IP UPDATE

Can’t patent idea of using asynchronous data streams during web conferencing

by Dexter Hamilton | Feb 5, 2026 | Patents

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a patent infringement suit, holding that the asserted web conferencing claims were directed to an abstract idea, lacked any inventive concept, and were therefore not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. Section 101. US Patent No. 7,679,637 LLC v. Google LLC, Case No. 24-1540 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 22, 2025) (Moore, CJ.; Hughes, Stoll, JJ.)

The patent owner accused Google of infringing a patent that describes systems for web conferencing that allow users to view and manipulate multiple data streams asynchronously, for example by reviewing earlier content while a live presentation continues. The representative claims recited client applications for presenting and observing participants, and some claims recited a server application and a “time scale modification component” to maintain audio quality at different playback speeds. Google moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were ineligible under Section 101. The district court agreed and denied leave to amend on the rationale of futility. The patent owner appealed.

Reviewing de novo, the Federal Circuit applied the two-step Alice framework. At step one, the Court concluded that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of allowing users to manipulate and review data streams in a web conferencing environment. The Court found that the claims recited desired results, such as asynchronous viewing, without explaining how those results were achieved or identifying any specific technological improvement. The patent owner argued that the claims were not result oriented because they recited two client applications, but the Court found that the claims still failed to describe any technical mechanism for performing the claimed functions.

The patent owner also pointed to alleged “functional claiming” in Google’s own patents, but the Federal Circuit noted that the eligibility of unrelated patents was irrelevant. The Court further rejected the notion that the mere existence of factually distinguishable Google-owned patents somehow amounted to a sweeping concession by Google that all patents involving functional claiming approaches were necessarily patent eligible.

Turning to step two, the Federal Circuit concluded that the claims lacked an inventive concept. The specification described the client applications and the time scale modification component as conventional components performing their ordinary functions. The patent owner largely repeated its step one arguments, which the Court found insufficient to supply an inventive concept.

Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected the patent owner’s argument that dismissal at the pleading stage was premature. Because the asserted patent was ineligible as a matter of law and the patent owner identified no factual allegations that could alter the Section 101 analysis, any amendment would have been futile.

Case exterminated too soon: DTSA and CFAA claims survive

by Jodi Benassi | Feb 5, 2026 | Trade Secrets

The US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit partially reversed and partially affirmed a series of district court rulings arising from alleged corporate espionage between competitors in the pest control industry. The decision clarifies the scope of recoverable “loss” under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) after Van Buren and underscores that causation requirements under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) and state trade secret law depend on the remedy sought. Moxie Pest Control LLC, et al. v. Kyle Nielsen, et al., Case No. 24-4076 (10th Cir. Jan. 21, 2026) (Hartz, Moritz, Rossman, JJ.)

Moxie sued rival Aptive Environmental, alleging that Aptive employees bribed current and former Moxie sales representatives to obtain confidential sales data stored in Moxie’s password-protected SalesRoutes system. According to Moxie, Aptive used this data (particularly sales leaderboards) to recruit door-to-door sales representatives by portraying Aptive as the more lucrative employer. Moxie brought claims under the CFAA, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, DTSA, and Utah’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).

The district court dismissed Moxie’s CFAA claim at the pleading stage, denied motions to compel broad damages discovery, and granted Aptive summary judgment on the RICO, DTSA, and UTSA claims based on a lack of causation. Moxie appealed.

CFAA claim reinstated

The Tenth Circuit found that the district court erred in dismissing Moxie’s CFAA claim for failure to plead a qualifying “loss.” The district court had interpreted Van Buren v. United States as requiring plaintiffs to allege a technological harm, such as damage to data or systems, to recover under the CFAA. The Tenth Circuit rejected that interpretation, explaining that Van Buren addressed what conduct constitutes a CFAA violation, not the scope of recoverable loss once a violation has occurred.

