

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that Ed Sheeran’s 2014 hit “Thinking Out Loud” does not infringe the copyright on Marvin Gaye’s 1973 classic “Let’s Get It On.” Structured Asset Sales, LLC v. Sheeran, Case No. 23-905 (2d Cir. Nov. 1, 2024) (Calabresi, Parker, Park, JJ.)

In 1973, Ed Townsend and Marvin Gaye wrote the Motown hit “Let’s Get It On.” Townsend subsequently registered a copyright for the song’s melody, harmony, rhythm, and lyrics by sending the deposit copy of sheet music to the US Copyright Office. Townsend, Gaye, and Motown Records each held a one-third share in the copyright. Structured Asset Sales (SAS) purchases royalty interests from musical copyright holders, securitizes them, and sells the securities to other investors. SAS owns a one-ninth interest in the royalties from “Let’s Get It On.” Townsend’s remaining two-ninths share in the copyright is split between Kathryn Griffin, Helen McDonald, and the estate of Cherrigale Townsend.

In 2014 Ed Sheeran and Amy Wadge wrote the global chart-topper and Grammy-award-winning song “Thinking Out Loud.” In 2018, SAS brought a copyright infringement suit against Sheeran, Wadge, and various entities that produced, licensed, and distributed “Thinking Out Loud” (collectively, Sheeran). SAS alleged similarities in harmonies, drums, bass lines, tempos, and chord progression combined with anticipation (harmonic rhythm). SAS’s lawsuit followed the Griffin/McDonald/estate of Cherrigale Townsend’s 2017 lawsuit against Sheeran (Griffin lawsuit) alleging materially similar claims.

The district court determined that SAS’s infringement claim was limited to the scope of Townsend’s registration as reflected in the deposit copy (i.e., the sheet music) and excluded the sound recording of “Let’s Get It On.” As evidence that the songs were similar, SAS’s expert witness testified that the “Let’s Get It On” deposit copy included an inferred bass line that matched the bass line in Gaye’s sound recording of “Let’s Get It On” and the bass line in “Thinking Out Loud.” The district court rejected this testimony, concluding that “copyright law protects only that which is literally expressed, not that which might be inferred or possibly derived from what is expressed.”

The district court then denied Sheeran’s two motions for summary judgment without prejudice, determining that whether chord progression and harmonic rhythm in “Let’s Get It On” demonstrated sufficient originality and creativity to warrant copyright protection was a factual question to be determined at trial. Sheeran filed a motion for reconsideration. After the jury in the Griffin lawsuit found that Sheeran did not infringe the “Let’s Get It On” copyright, the district court granted Sheeran’s motion for reconsideration and concluded that “[t]here is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants infringed the protected elements of [‘Let’s Get It On’]. The answer is that they did not.” SAS appealed.

SAS argued that the district court erred in limiting the evidence SAS could present to support its infringement claim and in granting summary judgment in favor of Sheeran. The Second Circuit rejected both arguments.

The Second Circuit explained that excluding the audio recording of “Let’s Get It On” was not error because the 1909 Copyright Act protects [...]

Continue Reading



read more

BLOG EDITORS

Paul Devinsky

Amol Parikh

Jodi Benassi

STAY CONNECTED

Subscribe

TOPICS

ARCHIVES