Under the statute’s plain language, “loss” includes reasonable costs incurred in responding to an offense or conducting a damage assessment. Moxie’s allegations that it spent more than $5,000 investigating the unauthorized access (specifically identifying the perpetrators, methods, and scope of access) fell squarely within that definition. The Tenth Circuit emphasized that investigative costs aimed at understanding the breach itself are recoverable, even absent data corruption or system impairment.

Discovery rulings affirmed

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Moxie’s motions to compel expansive damages discovery. While acknowledging that some requested information could be relevant, the Court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion by limiting initial disclosures and inviting more targeted follow-up discovery. Moxie’s failure to pursue narrower discovery after the district court’s ruling weighed against a finding of abuse of discretion.

Trade secret and RICO claims

The Tenth Circuit agreed that Moxie failed to establish causation sufficient to sustain its RICO claim or to recover unjust-enrichment damages under the DTSA and UTSA. Evidence showing that Aptive sought Moxie’s data, used it in recruitment meetings, and experienced revenue growth during the same period amounted to correlation, not proof that the misappropriation caused Aptive’s profits. Without evidence tying the stolen data to actual financial gain, unjust-enrichment theories failed.

However, the [...]

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IRPA claims accrue at first publication, not first discovery

by Ashley K. Justice | Feb 5, 2026 | Copyrights

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit confirmed that the single publication rule applies to claims brought under the Illinois Right of Publicity Act (IRPA), 765 ILCS 1075/1 et seq. Giovannelli v. Walmart Inc., Case Nos. 24-2869; -3103; 25-1185; -1223 (7th Cir. Jan. 22, 2026) (Brennan, Scudder, Pryor, JJ.)

In 2009, US Army veteran Nicholas Giovannelli was unknowingly photographed while deployed in Afghanistan. The image was later posted on a US Department of Defense website, downloaded by Stocktrek Images, and then licensed and sold as posters on public retail websites, including Posterazzi, Walmart, Pixels, and a large e-commerce company. Giovannelli remained unaware of the photo’s commercial use until 2020, when a friend discovered the posters while searching for their unit number.

Giovannelli sued Walmart, Stocktrek, Pixels, the large e-commerce company, and Posterazzi under the IRPA, which prohibits the unauthorized commercial use of an individual’s name or likeness. After removal to federal court, the cases were severed to address misjoinder.

Under Illinois law, IRPA claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. The defendants argued that the claims were time barred under the single publication rule, which starts the limitations period at first publication, meaning Giovannelli would have needed to sue within one year of Pixels’ 2011 posting, Walmart’s 2016 posting, or the large e-commerce company’s 2018 posting. Giovannelli countered that the discovery rule should apply because the publications were “hidden” or “inherently undiscoverable,” asserting he had no reason to know of the posters until 2020. The district courts granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, applying the single-publication rule. Giovannelli appealed.

The Seventh Circuit, applying Illinois substantive law under diversity jurisdiction, made an “Erie guess” because the Supreme Court of Illinois has not addressed whether IRPA claims follow the single publication rule or the discovery rule. The Seventh Circuit looked to the 2006 Illinois Appellate Court decision in Blair v. Nevada Landing Partnership, which rejected the discovery rule in the IRPA context. Although Giovannelli argued that Blair’s discussion was dicta, the Seventh Circuit explained that dicta may still guide an Erie analysis. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment, finding that Illinois would apply the single publication rule to IRPA claims. The Court explained that the exception for hidden or inherently undiscoverable publications did not apply because the posters were available on public websites, and Giovannelli’s friend located them through a simple search using their unit number.

Skinny label: Supreme Court to weigh inducement claims against generics

by Anisa Noorassa | Jan 29, 2026 | Cert Alert

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether a generic drugmaker that fully carves out a patented use from its label can nonetheless be held liable for induced infringement based solely on marketing its product as a generic version of a branded drug and referencing public information about the branded product, without promoting the patented use.

In Amarin Pharma v. Hikma Pharmaceutical USA, Case No. 23-1169 (Fed. Cir. June 25, 2024), the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that Amarin adequately pleaded induced infringement based on allegations that Hikma marketed its product as a “generic” version of Vascepa and cited publicly available information about Vascepa, even though Hikma’s label carved out the patented indication pursuant to Section viii of the Hatch-Waxman Act.

In its petition to the Supreme Court, Hikma argued that the Federal Circuit’s ruling threatened the statutory balance struck by Hatch-Waxman by exposing skinny-label generic manufacturers to inducement liability based on conduct unrelated to the carved-out use. According to Hikma, permitting inducement claims under these circumstances would effectively nullify Hatch-Waxman Section viii by allowing plaintiffs to rely on generic marketing statements that do not instruct or encourage use of the patented method.

The questions presented are:

When a generic drug label fully carves out a patented use, are allegations that the generic drugmaker calls its product a “generic version” and cites public information about the branded drug (e.g., sales) enough to plead induced infringement of the patented use?
Does a complaint state a claim for induced infringement of a patented method if it does not allege any instruction or other statement by the defendant that encourages, or even mentions, the patented use?

Hot out of the oven: Trademark limits on pizza-inspired names

by Keval Amin | Jan 29, 2026 | Trademarks

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed-in-part and reversed-in-part a preliminary injunction barring the use of PIZZA PUFF, concluding that the trademark owner failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits because the term was likely generic and, in any event, was descriptively and fairly used. Illinois Tamale Company, Inc. v. LC Trademarks, Inc., Case Nos. 24-3317; 25-1072; -1076; -1112 (7th Cir. Jan. 16, 2026) (Scudder, St. Eve, Jackson-Akiwumi, JJ.)

Illinois Tamale Company (Iltaco), a Chicago-based food company, has sold its signature “Pizza Puff” since 1976, distributing the product nationwide alongside other “Puff”-branded products. Iltaco owns federal trademark registrations for PIZZA PUFF (registered in 2009) and PUFF (registered in 2022).

In March 2024, Little Caesars introduced “Crazy Puffs,” small baked dough cups filled with pizza ingredients. The product launched as part of Little Caesars’ long-running “Crazy” line and was marketed prominently under the Little Caesars name, logo, and orange trade dress. Little Caesars secured its own federal registration for CRAZY PUFFS, and the United States Patent and Trademark Office identified no conflicting marks during examination.

Following the product launch, Iltaco sent a cease-and-desist letter claiming that CRAZY PUFFS and the phrase “4 Hand-Held Pizza Puffs” infringed its trademarks. When Little Caesars declined to change its marketing, Iltaco sued for trademark infringement and unfair competition and sought a preliminary injunction. The district court issued a split ruling, enjoining Little Caesars from using PIZZA PUFF but permitting continued use of CRAZY PUFFS and PUFF. Both parties appealed.

The Seventh Circuit found that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in assessing the protectability of PIZZA PUFF. The Court explained that rather than asking whether competitors could offer similar products without using the term, trademark protectability turns on the “primary significance” test, which is whether consumers primarily understand the term as a brand name or as the common name of a product. Because generic terms can never function as trademarks, the Court focused on evidence of consumer perception.

Applying that framework, the Seventh Circuit found substantial evidence that PIZZA PUFF was generic:

More than 80% of surveyed consumers viewed the term as referring to a product category rather than a brand.
Dictionary definitions treated the term generically.
Third-party filings and industry usage consistently employed the phrase as a common name.

This evidence rebutted the presumption of validity afforded by Iltaco’s federal registration, and Iltaco failed to demonstrate a likelihood of proving distinctiveness at trial. The Court therefore concluded that Iltaco did not show a likelihood of success on the merits and reversed the preliminary injunction barring Little Caesars’ use of PIZZA PUFF.

The Seventh Circuit further found that even if PIZZA PUFF were distinctive, Iltaco still could not obtain injunctive relief because Little Caesars was likely to prevail on a fair-use defense. The Court emphasized that fair use requires only descriptive, good-faith use, and not a perfect fit between the challenged term and the product. Here, PIZZA PUFF plausibly described Little Caesars’ light, pizza-filled food [...]

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